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SUMMARY 
The purpose of my research was to compare Canadian and 
British experience with regional economic development policy by 
examining Scotland as a lagging region within the United Kingdom 
economy and the Atlantic Provinces as a lagging region within the 
economy of Canada as a whole. 
This thesis is in four Parts. Part I contains a review 
of the economic theory related to regional development. Part II 
presents an examination of Scotland's position as a major economic 
region within the United Kingdom economy, and recounts the history 
of British regional policy as applied in Scotland since the 1930's, 
with particular reference to the "growth areas" adopted for Central 
Scotland in 1963. In Part III, there is a specification of the 
real nature of the development problem confronting Canada's Atlantic 
Region, and an analysis of the policy response to which it has given 
rise in the past. Chapter 16, which comprises Part IV, develops a 
set of recommendations regarding the future development of, and 
policy and programs for, the Atlantic Provinces economy. 
The argument of the thesis is also in parts, namely, the 
theoretical findings of Part I and the empirical conclusions of 
both Parts II and III, all of which are summarized in greater detail 
in Part IV. 
Part I proceeds from a consideration of the 
place of 
regional development in economic theory, through a review and 
analysis of various regional development theories - past and 
present - to theoretical conclusions on two levels. In technical 
terms, the conclusion is that effective regional economic development 
means increasing the complementarity of factor equipment as between 
two or more regions within a country. The more general, or social, 
conclusion of Chapter 4 is that regional economic development should 
become a long term objective for the nation as a whole, so that 
residents of all regions can make positive contributions to the 
economic, social and political life of the nation. 
Given these 
two conclusions, the objective of regional policy should 
be to 
make each major region as economically self-supporting as possible, 
and policy, programs and projects should 
be assessed in terms of this 
objective. 
Part II is in four chapters. Chapter 5 reviews the history 
of British regional policy for Scotland, which is seen to consist of 
two elements, namely, physical planning policy and location of 
industry policy. The Toothill Committee's 1960-61 study of the 
Scottish economy is also analyzed. Chapter 6 describes the selection 
process actually used by the Scottish Development Department 
in 
choosing the "growth areas" announced in the White Paper on 
Central 
Scotland of November 1963. Chapter 7 presents an analysis of changes 
in manufacturing employment in Central Scotland between 
1954 and 
1966, and their relevance to the "growth areas". Chapter 
8 is an 
assessment of the important characteristics of the 
"growth areas" 
selected in 1963, as well as of their value as a technique 
for 
economic development in Central Scotland. 
Part III posits that in 1961 the economic base of the Atlantic 
Provinces economy consisted of Forestry, Fishing, Mining, and 
Public 
Administration and Defence, and contends that the objective of policy 
should be to expand this economic base. Specifically, it is argued 
that Manufacturing is the sector whose growth should be stimulated in 
order to achieve this objective. "Growth centres" or "growth areas" 
are recommended as the best approach to follow in formulating policy, 
programs and projects to pursue this objective, on the basis of the 
empirical evidence about Scotland discussed in Part II. Iii addition, 
there should be suitable financial incentives available to Manufacturing 
industries, and firms, which locate or expand their capital facilities 
in the designated "growth centres". 
More specific aspects of a "growth centres" policy for 
Canada's Atlantic Provinces are elaborated in Chapter 16. 
Finally, the respective roles required of the federal and 
provincial governments in formulating and executing a proper regional 
development program for the Atlantic Region within the Canadian 
Confederation, are also described. 
CHAPTER 1 
The Place of Regional Development in Economics 
"Regional economics" has been described by Meyer1, in its 
American manifestation, as the postwar creation of a new area of 
specialization in economics attended by a new professional association, 
a new journal and some indications of increasing intellectual and 
academic respectability. The incorporation of "regional development" 
within the received body of economic theory is even more difficult 
than is the case with "regional economics" because regional development 
is the proper concern not only of the economist but of the political 
scientist, the physical planner, the geographer, and even the 
sociologist, as well. This may make "regional development" a bit 
of a bastard; hence the need, for the purposes of the present study, 
of defining the field to be covered as "regional economic development". 
Regional economic development is about the economic 
development of regions. Two parts of the field, thus defined, may 
be broadly distinguished, namely, the study of past development 
and the problems to which it has given rise; and the direction, 
character, rate and manner of future development which should be 
fostered. Both involve considerations of public policy. This means 
the present thesis is essentially a study in political economy at 
the regional level. 
A notoriously difficult problem is to find a generally 
acceptable definition of what constitutes a region. The word has 
many connotations and geographers, in particular, have been wont to 
spend a good deal of effort in delineating various types of region. 
Given the diversity of disciplines from which "regional" analysts 
are drawn, plus the fact that the boundaries of both political and 
1John R. Meyer, "Regional Economics: A Survey", A. E. R., March 1963. 
1 
2. 
administrative units have seldom, if ever, been established by 
reference to any standard, let alone theoretically sound or homogeneous, 
set of criteria, it is not surprising that a generally agreed basis 
of a proper definition for a region is its suitability for 
analyzing, and attempting to remedy, the particular problem at 
hand. The definition used here, therefore, is in accord with that 
proposed by Joseph Fisher: 
"... the most helpful region in many instances is 
what might be called the economic development 
region .. (where) .. the emphasis is on the 
development of policies, programs and actions to 
move the region from where it is economically 
toward pre-determined objectives. i2 
Although this may appear to be an overly simple definition, 
which does not seem to say very much, it is a useful concept 
covering, as it does, any region to which policy measures may be 
applied in the attempt to achieve various economic objectives. In 
regional studies attention is frequently focussed on those regions, 
which, by virtue of their having become problems, have had some 
history of backwardness or decline. The regions to be given 
particular attention here - Scotland, and the Canadian Atlantic 
Provinces - both conform to this general definition of regions. 
Each, moreover, is a major economic region within the national 
economy to which it belongs. 
To recapitulate, the present study is of the economic 
development of major economic regions which, for various reasons 
have not kept pace with the rest of the country of which they 
comprise parts and are, therefore, economically lagging regions. 
The examination here is limited to such regions within economically 
"advanced" nations although, of course, the problem of regional 
retardation is certainly not confined to them. 
2J. 
L. Fisher, "Concepts in Regional Economic Development 
Programs", Papers and Proceedings Reg. Sci. Assoc., 1955,1, W6. 
3. 
Objectives of the Thesis 
The present study has several, related objectives, as 
follows: 
(1) to review the evolution and present state of 
economic theory relating to regional economic 
development. This review is presented in the 
concluding section of this chapter, and in Chapter 2. 
(2) to outline the theoretical aspects of policy for 
regional economic development (Chapter 3), and to 
consider its essentially social purposes (Chapter 4). 
(3) to describe the emergence in Britain of regional 
policy for Scotland, especially during the postwar 
period. This description is contained in Chapters 
5,6 and 7. 
(4) to review the adoption, and to assess the significance, 
of the "growth areas" approach to policy for Scotland, 
in 1963. These matters are covered in Chapter 8. 
(5) to describe and to assess the nature of the economic 
problems confronting Canada's main lagging region, 
the Atlantic Provinces (Chapters 9 and 10). 
(6) to review and to assess the evolution of regional 
economic policy for the Atlantic Provinces during 
the recent past (Chapters 11 - 15). 
(7) to draw conclusions based on the theoretical 
considerations discussed in Part I (Chapters 1- 4) 
and the lessons to be derived from Scottish experience 
with regional policy, which can be applied to the 
Atlantic Provinces, and, on this basis, to outline a 
suitable policy for the economic development of 
Canada's Atlantic Provinces. 
4. 
The approach to be followed in the thesis is a comparative 
analysis of Scottish and Canadian regional development problems and 
policy. What basis, it may fairly be asked, is there for comparing 
these two "regions" in different countries? 
There are, of course, a number of similarities between 
Scotland and the Atlantic Provinces. Both are subject to a 
Parliamentary form of government on the British model although, 
as parts of a federation, the Atlantic Provinces have greater powers 
to adopt "provincial" programs. At the same time, the existence 
of a Secretary of State for Scotland and the conduct of certain 
programs at Edinburgh, means that Scotland bears a closer resemblance 
to the Atlantic Provinces than other British regions like the Northeast, 
the South West, etc. 
3 
Each region contains roughly 10 per cent of the national 
population. Unemployment in both regions displays a tendency to rise 
at times to "twice the national average". 
Both areas are major economic regions in their respective 
countries, clearly large enough to be suitable for the application 
of a comprehensive development program. 
Within their own countries, both "regions" are some distance 
away from the main population, and decision-making, centres. 
Similarities such as these make Scotland and the Atlantic 
Provinces reasonable subjects for comparison. But the existence 
of a number of differences must also be noted. For example, consider 
the following: 
3The 
same is true of Wales, and to a still greater extent, of 
Northern Ireland. 
5. 
- Scotland is a much older economy than the Atlantic 
Provinces, and it has a correspondingly longer 
experience with regional policy. Far from making 
comparison invalid, however, this greater experience 
is perhaps the best argument of all for analyzing 
Scotland's record with regional development, since 
regional policy in Canada has emerged largely within 
the past ten years and there is thus little direct 
experience to guide it. 
- Industry is much more important in Scotland than in 
the Atlantic Provinces. One is an industrialized 
economy, the other is not. This must be borne in mind 
when the relevance of policy in one region to the other, 
is being assessed. 
- Generally speaking, Scotland is a 
"mature" economy 
suffering the effects of technological change on her 
industrial structure, while the Atlantic Provinces are 
perhaps best characterized as an "underdeveloped" 
economy. 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
Against this background, the purpose of this chapter is to 
consider what economic theory can offer as a basis for regional 
economic development. Economic theory, however, is not itself a 
coherent, interrelated whole. There is, for example, the well-known 
general distinction between macroeconomics and microeconomics: this 
distinction is reflected also in the tendency for professional 
economists to talk of problems of "aggregation" and "dis-aggregation". 
Such talk, of course, arises from the fact that these two main parts 
of economic theory have not as yet been successfully integrated. Of 
the two, macroeconomics provides more of the stuff of regional 
economic development than microeconomics although some aspects of 
microeconomics, in particular the behaviour of industrial firms in 
making location decisions, certainly cannot be ignored. Another 
6. 
factor in the proliferation of "branches" of economic theory has 
been the tendency for theoretical developments to arise in response 
to contemporary problems in the real world. Just as the theory of 
international trade first developed, in its welfare aspects at 
least, as a reaction against merchantilist beliefs in protectionism, 
so too the Keynesian theory of income and employment determination 
came about as a response to the severe unemployment of the Great 
Depression and the inadequacy of government policy in alleviating it. 
The evolution of economic theory in response to important policy 
issues also helps to explain why, for example, monetary theory has 
benefited greatly from contributions by British economists working 
in a tradition of financial institutions with important economic 
roles while trade theory has been, at least since Ricardo and Mill, 
more often the prerogative of Scandinavian economists by virtue of 
their countries' unashamed dependence on foreign trade. Similarly, 
American economists bound perhaps by a generally greater allegiance 
to the market mechanism and the virtues of competition, seem to 
have paid special attention to the theory of the firm. One 
implication of this process of evolution in several directions, 
often in response to contemporary and sometimes "local" problems, 
is that economic theory constitutes a received body of knowledge 
which, although it is sometimes referred to as "doctrine", has not 
in fact come to us from infallible authority. This point is, of 
course, well recognized by theoretical economists actually engaged 
in the continuing effort to test existing theoretical hypotheses 
and to formulate new ones. 
There are, then, several branches of economic theory. Some 
of these touch one another when the wind blows. Others, however, 
are only related to one another by virtue of their belonging to the 
same tree: even in a hurricane they remain out of contact with one 
another. 
Regional economic development can be related in some, usually 
relevant, way to most of these branches. Regions trade with one 
another, hence some of the theorems of international trade theory 
7. 
may be applied to regions with appropriate modifications. A well- 
known example of this approach is Bertil Ohlin's Interregional and 
International Trade in which, indeed, he characterises international 
trade as one special case of interregional trade. Theories of 
economic development may also be applied to regions as well as to 
countries providing the regions are big enough -a criterion which 
each of the major economic regions with which I shall be concerned, 
satisfies. Income and employment levels are presumably determined by 
the same sort of factors in the short run that neo-Keynesian theory 
teaches us to observe at the national level. And so on. As Meyer 
has noted, the "almost unavoidable temptation ... is to assert that 
it (regional economics) is simply all of economics scaled to whatever 
level is required to adequately measure or forecast economic 
activity for a specific geographic area". 
4 
The temptation must be 
avoided, however, if regional economics is to retain a distinct 
character of its own. This is even more the case with regional 
economic development than with the "regional economics" surveyed by 
Meyer, since regional economic development is somewhat narrower in 
scope and, being related particularly to development or development 
policies, more specific in purpose. 
It would be most helpful to have a theory of regional 
economic development. Although, as we shall see, a number of 
partial theories have been suggested which suit particular 
circumstances rather well and justify certain lines of. policy 
action more or less successfully, a general theory of regional 
economic development has not so far evolved to cover different sorts 
of circumstances and accordingly prescribing various lines of policy. 
Such a theory, of course, would be no mean feat for even the most 
skilled theoretician to develop. That it has not evolved is perhaps 
essentially because regional economic development is a relatively 
new field and those involved in it, whether economists or not, have 
been mainly concerned with attempts to solve practical problems. 
Meyer, OP. CIT., p. 20. 
8. 
However that may be, it will be necessary here to consider 
instead the contributions which the main, conventional branches of 
economic theory have made, or may make, to regional economic 
development. Which of these are more important than others? Which 
offer the greatest promise of future refinement and/or empirical testing? 
Above all, can they someday be integrated into a general theory of 
regional economic development? To examine these questions, I shall 
review the "borrowings" from the main, conventional branches of economic 
theory which have guided regional economic development, particularly 
regional development policy, in the past. In Chapter 2, I shall 
consider show 
far regional development economists have gone towards 
providing a theory of regional economic development; the limitations 
to be noted will represent gaps in the available theory which might, 
presumably, be filled eventually. Then, in Chapter 3, I shall develop 
certain of these available theories as "working assumptions" to provide 
a theoretical framework for the present study. In Chapter 4, the 
social justification for regional development is discussed. 
The Emergence of Regional Policy 
Like the older branches of economics, regional economic develop- 
ment has been a response to policy problems. It has appeared in the 
form of policies to alleviate problems associated with the backwardness 
or decline of particular regions. Here too such theories as exist have 
followed from attempts to deal with contemporary practical problems. 
Indeed, the recent emergence of regional economic development can be 
explained partly by the fact that governments in the economically 
advanced countries have only lately been able to turn part of their 
attention away from national, and therefore more pressing, problems of 
unemployment and slow growth. In a sense, regional economic development 
had to await greater success with national economic policy than had 
been achieved prior to World War II. Meyer dates the emergence of 
regional economics in the United States from the early postwar years, 
and in Canada regional aspects of development were first discussed 
seriously only in the middle fifties. 
5 
Similarly, although the problem 
5R. D. Howland, Some Regional Aspects of Canada's Economic Development, 
a study for the Royal commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, is 
really the first attempt to analyze regional difficulties in a national context. 
9. 
of the Italian South had been recognized and received considerable 
attention in the historical literature, it was not until 1950 that the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was established and 1954 before the "Vanoni 
Plan" was formulated. 
6 
In Britain, however, where the Depression 
of the 1930's had fallen with particularly harsh effects upon those 
regions which had been first affected by the Industrial Revolution 
several decades earlier and were therefore more vulnerable to industrial 
decline, regional problems had been met somewhat earlier. As a 
consequence, regional policy had its first, explicit beginnings in 
Britain and the evolution of regional economic development theory can 
be traced to Britain in the middle thirties. 
7 
Regional policy thus first arose in the United Kingdom in 
response to the heavy unemployment experienced in certain, largely 
industrial regions of the British economy especially affected by the 
decline in the world industrial economy. It was not essentially a 
policy for regional economic development as I have defined it, but it 
was a regional policy. Its roots were perhaps mainly in social concern 
for the individuals displaced from work and the hardship thus imposed 
on them. Although it was later to be given a degree of economic 
justification by Keynesian theories of income and employment determination 
which gave government the major responsibility for increasing aggregate 
demand sufficiently to eliminate unemployment, it is doubtful whether 
the Keynesian influence would have been strong enough in the middle 
thirties to carry regional policy into respectability if it had had to 
do the whole job itself. Indeed, regional policy came into being much 
6An 
excellent review of postwar Italian literature on the problem 
of the South is contained in P. Giani, "Recent Italian Works on 
Theories of Economic Development", in Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 
Quarterly Review, March 1960, No. 52. He notes that in the early 
postwar years Italian economists were strongly influenced by 
Anglosaxon, especially Keynesian, theories of full employment. 
7 
Meyer's article on "Regional Economics", by its lack of reference 
to non-American experience, is unsatisfactorily incomplete. 
10. 
sooner than the Keynesian remedy became acceptable to the politician 
with sole opportunity to put it into effect. 
8 
Regional policy was 
born of the social desire in Britain to alleviate the plight of the 
large numbers of industrial workers, particularly on Clydeside in 
Scotland, in Northeast England, and in Wales, who had become unemployed 
when the shipbuilding and heavy engineering industries were severely 
affected by the decline in world production and trade. Although the 
explicit purpose of the Special Areas legislation of 1934 was to 
encourage new industrial location in such areas, 
9 
this was seen largely 
as an extension of social welfare policy to shield the unemployed from 
the full consequences of the industrial and trade depression. 
A second factor in the emergence of regional policy was added 
a few years later by the administrators of the Special Areas 
legislation; again, however, the basis of this further justification 
for regional policy was laid quite outside the boundaries of economic 
theory. In his 1936 annual report Sir Malcolm Stewart, the Special 
Areas Commissioner for England and Wales noted the tendency for new 
industrial enterprises which could have absorbed idle labour in the 
Special Areas, to locate in the South-East of England, especially in 
Greater London. He therefore proposed a general embargo, subject to 
certain exceptions, on further factory construction in the Greater 
London Area. The Commissioner's concern was directed at the inability 
of the Special Areas to attract new industry unless something drastic 
8The 
resistance to Keynesian economics lasted rather longer in the 
United States, in fact until the 1962 "tax cut" program of the 
Kennedy administration. 
9At first the Commissioners' powers were limited to persuasion and 
exhortation, improving water supply and sewerage, clearing sites, 
removing slag heaps, and establishing small holdings. Before long, 
however, financial assistance to the establishment of industrial 
undertakings including the provision of factories for letting, was 
added. 
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were done to prevent the most favoured regions from attracting the 
lion's share of new enterprises. He recognized an imbalance of advantages 
for new industry in favour of London and sought redress simply by 
having it made illegal for further expansion to occur in the region 
with the greatest apparent advantage. 
The issue was debated in Parliament in 1937. Afterwards the 
Government established a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of 
Sir Montague Barlow. The concern about congestion, and thus the first 
official recognition of "congested" regions in British regional policy, 
became explicit in the Commission terms of reference: 
"to enquire into the causes which have influenced the 
present geographical distribution of the industrial 
population of Great Britain and the probable direction 
of any change in that distribution in future"; 
"to consider what social, economic or strategical 
disadvantages arise from the concentration of industries 
or of the industrial population in large towns or in particular 
areas of the country"; 
"and to report what remedial measures if any should be taken 
in the national interest. " 
The Commission reported in August 1939 and its report was 
published in January 1940. 
i0 
It stated, (and note the sequence of 
considerations as listed), "the disadvantages in many if not most of 
the great industrial concentrations alike on the strategical, the 
social and the economic side do constitute a serious handicap and 
even in some respects dangers to the nation's life and development 
and we are of the opinion that definite action should be taken by 
the Government towards remedying them. " 
Agreed in this general conclusion, the members of the 
Commission divided on how to put it into specific effect. The 
majority recommended the establishment of a National Industrial Board 
10Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, 
Report, Cmnd. 6153, Londons H. M. S. O., 1940. 
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charged with responsibility for dispersing industry from the congested 
areas, including the Greater London area immediately, and developing 
a better balance of industry in the different regions. . 
The minority report went further and recommended a new 
Ministry with powers to research into and control the location of 
industry throughout Great Britain, and to promote and supervise the 
planning of the country for industrial, agricultural, residential, and 
recreational requirements. 
Neither the majority nor the minority report could be acted 
upon in legislation during the War. They were to influence the sort of 
regional policies introduced, however, in the postwar period. And 
whatever the validity of the concern about over-congestion in the most 
prosperous regions, there is little doubt that the various measures 
for restraining expansion in such areas have been a necessary condition 
for the successful pursuit of policies to stimulate economic development 
in the lagging regions. 
Regional and National Policy 
Whether real or only alleged, 
11 
this "congestion" provided a 
means for setting regional policy within the framework of national 
policy, a change which increased the respectability of the measures 
for assisting the Special Areas. Moreover, the change was to be 
carried several steps further in the postwar period, through the 
system of industrial development certificates (I. D. C. 's), to provide 
an essential source of new industrial ventures whose location could 
be diverted to the less prosperous regions. The "congestion" was 
described mainly in its physical aspects, and even though the results 
envisaged were seen to have possible economic and social consequences, 
there was no explicit justification drawn from economic theory. 
llSee 
A. E. Holmans, "Industrial Development Certificates and Control 
of the Growth of Employment in South-east England, " Urban Studies, 
November 1964. Holmans argues that further development in the 
South-east is by no means circumvented by congestion. 
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The first direct and explicit link between regional policy and 
economic theory was drawn in 1944, first in the White Paper on Employ- 
ment Policy, and then in Lord Beveridge's Full Employment in a Free 
Society. The White Paper meant official Government approval for 
regional policy, of course. By then, however, regional policy had 
become an accepted government responsibility. The War, moreover, had 
played an important part in broadening the basis of its justification 
from what, in the 1930's, had been essentially social welfare and 
physical planning considerations. For one thing, effective demand had 
been maintained at the full employment level. At the same time, the 
War had also forced a substantial shakeout of manpower throughout the 
British economy - one result of which, incidentally, was a postwar 
shortage of coal miners. Against the background of full employment 
and unusual occupational mobility, the British authorities also 
gained some valuable learning experience with locating munitions 
factories in the more remote regions of the British economy. Although 
this policy was prompted more by strategic considerations than 
anything else, its successful execution under extreme wartime conditions 
was probably of critical importance in building up the British confidence 
in relocation of industry as a tool of regional development policy. 
Nevertheless the White Paper clearly brought regional policy 
under the Keynesian umbrella and thereby exposed it to increasing 
scrutiny by economists. This scrutiny was prosecuted most often at 
this stage in terms of the Keynesian analysis. What, then, did 
Keynesian theory contribute to the analysis of regional problems and 
more especially, to the evolution of a theory of regional economic 
development? 
The full employment policy enunciated in the 1944 White Paper 
treated regional policy as a special case of the more general 
measures to be carried out at the national level. Unemployment 
nationally was to be avoided through the maintenance of an adequate 
level of aggregate demand. For the more difficult regions these 
national measures were to be reinforced by further special provisions: 
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(1) the location of new enterprises would be influenced 
so as to diversify the industrial composition of 
areas particularly vulnerable to unemployment; 
(2) obstacles to the transfer of workers from one area 
to another, and from one occupation to another, would 
be removed; 
(3) training facilities would be provided to fit workers 
from declining industries for jobs in expanding 
industries. 
Thus regional policy became more or less a logical extension of the 
national policy for full employment, involving only some additional 
means of reducing unemployment regionally beyond those required 
nationally. Apart from particular physical and social welfare 
aspects, the policy at the regional level was conceived largely, if 
not entirely, against the national economic objective of full 
employment. No examination of peculiarly regional problems nor of 
purely regional objectives was necessary, since these were assumed 
to be identical with the national, full-employment objective. Thus 
at this stage in its evolution, regional policy in its economic 
implications was simply an extension of national full-employment 
policy. It was not yet a policy for regional economic development, 
except perhaps by implication. 
Postwar Regional Policy in Britain 
During the years immediately after the War, regional policy 
was vigorously pursued under the Distribution of Industry Act, 1945. 
Restrictions on factory building which had been introduced as part of 
the wartime licensing system, were maintained. The less prosperous 
regions, or Development Areas12 as they were called, whose problems 
12These 
were the North-Eastern Development Area, the West Cumberland 
Development Area, the South Lancashire Development Area, the Wrexham 
Development Area, the South Wales and Monmouthshire Development Area, 
and the Scottish Development Area. With the inclusion of such major 
centres as Cardiff and Glasgow, the Development Areas were 
considerably more extensive than the Special Areas under the 1934 
legislation. 
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were now complicated also by a lack of coal which led to some increase 
in unemployment, were thus able to attract a more than proportionate 
share of total fixed investment. 
Building restrictions were relaxed somewhat during the 1948-49 
recession as the building licensing system was allowed to lapse. 
Subsequently, however, unemployment nationally was again reduced to a 
low level where it remained throughout most of the ensuing decade. 
Thus, although the Board of Trade could no longer use its power of 
negative control on factory building to "steer" new factories or 
factory extensionsto the Development Areas, the latter continued to 
enjoy a high degree of prosperity as a result of full employment 
being maintained in the national economy. 
This state of affairs characterized British regional policy 
throughout the 1950's and into the early 1960's. A combination of 
full employment in the national economy with policies designed explicitly 
to bring "work to the workers" in the Development Areas and pursued 
with some vigor through the maintenance of the wartime building 
licensing system into the years immediately following the War, brought 
a noteworthy increase in employment to these Areas. Here it should be 
recognized that it was the state of full employment nationally which was 
the more important of these two elements in the success achieved in the 
less prosperous regions. Without full employment the incentive to 
look further afield simply does not operate with the same force on an 
industrialist contemplating expansion in a more prosperous region. 
If he can find the additional labour he requires nearby, there is no 
point, from his viewpoint at least, in considering a move or an expansion 
into a more remote (to him) and unknown area. For this reason primarily, 
national full employment is a prerequisite for increasing employment 
in the less prosperous regions of any country. 
Similarly, full employment policies are the prior condition of 
success in these regions. This is the main lesson of regional policy 
to be learned from Britain's experience during the immediate postwar 
years.. 
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The tenuous association of regional policy with full 
employment objectives did not, however, result in much healthy 
exchange of analytical concepts and tools, beyond a happy assumption 
in some quarters that a Keynesian-type multiplier would inevitably 
result in early and substantial improvement in the regional economies 
if only the initial impetus from investment in newly located 
industries were made large enough. This transplantation from Keynesian 
theory to regional analysis of the multiplier proved unsuccessful 
because the underlying assumptions were not examined and modified 
sufficiently. In particular, the assumption that unemployed resources 
in the regions were capable of responding to the stimulus of increased 
demand is obviously less applicable to labour which has been chronically 
unemployed or underemployed that to those affected by short-term 
idleness resulting fram a temporary deficiency of demand. Also, the 
"multiplier" adherents seemed to underestimate the likelihood of 
substantial "import leakages" into the less prosperous regions from 
the more industrially-developed, more prosperous regions. Similarly, 
the application of. the Keynesian remedy to regional policy remained 
simple and direct; raise aggregate demand adequately and the problem 
of regional unemployment would disappear. The region was seen simply 
as a microcosm of the national economy. Although the policy involved 
the attraction of industry, this was treated by some economists and 
policy makers as an associated and necessary means of raising regional 
demand. 
During the middle and late 1950's, when it became clear that 
European growth had been so rapid as to reduce the level of national 
unemployment in many countries to, or below, the "full employment" 
level suggested by Beveridge, it became fashionable in some quarters 
to consider unemployment as an almost purely local problem, affecting 
only a small number of (usually) isolated localities. This led to the 
conclusion that regional policy should be so tailored as to concentrate 
on solving the unemployment which remained in those particular 
localities where it still existed. Accordingly, in Britain development 
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districts13 were scheduled in place of the former development areas, and 
similar changes in policy were adopted in some other European countries 
as well. When, however, this approach began to have mixed and at times 
contradictory results, it was noted that the policy tended to result 
in firms being forced to establish in those areas least suited to the 
firms' further development, and least likely to cause secondary 
effects throughout the whole region. The danger also was either that 
productive firms changed their minds about establishing new facilities, 
or later found themselves with new facilities in rather unlikely, 
usually unpromising locations. 
Regional Policy and Economic Growth 
By this time, also, the continued operation of the European 
economies at full employment had permitted economists, and policy 
makers, the relative luxury of considering how best to foster the 
further growth of the economy, where previously they had been pre- 
occupied with how best to reduce, or to avoid, unemployment. In this 
newly emerging situation regional proponents were not long in bringing 
forth the argument that effective measures for regional development - 
as opposed to measures to relieve regional and/or local unemployment - 
constituted a valid and promising source of further national growth. 
It was this changed emphasis, on positive development as compared with 
the former attempt to relieve "excessive" unemployment, which permeated 
the White Papers of November 1963 on Central Scotland and the North 
East. Regional development, a more mature form of regional policy, thus 
was given greater respectability by its being brought under the mantle 
of economic growth. 
13These 
were "any locality in Great Britain in which in the opinion of 
the Board of Trade a high rate of unemployment exists, or is to be 
expected...., and is likely to persist, whether seasonally or 
generally. " Such districts were based on Ministry of Labour employment 
exchange areas, and were scheduled from time to time by the Board of 
Trade. The level of unemployment necessary for a district to qualify, 
in practice was four per cent. The introduction of development 
districts first came with the Distribution of Industry (Industrial 
Finances) Act of 1958, and was extended throughout the country with 
the Local Employment Act of 1960. 
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On a theoretical level it remains a question whether regional 
development can, however, be seen as a part of theories of economic 
growth, or, in the broader sense, of theories of economic growth and 
development. To the latter category belong such contributions as those 
of Lewis, Myrdal and Hirschman. The former category, theories of 
growth in a narrower sense, will be examined first, however. 
Contemporary theories of growth -a relatively recent branch 
of economics - have developed from the Keynesian theory of short run 
income and employment determination although, of course, growth is a 
long term process. The Harrod-Domar problem, for example, consists of 
how savings and investment can be kept in equilibrium over time so as 
to enable growth of total output (or income) to proceed at a steady 
rate. 
14 
What regional economic development theory has borrowed from 
economic growth theory is the fashionable assumption that more rapid 
growth is desirable, perhaps the most desirable, objective for public 
policy. It is this assumption, as already noted, which has provided 
considerable support and justification for special regional development 
measures. Anything that raises production in regions with unutilized 
resources will, ipso facto, raise national output and thereby 
contribute to further national growth. 
Regional Policy and Development Theory 
Regional economic development may also, of course, be considered 
simply as a particular case of economic development. To find a 
suitable theory of economic development might be to find a theory of 
regional economic development, the main difference being largely a 
141t 
cannot, of course, be steady unless the population growth rate, 
which is treated as an "autonomous" variable in growth theory, is 
also steady. What conventional growth theory does is to eliminate 
population change as a factor influencing the growth process in 
order to concentrate on such factors as savings and investment. 
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different level of abstraction and/or application. Most of the 
literature on economic development is based on the underdeveloped 
countries: sometimes it deals specifically with regional aspects, 
especially in its concern with balanced (or unbalanced) growth, 
although this is not its main emphasis. Little has suggested that 
there are broadly two types of economic development theory: that 
concerned with explaining the genesis of progress, or lack of it, and 
the subsequent course of growth; and that concerned with planning 
growth, hence with breaking the bottlenecks to a forced, more or less 
state-directed, process of growth. 
15 
Theories concerned with the 
genesis and course of growth such as the poverty-trap theory (that 
is, the underdeveloped countries are too poor to save), the theory 
that a lack of investment opportunities prevents development, or that 
entrepreneurial spirit is lacking, do not take us far, however. 
Theories on how to accelerate growth in the underdeveloped 
countries place emphasis on various bottlenecks. One such is a low 
absorptive capacity for investment. Another consists of a savings 
level inadequate for the import on the necessary scale, of capital 
goods without encountering a balance of payments deficit because the 
domestic supply of investment goods is small or relatively inelastic. 
Still another would be insufficiently liberal trade policies to enable 
the expansion of export earnings. Also, there is frequently the 
difficulty of attracting foreign capital to fill the gap in domestic 
savings. 
Much of the substance of economic development theory of both 
types may be applied equally well to lagging regions. The difference, 
however, is that a region is part of a national economy and not 
dependent, to the same extent, therefore, upon savings within the 
region or foreign capital to overcome balance of payments difficulties. 
The region may instead be able to draw on a flow of investment funds 
151. 
M. D. Little and J. M. Clifford, International Aid, Aldine Publishing 
Company, Chicago, 1966, p. 129. 
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from its national government or, in some cases, by private firms with 
headquarters elsewhere within the same country, without the same 
restrictions as would be imposed by having its own external equilibrium 
to maintain. It thus may avoid the difficulties of having to reduce 
consumption in order to raise savings to a higher level, and the 
further problem of seeing these savings diverted into investment that 
would raise productive capacity and ultimately, employment and income. 
The easier and quite feasible course, for a region in an advanced 
economy, is to maintain consumption but to obtain a high level of 
investment by persuading the national government to direct a more than 
proportionate share of public investment to the region. That is, in 
allocating its investment resources among various regions of the country, 
the national government would divert a share to the underdeveloped 
region that was greater than the region's present percentage contribution 
to national output, or its percentage of the national population, or 
some similar "norm". Similarly, the region may, with or without the 
active assistance of the national government, seek to persuade national 
enterprises in the private sector to erect new factories in the region - 
the effect of which is also to raise investment and thereby expand the 
region's ability to generate higher income and employment on a 
continuing basis. In either case, the additional investment would come 
about without there having to be the same degree of internal "self- 
sacrifice" as when the expansion of productive capacity results from 
increased savings internally within the region. Moreover, higher 
savings may be injected from outside the region. 
A proper understanding of these factors depends, however, upon 
the availability of information about regional economies that is 
frequently not available. In particular, there is a need for a suitable 
system of social accounts for each broad region within a country. Such 
a system would incorporate information about a region's "balance of 
payments". The need for such data is especially great in a federal 
country like Canada where intergovernmental transfers across regional 
boundaries assume a considerable degree of importance. 
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The inadequacy of economic development theory for adaptation 
to regions, however, is due to the same sort of reason as the short- 
comings of growth theory. There is as yet no single general theory of 
economic development which is widely accepted. Nor perhaps should we 
expect one ever to emerge. Economic development is a complex, long-term 
process in which many factors, not all economic, interact: to expect 
to find a single theory capable of comprehending all such factors and of 
being applied to all sorts of development situations would appear, to 
say the least, unrealistic. At any rate, while many of the factors in 
development are common to regions and countries, the existing state of 
economic development theory is too unsettled to allow regional economic 
development to find a readily applicable junior version therein. 
This brief, cursory review of Keynesian income and employment 
theory, growth theories, and development theory evolved from the attempts 
to aid the underdeveloped countries, has shown that while regional 
economic development has tapped each from time to time for vital inputs, 
none in its present. state provides a ready general theory capable of 
serving as a general theoretical guide for regional economic development. 
Perhaps this only reveals the lack of perfection in these branches of 
general economic theory. It certainly leaves a clear field for regional 
economic development to find its own theory based on its own peculiar 
characteristics and capable of dealing with its own peculiar problems. 
Probably, that is as it should be. 
In Chapter 2 some theories of this type are examined. 
CHAPTER 2 
Some Theories of Regional Economic Development 
Introduction 
A theory of regional economic development should be capable of 
explaining, in general or abstract terms, why some regions have not 
experienced the same degree of development in the past and thus find 
themselves different in important economic respects from other regions 
in the same country. Usually the emphasis in discussions of regional 
problems has been on the poorer regions although a good general 
theory of regional development would not have this limitation but could 
also be invoked to explain why the richer regions have attained their 
present status. Similarly, such a theory would also be capable of describing 
the process whereby some regions may decline and thus be transformed 
from rich to poor regions. To deal with these three types of cases, 
the theory required is essentially an explanation of observable 
processes of change in the real world. A second, ultimate purpose of 
having a theory of regional economic development is to offer guidance 
to the policy maker on how, in particular, the poorer regions can be 
brought-to a higher level of economic performance - in other words, how 
they can be assisted to develop. Here the emphasis would be on 
isolating the important variables, perhaps on the basis of what 
general inferences may be drawn from the analysis of past change. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review several contributions 
to theories of regional development as a basis for developing, in 
Chapter 3, the "working assumptions" which I shall make as a sort of 
theoretical framework in which to compare some aspects of regional 
development, particularly policy for regional economic development, in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. 
The Classical View 
A number of regional theories have been advanced against the 
background of, and indeed frequently in an attempt to refute, what 
22 
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might be called the "classical" approach to regional economic 
development derived from the welfare assumptions of conventional 
microeconomic price theory. one of these assumptions is that "pure" 
or "perfect" competition will lead eventually to an optimum allocation 
of resources consistent with consumer preferences and in harmony with 
social objectives. There would be no such thing as "externalities" to 
be taken into account. When the operation of a more or less market-driven 
economy was observed to result in a tendency for economic activities 
to concentrate in some areas and enable such areas to achieve higher 
per capita levels of output, income and employment - and therefore 
higher standards of living - than other areas within the same country, 
it was concluded that the concentration was caused by the competitive 
nature of the system and was, therefore, a necessary result of the 
desirable (and assumed) blend of consumer preferences and social 
objectives in total harmony. Proponents of this view have usually 
argued their case without having to demonstrate that "pure" or "perfect"' 
competition actually does characterize any functioning economy in the 
world today or in any earlier day: the demonstration of this important 
link in their argument, in fact, poses a serious challenge. At worst, 
they were only forced to concede some interferences with their 
assumption of unfettered and unbridled competition. They did not 
concede the existence of "externalities". The extreme case of 
perfectly competitive conditions, useful in enabling economics students 
to grasp the technical concepts of their discipline, was, at least for 
the purposes of this argument, boldly assumed to hold sway in the real 
world. In particular, complete interregional mobility of factors was 
assumed to exist in the real world where, in fact, there are important 
barriers to such mobility, especially of the labour factor. Such imper- 
fections and interferences with the market mechanism as were admitted 
were insufficient, it was implicitly assumed, to prevent "market 
forces" from having the main influence on economic development. 
Moreover, according to this "classical" school of thought, the 
uneven incidence of development among regions and its consequent 
differentials in living standards are only temporary phenomena anyway. 
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The continued free play of "market forces" would eventually result 
in the movement of resources, especially labour, from the less 
prosperous regions to those where the main benefits of development 
are being felt. In time, the resulting depopulation in the poorer 
areas would eliminate the problem. In other words, the balance of 
population with resources would be restored when, on a per capita 
basis, output, income and employment would become equivalent to the 
levels attained in the prosperous areas. The implications of this 
theory are clear enough: policy which seeks to stimulate development 
in the lagging regions is, in the long run, unnecessary and, indeed, 
even perverse. 
Ohlin's Theory of Interregional Trade 
A comprehensive attempt to formulate an economic theory 
specifically about regions was made by a Swedish economist, Bertil 
Ohlin, during the 1920's. While he was not concerned primarily with 
regional development or with policy aspects, his analysis of regional 
economic systems affords a useful start in constructing a theory of 
regional economic development. 
' 
It is now generally accepted that Ohlin did not achieve his 
purpose of bridging the gap between international trade theory and 
location theory. (Isard agrees, however, that location and trade are 
"as two sides of the same coin2, and strives to achieve a better 
integration of these two branches of economic theory. ) This need not 
deter us from making use of Ohlin's systematic treatment of interregional 
trade, since the latter is valuable in itself and of relevance to the 
'Ohlin, 
Bertil, Interregional and International Trade, Harvard, 1933, 
Preface, pp. vii, viii. 
2lsard, Location and Space Economy, M. I. T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
1956, p. 6. His chapter on "Some General Theories of Location and 
Space Economy" is an excellent review of previous work in this field. 
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present study. Moreover, although developed within the framework 
of general equilibrium theory, Ohlin's treatment of interregional 
relations is less confined by the unrealistic assumptions (pure 
competition, price of a commodity equals average cost, price of a 
factor equals marginal product) normally involved in equilibrium 
analysis and also may be more easily transposed to the level of 
macroeconomic theory. 
3 
Ohlin begins by noting that a region's supply of productive 
factors is not the sole determinant of the relative prices of the 
factors of production (and the state of economic development) within 
the region. Regional demand must also be taken into account, even 
if there is no trade with other regions. If there is interregional 
trade, the region's factor supply is thereby exposed to extra-regional 
demand; also, its own demand may be met, at least partly, by factor 
supplies in other regions. There are other influences than factor 
supply and consumer demand to be taken into account as well -- 
including the physical conditions of production, the tastes of 
consumers, the inclination of man to work and save, and the ownership 
of the factors of production. 
Exposure of a previously "closed" region to trade with another 
region in essence introduces one new variable -- the interregional 
exchange rate -- and sets one new condition, that the value of 
3Richardson 
points out that "regional economics" began as an 
amalgamation of macroeconomics (theory of income determination) and 
international trade theory. See Harry W. Richardson, Regional 
Economics, London, Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1969, p. 427. 
4The 
notion of an interregional exchange rate is used here in a 
comprehensive sense. If the regions trading with one another are 
parts of the same country, then, of course, their "exchange rate" 
does not exist as such and there may be a continued imbalance of 
trade between them. Even so, however, such imbalance must be 
offset by a reverse imbalance on "invisible" or capital account. 
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imports and exports must balance, to the system of equations which 
determines the region's price system. Each region then has an advantage 
in the production of commodities into which enter considerable amounts 
of factors abundant and cheap in that region, because the play of 
reciprocal demand in two (trading) regions influences the nature of 
interregional trade as much as the internal supply of productive 
factors of each region. The effect of such trade is to equalize 
cdmmodity prices. There will also be a tendency towards equalization 
of the prices of the factors of production. 
5 
This argument assumes complete divisibility which is 
contradictory to the conditions encountered in the real world. The 
lack of divisibility makes production on a large scale more efficient 
up to a certain point than production in small quantities. It is 
also indivisibility which makes for external economies as, for example, 
in a large, specialized labour market for firms requiring certain types 
of special skills. 
The exploitation of such internal and external economies of 
scale makes for further interregional trade based on further division 
of labour: this would be true even if two trading regions had both 
identical factor equipment and identical demand conditions. This is 
because the demand for productive factors in the various industries 
where large-scale production makes for cheap production must vary. 
Usually, of course, the economies of scale strengthen the tendency 
which arises from differences in demand and supply conditions between 
regions, to division of production in all cases where the most efficient 
scale is large compared to the need for the product. The advantages of 
large-scale production thus strengthen the tendency toward interregional 
trade already basically inherent in the differences in the regions' 
respective supplies of productive factors. 
SOhiin, 
92. 
. 
Sit., p. 49 (summarized) 
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The effect of the trade induced by the economies of large- 
scale production is a more efficient organization of production 
whereby the disadvantages of a lack of divisibility are substantially 
reduced, just as interregional trade reduces the disadvantages arising 
from a lack of factor mobility. 
In this way interregional trade can serve as a substitute for 
interregional factor movements. Ohlin's underlying assumption up to 
this point, however, is that factors are not mobile between regions 
although they are fully mobile within them. Hence, in this respect, 
his conclusions about interregional trade differ fundamentally very 
little from those of international trade theory, where the assumption 
of factor immobility between countries is distinctly more valid. In 
order to distinguish interregional economic relations from international 
trade, it is mainly this assumption of a lack of factor mobility which 
must be relaxed. 
Generally speaking, the fact is that factors of production 
move more freely between regions within a country than between 
countries. 
6 
Such factor movements are analyzed by Ohlin in terms of 
their effects upon interregional trade and its implications. 
In general, factor movements? contribute to the equalization 
of interregional factor prices and would appear, therefore, to obviate 
part of the need for trade. Their effect upon trade, however, will 
depend upon their impact on the three main factors influencing the 
volume of interregional trade, namely, 
(1) the inequality of factor equipment. If factor 
equipment is rendered more equal, trade will be 
reduced; if more unequal, it will be increased. 
6Seymour 
Harris questions this -- but the United States may not be typical in 
its role as capital-supplier to other countries. 
7For 
a more thorough analysis of factor mobility, see Richardson, 
op. cit., Chapter 12. 
28. 
(2) the size of the respective regional incomes, i. e., the 
volume of demand in different regions. 
(3) the direction of demand. The immigrant labourer need 
not demand the same goods as the expatriated capitalist. 
The actual effect of factor movements upon interregional trade 
in particular cases may also be affected by economies of scale and 
the availability of unutilized (natural) resources tending to moderate 
the tendency toward factor price equalization. Ohlin argues that in 
time, however, the onset of diminishing returns will enable the equalization 
tendencies to operate. Until then, no reduction in trade is caused nor 
has there been any tendency for the character of trade to change. 
Another complication is that factor movements affect various industries 
differently: if, for example, the resulting economies of scale are 
felt in export industries, trade will tend to increase; if in import 
industries, trade will tend to diminish. 
Although natural resources are immobile, both labour and 
capital are not, the chief obstacle in each case being considered by 
Ohlin to be the psychological aversion to change rather than the 
financial expenses to be incurred in such a move. Just as factor 
movements depend upon the interregional price system, so too are they 
influenced by the other parts of the system. Hence factor movements 
must be placed within the system. In general, their main effects 
consist in: 
(a) the transfer, through capital movements, of buying 
power from the lending to the borrowing region; and 
(b) more importantly perhaps, an alteration of the factor 
supply in each region. 
Whether or not such movements are apt to lead to movements of 
commodities or more factors is difficult to determine without 
examining particular actual situations. 
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Factor and commodity movements are both adjustment mechanisms 
in interregional economic relations8, each implying a local adaptation 
of the supply of goods to the conditions of demand. 
The obstacles to interregional commodity movements consist 
essentially in the costs of transfer, which must also be fitted into 
the interregional price system. Such costs of transfer are equal to 
the prices of transfer services, that is, all services required to 
transfer commodities from one region to another and are, therefore, 
more comprehensive than simply transport charges. As between various 
regions, commodity prices tend to differ by the costs of transfer. 
Costs of transfer reduce trade and thus weaken the tendency 
to equalization of factor prices. This also involves a reduction in 
the scale of production in many industries. Transfer costs limit 
the size of markets and of units of production much more in some cases, 
e. g., large regions, than in others, e. g., small ones. In general 
interregional costs of transfer not only hamper interregional trade 
but change its course and, to some extent, its effects. 
Ohlin and Location Theory 
According to Ohlin, the actual distribution (of productive 
factors) at any given moment is a function of: 
(1) localization at earlier times; 
(2) changes in domestic supply through births, deaths, 
savings, etc.; and 
(3) interlocal (factor) movements which the local price 
differences are able to effect in spite of the 
incomplete mobility of labour and capital. 
8See 
Edgar M. Hoover, Introduction to Regional Economics, Alfred A. Knopf, 
New York, 1971, pp. 238-242, for another discussion of regional 
development and interregional movements of capital and labour. He also 
considers the question of whether such factor movements are likely to 
lead to convergence of regional per capita incomes within a country; 
but this discussion is based entirely on the United States where 
regional per capita incomes have displayed a tendency toward 
convergence over time. This tendency has not been present in the 
Canadian experience, however. 
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Ohlin makes three general observations: 
(a) "As factor movements depend upon the price system, 
or rather upon all the circumstances affecting it, 
factor movements imply an adaptation of factor supply 
to these circumstances which is 'advantageous' from the 
point of view of price economy. "9 In other words, such 
movements result in a larger aggregate output. 
(b) "Labour and capital movements are as a rule greater 
within countries than between them. " 
10 
Thus from the 
standpoint of price economy interregional adjustment of 
factor supply to differences in natural and transport 
resources is "better" than the corresponding process 
of international adjustment. 
(c) "Labour movements make possible an enormous agglomerating 
of population in cities, where wages, both nominal and real, 
are usually higher than in country districts. It is even 
conceivable under certain circumstances that factor 
movements lead to increased local differences in factor 
prices. " 
11 
The present localization of industry and of factor supplies 
among regions is thus, as Ohlin notes, the result of a historical process. 
To understand the nature and structure of any regional economy, therefore, 
requires some knowledge of its economic history. Moreover, the historical 
development has been marked by a number of arbitrary influences on 
9Ibid., 
p. 226 
10Ibid., 
p. 226 
11Ibid., 
p. 227 
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localization which have left their mark, and which need not be 
wished away. Nor is there any need to neglect the effect which 
similar arbitrary elements might cause, or indeed be made to cause, 
on future localization. 
Inventions, mistakes, and arbitrary pricing policies may all 
cause a deviation from an optimum localization, i. e., whenever 
price differences between different regions are not explained by the 
costs of transfer. Firms may follow uniform pricing for all regions, 
for example. Similarly, firms may buy commodities at the same price 
in a district, regardless of transportation costs. 
12 
Ohlin's Contribution Assessed 
Ohlin's theory of location is weak and only verbal, and has 
been largely superseded by the subsequent work of Hoover, Isard and 
others. Isard, in particular, has attempted to weave an integrated 
theory of location and trade from the earlier strands of location 
theory contributed by Losch, Von Thunen, Weber, Predohl, Ohlin and 
Hoover. He himself notes that the result is not adequate to explain 
all forms of trade, because: 
"First, the general theory of location developed ... does not 
consider, except in minor fashion, the aggregate demand and 
income side of the picture, particularly as they relate to 
regions and to interregional trade. " 
"Secondly, trade may be international as well as intranational., 
13 
12It 
is true, of course, that uniform pricing policies across a 
country may enable manufacturers in the lagging regions to 
purchase some components at prices lower than the local costs of 
production would be. But, on the whole, "postalization" is more 
likely to apply to final products than to inputs of components or 
raw materials. 
13Isard, 
op. cit., pp. 207-8. 
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Isard goes on to elaborate his theory of location and space economy 
by considering other basic factors introduced when trade becomes 
international. In this his approach is essentially an attempt to 
generalize his theory into the wider framework. In other words, 
he attacks the problem from the other end than Ohlin, who sought 
to extend interregional and international trade so as to comprehend a 
general location theory. Also, whereas Isard starts avowedly with 
the factors which determine the location of an individual producing 
unit (or firm) and moves gradually from there to general tendencies, 
Ohlin's theory is more a general equilibrium theory. 
Theories of location, however, offer inadequate guidance to 
the formulation of policy for regional economic development. In part 
this is because the derivation of a general theory of location 
sufficiently comprehensive to explain all kinds of locational variation, 
has proven elusive. Perhaps also it is due to the relative neglect 
of this aspect of economic theory over the years; perhaps the recent 
emergence of increasing interest in "regional science" will lead to 
further developments on this front. To some extent, however, the goal 
may prove impossible of attainment if the currently fashionable micro 
approach is used. If so, conducting the analysis at the level of 
economic relations between regions with the use of macro concepts, may 
offer a worthwhile compromise -- at least, as an interim measure. Such 
a compromise has the attraction of permitting a greater degree of 
empirical determinacy and is possibly a more effective approach to the 
study of regional change than the equilibrium analysis technique of 
location theory. 
Ohlin's theory of interregional trade, although conceived as 
a necessary step towards his theory of international trade rather than 
as an end in itself, is remarkably complete. This is due to his 
treating trade as one, but not the only, result of a many-market price 
system comprised of several regions. As a result, he has elaborated 
what is essentially a macro theory of why regions differ in terms of the 
character of their economic activities, how such differences are 
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affected not only by trade in commodities, but also by interregional 
factor movements. The analysis is mainly conducted in terms of comparative 
statics, and there is little empirical verification offered except in 
very general terms; nevertheless, he succeeds in showing that 
interregional trade and the interregional localization of industry (and 
other types of economic activity) are essentially dynamic processes. 
Of particular value is his identification and analysis, within the 
interregional price system, of the main factors influencing localization, 
transfer relations,. factor movements, and trade. 
A serious limitation of Ohlin's analysis is his implicit 
assumption -- in the best classical tradition -- of full employment of 
capital and labour. His theory should, therefore, be modified to 
take account of interregional economic change in a context characterized 
by the availability of unused productive factors, especially labour. 
14 
The Importance of "Institutional Factors" 
The assumption of pure competition implicit in Ohlin's 
analysis needs to be relaxed in the process of formulating a useful 
theory of regional economic development. The tendency to interregional 
factor price equalization inherent in trade and factor movements 
between regions -- the two main interregional adjustment mechanisms -- 
will be affected by any deviations from the assumed condition of pure 
competition. For example, if industries located in one region maintain 
uniform prices for their products in several different regions, the 
transport obstacle to interregional commodity trade will be thereby 
14See 
the Introduction to L. Needleman, Regional Analysis; Selected 
Readings, Penguin, 1968, pp. 10-11, for a summary of the 
argument that the existence of high unemployment and low activity 
rates in depressed regions are evidence of reserves of unused labour 
resources which, if employed, would raise national output. Needleman 
suggests that the costs of government intervention designed to bring 
these labour reserves into use would be more than offset by the 
increased output so obtained. This contention is one of the important 
reasons for national support of regional development programs used 
by advocates of regional policy. 
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reduced, and more distant regions will be discouraged from 
establishing their own production facilities to supply their own 
internal demand. In some cases such as this it may well be desirable 
for production to continue to be concentrated in one region, for 
example, whenever there are significant economies to be attained 
from large scale production. Here too, however, it is impossible 
to generalize on the resolution of this conflict between transport costs 
and economies of scale; instead, practical examples must be examined 
individually. 
Uniform pricing policies on the part of producers are but 
one example of "institutional" factors which may impede the tendency 
toward factor price equalization between regions. That is to say, 
there are a number of ways in which economies in the real world do not 
conform to the conditions assumed to exist in conventional models of 
the so-called market economy. These deviations from the theoretical 
norm are referred to as "institutional" factors, or market imperfections. 
The importance of such "institutional" factors was emphasized in a 
study of regional development problems in Europe conducted by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in 1954.15 The study 
pointed out that, contrary to the predictions of the conventional 
model of a market economy, serious problems of unemployment and under- 
employment continued to prevail in some regions of virtually every 
European country. Thus the authors looked for interferences with the 
market system which might prevent them from attaining the spatial 
equilibrium, in the sense of interregional equality of factor prices, 
expected by the operation of competitive forces in economic theory. 
They discovered a number of such interferences or "institutional" 
factors. These factors become important when interregional trade and 
factor adjustments are not sufficient for complete equalization of 
15U. 
N. Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 
1954, Geneva, 1955, Chapter 6, "Problems of Regional Development 
and Industrial Location in Europe. " 
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factor prices with the result that the poor regions are characterized 
by unemployment and underemployment of (relatively) immobile labour. 
The apparent solution in such circumstances is the immigration of 
capital to such regions to combine with the available labour supplies 
in new productive activity: the U. N. survey explicitly suggests 
industrial decentralization. Certain institutional factors serve, 
however, to make the process of industrial development in the poor 
regions even more difficult than interregional price theory envisages. 
There is a lack of social capital. Instead of the lower wage rates 
which theoretically would result from the relative absence of production 
facilities due to concentration in richer regions, wages are prevented 
from falling in the poor regions by national trade union pressures and 
national wage policies which do not differentiate between regions. 
Local taxation may be higher. Imperfections in the credit market may 
be more pronounced. Railway freight policy, by discriminating in 
favour of raw materials and against manufactured goods, discourages 
the processing of regional raw materials and mining output on the spot. 
Large-scale manufacturers sell at a single uniform price across the 
country, thereby absorbing their transport costs within their total 
pricing policy; this also reinforces the tendency for firms to locate 
near their large consuming markets. 
16 Costs of energy may be higher 
too in poorer regions. 
Such "institutional factors" interact to reinforce the 
cumulative process of growth in the prosperous areas and may be 
extremely powerful barriers to the spread of industry to the poor 
regions. The U. N. survey suggested that these obstacles are probably 
of much greater weight in explaining the backwardness of many poor 
regions than any natural handicaps from which they might suffer. 
16At 
the same time, it may be noted, these tendencies may keep down 
the price of various manufacturing inputs in the less prosperous 
regions. They may also serve to reduce the cost of living in such 
regions. 
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Myrdal's Analysis of Regional Change 
Myrdal17 uses the evidence contained in the U. N. report on 
regional inequality in Europe in expounding a theory of regional 
economic differentials that is more general and more dynamic than 
Ohlin's, although it is less carefully reasoned. 
Myrdal rests his theory of social change upon the principle 
of circular and cumulative causation whereby one negative factor is, 
at the same time, both cause and effect of other negative factors. 
As an illustration, he cites the Negro problem in America. The two 
important factors - white prejudice and the low plane of living of 
the Negro population - cannot lead to any equilibrium because they 
tend to reinforce each other in a continuing worsening of the Negro 
plight. There is, Myrdal argues, similarly no tendency toward 
automatic self-stabilization in the social system. The rich get 
richer, while the poor get poorer. 
The implications of the circular causation hypothesis are 
several. It is useless to look for one predominant factor, a "basic 
factor" such as the "economic factor". Moreover, any realistic study 
of under-development and development in a country, or a region of a 
country, lies far outside the boundaries of traditional economic 
theory, largely because the "institutional" (non-economic) factors 
also tend to operate in the same direction. He applies the principle 
to the process whereby a region declines economically. A factory is 
destroyed, causing unemployment. The local market thus shrinks, and 
some businesses are induced to move elsewhere. Others are discouraged 
from coming. In time the population age structure worsens. Local 
tax rates have to be increased to cover the loss of revenues caused 
by the disappearance of industry. The higher tax rates reinforce the 
tendency to decline. And so on. 
Once a decline is initiated, both "economic" and "institutional" 
forces thus work towards inequality. 
17Myrdal, Gunnar, Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions, London, 
Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1957. 
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Yet there is also an encouraging side to Myrdal's hypothesis. 
An upward movement of the entire system can be effected by measures 
applied to one or the other of several points in the system. That is 
to say, the principle of circular causation, once its direction is 
reversed, promises final effects of much greater magnitude than the 
efforts and costs of the reforms themselves. 
Hirschman and Government Policy 
A. O. Hirschman also sees certain, more or less institutional, 
factors as important in the process whereby lagging areas are 
eventually enabled to achieve a higher level of economic development. 
Chief among these is government policy and in particular, the regional 
allocation of public investment. The decision by the national 
government to promote the development of the lagging regions will also 
be partly a response to the national political system in which, in 
consequence of their being effectively denied entry to industrial 
careers and thereby having to undertake political careers, capable 
and enthusiastic spokesmen for the interests of the lagging regions 
will emerge. Moreover, the continued concentration of public 
investment in the most prosperous regions cannot be accepted in the 
long run by governments because of "compelling considerations of equity 
and national cohesion. 1,18 
The allocation of public investment resources may be according 
to one of three principal patterns: 
(1) dispersal across the whole country prompted, more 
characteristically in the underdeveloped countries 
but elsewhere too, by political considerations, the 
notion that economic progress ought to affect equally 
all members and sections of the community (what Hirschman 
calls the "group-focussed image of change"), and 
shortages of certain capital inputs necessary for large, 
but not for small, projects. 
18Hirschman, 
A. O., The Strategy of Economic Development, Yale, 1958, 
p. 193. 
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(2) Concentration on growing areas which may be 
encouraged by international aid being available 
only for these and the "demonstration effect" of 
similar projects in other countries, but most important, 
by the growth pattern characteristic of rapidly developing 
countries. "Development often begins with the sudden, 
vigorous and nearly spontaneous growth of one or a few 
regions or urban centres, resulting in serious shortages 
of electric power and water supply, as well as in housing 
and transportation bottlenecks. Thus, urgent demands 
for several types of capital-intensive public investment 
appear and must be given the highest priority whether or 
not they correspond to the government's sense of 
distributive justice and to its pattern of regional 
political preference. The public investment in overhead 
capital in turn makes possible further growth of industry 
and trade in the favoured areas and this growth requires 
further large allocations of public investment to them. "19 
A shift from a scatter to a concentration policy for 
investment usually also involves a considerable enlargement 
of the total amount of funds required for public investment. 
Proponents of this pattern of public investment would, 
I suppose, consider it improper to try to eliminate 
regional differences. They would argue for further 
concentration of investment in prosperous regions as the 
best way to achieve national growth. Yet it is desirable, 
indeed necessary, to pay some attention to the less 
prosperous regions and the further contributions their 
development may make to national growth. 
(3) Attempts to promote the development of backward areas, 
which may arise even before the growing areas have 
reached their full potential. Once further development, 
especially social capital, begins to be financed from 
the earnings on earlier investments in the growing 
regions, some revenues from taxes originally imposed 
to finance such investments may be diverted to the 
backward areas. There is a greater danger of misguided 
investment in backward areas than in growing areas where 
capital shortages are clearly identified as a consequence 
of growth; and this often leads to a program of endowing 
the backward areas with social capital networks comparable 
with the growing regions when, in Hirschman's view, it 
would be preferable to endow a backward area with "some 
ongoing and actively inducing economic activity of its own, 
in industry, agriculture, or services. "20 
19Ibid., 
pp. 192-3. 
20Ibid., 
p. 195. 
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This is the approach which should, in my view, be taken in 
the Atlantic Provinces of Canada. But I shall return to this 
argument in a later chapter. 
Essential Differences Between Regions and Nations 
Apparently a proper understanding of the economic development 
process within regions of a country requires consideration of 
"institutional" factors as well as "economic" factors. 
21 
These "non- 
economic" factors may even have the effect of raising the theory from 
the economic to the social level: indeed, as already noted, Myrdal 
styles his circular causation thesis a theory of social change, that is, 
one which has application on a more general level than in strictly 
economic terms. However that may be, there is one particular group of 
institutional factors which must be considered in order to distinguish 
the situation of regions from that of nations. In general, this 
group consists in the absence between regions of the barriers to factor 
mobility and commodity trade which have been erected by nations in an 
effort to protect their own citizens from the adverse effects of 
international trade, and thus to permit a greater degree of internal 
control over their national economic destiny. A consideration here of 
the effects, beneficial and adverse, of the lack of such institutional 
barriers to trade and factor movements between regions of a country 
will also enable us to relate Ohlin's contribution with its specific 
orientation to trade between regions, to the more recent work of Myrdal 
and Hirschman which treats the regional economic problem in the more 
general context of growth and development. 
Balance-of-Payments Adjustment for a Country 
Let us consider the reaction of a country to an adverse 
balance of trade, that is, with an excess of imports (of commodities 
21 
Broadly the same conclusion has been reached by development 
economists such as Lewis, Hagen, Hirschman and others with 
experience of the recently increasing effort to assist the under- 
developed countries. 
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and services) over exports (of commodities and services . 
22 
Initially, the country might finance the additional imports by 
utilizing its reserves of gold and foreign exchange; this could be 
a temporary expedient at best, however, because its reserves are not 
unlimited. If the adverse balance on current account were more than 
a purely temporary phenomenon other, more permanent adjustments would 
be necessitated. 
One possibility would be for the national government to meet 
the problem directly, and seek to reduce imports. A national government 
has powerful weapons at its disposal to execute such a policy. 
Tariffs may be imposed or raised on imported goods, either generally 
or selectively. Quotas may be set and import licenses, if such exist, 
withdrawn or suspended. The risk of adopting such a policy is, of 
course, that other countries may retaliate against the country's 
own exports; nevertheless, the instruments of policy are available 
for the government to use if it so decides. The measures to reduce 
the flow of imported goods may be accompanied by other measures aimed 
at reducing expenditures on imported services: for example, tourist 
expenditures abroad might be reduced by restricting the availability 
of foreign currency to tourists. 
Another direct means of correcting the adverse current account 
balance would be for the national government to stimulate exports, 
perhaps in combination with measures to reduce imports. Potentially, 
there are a variety of possible actions available for this purpose, 
including remission of taxes on production for export, the payment of 
subsidies to exporting industries, and the attraction of more foreign 
tourists to the country. 
22Richardson 
analyzes the mechanisms of adjustment in the regional 
balance of payments in his Chapter 10. His conclusions do not 
differ fundamentally from those which follow in the text. He points 
out that the substantial differences of adjustment processes, between 
regions and nations, arise from differences in the respective 
institutional frameworks. 
Y 
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An indirect approach which has the advantage that it both 
encourages exports and reduces imports, would be a devaluation of 
the currency. This option is there for the national government to 
utilize if it chooses, although governments have been prone recently 
to consider it a risky venture because of possible retaliation or a 
consequent speculative "run on the currency". 
Of course, it is not always necessary that an adverse balance 
of trade be corrected by direct means. Instead, other items of the 
balance of international payments may provide, or may be adjusted to 
provide, an offset to the trade imbalance and thereby maintain overall 
external equilibrium. In short, movements of capital in various forms 
into the country may exceed, or be made to exceed, outward movements 
by the required amount. Such movements may take several forms: 
emigrants' remittances to relatives at home may provide considerable 
compensation by themselves as, for example, in the Irish case; investment 
opportunities in the country may be adequate to attract a substantial 
flow of foreign direct investment, either on a short-term or a long- 
term basis, or perhaps both; other nations may even be prepared to lend 
capital for development to the national government, perhaps under 
international aid programs. Within limits, a national government has 
powers to influence the flow into the country of capital in these 
various forms; perhaps it is best able to encourage an increase in the 
flow of short-term funds. through its powers to increase interest rates. 
It is probably least able to affect the volume of emigrants' remittances. 
Its ability to affect the flow of private and public long-term capital 
into the country may be considerable, but is less certain: much will 
depend on the "economic climate", to the improvement of which, of course, 
its own overall policies may make a powerful contribution. 
Although its ability adequately to secure, or to increase, the 
flow of capital into the country from abroad is somewhat circumscribed, 
the national government's ability to control the outward flow of 
capital -- public and private -- to other countries, is not. The fact 
is that a nation may choose to allocate all internal savings to internal 
investment if it wishes, and may execute such a policy in various ways. 
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It would perhaps refrain from going so far as to enforce the 
repatriation of long-term capital already invested abroad; but it 
might well choose to reduce or eliminate further foreign investment 
by its own citizens and governments. 
The overriding necessity for a nation is the maintenance of 
overall equilibrium inthe total balance of international payments, at 
least to the point where any temporary imbalance can be adequately 
covered by the reserves of foreign exchange it has available. Imbalance 
more serious than this must be corrected in the short run, because of 
the consequences which would otherwise result -- chiefly, inflationary 
pressures and a possible loss of confidence in the currency. To prevent 
these serious results, a nation will impose economic discipline on 
itself to the extent necessary to restore external balance. Until this 
is achieved, other objectives of economic policy - including long-term 
growth and development - must be set aside. Thus external equilibrium, 
for a country, is a necessary prior condition for growth and development 
which serves also as a disciplinary force helping to determine the 
proper basis for such growth and development. The need to ensure 
continuing equilibrium in the balance of payments forces a country to 
consider among other things, which course of development is likely to 
be feasible against the wider background of international competition. 
While the national government may enforce limitations on competitive 
or natural forces at home, it has no direct power over its external 
relations: instead it must be constrained in its longer term economic 
policy by its reading of economic trends and future opportunities in 
the international sphere. 
Balance of Payments Adjustment for a Region 
A region is not constrained in this way to the same extent. 
Nor, on the other hand, does it possess the same degree of internal 
economic control as a nation. It cannot undertake its own reaction 
to the pressure of external disequilibrium, but must acquiesce in an 
adjustment carried out at the national level on national considerations, 
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and take whatever consequences may follow at the regional level. 
These may be beneficial or adverse depending on the region's peculiar 
circumstances. 
Suppose a region has an adverse balance of (visible and 
invisible) trade. Now it is just as necessary for a region to attain 
overall equilibrium in its total balance of payments, as it is for a 
nation. 
23 
The adjustment process differs fundamentally,. however, 
because the region has less power to determine the nature of the 
adjustment on the basis of its own particular interests, and because 
a region does not possess the same instruments of policy as a nation. 
In the first place, it might be supposed that an excess of imports over 
exports cannot be financed from the foreign exchange reserves, simply 
because a region does not hold such reserves. 
That is not the whole story, however. Assume a national economy 
with no foreign trade, but with interregional trade. Then, with a 
single monetary unit established at the national level, all cash 
balances in each region may be treated, in effect, as "foreign 
exchange". Any imbalance of trade will then be accompanied by a 
change in the region's holdings of this "foreign exchange"; for example, 
a trade deficit, i. e. an excess of imports, would result in a loss of 
cash to other regions. In this sense a region is in much the same 
position as a nation under a Hume-type gold standard. Whereas the gold- 
standard nation meets a trade deficit by shipping gold abroad, a 
region finances its deficit by transferring cash, or "foreign exchange", 
to other regions. Unlike the gold-standard nation, however, the deflation 
23Such 
equilibrium appears to be attained automatically because, 
with a common national currency, there is no interregional exchange 
rate to be adjusted. The maintenance of overall equilibrium is just 
as necessary for a region, nevertheless, with, for example, any 
deficit on visible trade having to be offset by a compensating 
entry on invisible account such as a flow of emigrants' remittances. 
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of prices and wages within the regional economy consequent upon its 
loss of reserves, will not be complete, due to institutional factors 
such as the pressure for national parity in wage rates by trade 
unions. In the absence of complete flexibility of wages and prices, 
the region losing its cash "foreign exchange" must take a part of 
its deflation in the form of higher unemployment. 
Nor can a regional government restrict the flow of imports 
from other regions by means as effective as those available to national 
governments. Quite the contrary; an unimpeded flow of goods and 
services across regional boundaries within a country is usually 
considered a part of the very definition of a "nation". 
As to the exports from the region to other areas, the regional 
government is potentially not so poorly equipped compared to a national 
government; its opportunity to stimulate exports via tax remission 
and subsidies may even be as great if there is a regional government, 
as under a federal system, for example. Even then, however, the 
region's effort in this regard might be frustrated by the similar 
efforts of other regions (in the case of exports to other regions 
within the same country), or by a refusal on the part of the national 
government to condone this form of competition among regions for an 
increased share of national exports. 
The restoration of external balance by means of a currency 
devaluation is clearly out of the question for a region, again 
because it has no regional currency to devalue. Its exchange rate 
with other regions is determined in effect by its terms of interregional 
trade, and internationally by whatever rate is accepted or enforced 
by the national government for the whole country. 
A region, by its very nature, is thus left with having to 
offset the posited adverse balance on current account by other items 
in its total balance of payments. There may be a flow of emigrants' 
remittances on which to rely, and these are more likely in poor 
regions where net emigration has been an important adjustment 
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mechanism over time. In such regions, however, the net flow of long 
term capital is likely to be outward because of the past history of 
economic backwardness and a lack of investment opportunities. Unless 
credit markets are organized on a regional basis, as in the United 
States, the flow ofýshort-term capital through a national banking 
system, for example, is also likely to be outward. Regional 
governments may borrow extraregionally, as in the case of Canadian 
provincial governments who frequently have recourse to the New York 
bond market, but such loans are repayable, of course, and interest 
on them may impose undue burdens on the limited financial capacity of 
regional governments. 
A region has some power to influence these various inflows 
of capital but it is not substantial. If it is a poor region, its 
power in this respect will be even less than the national government 
can exercise over foreign investment in the country at large. 
It is more impotent still as regards the movement of private 
regional savings into investment in other regions or other countries. 
Its status as a part of the wider national framework in which 
investment opportunities are assessed by the criterion of expected 
return (benefit over cost), almost automatically means that a poor 
region will continue to have its savings siphoned off until such time 
as all industrial projects promising greater returns elsewhere in 
the country have been carried out. 
24 
One very important item in the interregional balance of 
payments, which does not appear in a country's balance of international 
241ts 
control of internal public savings is, however, much greater 
since it decides itself on the allocation of its tax receipts to 
various expenditure purposes; but this item does not appear in the 
balance of interregional payments. 
46. 
payments, consists in the flow of funds into the region from the 
national government. 
25 
The corresponding outflow consists in taxes 
remitted by regional firms and residents to the national authority, 
but we may assume these to be smaller, in the case of a poor region, 
than the inflow. These incoming funds are usually of three types: 
direct expenditures in the region by the national government for various 
purposes, including capital outlays; transfer payments to individuals 
in the form, for example, of unemployment benefits and old age pensions; 
and grants made for various purposes to the regional government, either 
conditionally or unconditionally. These inflows from the national 
government may, and in the case of less prosperous regions usually do, 
constitute the really effective means of compensating for the excess of 
a region's consumption of imports over exports (of goods and services) 
produced. In such circumstances they are thus a rough measure of the 
current "benefit" to the region from its membership in the wider 
national territory. 
It must be emphasized, however, that the attainment of overall 
external balance in this way essentially provides a region with "an 
easy way out" by comparison with the adjustment required of a nation 
faced with similar difficulties. Instead, for example, of having to 
reduce its consumption of imported goods (and services), perhaps to 
accept lower real income in consequence of a devalued currency, and 
possibly to suffer a temporary rise in unemployment, the region is 
enabled to enjoy consumption in excess of production indefinitely. 
26 
25The 
counterpart, in a country's balance of international payments, 
would be an inflow of "aid" in one form or another, from another 
government or an international development agency. 
26For 
the purpose of this argument, it is assumed that our hypothetical 
region's ratio of dependent to working population is not significantly 
different from the ratio in our hypothetical nation. 
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Since it is not required to work out its own economic salvation, 
perhaps involving a painful degree of short-term restraint, in the 
same way as a nation, the region is not forced to face up to its 
long-term possibilities within the wider framework of interregional 
(and international) competition. It may instead, being offered the 
path of least resistance by virtue of the national government's 
willingness to offset the continuing adverse balance on current 
account indefinitely, be thereby denied the opportunity to chart and 
follow a long-term course of growth and development for itself that 
might serve both the regional and the national interest better. For 
its part, the national government, by co-operating in the process either 
deliberately or willy-nilly, may have overlooked latent possibilities 
of achieving further economic progress nationally as well as regionally. 
The external equilibrium required of a region is thus a passive 
kind, neither requiring short-term painful adjustments to avert or 
meet crises occasioned by disequilibrating forces nor, therefore, 
serving to discipline the region to keep to a feasible path of long- 
term growth and development. The absence of sanctions for deviations 
from this path makes it all the more difficult to determine in what 
ways, and to what extent, the region's development is synonymous with 
national economic progress. 
The inflows into the poor region from the national government 
constitute a transfer of buying power from the rich regions of the 
country. As already noted, some of these will be explicitly for 
capital investment purposes and if properly directed, may have the, 
effect of accelerating the long-term growth and development of the 
poor region. Others, however, may be to support a higher level of 
current regional consumption than would be possible if the region relied 
entirely on her current productive effort, as in the case of providing 
better public services (and thus greater public consumption of such 
services), or when the inflows take the form of transfer payments to 
individuals in the lower-income groups. 
A parallel may be drawn here between the national government's 
contributions to the regional economy and the international aid rendered 
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to underdeveloped countries. Whereas, however, the latter is usually 
the subject of careful scrutiny by the donor countries or an inter- 
national agency in an attempt to ensure that the aid is directed 
towards the encouragement of long-term growth and development, this 
kind of scrutiny rarely precedes the provision of regional aid by 
national governments. Not all international aid is directed to capital 
purposes, of course; but it is perhaps fair to suggest that a higher 
proportion of it is likely to be so used than in the case of national 
aid to lagging regions. 
To the extent that this is so, from the regional viewpoint 
the outside aid may be accepted as a permanent feature of its economic 
condition. There are then several risks which ought to be recognized. ' 
The incentives to seek the benefits of growth and development by 
means of extending and improving the region's own productive capacity, 
may be dulled. These benefits take their most obvious form in 
increased consumption and a higher material standard of living: if 
the higher standard is already available from the national government, 
why should the region bother to seek more rapid growth and development? 
The shrewd regional residents will not be long in accepting 
the rules of the game, and may prefer to seek increases in the 
national government's expenditures in the region as the most feasible 
basis for further increases in regional consumption. The more 
restless may choose to migrate from the region to other areas where 
their energies may be applied in more "productive" pursuits. The 
efforts of the restless are largely lost to the region but nevertheless 
available to the nation, so a national loss is not necessarily involved 
in this response to the situation. The efforts of the shrewd are 
immediately beneficial to the region, but largely lost to the nation. 
This loss takes the form of potential regional output foregone which 
could have contributed to further national growth and development. The 
social function of the shrewd regional residents thus consists in 
financial intermediacy between the nation and the region -- a value 
roughly equivalent to the salaries paid such individuals is included 
in the regional and national income, of course, but this value is 
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likely to be small in relation to the potential output loss from 
those more passive regional residents whose current consumption is 
also augmented as a result of the efforts of the shrewd who actively 
represent their interests. 
That these risks exist is not to say with certainty that they 
will operate. It may be, for example, that increasing consumption in 
a poor region will trigger a demand on the part of regional residents 
for consumer goods, sufficient to provoke a greatly increased 
inclination to work and earn more: the creative role of imports in 
this manner has been discussed by Lewis in his classic on growth in 
underdeveloped countries. 
27 
The actual outcome seems likely to differ 
among regions, and therefore demands empirical examination. This outcome 
will depend in part on whether growth can be effectively transmitted 
from the rich to the poor region, perhaps under the aegis of the national 
government, and this in turn will depend on whether, interregionally, 
the "trickling down" tendencies are stronger than the "polarization" 
tendencies. 
The Interregional Transmission of Growth 
Hirschman regards the tendency for any economy first to 
develop one or several regional centres of economic strength 
("growing points" or "growth poles"), and the resulting interregional 
inequality, to be "an inevitable concomitant and condition of growth 
itself". 28 Because the economic operators consistently over-estimate 
the external economies due to the growth poles, however, the clustering 
of, investment there which is healthy for the consolidation of growth 
at an early stage, becomes unhealthy when its continuance involves 
the neglect of investment opportunities that may have arisen or could 
be made to arise elsewhere. Whether such other opportunities arise as 
27W. 
Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth, Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 
Homewood, Illinois, 1955. 
28Hirschman, 
op. cit., p. 184. 
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a result of "natural" forces or have to be artificially induced will 
depend, in part, on the relative strengths of what Hirschman calls 
the "trickling down" and "polarization" effects in the interregional 
transmission of growth. 
These correspond very closely with Myrdal's "spread" and "back- 
wash" effects. 
29 
Hirschman, however, is more optimistic than Myrdal 
about the ability of his "trickling down" effects eventually to over- 
come the "polarization" effects. The difference between them, however, 
is mainly one of emphasis since Hirschman bases his optimism ultimately 
on his expectation that government economic policy would eventually 
come to the aid of the "trickling down" effects. Myrdal, on the other 
hand, uses the tendency for his "backwash" effects to operate more 
strongly, interregionally, than his "spread" effects, as a justification 
for government intervention to reverse the direction of his cumulative 
causation mechanism. Myrdal has merely restricted his diagnostic 
analysis to "market" forces, whereas Hirschman treats government policy 
as one of his variables from the outset. 
29 Interregional differences are affected by "backwash effects" and 
'bpread effects". A prosperous region owes its attraction mainly 
to the historical accident that something was once started there, 
and not someplace else. (This is, of course, somewhat reminiscent 
of Ohlin's theory. ) The "backwash effects" consist of all relevant 
adverse changes, caused outside that region, by economic expansion 
in the region. The "spread effects" are the corresponding beneficial 
changes. 
The "backwash effects" chiefly influence migration, capital movement, 
and trade. Labour and capital both flow to the prosperous region from 
other regions, and trade is affected in a way detrimental to the other 
regions. Similarly, the "non-economic factors" such as roads, railways, 
medical care, and school facilities become relatively inferior in 
the other regions and thus become "backwash effects" too. 
On the other hand, the "spread effects" consist in the widening of 
markets for agricultural produce and new markets for raw materials 
from other regions, and perhaps even the spread of economic expansion 
to these other regions. 
The higher a country's economic development, the greater will be 
the "spread effects". In addition, because richer countries have 
adopted the "welfare state" to a greater extent, market forces which 
result in a backwash effects have been offset by government action, 
while those resulting in spread effects have been supported. Market 
forces have not been similarly counteracted in the poorer countries. 
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In a two-region model comprising a growing North and a backward 
South, two populated regions, Hirschman analyzes the two types of 
effects in the absence of compensatory government policy. The 
favourable effects consist of the trickling down of Northern progress 
to the South, and include: 
(1) most important, Northern purchases and investments in 
the South, most likely if the two economies are 
complementary rather than competitive, e. g., in their 
resource bases and other factor endowments; and 
(2) the absorption by the North, through migration, of 
some disguised unemployment of the South, thus raising 
the marginal productivity of labour and per capita 
consumption levels in the South. 
The adverse effects are any tendencies toward the polarization of 
further growth in the North, for example: 
(1) the displacement of Southern enterprises in manufacturing 
and exports by their more competitive counterparts in 
the North, which is most likely if the two economies 
are competitive in natural resources and factor endowments; 
(2) besides the loss of the jobs and income so involved, 
the South may suffer the further disadvantage of having 
to buy its manufactured goods from the North instead 
of from less expensive foreign sources; 
(3) the loss, through migration Northward, of the South's 
key technicians and managers as well as of the more enter- 
prising young men. If this loss is greater than the 
gain to the North, there is also a net national loss. 
(4) the similar migration of any capital the South manages 
to generate. 
Some Implications for Regions 
It is essentially their greater exposure to these two types 
of effects which distinguishes regions from nations. A nation has 
the difficult task, if it is less prosperous than other countries, of 
having either to find its own internal dynamic or to secure a connection 
with a country already experiencing economic growth. This basis might 
be laid through exporting a product in which it has prospective 
comparative advantage to the richer country, which may itself be 
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difficult and not without attendant costs, particularly in the short 
term. Or it might be found in attracting foreign private investment. 
Or perhaps international aid could be the effective basis for 
securing a growth connection. 
Regions have a considerable advantage over countries in being 
more exposed to the trickling down effects. If the rich North 
requires new or additional supplies of raw materials, for example, it 
is much more likely, 
,j 
priori, to look to its sister Southern region 
than to buy them in foreign markets. Obviously, however, the North 
will turn to the international market whenever the particular items 
needed are not available in the interregional market. Thus the existence 
of complementarity in factor equipment between the North and the South 
is extremely important: its existence almost ensures that, sooner or 
later, the South will grow in step with the North; its absence, on the 
other hand, acts as a powerful deterrent to the solution of the South's 
difficulties by "natural" forces. 
The quid pro quo for their being more exposed to trickling 
down effects, however, is precisely that, unlike nations, regions must 
acquire absolute advantage rather than comparative advantage. 
It is not enough that they produce one product better than 
another, a condition which enables countries to concentrate on the 
former and trade it for the latter. They must produce each product to 
be sold in another region cheaper than it can be produced on the spot 
there. This situation of greater competitive difficulty for regions 
arises from the greater mobility of factors between regions than 
between nations, and from the existence of a common currency. 
Because they cannot rely on comparative advantage, but must achieve 
absolute advantage, regions are also more exposed to the polarization 
effects. As already discussed above, they do not possess the "institutional" 
autonomy which countries can guarantee for themselves by various means. 
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Hirschman argues, nevertheless, that in time the trickling 
down effects may be expected to gain the upper hand. Either 
complementarity will emerge, perhaps as a result of the North's 
reaching full employment and having to look to the South as a location 
for new productive activity in order to continue its own growth. 
Or, failing the "natural" emergence of complementarity, the dominant 
polarization tendencies will be offset by government policy. 
Even with complementarity of resources, however, government 
intervention may be necessary to counteract checks to the trickling- 
down effects, in particular as a result of low short-run supply 
elasticity in the South causing the terms of interregional trade to 
move against the North. Three long run adjustments are then possible. 
First, and most satisfactorily for both North and South, the higher 
prices for Southern output may stimulate a rise in Southern production. 
Secondly, the shortages of Southern output may curtail Northern 
production as a result of rising labour and material costs, to neither's 
advantage. The third, and perhaps most likely, result would be for the 
North to obtain its requirements elsewhere, from other regions or through 
imports from abroad. In time, of course, the South might recover from 
the effects of this reaction by raising its production for the North 
and regaining its connection with the growth process. If not, it 
would have lost part of its advantage, and the consequent trickling- 
down effects, from complementarity with the North. Worse still, if 
the North meanwhile had developed its own internal sources of the 
South's kind of output, the South's ability even to regain its market 
may have been lost. 
Then too the South must await the emergence of government 
policy. This may arise when industry becomes "congested in Northern 
cities and its expansion is hampered by the insufficient size of the 
home market resulting from the depressed income levels in the South. " 
"Also, economic policy makers will be impelled to take a close 
look at Southern development potentials whenever balance-of-payments 
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or other supply difficulties make it clear that the country is 
harming itself by its failure to utilize fully its Southern resources. "30 
Such political forces as these, making for the transmission of 
growth because they operate more strongly within countries than 
internationally, make the transmission of growth much more likely 
interregionally than internationally. 
Hirschman argues that policy and institutional arrangements 
for regional development should be such as to maintain and strengthen 
the trickling down effects, and also to provide certain "equivalents 
of sovereignty" to counteract the polarization tendencies. Regional 
institutions and programs can overcome the despondency and self- 
denigration so often encountered in such regions, and mobilize latent 
energies. National tax concessions can substitute for tariff 
protection, as can some autonomy in bank credit policy. Preferential 
exchange rates could be used to stimulate exports (to other regions 
as well as to other countries). Such policies to counteract 
polarization tendencies should, however, be designed so as not to 
interfere with the trickling down tendencies in the process. They 
should "insulate the South sufficiently so that it may undertake 
certain industrial and export activities in competition with the 
North; but, at the same time, the complementary relationships that make 
the South a supplier of the North must be preserved and intensified. , 
31 
Hirschman places considerable emphasis on complementarity 
between growing and backward regions as a necessary condition for 
transmitting growth between them. Although his analysis is conducted 
largely in terms of the underdeveloped countries, this condition would 
not, a priori, be any less valid in advanced economies marked by 
interregional economic differentials. There too, policies to extend 
the degree of complementarity between regions should be an effective 
30Hirschman, 
op. cit., p. 190. 
31Ibid., 
p. 200. 
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basis for promoting greater regional "balance". In fact, it may be 
even more relevant since the advanced countries are characterized by 
a much greater development of manufacturing industries, particularly 
secondary manufacturing. The challenge would be to achieve 
complementarity among regions through greater division of labour within 
secondary manufacturing. The scope for this is enormous, as evidenced 
by the fact that trade in manufactured goods has been a growing field 
of trade at the international level. The fears expressed only a few 
years ago that trade in industrial goods would be limited, have proven 
groundless in the light of postwar experience. 
Finally, it should perhaps be noted that there is no real need 
for a region to seek to create its own dynamic as a basis for growth. 
If such exists, it should have appeared by now (unless the region is 
unpopulated or undiscovered, or both) and the region probably would not 
be in difficulty. To seek for one which has not appeared while ignoring 
the development possibilities afforded by the region's status within a 
wider national territory, would be to engage in partial analysis 
without any real sense of purpose. It would be much better, and more 
realistic, to examine the region's problems in their proper setting 
and not make the task of encouraging growth and development more 
difficult than it already is. 
Regional Policy and National Growth 
Hirschman's theory deals with the interregional transmission of 
growth, and the conditions under which such transmission is likely to 
occur. Advocates of regional development policies have recently been 
using growth as a justification for such policies on the argument that 
utilization of unemployed resources in less prosperous regions, 
especially labour, would add naturally to national output and national 
growth. This argument has been presented especially by economists in 
the Western European countries. In the wide instructive British 
literature on this subject, this case is perhaps best set out by Thomas 
Wilson in his Policies for Regional Development: 
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(1) although there has been a net movement of labour, 
in most countries, from the less prosperous areas 
to the more prosperous, this has rarely been on 
such a scale as to eliminate the excess margin of 
unemployment; 
(2) even if enough of the unemployed were to migrate in 
order to reduce unemployment in these areas to the 
national average, the remaining population might still 
be inefficiently used; 
(3) it would be easier to maintain a high level of national 
employment without incurring the risk of inflation if 
labour were more evenly distributed relatively to the 
opportunities for employment. 32 
This argument has been raised against the immediate background 
of general British dissatisfaction with the rate of national economic 
growth during the 1950's and 1960's. It might, therefore, be 
interpreted as implying that regional economic development policies are 
suitable only when the year-to-year gains in national output are 
sluggish and it is necessary to consider extreme methods of raising 
the national growth rate such as siting new factories in backward 
areas. This is not so. The same argument applies on a long-term 
basis: if the continuing, long-run development of less prosperous 
regions can be secured, such will render a powerful continuing 
contribution to growth and development of the whole country. 
33 
it 
is essentially a question of making the maximum use of all available 
resources over time. The further growth of rich regions, to the 
neglect of additional development opportunities available in the poor 
regions which are not entirely transferable to the rich regions, does 
not constitute such maximum use of resources. 
32 
T. Wilson, Policies for Regional Development, University of Glasgow 
Social and Economic Studies, Oliver and Boyd, 1965. This was first 
published in Canada as Financial Assistance with Regional Development, 
a report prepared for the Atlantic Provinces Research Board, Fredericton, 
New Brunswick, 1964. 
33For 
a more fully articulated development of the national implications 
of regional development policy, see Edgar M. Hoover, 22. cit., pp. 257-261. 
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This viewpoint is not shared by all economists, however. 
Among those who take an opposite view is Anthony D. Scott, whose views 
will now be examined. 
A Canadian View of Regional Development 
There is a strong bias in Canadian economic thinking, under- 
standable perhaps in terms of Canada's own historical development, 
towards the view that natural resources are the main determinant of 
economic development. The staples theory as developed by Innis is 
usually invoked to trace the original settlement of the country by 
western Europeans, and its subsequent economic progress. The cod 
fisheries, the fur trade, the wheat boom, and more recently, the post- 
war exploitation of mineral and petroleum resources are cited to show 
that Canadian development has been marked by the development of one 
staple, or export commodity, followed by another. The theory is a 
fairly valid description of the development process in a resource-rich 
country developed, and still developing, on the basis of the inward 
migration of both capital and labour. It is, in other words, a theory 
of Canadian settlement. Whether it will continue as a valid description 
of future development will depend, among other things, on whether the 
manufacturing sector becomes a larger part of the total economic 
structure. 
Scott34 develops a version of this theory as a theory of 
regional economic development. He is led, incidentally, to this approach 
by his conclusion that "trade and location theory are suggestive, but 
not really helpful, for their conclusions usually depend on the 
assumption that factor inputs... are not mobile among regions. , 
35 
34A. 
D. Scott, "Policy for Declining Regions: A Theoretical Approach", 
Conference on Areas of Economic Stress, Queen's University, Kingston, 
Ontario, Canada, January 1965 (mimeographed). 
351bid., 
p. 2. This is a surprising statement: for Ohlin, the theorist 
to whom Scott ascribes greatest responsibility for the trade theory 
he especially discusses, has, as we have seen, treated such factor 
movements at considerable length. The explanation must be that Scott has only read the first part of Ohlin's book, while interregional factor movements are only introduced to the analysis therein in Part Three. 
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Location theory is defined by Scott to cover both industrial 
location and the migration of workers. He concludes that a dynamic 
theory capable of comprehending all the variables involved has not yet 
emerged, and that few general hypotheses have so far been tested 
empirically because the evidence is fragmentary for the migration of 
both capital and labour. The only generalization possible is that 
theories of location and migration must focus attention on factor 
endowments and on the productive techniques used by the various 
industries. 
Scotts "regional staple" theory, which is closely related to 
the idea of the "export base" as developed by some American regional 
scientists36, is used to explain: 
(1) factor accumulation. This occurs in response to an 
outside demand for natural resources in an unsettled 
region, savings for investment being generated also 
outside the region. Later, capital and labour are 
accumulated internally and the theory must explain how 
these are held within the region. 
(2) factor migration and regional growth. Growth commences 
either when productive technology makes it possible 
for the region to supply a natural (sic) product, or when 
the demand price rises. When the potential net value 
added is sufficient to cover going factor returns plus 
migration costs, the factors are induced to migrate 
inwards. 
(3) self-sustained growth. This will have occurred if the 
decline of the original staple is followed by "a period of 
reallocation of inputs among industries, accompanied by 
unemployment, a re-pricing of labour and capital services, 
all eventually followed by a resumption of growth with 
full employment. More likely, however, the decline of 
the export base will, given time, lead to the emigration 
36See 
the North-Tiebout controversy, reprinted in John Friedman 
and William Alonso (eds. ), Regional Development and Planning, 
Cambridge, Mass., M. I. T. Press, 1964, pp. 240-265. 
37Scott, 
OP. cit., p. 18. 
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of its labour and capital, the decline of the 
residentiary industries3 , and the eventual reversal of 
the region's growth rate. The process may be time- 
consuming as some labour, and fixed capital, inputs are 
immobile. The disappearance of the "staple" industry 
will leave local real incomes dependent not on the price 
of the export staple in relation to outside price of 
labour and capital, but, basically, on the local birth 
rate. "Apart from the opportunity to emigrate setting 
a floor below these incomes, the region' economy is in 
effect cut off from the outside economy: 
°9 
The chances, 
moreover, of the region finding a new "staple" are small 
because such new "staples" as come along are not likely 
to be situated in the same regions as the old. "Thus 
continued Canadian economic progress leaves in its wake 
a series of depressed regions whose populations, and 
governments, are immobile. "40 
(4) regional contribution to national growth. In a national 
economy closed to international migration of labour and 
capital, the regional development of staple industries 
will be the mechanism of national economic growth, i. e., 
rising per capita incomes. If the economy is open, 
however, like Canada's, it no longer follows that the 
staple-theory mechanism produces higher incomes nationally. 
Scott draws the following main lesson ("almost a truism") from 
his model: "regional incomes need not decline below the national 
average if labour is at least as mobile as capital, and if both inputs 
emigrate at the rate dictated by the rate of decline of the staple 
industry's market (while it pays national wage and interest rates) and 
by the associated decline of the residentiary industries. "41 
Scott elaborates this finding in a section on regional policies, 
and concludes: 
38Scott 
defines these to include any manufacturing industries. 
39Scott, 
öp. cit., p. 21. 
40 
Ibid., p. 22. 
41Ibid., 
p. 26. 
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(1) because it is impossible for (local) government to do 
much about the complete emigration of capital, and 
impossible for it to prevent the emigration of the most 
valuable part of the regional labour force, it might better 
concern itself with minimizing its problems by promoting 
emigration (down to a level where a more "modest" staple 
can pay the national rates of return on labour and capital) 
than with trying to halt or reverse the flow. 
(2) because the inertia of the last-remaining people and units 
of capital is justified by the survival of inappropriate 
units of government, dismantling the regional economy to 
a level appropriate to the industries that it can now 
sustain requires the re-apportioning of regional government 
functions. 
Scott considers a helpful regional policy to be "one that leads 
to incomes that equal the national level, not one that merely leads 
to more industry or more employment at lower standards, nor to a slowing 
of the appropriate rate of regional decline., 
42 
Unhelpful policies 
thus include attempts to remedy the transportation difficulties of 
declining export industries through port and highway facilities and 
subsidies to transport carriers, tax incentives for industry, assistance 
with social capital, and "the deliberate siting of provincial and 
federal installations in areas of low income or employment, without 
regard to their extra expense. "43 Moreover, recent Canadian regional 
plans are criticized for seeking a certain type of "regionary" success, 
not high average incomes for the present residents and their children, 
wherever they choose to live, and because the proposals advanced 
"usually contain many more provisions for the attraction and holding 
of industry than for the embodiment in the labour force not only of 
skills and abilities, but also of an adaptability, a capacity to adjust 
to the techniques, languages, customs or laws of other regions. , 
44 
421bid., 
p. 26. 
43Ibid., 
p. 30. 
44 Ibid., p. 34. 
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Scott admits that the policy he advocates is inapplicable to 
regions with permanently immobile labour, or if provincial and lower 
levels of government persist in their "regionary" bias. Because 
capital is mobile even then, such regions may attempt: 
(1) to increase local saving, and direct it to local 
industries which must be government-owned to avoid 
its use in investment elsewhere; 
(2) to attract private capital on new terms, at a cost 
to someone; 
(3) to increase the resource base. 
Scott finds the last "the most attractive way out, for if a new staple 
is found, it will last, whereas new sources of capital either depend on 
the maintenance of helpful policies by the central government or (in the 
absence of complete nationalization at the regional level) tend to 
drift away. , 
45 
Scott does not explain why the new staple "will last", nor 
does he deal very effectively with the consequences of the search 
for new natural resources being unsuccessful. More important, his 
excessive concern with a natural resource "staple" as the main 
determinant of economic development anywhere, obscures his view of 
the role which manufacturing industries may play in generating income 
and employment in regions some distance from the raw materials they 
consume as, e. g., in Britain, New England, and Japan. His proposition, 
"Certainly most manufacturing industries are resource-oriented, if the 
word resource is defined to include natural advantages in transportation, 
cheap access to raw materials, and so forth", either is unconvincing, 
or it removes the need for his export staple entirely. 
Even applied specifically to Canadian economic development, 
the theory is deficient because it provides little scope for the greater 
45Ibid., 
p. 40. 
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emergence in future of market oriented manufacturing industries, and 
because it advocates that Canadian labour should become rather gypsy-like 
in its behaviour, wandering from one resource opportunity to the next, 
forever. 
His assessment of the impact of regional decline is unnecessarily 
harsh because he assumes that the most valuable workers who migrate 
first, cannot be replaced. At least a partial replenishment is 
possible from new workers entering the labour force locally for the 
first time as they complete their education or training, whose 
situation may depend on whether (temporary) aid to industry can 
establish new export staples. If so, their numbers may also be augmented 
by the return of those emigrants who were first induced to leave by the 
earlier decline. Factor supply adjustments to economic change are not 
a once-and-for-all affair. 
Scott implicitly assumes an elastic supply of natural resources, 
an assumption which becomes less and less credible as the world's 
population continues to grow. One wonders whether the point has not 
already been reached in many countries, although not yet in Canada, 
where the (total) labour supply is almost as immobile as natural 
resources usually have been assumed to be in trade, location and 
"staples" theory, simply because the world's supply of vacant, unsettled 
land with good, exploitable resources is steadily diminishing. Does 
the professor need reminding that scarcity, like factor emigration, is a 
fact of economic life? 
His tacit assumption of full employment in his "staple" model 
is also at odds with the facts of economic life. Unrealistic is the 
best way to describe his predilection with instantaneous achievement 
of the ideal of national (high) level of incomes from all new types 
of economic activity undertaken. 
Finally, his whole theory is to some extent merely gilding the 
lily. "Staple" as used here means export base, and amounts to saying 
no more than that a region must have a source of outside income. 
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The Export Base Theory46 
According to the export base theory of regional development, 
economic activities in a region may be classified into two categories. 
Those activities which sell their output in other regions, and thus 
earn export income, are part of the export base, or economic base as 
it is sometimes called. Those which sell within the region are termed 
non-basic or residentiary, because they serve a demand which is internal 
to the region. The theory postulates that the size of the regional 
economy is determined primarily by the size of the economic base. 
If the economic base is expanded, the total regional economy can be 
expected to increase in direct proportion, that is to say, the 
regional economy will be expanded by a factor (multiplier) which is 
the reciprocal of the ratio which the economic base bears to the 
regional economy. 
It is important to understand clearly the time horizon and 
the type of policy or analytical framework within which this theory is 
to be used. 
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In the short run, the base theory presents a Keynesian 
interpretation of what determines the level of income (and employment) 
within a regional economy. Thus an increase in exports, in response 
to some addition to extraregional demand, results in a flow of new 
46Richardson 
also discusses the economic base concept both as a part 
of interregional income theory (Chapter 10) and as a theory of 
growth (Chapter 13). His conclusions are broadly similar to mine. 
Thompson uses the export base theory as a point of departure for 
developing a theory of urban-regional growth. See his "Internal and 
External Factors in the Development of Urban Economics" in Perloff 
and Wingo, eds., Issues in Regional Economics, Resources for the 
Future, Inc., John Hopkins Press, 1968. Both Richardson and Thompson 
criticize the excessive reliance upon exports as the factor promoting 
regional growth and development, in the export base theory. 
47It 
is also necessary to recognize that the export base theory 
emphasizes the role of demand in causing regional development. 
Scott's analysis, discussed previously, emphasizes the role of supply 
factors, viz., the location of natural resources. As Edgar M. Hoover 
points out, both approaches are relevant and necessary parts of an 
adequate theory of regional change and development; see Hoover, 2k. 
. 
Sit.. 
pp. 221-ff. 
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income to the region concerned. The exporters buy beer or some other 
non-basic commodity, producers of beer purchase other commodities and 
services, and so on. Because at each round a portion of the income 
received is not spent within the region, that is, it is saved or used 
to import goods and services from other regions, the cycle cannot 
continue indefinitely. Eventually it peters out, at the point where 
regional imports have grown to the level where they offset the original 
injection of income from exports. It can be shown that the total 
impact on regional income will be greater than the original increase 
in exports by a factor (multiplier) which is equal to the reciprocal 
of the marginal propensity to save or to spend on imports (sometimes 
called the marginal propensity to "leak"). This, it should be noted, 
is not the same value suggested in the preceding paragraph. 
In this form the economic base theory is simply a particular 
version of the conventional Keynesian theory of (short run) income and 
employment determination. It places special emphasis on exports as 
a determinant of regional income and employment whereas, in the usual 
version, income and employment are also influenced by the other 
variables that comprise effective demand, namely, Consumption, Investment 
and Government Spending. Of these three, moreover, Investment and Govern- 
ment Spending are just as exogenous to the flow of income as Exports, 
while Consumption is treated as endogenous, being partly dependent 
on the level of income itself. Thus there is no good reason to treat 
Exports as the crucial variable affecting income and employment in the 
short run. So it would seem that, for short run income determination 
and the related matter of stabilization policy, the economic base 
theory offers only a partial explanation. 
More specifically, it is not a theory of regional growth 
because when the original injection of export income peters out after 
successive rounds of expenditure within the region, the level of income 
and employment in the regional economy returns to the level which 
existed prior to the injection. The injection has provided only a 
temporary boost for regional income and employment. The situation can 
65. 
be illustrated by an example. Suppose there is an increase in 
extraregional demand for some product of the region, e. g., pulpwood. 
Pulpwood producers hire additional workers in order to meet the new 
demand. These workers, previously unemployed, use their wages to 
buy additional consumer goods and services. Income (and perhaps 
employment) rises in the consumer industries in the region, and 
workers in these industries use the additional wages they receive 
to purchase other consumer goods and services. And so on. At each 
round, however, some of the consumer goods and services purchased have 
to be "imported" into the region from outside, and so a portion of 
each round of expenditure "leaks" from the region. Eventually these 
"leakages" build up to the point where they equal the original injection 
of income represented by the increase in demand for pulpwood exports. 
At this point, the effect of the original injection will have 
run its course. Unless the higher demand is sustained, that is, unless 
the increase in extraregional demand is permanent, regional income and 
employment will return to their previous level. The process of 
adjustment will proceed in much the same way as with the expansion of 
demand for pulpwood in the first place. Pulpwood producers will lay off 
workers, whose expenditures will contract, causing a reduction in 
expenditures for consumer goods and industries and perhaps some further 
unemployment, etc. 
It is important to remember that, like Keynesian theory 
generally, this export base model of regional income determination 
is relevant only to the short run. Supply conditions in the regional 
economy are assumed constant, including a given state of technology, 
a given structure of industry, and a given set of input-output relations. 
All that is allowed to vary are, on the one hand, exogenous demand 
factors such as export sales and, on the other, the level of income 
and employment. The analysis is a form of comparative statics, and 
simply cannot deal adequately with the dynamics of growth. It is only 
capable of answering this sort of question: 'given certain supply 
conditions, which may be considered more or less constant in the short 
run, what factors determine the level of income and employment in the 
short run? 
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But in regional development, as in growth and development 
generally, we are not concerned with this question at all. Rather, we 
are interested in understanding how and why growth and development occur. 
In particular, we are interested in observing, explaining, and 
influencing changes in demand and supply conditions of the regional 
economy as they occur over time, i. e., in the long run. To do this 
we need either a more dynamic and broader model than the Keynesian one, 
such as the Harrod-Domar model or the neoclassical model of growth, 
or a number of different models, each emphasizing a separate aspect of 
the regional development process. Among the latter would be included 
the export base theory applied in a long-term sense. 
As a model of long-run development, the export base theory 
posits that the growth of a region depends upon the growth of its 
export industries or the expansion of its export base. Because it 
therefore places its whole emphasis on the role of extraregional 
demand as the main determinant of regional growth, it is not a complete 
theory of regional development. Other factors can be just as important 
in some circumstances as dynamic determinants of regional change, 
including autonomous investment, technical change, increasing 
efficiency in regional supplying industries, and central government 
spending. But it does draw attention to one of the most important, 
and frequently neglected, aspects of regional growth and development, 
namely, the relationship between a particular region and the national 
economy - or set of interrelated regions - to which the region belongs. 
It frees us to consider other methods of achieving faster growth than 
"taking in each other's washing". It helps us realize that each region 
must find a role(s) to perform in the national economy -a lesson which 
is important especially for regions with relatively small populations 
which cannot hope to achieve complete self-sufficiency without some 
sacrifice of efficiency. 
48 
It lets us recognize that the task of 
regional growth and development may be divided into two parts: 
48This 
point has been accepted also by many countries which have 
benefited enormously from developing their capabilities to perform a 
world-wide role in selected economic activities in which they have 
specialized. Sweden is perhaps the best example. 
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(1) stimulating increases in export demand for a 
region's present or potential output or, alternatively, 
develop. ng a sound basis for predicting which products 
are likely to be subject to increasing demand in other 
regions in future; 
(2) taking steps to ensure that the region will be capable 
of responding, on the supply side, to meet the increase 
in export demand. 
Further, it can more readily be appreciated that, without some 
attention being paid to the former, little success is likely with the 
latter. 
The export base theory stresses the importance of increasing 
regional exports as a means of achieving faster regional growth. Fast 
growing regions will thus tend to run export surpluses. In order to do 
so they must be able to draw upon available sources of unutilized 
labour, perhaps by absorbing regional unemployment and underemployment, 
or by the in-migration of labour from outside. One advantage of the 
export base model is that it allows for this possibility. The theory 
is predicated on the notion that growth is unbalanced, that is, it does 
not strive to explain the notion of an equilibrium rate of growth 
based on the assumption of full employment. For this reason it seems 
more applicable to the type of problem confronting regional economies 
such as the Canadian Atlantic Provinces which are characterized by 
substantial margins of underutilized labour. 
In pursuing a policy of expanding a region's export base, the 
problem reduces to that of developing complementarity of factor 
equipment with other regions with which the underdeveloped region 
trades. Preferably, such complementarity should be achieved with 
richer, growing regions within the same country. Obviously, there 
will be advantages in having the richer region in reasonably close 
proximity, e. g., a neighbouring region. 
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Another implication of the export base theory is that it 
offers a greater opportunity for regions to enjoy economies of scale. 
By specializing in certain products or sectors and developing 
production capabilities therein, a region can hope to serve the wider, 
interregional market, the whole national market, or even become an 
earner of export income for the national economy by successfully 
penetrating foreign markets. 
CHAPTER 3 
The Technical Means of Regional Economic Development 
The essential elements of the theory elaborated by Ohlin and 
later amplified and modified by the contributions of Myrdal and Hirschman, 
may be briefly summarized as a guide to policy for regional economic 
development. It should be noted, incidentally, that this summary does 
not deal directly with the question of whether regional economic 
development should form part of any country's national economic policy. 
That is a separate matter, and will be examined in Chapter 4. 
For the present we are primarily concerned with the general 
guidance which the theories discussed in the previous chapter can 
offer for the purely technical aspects of policy for regional economic 
development. In other words, we wish to determine which are the 
important variables, or sets of variables, that influence interregional 
economic relations within a country, and how they interact upon one 
another. Once identified and related properly to one another, the 
system comprising these variables and their relations can serve as one 
means of assessing -- in a strictly technical sense -- existing 
regional policies and perhaps of suggesting other, more promising 
policies for regional economic development. 
Localization of Productive Factors 
Let us suppose that the existing interregional localization 
of productive factors is, as Ohlin contends, a function of: - 
(1) localization at earlier times; 
(2) changes in the domestic supply of productive factors 
through births, deaths, savings, etc.; and 
(3) factor movements which the interregional price differences, 
as broadly interpreted, have been able to effect in spite 
of the incomplete mobility of labour and capital. 
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If we now wish to consider how policy may be used to influence 
the future localization of productive factors, we may treat the 
desired future pattern (whatever it may be), as a function of the same 
three variables. The difference would be, however, that in the policy 
context, the present localization would have to be treated as a 
given datum. In other words, policy will be effective (over time) to 
the extent that it can influence either future changes in the domestic 
supply of productive factors, or future factor movements, or both. This 
amounts to saying only that any inequality between regions in their 
respective supplies of productive factors, and thus their capacity to 
earn income from the total economic activity undertaken throughout the 
interregional price system, may be reduced either by increasing the 
supply in the relatively deficient region from whatever sources may 
exist internally, or by augmenting that supply through the movement 
into the deficient region of factors from the region with the larger 
share of total productive factors, or through some' combination of these 
two sources. 
We may avoid, for the present, an explicit consideration of 
whether Scott is correct in his conclusion that natural resources are 
the overriding influence in determining the location of economic 
activity, by treating natural resources as one type of productive 
factor. It is true that Ohlin's theory specifically includes only 
capital and labour as main types of productive factor and that he too 
treats the availability of immobile natural resources as an important 
influence in attracting capital and labour to a region. Yet he also 
recognizes the subsequent further effects on localization of any 
initial concentration of labour and capital, and of a region's eventual 
growth as a consumers' market. Moreover, he specifically recognizes 
that labour and capital are broad categories capable of division into 
numerous sub-categories; and the same is true, of course, of natural 
resources. From a technical viewpoint there is no need, at this 
stage of the argument, to distinguish natural resources from labour 
or capital: each is, potentially, an input to the productive process. 
A bountiful supply of any one of these three factors, ceteris paribus, 
gives a region some initial advantage over other, less well endowed 
regions. 
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In addition, a region's supply of natural resources lends 
itself to increase, at least conceptually, either from newly discovered 
internal sources (as Scott enthusiastically suggests) or through the 
inward movement of natural resources from other regions. The latter 
point is not an academic one; for certain regions, and nations, with 
bountiful supplies of labour and capital, can and do import the natural 
resources they require. The most obvious example of such movement of 
natural resources is the United States, which relies heavily on the 
importation of natural resources, mainly in raw or partly processed 
form. This type of trade is the main form of Canada's exports to the 
U. S., her most important external market. 
A region's supply of productive factors at some specified 
future time, because it is to a considerable extent a function of its 
present supply, can only be changed gradually over time as a result 
of internal changes or from whatever external sources may exist. 
Policies intended to achieve some prescribed supply of productive 
factors by some future time will be effective, therefore, to the 
extent that they can effect these internal changes and/or external 
sources. This means, then, that there are two types of policy for 
regional development: 
(1) that which influences internal changes through births 
and deaths of both people and firms, savings, and 
investment; 
(2) that which influences interregional factor movements 
(including the movement of natural resources). 
It is not clear, without an examination of the jurisdictional 
division of responsibilities between the national and the regional 
government, whether the first type of policy falls within the scope 
of the regional government. Clearly, however, it does not require 
the direct acquiescence, or involvement, of other regional governments. 
The second type, policy dealing with interregional factor movements, 
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clearly does require the collaboration of at least two governments 
if it is to be effectively applied. 
1 
In regions'with some history of past development, the 
existing supply of productive factors, that is, capital and labour, 
is bound to be more important in determining future localization than 
in virgin territories of the type Scott favours. In the latter, by 
definition, there is no capital or labour, only natural resources. 
In settled regions, however, alterations in the supply of such factors, 
brought about through changes in the region's industrial structure, 
are bound to be more of a time-consuming process. This is essentially 
what makes measures to influence regional economic development 
inherently a part of long-term economic policy. It, therefore, 
follows that except insofar as the timing of particular expenditure 
projects is concerned, regional policy should be as little distorted 
as possible by the vagaries of the business cycle. 
Its long term character also renders any empirical assessment 
of the success or failure of regional policy, except over long periods, 
extremely difficult. When the regional policy is itself subject to 
frequent change, such empirical assessment becomes virtually impossible. 
The Gist of Regional Policy 
Long term programmes designed ultimately to influence either 
internal or external sources of supply of productive factors are thus 
If the two regions are part of the same country, the national 
government's acquiescence would probably be sufficient to support 
the region's own government in bringing the desired policy into 
effect. With a federal system, the number of consenting governments 
needed may rise to three, namely, two regional units and the national 
authority. If the two regions are not within the same country, this 
aspect of the problem becomes even more complicated, and enters the 
field of international negotiation. 
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the gist of regional policy. They need not, however, consist in 
attempts to influence internal births, deaths, and savings, or 
interregional factor movements, directly, but may also incorporate 
measures whereby these potential sources may be indirectly, but 
effectively, stimulated. In other words, their effect on internal 
and external sources of productive factors will be a legitimate test 
of the suitability of various regional policies whatever their 
immediate impact may be or whatever particular form they may take. 
The theory reviewed in Chapter 2 does offer, however, some 
important suggestions about the form which such policy should take. 
In particular, Hirschman's conclusion that the trickling down effects 
need to be strengthened if growth is to be transmitted interregionally 
is essentially an argument for promoting greater interregional trade 
based on complementarity of factor supplies. Such trade would lead 
to greater interdependence between the regions. Thus, by exposing 
its supply capacity to demand from a rich region, it would enable the 
poor region to participate more in the growth of the rich region. 
The more that economic relations between the rich region and the poor 
region can be made to consist of commodity movements rather than of 
factor movements in one direction only, the greater will be the degree 
of integration of the poor region with the rich one. 
Scott's "export staple" theory implies much the same lesson 
although it is expressed in different terms and although Scott is 
himself led to rather pessimistic policy conclusions. Trade in the 
specific form of some staple for which there is extra-regional demand 
and which thus can earn extra-regional income, is necessary for a 
region to develop. Within a country, this conclusion may be 
generalized as follows: trade in commodities (of any kind) between 
a rich region and a poor region is necessary for the poor region to 
develop. There is no logical need, at the purely theoretical level, 
to specify the kind of product which the poor region should sell to 
the rich region beyond saying, as Hirschman does, that such products 
are more likely to be sold if they satisfy a demand that cannot be met 
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as effectively from other sources available to the rich region. 
Complementarity is thus the only necessary condition for interregional 
trade in commodities to occur. 
2 
The emphasis placed by Scott on the 
trade having to consist, even initially, in the sale of natural 
resources by the poor region is both undue and unnecessary; it merely 
reflects his insistence upon establishing a connection between 
regional development theory and the North American settlement pattern 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The Significance of Natural Resources 
There are a number of practical examples which cast 
considerable doubt on Scott's contention that natural resources are 
an overriding influence in determining the location of economic 
activity. They may be classified into three groups. 
In the first place, there are many prosperous industries 
throughout the world which utilize imported raw materials. Japan, 
for example, has developed an extensive steel industry despite the 
fact that she must import both coal and iron ore, the natural 
resources required. The United States, as already noted, is a net 
importer of such natural resources as oil and gas, electric energy, 
iron ore, pulpwood and woodpulp, and certain agricultural and fish 
products. The Danish furniture industry, the English china industry, 
and the Caithness glass industry, which all utilize imported raw 
materials and energy, are other examples. 
2The 
partial or complete absence of such complementarity leads to the 
poor regions-, having,, -an, -adverse balance of payments. The implications 
of such an adverse balance were explored in the previous chapter. 
Over time the existence of a continued deficit in commodity trade 
may make a region dependent on income transfers from the central 
government, and thus render it. less and less capable of developing 
its own basis for increased commodity trade with other, richer regions. 
It is thus desirable to find a satisfactory basis of complementarity 
for a region as early as possible, to break the vicious circle 
whereby the region, otherwise, becomes more and more "dependent" on 
the transfer of income which it receives from other regions without 
having to "earn" such income. 
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Secondly, the other side of the coin is that many countries 
and regions have been unable to develop economic activity, or able to 
do so only to a limited extent, even though they have access to 
natural resources of one kind or another. Here we need look no further 
than the Atlantic Provinces. Iron ore from Labrador is shipped in 
semi-processed form to the United States. Pulpwood, rough lumber, and 
pulpwood chips are exported in the unprocessed state to the U. S. and 
the U. K. where they undergo further manufacture. Even hydroelectric 
energy sources, with improving technology that permits transmission 
over long distances, no longer exercise the same influence on the location 
of industry they did formerly. Thus, power from Churchill Falls is 
utilized in New York City. In other words, access to markets is 
increasingly a more important locational factor than supply of raw 
materials, for many types of economic activity. 
Thirdly, access to markets is but one example of a series of 
factors which may assume greater importance than natural resources in 
determining the location of many types of economic activity. The 
Danish furniture industry, already referred to, relies on design 
capability, an acquired advantage. The availability of certain types 
of skilled or unskilled labour is not necessarily related to the 
supply of natural resources, but can be important for many industries. 
A large, diversified labour market in which many industries prefer to 
operate, is more likely to be synonymous with. a large, metropolitan 
consumer market, rather than with the supply of natural resources. 
For the service industries particularly, location at or near the 
market is a virtual necessity; hence, increasing urbanization also 
tends to reduce the importance of natural resources as a location 
factor. 
In summary, Scott's thesis may have some validity when applied 
to the settlement of a new, previously unpopulated territory. But it 
is much too simple an approach to offer useful guidance to location 
tendencies in the increasingly complex economic conditions which 
prevail in the second half of the twentieth century. It follows, 
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therefore, that regional development policy should not be unnecessarily 
circumscribed by Scott's main proposition that new economic activity 
must be based upon natural resources. A more helpful basis for 
regional development may instead be found by considering all three 
components of a poor regionts present and potential supply of productive 
factors -- labour and capital as well as natural resources. Thus we 
may return to the main thread of my argument. 
Interregional Trade 
The encouragement of interregional trade is, then, one means 
of fostering the economic development of a poor region. The tying of 
its economy to another, stronger regional system in this way will, over 
time, enable it to become integrated in the larger economic system 
thereby created; if, eventually, all regions come to have proportionately 
equal total supplies of productive factors (though the character and 
"mix" of such factors may differ between regions) there will be "perfect" 
integration. Each region's factor supply would then be capable of 
contributing to production and, hence, income within the whole 
(national) economy in proportion to its importance as a part of the 
system. 
Viewed in this way, as a force working towards integration and 
greater interdependence among regions, interregional trade in 
commodities provides a focus for regional policy making. One purpose 
of regional policy will be to stimulate interregional trade based 
on complementarity. 
Moreover, as trade develops in commodities there will be a 
tendency for factor supplies to adjust to the new conditions thus 
introduced to the interregional price system. Ohlin has observed 
that factor movements are in essence an adaptation of factor supply 
to change in the price system and has concluded further, that such 
factor movement adjustments are "advantageous" in an overall sense 
from the viewpoint of price economy. In other words, total production 
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is enabled to increase in the interregional price system as a result. 
It is possible, therefore, for policy to infouence interregional factor 
movements not only by direct controls or inducements, but also by the 
indirect method of influencing interregional commodity trade. To some 
extent also, the stimulation of more interregional commodity trade may 
obviate the need for policy aimed directly at increasing internal 
sources of productive factors. 
An operational theoretical framework for regional economic 
development policy thus might be developed on the main assumption 
that measures to stimulate interregional trade in commodities may 
lead eventually to an increase (relatively) in the poor region's 
total supply of productive factors, because of the indirect effects 
such measures have on interregional factor movements. Changes in 
such supplies, whether from within the region or as a consequence of 
interregional factor movements, may properly be used as a test of 
effectiveness for regional policy. But the regional policy may take 
the form entirely of measures to induce more commodity trade and need 
not include any attempts to influence changes in factor supplies 
directly. 
Ohlin has shown that the volume of interregional trade is 
dependent on three main factors: 
(1) the inequality of factor equipment, that is, the 
supply of labour, capital and natural resources. My 
inference is that since trade tends to vary directly 
with such inequality, policy should seek to make 
factor equipment in the poor region more unequal, that 
is to say, the poor region must be enabled to 
specialize in certain lines of production for the bi- 
regional market. 
(2) the size of the respective (total) regional incomes. 
From this I conclude that, as trade is reduced by 
further concentration in the rich region, policy should 
seek to reduce any tendencies for further increases 
in total production (and hence income) throughout the 
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interregional price system, to be concentrated in 
the rich region. 
(3) the direction of demand. There must be a demand, or 
at least a potential demand, in the rich region for the 
goods which are to be produced in the poor region. I 
conclude, therefore, that this suggests the need for 
some selection of the type of goods in which productive 
capacity is to be stimulated in the poor region. 
A fourth factor may be the existence of the economies of scale. 
If such economies are available only to economic activities carried 
on in the rich region, perhaps because its internal market is greater 
than the poor region's, the effect will be a tendency to reduce 
interregional trade still further below the already low level brought 
about directly as a result of the rich region's having the larger 
share of production factors. If, to make matters worse, such economies 
of scale enable the rich region to sell in the poor region at prices 
below the poor region's costs of production (in the absence of 
economies of scale), the trade in commodities will become increasingly 
unbalanced. 
3 
The implication I draw for policy here is simply that, 
as far as possible, the economic activities to be sited in the poor 
region should be capable of exploiting economies of scale in producing 
commodities to be traded with the rich region. This has the further 
implication that, in consequence, more rather than fewer, economic 
activities may have to be established in order to provide the poor 
region with the desired share of all interregional productive factors. 
30f 
course, in a closed system, there would have to be a 
compensating flow of payments on "invisible" account to offset the 
imbalance on trade account if interregional payments (including 
payments to social welfare recipients) are to be balanced, as they 
must be. 
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Regional Trade Policy 
Since interregional trade depends on complementarity, policy 
to stimulate such trade must seek also to increase the degree of 
complementarity by a selective approach, probably on the part of the 
national government, to the commodities in which trade is to be 
fostered. This aspect of policy is treated further in Chapter 16. 
Short term gains are less apt to be eroded in the long run if trade 
is fostered in those commodities which may be produced in the poor 
region and "exported" to the rich region rather than obtained by the 
rich region from internal or other, external sources. 
With very rich, growing regions it may be necessary for the 
rich region to forego certain lines of production in order to leave 
some scope for the poor region to build up its supply capacity in such 
fields. This would perhaps involve some cost to the rich region in 
the short, or even the medium, run; but in the long run these costs 
would be offset by the attainment of higher, possibly more efficient, 
production throughout the whole interregional price system. The 
sacrifice of some efficiency (and thus real income) in the short term 
could be more than offset by the attainment of higher total production 
in the long term. 
The stimulation of interregional trade in commodities is likely 
to require, of course, considerable investment in new productive 
capacity. Hirschman treats such investment by the rich region in the 
poor region as a trickling down effect somewhat separate from increased 
purchases of commodities but having much the same influence on 
reducing interregional differences. Such investment is also much 
more likely to occur if the region's respective productive factors are 
complementary. It may, however, be part and parcel of the whole 
process of increasing interregional trade on the basis of greater 
complementarity since, as seems likely, some capital investment may 
be necessary in order to equip the poor region with the (capital) 
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factors it requires to combine with the factors it already possesses 
to produce the commodities to be sold to the rich region. 
4 
In such circumstances the investment, i. e., the interregional 
movement of the capital factor, may have to precede the trade in 
commodities. In both theoretical and practical terms, however, it is 
the need to foster interregional trade and thus to expand the supply 
of productive factors in the poor regions which give rise to the 
initial need for the capital investment in new productive capacity 
in the poor region. The transfer of some capital from the rich to 
the poor region is a means to the end of increasing commodity trade 
between them. Apparently, also, the adjustment of factor supplies 
begins with the decision to increase trade through investment in the 
poor region, and does not await the actual movement of the commodities 
to be traded. 
Another important implication for regional economic development 
policy which derives from the requirement to increase complementarity, 
is that the poor region should seek out opportunities to supply commodities 
which are at or near the margin between what the rich region produces 
efficiently and what it produces inefficiently or chooses to import 
from abroad, in which the poor region has a reasonable prospect of 
becoming an efficient producer. This approach differs fundamentally 
from attempting to stimulate the development of the poor region through 
the creation of an economic structure similar to, or even identical 
with, the rich region's structure. The latter course will only lead 
to greater interregional competitiveness in the respective supplies 
4It 
may also have to acquire certain types of labour, skilled 
workers or managers for example, from sources external to the 
region as a consequence of the decision to create new capital 
facilities. 
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of productive factors, with a consequent decrease in commodity trade and 
the probability of a further increase in interregional disparity. 
5 
The Need for Economic Growth 
In a static interregional price system, i. e., a stagnant 
economy, the decision to create new capital facilities in the poor 
region would, in the absence of greater internal savings, require 
the simultaneous dismantling or abandonment of similar existing 
facilities in the rich region, and the transfer of productive factors 
formerly employed in the rich region, to the poor region. The problem 
would be even more stark if the interregional system were operating at 
full capacity. 
6 
A dynamic, growing national economy, however, presents an 
opportunity for the development of poor regions. The stimulation 
of interregional trade, and of more investment in the poor region, 
can be effected by seeking to influence the localization of new 
productive factors that become available as a result, largely, of 
population growth and technical progress. In such circumstances 
regional development becomes a feasible undertaking. 
But such regional development will not automatically ensue 
even in a rapidly expanding national economy. Rather, the opportunity 
must be seized through the adoption and pursuit of a suitable regional 
development policy. If appropriate policy is adopted and put into 
5An 
encouraging factor is the growth in world trade in manufactures 
between developed manufacturing countries. Even the developing 
countries have increased their trade with the developed to an 
encouraging extent. 
6There 
would then, however, be less pressure for the reduction of 
interregional disparity since the poor region would also enjoy 
full employment. 
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effect, then time can be thereby brought to the side of the poor, 
peripheral regions. The poor region's supply of productive factors 
can be augmented deliberately over time. Without such regional 
policy, time would remain on the side of the rich, central regions 
which would continue to expand more rapidly as a result of such 
market and institutional factors as economies of scale, agglomeration 
tendencies, and better access to markets. In short, while a growing 
national economy is a necessary condition for effective regional develop- 
ment, it is not a sufficient condition. Deliberate policy for regional 
economic development must be adopted and pursued. 
The most difficult thing in executing a policy for regional 
economic development may well be, to begin. This is implicit in the 
suggestion above that investment, probably using at least some 
factors available only in the rich region, will have to precede the 
initiation of trade. Since the investors, whether private or public, 
will probably want to be satisfied that the commodities eventually 
to be produced can, in fact, be sold, there may also have to be prior 
agreement to the policy by private or public interests in the rich 
region. Moreover, the securing of such agreement, especially if it 
is with the rich regional government, may need the active help of the 
central government. With all the uncertainty surrounding the start 
of what is apt to be a radical change in economic policy by all 
governments concerned, this tactical obstacle may be the most difficult 
to overcome. 
Once overcome, however, the poor region might find itself soon 
on the way to relatively rapid, or at least steady, development and 
integration in the national economy. At least, this is the hope 
offered by Myrdal's conclusion that his cumulative causation process, 
once reversed from its negative direction, becomes a powerful, built-in 
factor working for the steady progress of the poor region. 
Moreover, Ohlin's second general observation about factor 
movements lends support to this anticipation. Such factor movements 
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are, he noted, greater within countries than between them. It may 
well be that, given a conscious policy decision to stimulate the 
economic development of a poor region on the basis suggested here, 
there would follow a sufficient change in expectations to induce 
a greater willingness on the part of workers to move into the poor 
region (or to remain there rather than emigrating), and on the 
part of owners of capital to undertake a more active search for 
investment opportunities in the poor region than had hitherto been 
worth their while. 
Marketing 
The main obstacle to interregional commodity trade is, 
as Ohlin has pointed out, the costs of transfer, or marketing in 
the comprehensive sense. These in turn depend on the distance between 
the rich region and the poor region, and the character of the earth's 
surface over which transportation takes place. Such costs cannot 
be ignored, but "must be added to the elements which comprise the 
interregional price system". They cannot be treated in abstract 
theoretical terms, in other words, but must be included in any 
empirical analysis of economic relations between regions. Costs of 
transfer here means all services (of productive factors) required 
to transfer commodities from one region to another, and is thus a 
broader concept than "transport charges". 
From the viewpoint of the individual firm or producer, "costs 
of transfer" may appear to consist simply of "transport charges" 
payable to the railway company, trucker, shipping firm, or airline 
which transports products to market, or raw materials to the factory. 
From an overall, macroeconomic -- or social -- perspective, however, 
"costs of transfer" reflect the usage of all labour and capital 
required to build, maintain and operate transportation facilities 
and systems. Labour and capital used for such purposes, are no longer 
available for use in the direct production of goods, or in other types 
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of economic activity. Ohlin recognizes this need to take account of 
the "costs of transfer", but does not go much further into analyzing 
its significance and implications. Nevertheless he does acknowledge 
the need to consider the distance factor in understanding interregional 
economic relations. He thus recognizes the failure to consider distance 
which characterizes most economic theory. 
Distance, from raw materials and/or markets, makes it necessary 
to consider the "costs of transfer", including transportation 
facilities or costs. But there are other implications which arise 
from the need to include the factor of space -- usually ignored in 
economic theory -- in the study of regional economic development. 
Some of these were treated in Chapter 2, and need not detain us any 
further here. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the main conclusion of this chapter is that 
"helpful" regional policies, to borrow Scott's phrase, will consist 
essentially in attempts to increase complementarity between regions 
so as to integrate poor regions in the national economy by fostering 
greater interregional trade in commodities. An important means of 
achieving increased trade, and complementarity in factor equipment, 
will be through new capital investment in the poor region. Such 
investment should be concentrated in economic activities whose 
products can be sold in the rich region or throughout the interregional 
price system, preferably including industries which can reap the 
economies of scale. Such activities need not necessarily be based on 
the extraction and processing of the region's own natural resources. 
A condition for this approach may well be that the rich region abandon 
or forego certain spheres of economic activity in order to provide the 
poor region with the opportunity to develop its (complementary) role 
in the interregional system. The stimulation of trade between regions 
in this way need not include any direct measures to influence inter- 
regional factor movements, except as short run expedients to relieve 
bottlenecks, since factor movements constitute an adjustment mechanism: 
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the interregional spread of all types of factors can be left to adjust 
itself to the new conditions created by the stimulation of greater 
interregional trade. This adjustment, and the expansion of trade, 
involve a long-term process which makes it imperative, therefore, 
that regional economic development be treated as part of long-term 
economic policy and not mainly, as it has been so often in the past, as 
part of stabilization policy. In devising and executing such policy, 
regard must be had for the costs of transfer -- in the broad sense -- 
because these constitute an important obstacle to interregional commodity 
trade. In view of Myrdal's circular causation hypothesis, which 
supposes that once the development of the poor region is underway its 
progress will be steady and continuous, the most difficult step in 
executing an effective regional development policy, may well be to 
begin. 
In the case of Canada's Atlantic Provinces there is, of course, 
no super planning agency to make decisions regarding the location of 
new capital investment on the basis of the objective of achieving 
greater complementarity of factor equipment between the Atlantic and 
other regions. Thus there is no mechanism available whereby such a 
policy can be put into effect as a once-and-for-all affair. Instead, 
an approach must be devised to influence individual investment decisions 
as they occur so that, over time, the desired increase in interregional 
complementarity can be achieved. As regards federal government 
investment, the investment decisions of various departments and 
agencies might be coordinated to this objective through the normal 
budget-making process, especially if a separate capital budget is 
normally prepared. In the case of capital outlays by the provincial 
governments, investment plans along the lines suggested by Thomas Wilson 
in his 1964 report to the Atlantic Premiers7, would be an appropriate 
device. 
7Thomas 
Wilson Financial Assistance with Regional Development, 
Atlantic Provinces Research Board, Fredericton, N. B., 1964, p. 67. 
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A more complicated problem in this respect is that of 
influencing investment decisions within the private sector. Guidelines 
might be developed and promulgated among business firms, with a view 
to having managers take the objective of increased interregional 
complementarity into account when deciding on individual projects; 
but this may be a rather far-fetched possibility. It would perhaps 
be much more feasible to apply such guidelines if there were a program 
of government financial assistance for private industrial investment. 
Then either the increased complementarity objective could be built into 
the criteria used in awarding financial assistance or, alternatively, the 
administrators of the financial incentives could be instructed to use this 
criterion as part of the basis for negotiating grants or loans to the 
firms concerned. 
To make this criterion operational, it would be necessary to 
keep the structure and interregional relations of each regional 
economy under review, in order to determine which industries -- or at least 
which types of industry -- should be encouraged to locate in each 
region. Then, whenever a firm in a desired category makes application 
for financial assistance, special efforts could be made to encourage 
its location in the region where it would contribute most to increased 
interregional complementarity. Thus there is a need to develop 
guidelines of this kind for use by incentives administrators as well 
as by managers of private industrial firms. 
The guidelines are required because the type of industries 
which are contemplating investment in new capital facilities at any 
point in time, is determined by other factors than the desire for 
increased interregional complementarity. These latter include not 
only the factor proportions which apply to the particular operation, 
a "supply side" consideration, but also the influence of demand 
including, for example, the income elasticity affecting the product 
concerned. 
CHAPTER 4 
The Social Purpose of Regional Economic Development 
The emphasis of the first three chapters has been on the 
technical and theoretical aspects of regional economic development. 
The discussion of theoretical aspects has revealed that economists 
hold different views as to whether regional development is a 
suitable objective of public policy. Scott's thesis that natural 
resources are the principal determinant of economic development and 
that other factors of production should move to the location of such 
resources so as to maximize total production and income, entails the 
obvious implication that labour, as one of the factors of production, 
should move, or be encouraged to move, to new natural resources as 
old sources become depleted. This is perhaps an over-simplified 
restatement of Scott's position, since he does admit the possibility 
that the original staple may be replaced, or made relatively less 
important, in time if the regional economy succeeds in growth and 
diversification. But it does characterize one extreme view of the 
attitude which governments should take towards declining or less 
prosperous regions. 
The notion that natural resources are the sole basis for economic 
development is more suited to the conditions of the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries. This was the period when commercial and colonial 
empires were being acquired and developed. The purpose of colonizing 
new territories was frequently to gain access to natural resources 
such as timber and minerals, and it was from these raw materials that 
the imperial powers' interest in these new territories largely derived. 
Their governmental responsibilities in the newly developing territories 
often extended only to those of their own citizens who went as 
colonists to the new territories. In many cases the imperial powers 
took little interest in the welfare of the people who already inhabited 
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their new colonial territories. Time would bring substantial changes 
in this regard; but during the initial thrust of colonial development, 
the inhabitants of the new territories were regarded by the colonial 
power not as citizens in their own right, but as foreigners or 
"colonials". Their services might be enlisted, providing the cost 
was not excessive, in recovering the desired natural resources around 
them and in having them transported to the mother country. But the 
very nature of the colonial relationship implied a standard of welfare 
for the "colonials" which was inferior to what citizens of the mother 
country expected to enjoy. 
The relationship of a lagging region to other regions in the 
same country is, in this respect, a different case for two basic 
reasons. First, there may be few natural resources in the lagging 
region which the national government is interested in developing. Thus 
for the national government the focus of policy making consists of the 
people who live in such lagging regions, not the natural resources 
that are available there. Secondly, and probably most importantly, the 
lagging region's inhabitants are citizens of the same country as those 
in rich regions, and usually come to expect a more or less equal 
standard of welfare, regardless of the "economic" circumstances - 
including the availability of natural resources - affecting their region. 
The object of policy then becomes that of seeing to it that those of 
her citizens who live in a lagging region are somehow enabled to enjoy 
a standard of welfare equivalent to that available elsewhere in the 
same country. Thus the proposition that economic development must be 
determined solely by the criterion of natural resources being available, 
does not hold unless the government is prepared to ignore the 
democratically-legitimate expectations of those citizens who live in 
the lagging regions. 
At another extreme is the view that all regions should be 
assisted to develop regardless of the costs involved or the 
difficulties that may, on a reasonable forecast, be expected. 
Fortunately this view is not usually held by economists: the debate 
about regional policy among economists has been centred, in fact, on 
the extent to which the costs (and the expected benefits) of regional 
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economic development differ from the costs (and the expected benefits) 
of encouraging labour migration to more prosperous regions. Economists 
who favour national measures to assist lagging regions thus do 
recognize that costs are usually involved. They deserve, therefore, 
to be distinguished from others, such as politicians and sociologists, 
who may miss the important point that regions are in competition with 
one another for limited supplies of capital (for example), and that 
this competition requires some choice as to which regions are to 
acquire new capital and in what relative proportions. 
While economists who favour regional development as an 
objective of policy do regard the costs (and benefits) involved as 
an important factor influencing the nature and timing of regional 
programs, they consider that suitable programs of this kind undertaken 
when national circumstances permit, are a desirable objective of public 
policy in the long run. As already noted there has been a concerted 
effort in the recent literature on regional development problems to 
demonstrate that, in a growth context, the benefits not only outweigh 
the costs incurred, but the excess of benefits over costs is greater 
than could be obtained either from non-intervention or from giving 
more deliberate encouragement to labour migration to the more 
prosperous regions. This is a difficult case to prove once and for 
all, simply because circumstances change and the "right" course of 
policy action today may be the wrong one tomorrow. Moreover, the 
opportunity to exercise such a choice may only arise occasionally, 
as for example, when a general review of national economic policy is 
being undertaken: even then, the range of choice will be limited -- 
perhaps severely -- by decisions that have previously been made, the 
full consequences of which cannot be altered. In other words, the 
relevant framework in which the question whether or not to pursue 
regional development should be asked, consists in the actual policy 
making process which affects the regional economy, and in particular 
economic circumstances affecting the region and the country to which 
it belongs. The ctuestion, therefore, cannot be resolved except by 
empirical examination, even if only purely economic aspects were to be 
considered. Here, as in other branches of economic theory, there are 
no irrefutable dogmas to guide the policy maker. 
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The last proposition is an important one. It amounts to 
recognizing that economic theory cannot provide ready answers to 
complex questions. 
This is rather different from the view sometimes encountered 
that economists know how to solve regional problems if only the 
policy makers would listen more carefully to them and follow their 
suggestions with less regard to the "political considerations". 
Some economists may indeed know how to solve regional problems but 
if so, it will not be solely because of their knowledge of economic 
theory. 
The decision whether or not to pursue regional development 
programmes is, of course, influenced by more than purely theoretic 
considerations. This is essentially because regional development 
has come to be regarded as one sphere of activity in which national 
governments engage, and in democratically governed countries (and 
probably to some extent also in totalitarian systems), the decision 
is affected --perhaps mainly affected --by political considerations. 
In the final analysis, the policy makers must be satisfied that any 
policy adopted is generally acceptable, at least to a majority of the 
electorate. 
Is there, then, any point at all in the economist attempting 
to specify the economic considerations that may be involved? Would 
it not be as well for him to devote his energies to other pursuits, 
since political leaders are obviously much better placed than he to 
assess the political considerations and to determine the mood of the 
electorate? This difficulty can be resolved if it is remembered: 
firstly, that the economic development of regions is, as of other 
units of political jurisdiction, in many respects the 
engine of progress in other spheres. Regional economic 
development is not an end in itself, but a means to a 
rising standard of living -- and perhaps other desirable 
social goals -- for the region and its residents. 
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secondly, that because these desirable social objectives essentially 
reflect the individual aspirations of regional residents, 
therefore, 
thirdly, it is necessary that programmes for regional economic 
development be made consistent with the social objectives 
they are intended to serve. This compatibility with the 
broader social purpose is a more important characteristic 
of regional programmes than rigid adherence to purely 
economic criteria, however they may be conceived. 
These points do not deny the economist a crucial role in the 
formulation of regional development programmes. Quite the contrary; 
because economic development is the means chosen to seek the 
attainment of the overall regional objectives, his potential value 
is enhanced. The achievement of consistency between the economic 
programmes undertaken and the social goals sought, demand his 
particular skills. But he will be well advised to remember the wider 
ends in view and, therefore, the limitations of his discipline in 
taking them into account. 
From the region's own viewpoint regional economic development 
programmes thus represent the expression of economic, social, and 
political goals. In this sense, a region's aspirations differ very 
little from a nation's aspirations. 
Most western industrial nations have adopted, as long term 
economic objectives intended to achieve other, wider social goals, 
some variation of the following: 
-a rising standard of living, that is, increasing real 
income per capita; 
1 
- high and rising levels of employment; 
2 
'This is, of course, a "welfare" objective. 
2Lower 
unemployment is not the same thing as high and rising 
employment. 
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-a high and sustained rate of economic growth, that is, 
increasing total real output of goods and services; 
3 
- stable prices; and 
-a viable balance of payments position, that is, a volume 
of real exports sufficient to balance real imports after 
allowing for long-term capital flows that can be justified 
in terms of prospective rates of return viewed dynamically. 
There is, of course, some element of conflict among some of 
these objectives which at certain times becomes sharp and clear. 
For example, the need to control a threatening serious inflation 
and/or to restore equilibrium in the balance of payments, may require 
a temporary relaxation in the effort to achieve higher employment, 
faster growth and increased real income. Similarly, on occasion it 
will be necessary to choose between maximum growth of income and 
maximum increases in employment. It seems that, even at the national 
level, it is not feasible to be dogmatic about the economic objectives 
which should be pursued. The inevitable conflicts among particular 
economic objectives can only be resolved in the context of actual 
circumstances as and when they arise. 
There are three main implications in the fact that any major 
economic region is part of a nation. The first is that the region 
must accept some share of responsibility for achieving national 
objectives, whether economic, social or political. The economic 
activities of the region must be guided by the sort of national 
economic goals outlined above, or whatever variation of them is 
accepted in its particular country. This does not rule out disagree- 
ment by any region with the objectives that have been adopted: indeed, 
one avenue of regional improvement that must not be overlooked, lies in 
securing periodic reformulation of the national goals so they will more 
suitably reflect the varying needs and aspirations of all regions. 
Pending success on this front, however, the region has a duty to constrain 
the pursuit of its own peculiarly regional objectives by the national 
interest. 
3There 
are alternative methods of measuring "economic growth", of course, 
e. g., by measuring increases in total real output per capita. 
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Secondly, and by the same token, the regions problems are 
not entirely its own. They deserve some attention from the country 
generally, and probably some contribution to their solution from the 
national government. This contribution may take a variety of forms. 
Finally, each region in making its claim for a greater share 
of total national resources --for example, for new capital investment -- 
must compete with other regions, both growing and lagging. That is to 
say, there will be frequent occasions when a choice is possible among 
several regions, and such choice should be made on the basis of a 
proper weighing of the relative benefits and costs expected among 
the respective competing regions. In other cases a particular 
opportunity may arise in only one region, and its claim is then 
clearly accepted by other regions. In the absence of regional economic 
development as one of the aims of national economic policy, the danger 
would be that such opportunities might not be exploited and, 
consequently, perhaps forever lost. 
In this sort of national policy framework, regional economic 
development becomes less subject to the vagaries of the short-term 
business cycle and the constraints it often imposes on regional 
measures under the present economic policy framework in Britain, for 
example. While the objectives of British regional policy are 
essentially long term in character, it is nevertheless true that regional 
policy measures operate effectively as an adjunct to full employment 
stabilization policy. Buoyant demand conditions nationally are a 
necessary condition for vigorous pursuit of these regional objectives. 
Thus, whenever it is necessary to restrain the growth of demand to 
counteract disequilibrium in the balance of payments, regional 
development objectives are temporarily displaced. Only when demand 
can be allowed to grow again, can the regions expect their prospects 
to improve. Within the wider framework embracing national economic 
and social goals outlined above, regional economic development, while 
still constrained by the national interest, becomes more clearly a 
long term objective for the nation as a whole. Its adoption by the 
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national government represents a commitment to help create the 
conditions in which residents of the region can make positive 
contributions to the economic, social and political life of the 
nation. 
In short, the purpose and the emphasis of regional development 
policy ultimately consist in striving to provide increasing economic 
opportunity for people living in different regions of a country. 
This implies a recognition that "People Prosperity" is to be preferred 
to "Place Prosperity"4 as an objective of public policy at the national 
level and, more particularly, as a goal of regional economic policy. 
The social case for regional development rests upon the assumption 
that it is beneficial for the nation that individuals in lagging 
regions should have opportunities to utilize their capacities fully. 
People Prosperity involves a deliberate attempt to improve 
the economic status of individual citizens of a country, without 
regard to which region or locality they happen to reside in. 
The Place Prosperity doctrine argues that, if public policy 
should specifically help the less-advantaged classes of people to 
find jobs, then it should by the same token seek to underwrite the 
prosperity and growth of all communities and regions. Sometimes such 
argument is based merely on the false assumption that whatever is 
true of individuals must also apply to areas. On a more rational 
plane, however, Place Prosperity may be considered as a rox for the 
ultimate ideal of People Prosperity. That is, a suitable method of 
improving the economic status of an individual is to raise the 
economic status of the region in which he happens to live. 
4These 
terms were first employed by Louis Winnick, "Place Prosperity 
vs. People Prosperity: Welfare Considerations in the Geographic 
Distribution of Economic Activity", in Essays in Urban Land Economics, 
in honor of the 65th birthday of Leo Grebler (Los Angeles: University 
of California, Real Estate Research Program, 1966). They are 
discussed further in Hoover, E. M., op. cit., pp. 259-ff. 
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Hoover points out two shortcomings of the Place Prosperity 
doctrine: 
(a) it ignores the fact that a region does not correspond, 
for any length of time, to a fixed set of people. 
Assisted mobility may offer a better alternative to 
job creation, in some circumstances, as a means of 
promoting regional development. 
(b) it may be wastefully nonselective in its assistance. 
Instead of helping the poor and the unemployed in a 
lagging region, the benefits of regional development 
programs may be bestowed instead on those who are 
already employed and prosperous. Growth of total 
regional income and employment does not automatically 
mean improvement in per capita income or the reduction 
of unemployment. 
The essence of my argument above is that regional economic 
development should not be treated as a peripheral national purpose, 
given serious attention only when other economic and social objectives 
are being attained or approached at satisfactory rates. It must, instead, 
be a primary objective of public policy which receives continuing 
attention if any progress towards it is to be made. This is 
essentially because the economic development of regions, as of 
countries, takes time; its stimulation demands a deliberate, pain- 
staking approach. It is not an activity likely to yield quick, 
powerful results if it is carried out only during the boom, or the 
late stages of expansion, of each business cycle. It must be made, 
rather, a long term social objective at the national level. 
This is not to say that the national government must sponsor 
the economic development of all regions, regardless of cost. There 
will always be some choice to be exercised as to which regions ought 
to be developed, or which ought to be the location for a particular 
investment, at any point in time. This choice should be exercised 
95. 
after some weighing of the relative costs and benefits of the 
various regions to be considered. Subject to other, non-economic 
constraints, the choice should be of the region where the development, 
the emphasis, or the investment project offers the greatest overall 
excess of benefits over costs. This is different from saying that 
the choice should be of the region where success seems most likely; 
since the demonstration effects of successful development in the 
past are so powerful, this approach would differ very little from the 
results of freely made private sector decisions according to the 
profit motive. The weighing of relative benefit/cost expectations 
among competing regions, within a framework of national objectives, 
would mean that the equation would include the possible effects on 
non-selected regions (and hence the country) of choosing any one. 
5 
This sort of analysis, in an ideal world, should be continually 
repeated since the results of one exercise will not apply to other, 
similar decisions. Nor can they be expected to hold good for all 
time. The interregional balancing of benefits and costs must be a 
continuing process guiding the formulation and execution of economic 
policy. The results cannot be predicted in advance, nor can useful 
generalizations be offered. 
What is possible is to suggest some general considerations 
which should guide regional development policy. In this it will 
be assumed that some defined and accepted division of the country 
into a number of major economic regions, already exists; that each 
of these major economic regions is a populated region; and that the 
complete depopulation of any region (a time-consuming process) is not 
open as a practicable alternative, even if only for "political" 
reasons. 
5It 
is recognized, of course, that the use of benefit/cost 
analysis within a social accounting framework is no easy task. 
Even, however, if no quantification is possible, the qualitative 
identification of all possible effects is a worthwhile prelude to 
policy action. 
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Against this background the object of regional economic 
development should be eventually to make each region as economically 
self-supporting as possible. Each region, in other words, should be 
given every possible opportunity and freedom to earn its own keep. 
This is not the same as trying to make each region self-sufficient, in 
the sense that it produces itself all the goods and services required 
for regional consumption; as Chapter 3 has shown, it will be necessary 
to encourage interregional trade so that each region may make a positive 
contribution to the economic life of the nation. Any international 
trade into which a region may enter is also a logical extension of 
interregional trade and another useful role for the region to play in 
national economic life. 
It can be conceded that development of lagging regions cannot 
always proceed without interruption or delay. There will be times when 
other national economic objectives have to be given priority. For 
example, it may be necessary for the national government to divert 
resources to prosperous regions in order better to achieve objectives 
of national growth, or to correct disequilibrium in the balance of 
payments. At other times political considerations may outweigh regional 
development goals. There would be such political costs to reckon 
with, whenever regional development begins to divert much needed 
infrastructure investment from booming population areas to lagging 
regions, especially where there is a strong possibility of capital 
under-utilization in the lagging regions. At such times regional 
development may have to proceed more slowly. The important need, 
however, is not to have regional development treated as the most 
important objective of national economic policy. Rather, it is to have 
regional development treated as one of the continuing objectives of 
such policy, to be considered whenever important decisions are made 
or significant policies are changed or introduced. 
If the object of regional economic development is viable 
economic regions, then it follows that the national government must 
devise regional (and national) economic policy with this in mind. 
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Programmes and projects should be assessed on the basis of their 
likely impact in terms of this long-term objective. Apart from 
social welfare programmes to relieve individual hardship during any 
transitional period, expenditures for regional economic development 
should be allocated to those economic activities to be carried on 
in each region which show reasonable prospects of eventually 
becoming efficient and self-supporting. Some short-term 
subsidization of inefficient, unprofitable activities may be 
necessary, even desirable, if the long term prospects of such 
projects appear sound; but the propping up of inefficient activities 
with little prospect of long term viability is to be studiously 
avoided. 
Because inevitably some regions are more prosperous than 
others, and economic development is itself an uneven process which 
cannot occur simultaneously in all regions, some degree of regional 
economic disparity can be expected even when regional development 
is an explicit social objective and even when regional programmes 
are carefully devised and consistently pursued. It will probably 
never be possible to eliminate such inequality entirely. What should 
be attempted is the removal of serious disparities from one region to 
another. But a policy commitment, expressed perhaps in terms of per 
capita income figures, to eliminate interregional disparities 
entirely, is something which should be avoided. For one thing, such 
a formulation may be interpreted in all regions as a form of 
guaranteed uniformity which could dull the incentives which exist 
for individuals to seek rewards in proportion to effort, under a mixed 
economic system. 
An aspect of such incentives and their effectiveness is the 
interregional factor mobility discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, where 
we noted that factors tend to move to higher returns even although 
factor mobility is less than perfect. We also noted that such factor 
movements constitute an important adjustment mechanism for the 
interregional price system, enabling the spread of productive factors 
to adjust to changing conditions throughout the interregional economy. 
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In this connection intraregional factor movements are no less 
important than interregional movements. It is mainly because a 
policy commitment to eliminate all interregional disparities 
entirely (and perhaps all intraregional ones too) may hinder the 
proper functioning of the adjustment mechanism of factor movements, 
that such a formulation of regional policy objectives is to be 
avoided. 
The effectiveness of policy is likely to be further enhanced 
if, in addition, no attempt is made to influence interregional factor 
movements by direct means. A clear choice between "work to the 
workers" or "workers to the work" is seldom, if ever, open in a 
decision-making situation, and there is really no practical purpose 
to be served in labouring what is an almost wholly academic issue. 
In effect, a little of both will be useful from time to time, both 
within and between regions. 
Finally, the argument of this chapter may be briefly 
summarized. Regional economic development should be seen as an 
important goal at the national level. Its aim should be the 
achievement of conditions in which each region can develop a useful, 
worthy role in the nation's economic, social and political life. 
Policies to further this aim should avoid permanent subsidy of 
economic activities in order to concentrate on encouraging and 
assisting the development of activities which show good, long term 
prospects of becoming efficient and self-supporting. The temptation 
to specify, as a policy objective, the complete elimination of 
inequalities in per capita measures of economic status interregionally, 
should be resisted because of its possible disincentive effects upon 
individual enterprise in search of reward. There is no practical 
purpose to be served by continuing the academic debate between those 
who favour taking work to the workers, and those who prefer taking the 
workers to the work, since some of both is frequently to be desired. 
Indeed, factor movements should not even be the focus of government 
policy for regional development; they constitute a valuable adjustment 
mechanism whereby factor supplies may adjust to interregional changes 
in commodity trade. Such changes in commodity trade are the proper 
object of policy measures. 
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All this amounts perhaps to no more than saying that regional 
economic development is an essential aspect of long term national 
growth policy. In this context idle resources should not merely be 
drawn into work in less prosperous regions, almost forcibly, only 
when no other source of such resources are available because the national 
economy is operating at or near capacity. Instead they should be 
assisted to develop over time, and thus enabled to make a positive, 
continuing contribution to national economic growth. In other words 
the purpose of regional economic development, as stated above, is to 
provide regions (or more precisely, their residents) with the 
opportunity to contribute to the nation's economic, social and 
political life. 
This interpretation of the social purpose of regional economic 
development is, moreover, quite consistent with the technical purpose 
outlined in Chapter 3. The fostering of interregional trade, by 
increasing complementarity among regions, in order to encourage greater 
interregional transmission of growth, represents, in effect, the 
technical means to the social ends discussed in this chapter. The 
emphasis on the wider social policy aspects at the national level of 
regional economic development is to be contrasted with the approach to 
declining or backward regions of those who pessimistically refuse 
to believe that such regions have any long term prospects and, 
therefore, should only be assisted towards further and/or faster 
decline. Those who hold this view apparently prefer to treat some 
citizens of a country as expendable, and justify their attitude with 
the proposition that total national income or total national output 
will be greater than if resources are diverted to regional economic 
development programmes. This proposition cannot be finally demonstrated; 
nor can my argument that, in the long run, regional economic development 
conducted on the basis I have suggested, be proven either. But it is 
my belief that if a choice must be made between these two divergent 
approaches, it is better to remember that economics is, after all, 
about people. 
6 
6I 
am indebted for this phrase to Professor A. L. Levine, one of my 
teachers at the University of New Brunswick. 
INTRODUCTION TO PART II 
The purpose of this Part is to describe the selection process 
actually used by the Scottish Development Department in choosing the 
"growth areas" announced in the White Paper of November 1963, "Central 
Scotland: A Programme for Development and Growth". In this, attention 
will be focussed on the criteria actually employed at each stage of 
the selection process, in order to determine, as objectively as 
possible, the actual basis of selection used. If the various factors 
taken into account can also be "weighted" somehow, an overall 
impression may be conveyed as to the nature and purpose of the "growth 
areas" actually selected. It should perhaps be emphasized that the 
object is not to assess whether on the criteria used, the "correct" 
places in Central Scotland were identified: this question will not 
be considered for the object is primarily to formulate, as clearly 
as possible, the basis of selection and not the result. 
Part II is in four chapters. Chapter 5 reviews the historical 
background to the growth areas selection exercise, as well as the 
policy framework within which the proposals for the future development 
of Central Scotland in which the growth areas figured prominently, 
were formulated. It deals with physical planning policy in Scotland, 
with British location of industry policy as applied to Scotland, and 
with the Toothill Committee's 1960-61 study of the Scottish economy. 
The last is analyzed in an attempt to deduce the Committee's view of 
the role growth areas should play in regional development policy. 
While its notion of growth areas was never made very explicit in the 
Toothill Report, the fact is that the Committee's study and 
recommendations inspired the selection process in 1963, and therefore 
warrant consideration in this way. 
The actual selection process is examined in Chapter 6. 
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In Chapter 7 an effort is made to summarize the changes in 
"growth areas" policy by examination of developments in British 
financial inducements since 1963, and to assess their significance. 
An assessment of the important characteristics of the "growth 
areas" as well as of their value as a technique for economic development 
in Central Scotland, is contained in Chapter 8. 
These final observations include a brief discussion of the 
relationship between the Scottish "growth areas" and the theoretical 
concept of the "growth pole" (pole de croissance) developed by the 
French economist, Francois Perroux, and others. 
Against the background of the regional economic development 
theory discussed in Part I, I thus want to examine the British 
experience with regional economic development policy. In particular, 
I want to compare the Scottish experience with Canada's experience 
in developing her main lagging region, the Atlantic Provinces. 
There are, of course, big differences between the Scottish 
problems and those of the Atlantic Region. It seems reasonable to 
hope, however, that some aspects of the Scottish experience would 
offer relevant comparisons, as well as being of interest from a 
broader point of view than that of Atlantic Region development. 
Part II has been based on material kindly made available to 
me by the Scottish Development Department, and on personal interviews 
with some of the officials involved in the work of the Department, 
and in the Board of Trade, during the period when this work was being 
carried out under the auspices of the Scottish Development Group. I 
am grateful for their substantial assistance; the conclusions reached 
herein, however, are my own responsibility. 
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Part II 
Chapter 5. 
Physical Planning in Scotland Since 1945 
LL 
Great Britain is a small, densely populated island in which land 
is a relatively scarce factor of production. As a result, the Government 
exerts considerable control over overall land use and is heavily involved 
in land use planning for the whole country. Prior to 1943, when the 
first Town and Country Planning Act was passed, local authorities were 
only empowered to prepare planning schemes for their areas. Since then, 
however, the Town and Country Planning Act has required that any develop- 
ment of land in Britain receive prior planning permission from the local 
Planning Authority (a county council or urban government unit). Such 
planning permission is given or refused in the light of the development 
plan prepared by each authority at five year intervals for its area. In 
turn, the development plans of the various local authorities must be 
submitted in advance to the Central Authority for approval. In Scotland, 
responsibility for reviewing and approving local authority development 
plans belongs to the Secretary of State for Scotland, and is executed by 
the Planning Division of the Scottish Development Department. It is 
therefore within this department that policy for the future land use 
planning of the country as a whole is usually developed. Moreover, with 
the local authorities also empowered to acquire land required for 
development in various ways, compulsorily if necessary, physical planning 
is much more than merely permissive. Decisions made at local authority 
level, once sanctioned by the Secretary of State, are soon put into 
effect. 
The implication of these arrangements is important. It is that 
the local authorities, along with the Scottish Development Department 
l, 
In terms of specific developments, private entrepreneurs are the 
instigators and the planning authorities control their activities. 
But in devising longer term plans involving the allocation of land 
within their jurisdictions to housing, commercial, industrial and 
other uses, the planning authorities themselves become the instigators. 
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are the main instigators of change in'the Scottish physical environment? 
When these powers are used with a view to economic development, the 
planning authorities assume the capacity of "economic operators" as 
well. They are thus in a position, partly to fulfill, or perhaps rather 
to complement, the social role which economic theorists have 
traditionally ascribed to the private entrepreneur. 
Another important piece of legislation in this connection is 
the New Town Act of 1946. This authorized the Secretary of State for 
Scotland to designate areas within the country to be developed as 
New Towns, the main purpose being seen originally as that of relieving 
congestion and excessive population-growth in large cities, especially 
London, by creating "overspill reception centres" where some of the 
population in such cities could be relocated. The development of such 
new towns was to be sponsored and administered by new town development 
corporations created for the purpose; members of these bodies were 
nominated by the Secretary of State and their administrative expenses 
borne by Exchequer grants until such time as the new towns became 
viable units and could be administered in the normal way by locally- 
elected councils, when the development corporation would be dissolved. 
Since responsibility for the designation of new towns is entrusted to 
the Secretary of State, the preparation of "outline development plans" 
for Scottish new towns is also a function of the Scottish Development 
Department. 
Several years before these two Acts were passed, the foundations 
of post-war physical planning and regional development in Scotland were 
effectively laid in the Clyde Valley Report and Plan. The Clyde Valley 
Region, comprising the whole of the counties of Dunbarton, Renfrew and 
Lanark, more than half of Ayr, and a few parishes in Stirling County, is 
centred on Scotland's major metropolitan centre, the City of Glasgow. It 
2Until 1962, when the Scottish Development Department was established, 
the responsibility for physical planning was carried by the Scottish 
Department of Health. 
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contained almost half of the total Scottish population, a consequence 
of the concentration of industry and population associated with 
Glasgow's rapid emergence during the Industrial Revolution as an 
industrial and commercial city of world-wide importance. , 
This agglomeration of industry and workers had been attracted 
to the area by its rich seams of coal which became the base for iron 
and steel, heavy engineering and shipbuilding. Relatively easy access 
to ocean transport had been a further natural advantage. During the 
world-wide Depression of the 1930'x, however, the concentration on 
"heavy" or basic industry had made the Clydeside economy especially 
vulnerable. From 1939 to 1945 the stimulation of demand for wartime 
purposes had permitted robust recovery by these particular industries 
from the unemployment of the 1930's, but had not left much room for 
diversifying the general economic structure. Accordingly, one of the 
problems encountered by the Clyde Valley regional planners in 1946 was 
"a relatively inflexible industrial economy of a predominantly heavy 
basic-character with a bad past history of serious recessions. 13 The 
industrial structure, dominated as it was by the shipbuilding and heavy 
engineering activities on Clydeside, was also considered to be 
"relatively immovable". 
It was the concentration of population which received greatest 
attention from the Clyde Valley planners, however. Particular concern 
was paid to overcrowding and unsuitable housing conditions, the extent 
of which had been rather well documented in available statistics. In 
three square miles of Central Glasgow in 1945 there were 700,000, 
persons, or an average gross density of 400 persons to the acre; in 
some sections net densities rose as high as 700 persons to the acre. 
Glasgow would have an estimated displacement from proposed redevelopment 
3Robert Grieve, "The Clyde Valley -A Review", a paper delivered at the 
Town and Country Planning Summer School held at the University of 
St. Andrews 1954 under the auspices of the Town Planning Institute, 
reprinted for the Town and Country Planning Association (Scottish 
Section), 452 Sauchiehall Street, Glasgow, p. 2. 
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areas of 550,000 persons, or half its total population, and some 
300,000 of these could only be rehoused by overspill beyond the 
City boundaries. 
4 
Because this scale of proposed overspill was 
about the same as what the London County Council envisaged as 
necessary from an area with a population three times the size of 
Glasgow's, the Clyde Valley planners were convinced that housing 
was "the fundamental problem". The idea that industries would be 
attracted to the new towns was entertained, rather tentatively, by 
the Clyde Valley planners, but was not widely held. 
New Towns Proposed 
The choice of "overspill" as a solution, in preference to the 
outward extension of Glasgow's own boundaries or increased spread of 
the whole Clydeside conurbation, was conditioned by the limitations 
imposed on development by physical topography, on the one hand, and 
the planners' desire to preserve` some sort of "green belt" on the 
other. "The Clyde Valley" is largely surrounded by uplands, moorlands 
and hill country, rising rapidly to heights which forbid development. 
Within this barrier, the physical characteristics are such that only 
a few areas exist on which some four new towns of the 50,000 class could 
be built without coalescence with other built-up Areas. 
5 
There was no 
lowland plain in which expansion would occur, as there was in all the 
large industrial areas of England. The application of the "sieve map" 
technique to the region revealed, moreover, numerous physical and land 
use restrictions on development including liability to flooding and 
mineral subsidence, as well as large areas of high quality agricultural 
land and certain other areas of high scenic value. Much of the 
The data quoted in this paragraph are from Grieve, op. cit. page S. 
5Grieve, 
page 14. Italics mine. There is no reason given for the 
choice of 50,000 as the desired size for new towns; the figure 
probably seemed ambitious at a time when the new towns policy was 
only beginning to emerge in Britain, although by today's standards 
the scale of development implied seems small. 
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subsidence problem was due to the working or prospective working 
of coking coal, of which Scotland was then very short - "there could 
be no question of restricting the working of this vital national 
resource to allow for housing development". 
In the event, the "Green Belt principle" could be applied, 
partly because it consisted of a system of interconnected wedges and 
cut-offs which were not suitable for building for various reasons. 
This physical constraint gave further support to the planners' own 
preference for a green belt which is clearly revealed in the following 
extract from the Plan itself: 
"It has been pointed out earlier in this Report that the 
Clyde Valley in its middle and lower sections was, before 
industrialization swept across it, a rich agricultural area. 
Even today ...... the quality of the land around and between 
the various parts of the great urban complex is, on the whole, 
of a high grade. It was unfortunate that there should have 
been this superimposition of first-rate farmland on a rich 
coalfield, because it meant not only a loss to agriculture by 
the coverage of so much land by urban and industrial uses 
but the impairment of so much more by damage to field drainage 
through subsidence, and by soot and smoke. " 
"It is felt strongly by us that the time has come to take 
stock of what is left, and to protect and safeguard it from 
further encroachment. The clamant need of this country today 
is for the supply to townsfolk of abundant quantities of the 
protective foods which we are eminently suited for producing - 
milk, green vegetables, eggs, etc. These must be fresh to 
yield their highest food value; they must be produced, 6 
therefore, as close as possible to the consuming areas. " 
The outer line of the Green Belt was based on the surrounding 
moorland edge, and contained the greater part of the Clyde Basin's 
agricultural land plus, of course, the Glasgow-centred conurbation. 
Within this outer ring all urban areas (except Glasgow, Greenock and 
Rutherglen) were capable of meeting their housing needs by peripheral 
6The 
Clyde Valley Regional Plan 1946, Preliminary Edition, June 1946, 
pp. 289 - 290. 
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expansion in the opposite direction from Glasgow; and the inner ring of 
the Green Belt was drawn accordingly. This left three major areas 
capable of accommodating new towns without coalescence with other urban 
areas: 
(1) the Houston-Bishopton area, west of Glasgow 
(2) Cumbernauld, north-east of Glasgow 
(3) East Kilbride, south-east of Glasgow. 
In these areas new town sites were proposed to take overspill. 
The four new towns, plus some peripheral building, plus the 
recommended building up of other places in Ayr, however, still left an 
overspill requirement to be met outside the Clyde Valley Region of a 
further 100,000 population. 
The Plan which emerged, however, was not the classic Green 
Belt system of urban regional planning, but a polynucleated urban 
system designed on a very tight pattern and set in a green background. 
Industrial estate sites were chosen to service the overall pattern, old 
and proposed, in relation to an adapted major road network which dealt 
with the cross-river road problem and also proposed two major new 
radials and three ring roads. The unco-ordinated railway system also 
was to be pulled together into a rationalized framework which, 
it was strongly recommended, should be electrified and co-ordinated 
with road transport. 
The Clyde Valley Regional Plan has not been completely adopted 
in all aspects and details. Grieve noted in 1954 that two of the major 
road proposals had been abandoned and that some intrusion by Glasgow 
into the green belt had occurred to help accommodate the city's pressing 
housing problem. Nevertheless important proposals in the Plan were 
implemented, including a considerable number of the industrial 
estates proposed and a great deal of housing built by local authorities, 
and perhaps most important, the commencement of East Kilbride, one of the 
four new towns recommended. But some years were to elapse before the 
others proposed were to be activated. 
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The self-contained new town was, according to Grieve, one 
of the fundamental principles of the Plan. Such new towns 
constituted a means not only of decongesting population from Glasgow, 
but also of decentralizing industry as well. They were seen as 
related to the proposed pattern of industrial estates in a special 
way in which "the main objects .... were the attraction of new 
diversifying industries and the reduction of travel to work. " In 
such new towns the planning and development of housing and industrial 
facilities would be carried out on an integrated basis. 
New Towns Established 
In 1947 the new town of East Kilbride was designated by the 
Secretary of State for Scotland. The document 
7 
explaining the 
proposals noted that the proposed development of the new town derived 
from four major principles of physical planning policy for the Clyde 
Valley Region: 
(1) planned decentralization of congested urban areas is 
essential; 
(2) urban development must be carried out in such a way as 
to prevent a physical link-up of existing urban units by 
further "urban sprawl", by preserving adequate green 
belt areas; 
(3) adequate provision is necessary "for new industries and 
for the relocation of existing industries at present 
accommodated in unsatisfactory premises or unsuitably 
located for the purposes of expansions"; 
(4) to give effect to these principles, the planned 
reconcentration of population and industry decentralized 
from congested areas in the Region in one or more new 
towns, is essential. 
7Department 
of Health for Scotland, "New Town at East Kilbride", 
Edinburgh, H. M. S. O., 1947. 
109. 
Many industrial undertakings in Glasgow and North Lanarkshire 
were located in outmoded premises "inextricably mingled with congested 
and obsolescent housing accommodation", and planned redevelopment of 
such areas was expected to reduce building densities and considerable 
decentralization of population and industry. 
The document referred to the growth of Greater Glasgow from 
13,000 acres to 28,500 acres between 1919 and 1939, an increase twice 
as great as what occurred between 1850 and 1914, as evidence of 
"urban sprawl". Private enterprise construction of 13,000 houses in 
Giffnock, Eaglesham and Newton Mearns in Renfrewshire, and Bearsden 
and Milngavie in Dunbartonshire, had enabled "an uncoordinated mass of 
peripheral housing development equivalent to a new town of the size 
proposed for East Kilbride, predominantly of one social class, with 
no civic identity, practically no independent social facilities and no 
industry. " The tendency to peripheral spread were to be resisted so 
as to secure an adequate green belt reservation around existing and 
new urban units in the region. 
Further new industrial estates also were to be established 
outside the limits of the present congested urban areas; the 60,000 
additional new jobs estimated to be required in the Glasgow area "within 
the next few years". These would have to be provided in industrial 
premises in entirely new communities. The scope for attracting such 
new industry to Glasgow itself was limited by the scarcity of suitable 
land for industrial sites and by the prior claim on such sites of 
Glasgow firms wishing to move from congested and out-of-date premises. 
East Kilbride thus had as its primary purpose the decentralization 
and decongestion of the existing urban areas in the Clyde Valley Region, 
in particular Glasgow itself and North West Lanarkshire. Although its 
boundary was to be only one mile distant from the Glasgow City boundary, 
its local and regional topography meant, in the Secretary of State's 
view, that East Kilbride could not be regarded as "a mere suburban 
appendage to the existing urban areas". 
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The designation of East Kilbride did not come about by 
unanimous consent. The City of Glasgow had argued, unsuccessfully, 
that East Kilbride was unnecessary since the accommodation of the 
"overspill" population could be provided through redevelopment within 
Glasgow itself. Another objection was raised by agricultural interests 
in the area affected where, it was argued, the new town as originally 
proposed would, if developed, divert some 4,200 acres from agriculture 
and thereby involve a loss of about 500,000 gallons of milk production 
annually. It was argued that this loss was contrary to the national 
interest, and the Secretary of State accordingly modified the boundaries 
originally proposed for East Kilbride so as to reduce the prospective 
loss by about 200,000 gallons of milk a year. 
In the end, the Clyde Valley Plan's recommendations held sway. 
East Kilbride, as Scotland's first new town was "to exemplify the 
best possible standards in such matters as industrial estate layout, 
the provision of houses at appropriate densities, and planned open 
space for recreation and amenity and the provision of schools with 
adequate recreational facilities easily accessible, and of other 
community facilities". 
Little further progress of a major nature along the lines 
recommended by the Clyde Valley Plan was made during the next several 
years. There was further development at East Kilbride, but Grieve noted 
in his review paper a hiatus between 1947 and 1952 in which the 
(general) problem appeared to receive a minimum of attention. In the 
latter year the local authorities established a new Clyde Valley Regional 
Planning Advisory Committee to examine various regional problems, but 
especially the overspill problem. For this purpose a study was carried 
out8 of the possible development capacity of the Clyde Basin, and showed: 
(a) possible peripheral areas in the Green Belt which might be 
developed without serious detriment to overall considerations; 
these were based on detailed landscape examinations of 
certain areas; 
8The 
study was done by the Department of Health for Scotland. 
111. 
(b) possible new town areas based on the Clyde Valley Plan; 
and 
(c) the beat of a number of areas at and about the 600 feet 
contour mark, some only of which had been examined 
(albeit sketchily) by the Clyde Valley Planning 
Consultants and considered as dubious because of 
altitude, lack of railway services, water supply 
difficulties, etc. 
The main consequence of this search was the recommendation of the 
Advisory Committee in 1954 that a new town be developed at Cumbernauld - 
as proposed earlier in the Clyde Valley Regional Plan. 
Meanwhile outside the Clyde Valley, in the County of Fife north 
of Edinburgh, the Secretary of State had designated another Scottish 
new town at Glenrothes in 1948. This is also an important coalmining 
area of Scotland, and the original purpose for Glenrothes was to 
attract a pool of miners to work the Rothes pit which was to be opened 
up, and which showed promise of long life. It was hoped that this new 
source would help offset the loss of coal production resulting from 
the decline of the Lanarkshire coalfields. It was estimated that about 
6,500 additional miners would eventually be required to work the Rothes 
pit and other seams being, or to be, developed in the surrounding area. 
The new town would provide housing for the miners away from the colliery 
in a "mixed community" to include members of other trades and occupations, 
as had been recommended by the Scottish Coalfields Committee in 1944. 
On the basis of a miner to total population ratio of 1 in 8 or 1 in 9, 
a total population of about 30,000 was envisaged for the new town in 
Clenrothes. Industrial development would be encouraged to provide 
necessary "balancing industries". 
9 
Objections to the new town were heard again from local 
agricultural interests concerned with the displacement of 1,700 acres 
9Department 
of Health for Scotland, Draft New Town (Glenrothes) 
Designation Order, Edinburgh, H. M. S. O. 1948. 
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of agricultural land and the consequent loss of 117,000 gallons of 
milk production annually, and also from two industrial firms in the 
area concerned that the new town-would exert certain detrimental 
effects upon their own operations and-prospects. Neither groups were 
successful in altering the Secretary of State's proposal to develop 
Glenrothes new town. 
Subsequently, however, the Rothes pit failed to live up to its 
promise and plans for its development were abandoned. There was 
consequently a delay in the build-up expected for this new town. 
Eventually, however, the industrial basis for the new town was re- 
oriented away from coal, and in recent years Glenrothes has been growing 
rapidly as a result of new, diversified industry attracted there. 
In 1955 Cumbernauld was designated a new town, Scotland's 
third, by the Secretary of State. The decision followed the 
recommendation made a year earlier by the Clyde Valley Regional 
Planning Advisory Committee. Its primary purpose was to receive 
population overspill from the City of Glasgow in view of the 
consideration that the direct extension of the Glasgow Boundary was 
undesirable. "Of the City's estimated immediate need for about 
100,000 houses, sites for only an estimated 43,000 were available within 
the City boundaries, leaving a balance of approximately 60,000 houses 
to be provided elsewhere. This estimate did not include the further 
requirement for sites for population to be displaced by redevelopment 
of Glasgow's congested areas. This situation led the Advisory Committee 
to propose at Cumbernauld a new town to provide for 50,000 people. 
The intention again was that the green belt around Glasgow 
would be preserved. Further peripheral extension would result in 
urban development on Clydeside sprawling in one continuous mass from 
the eastern limits of Airdrie to the western limits of Clydebank and Paisley. 
More co-operative as a result of the experience with East 
Kilbride, Glasgow Corporation agreed, in view of Cumbernauld's purpose 
in accommodating "overspill" from the City, to pay the statutory rate 
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contribution for ten years on each house built at Cumbernauld and 
let to a tenant nominated by the Corporation. It was expected that 
12,000 houses would be provided under this arrangement out of the 
14,000 total likely to be built at Cumbernauld new town. 
The loss to agriculture was restricted, as much as possible, 
to lower quality land by the siting of the new town, and this loss was 
regretted but considered necessary. 
Cumbernauld was also to be a "balanced community" with its own 
complement of industry and commercial facilities. " The designation order 
noted the existence of a number of suitable industrial sites, and by 
virtue of its location within the Scottish Development Area, its 
eligibility for assistance under the Distribution of Industry Act, 
1945, for approved industrial projects. The primary purpose of the 
proposed new town was to cater for Glasgow overspill, however, and 
the Secretary of State hoped "the powers available to the development 
corporation .... may assist in securing the transfer from Glasgow of 
undertakings established there who find it convenient to seek new 
locations in Cumbernauld and houses for whose workers can be provided 
in the new town". 
The fourth new town in Scotland was not designated until seven 
years later, in 1962. Glasgow overspill remained a pressing problem 
and the main proximate cause. Comprehensive redevelopment underway 
or planned in Glasgow would displace some 100,000 families from bad 
housing, and it was estimated that only about 40,000 could be rehoused 
within the redevelopment areas. The remaining 60,000 would be overspill 
and would give rise to a need by 1965 for over 1,000 more houses per 
year than could be provided in East Kilbride, Glenrothes and Cumbernauld 
or in other local authority areas under overspill agreements with 
Glasgow Corporation. The fourth new town. was to meet this need. 
Glasgow Corporation agreed to pay 3614 per annum for ten years for each 
house rented to a family nominated by the Corporation. But now there 
were other considerations as well. For one thing, with East Kilbride 
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and Cumbernauld already underway in the vicinity of Glasgow, "it was 
clearly desirable that any location in the already congested Clyde Valley 
should be avoided". The Green Belt thus remained an important article 
of the planning faith. 
The new town was planned to accommodate a population of 70,000.10 
Its location was determined after an examination of a somewhat greater 
range of factors than had been considered in the earlier cases. Chief 
among them was the suitability of the location for industrial develop- 
ment. Livingston was selected and finally designated in 1962 to 
include 6,700 acres in the adjoining Counties of West Lothian and 
Midlothian. Here a range of good factory sites was available, transport 
communications with Glasgow were good, and the area had recently been 
selected by the British Motor Corporation for its new commercial 
vehicle plant at Bathgate. Livingston new town thus held the prospect 
".... not merely of helping solve Glasgow's housing problem but also of 
using overspill constructively to create a new focus of industrial 
activity in the central belt of Scotland, linking the West with the 
centres of expansion in the Forth basin, and at the same time 
revitalizing with modern industries an area hitherto over-dependent on 
coal and shale". The experience with the three earlier new towns led 
to a materially larger provision-for industrial locations in the fourth. 
This emerging emphasis on the wider economic purpose of new town 
development, in which new towns are seen as a means of attracting 
industrial development for a wider region instead of simply providing 
jobs for the new town's own population, is interesting as a pointer to 
the still more general survey, report and plan for Central Scotland 
conducted by the Scottish Development Group a year later. In fact, the 
designation of Livingston in January 1962 preceded the start of the 
"growth areas" exercise by only a few months. 
10The 
increase from 50,000 to 70,000 marked a greater confidence 
resulting from the successful development of the earlier new towns, 
as well as a reflection of the estimated "overspill" need noted above. 
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It was anticipated that the population in Livingston and the 
surrounding area would rise from 70,000 to 170,000 over the subsequent 
20 years. The designation order mentioned the desirability of maintaining 
an adequate green belt separation of the several communities involved. 
Rehabilitation of areas whose physical appearance was marred by a 
number of shale bings, the result of mining operations in an earlier 
day, was also to be an integral part of the development programme in 
the Livingston area. 
11 
The Larger Purpose of New Towns 
To summarize, the main conscious purpose of establishing new 
towns in Scotland, as far as Glasgow Corporation was concerned, was 
in order to relieve Glasgow's problem of overcrowded and unsuitable 
housing by means of overspill. At the planning stage the attraction 
of industry to the new towns was seen as a desirable possibility rather 
than a specific purpose: if the workers to be rehoused from Glasgow 
could be provided with jobs in their new surroundings, so much the 
better. But the decision to establish new towns did not depend to any 
great extent on the likelihood, or otherwise, of their being able to 
attract new industries to the wider Glasgow region. There was, of 
course, some expectation that industrial congestion in Glasgow might 
be relieved in conjunction with the population overspill programme, 
but the latter remained the fundamental, and only necessary, purpose 
of the whole exercise. It seems especially clear that the new town 
planners were certainly not so bold as to envisage the new towns 
becoming poles of attraction for industrial firms moving into Scotland 
from other distant areas of Great Britain and, indeed, from beyond. 
A second impetus for the establishment of new towns consisted 
in the physical planners' preference for maintaining a green belt around 
The comprehensive economic and physical development of Livingston 
and the Lothians was subsequently made the subject of more careful 
examination by a team of physical planners and social scientists in 
the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh. 
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the Glasgow region. Whatever the merits of their argument it seems 
clear, in retrospect, that without this element in the Clyde Valley 
Regional Plan, the accommodation of Glasgow's further population growth 
might well have taken the form of the continuous "urban sprawl" 
which the planners so strenuously wished to avoid. The green belt 
article in the planning faith, reflected in the policy-makers' 
eventual decisions, this served an important role in laying the basis 
for the decision to proceed with developing new towns in Scotland. 
By the time Livingston was designated, however, the new town 
had become a broader concept in Scottish planning. Sufficient 
experience had been gained with the three earlier new towns to demonstrate 
that a new town, besides serving as a reception centre for Glasgow over- 
spill population and thereby also avoiding "urban sprawl", could also 
be used to attract new industrial activity to the wider region and 
thus assist in the general improvement of the whole economy of 
Central Scotland. 
The Scale of the New Towns 
Against this more general background of regional development, 
in both the physical and the economic sense, it may be asked how large 
a contribution the first three Scottish new towns had made to regional 
progress by the end of 1962, or roughly when the review of the present 
position and future prospects of Central Scotland was initiated by 
the Scottish Development Group. Some indication on this score may be 
had from the data summarized in Table 1. 
In total, the population growth in the three new towns together 
had amounted to over 50,000 persons by the end of 1962. In percentage 
terms this rate of increase is indeed remarkable, with East Kilbride 
having the most impressive overall increase (over 15 years since 
designation) of 1,337X. On an annual average basis, the rates of growth 
remain impressive for all three towns, ranging from 16% in Cumbernauld 
(over seven years) to 20% in Glenrothes (over 14 years). The reason 
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Table 1 
Changes in Population and Manufacturing, Scottish New Towns, 
to December 1962 
New town (and year of 
designation) 
Population 
East Kilbride (1947) 
Glenrothes (1948) 
Cumbernauld (1955) 
Total 
Manufacturing 
a. No. of firms* 
East Kilbride (1947) 
Glenrothes (1948) 
Cumbernauld (1955) 
Total 
b. No. of employees 
East Kilbride (1947) 
Glenrothes (1948) 
Cumbernauld (1955) 
Total 
c. Floor space ('000 sq. ft. 
East Kilbride (1947) 
Glenrothes (1948) 
Cumbernauld (1955) 
Total 
At Increase to Dec. 1962 
designation Dec. 1962 No. %%p. a. 
2,400 34,500 32,100 +1,337.5 +19.2 
1,100 14,140 13,040 +1,185.5 +20.0 
3,000 8,350 5,350 +178.3 +15.8 
6,500 56,990 50,490 +776.8 
3 60 57 +1,900 
4 13 9 +225 
3 15 12 +400 
10 88 78 +780 
314 8,251 7,937 +2,528 
1,683 3,794 2,111 +125 
171 2,721 2,550 +1,491 
2,168 14,766 12,598 +572.6 
173 2,149 1,976 +1,142 
750 999 249 +33 
151 873 722 +478 
1,074 4,021 2,947 +268.0 
*Assuming all the original factories were still in operation at December 1962. 
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these rates are so strikingly high lies, of course, in the very nature 
of new towns: they are completely new settlements in areas which were 
previously uninhabited, or virtually so. Hence their relative growth 
is dramatic because it is from a zero, or negligible, base. The same 
is true of the rates of increase in the three manufacturing indicators 
shown in Table 1. 
The proportion of the modest overall increase in the population 
of Scotland accounted for by the three new towns was also large. Over 
a somewhat different span, from 1951 to 1961, the national population 
increased by 82,075 and the new towns accounted for 39,897 or almost 
half of this. The total increase contributed by the three older 
communities with the next largest absolute population changes in 
Central Scotland, on the other hand, was only of the order of 17,000 
over the same period. 
In the context of the total existing population of Central 
Scotland the increase represented by the new towns becomes quite modest 
in percentage terms, especially when one considers that this increase 
occurred over a decade or more. Between 1951 and 1961 Scotland's 
population increase of 82,075 represented a relative rise of 1.6%; the 
new towns' increase of 39,897 thus added but 0.8% to the total 
Scottish population over the decade. 
From this analysis of the data on population change it can 
be concluded that the growth of the new towns, while impressive in situ 
and also as a proportion of the total population increase throughout 
Scotland, resulted in only a very small percentage addition to the 
national population. When one considers that a (larger) number of 
other areas within the country grew sufficiently to contribute as 
much again to the national increase, even after allowance is made for 
a decline of almost 35,000 in Glasgow's population, the overall 
importance of the new towns is again reduced somewhat. 
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Of course, a considerable part of the new towns' population 
growth was the direct consequence of deliberate overspill policy. It 
is interesting that the rise of 39,897 between 1951 and 1961 took 
place simultaneously with the decline of almost 35,000 in Glasgow's 
population. Of course, overspill from Glasgow was being accommodated 
elsewhere than in the new towns, so the new towns' growth resulting 
from other factors than overspill is doubtless greater than the difference 
between these two figures. Some indication of the importance of 
overspill is given by Table 2. Of the 4,315 houses completed in the 
three new towns together, 2,705 or 65.2% were built to accommodate 
population being moved from Glasgow. This suggests that something in 
the order of two-thirds of the total population growth in the new towns 
was the consequence of overspill. 
Even when offset by comparable reduction in the older areas, 
the creation of new employment in the new towns may be considered a 
positive benefit on the simple proposition that without it, the net 
result would have been an overall decline. To the extent that new 
employment generated in the new towns resulted from the attraction of 
activities new to Central Scotland and their subsequent expansion, 
and not simply from the transfer of existing frims out of Glasgow, 
the validity of this viewpoint is strengthened. Thus, although the 
net effect of the change in population numbers is lessened when Glasgow 
is included in the overall picture, the increase in manufacturing 
activity is not similarly devalued. The rise of 12,598 in manufacturing 
employment distributed among the three new towns takes on the significance 
of virtually a net positive contribution to the Central Scotland economy. 
The alternative, one may presume, would have been for the population 
moving to East Kilbride, Glenrothes and Cumbernauld to seek employment 
beyond Scotland. It is as if, with Glasgow too crowded to accommodate 
either its existing population or new industry, the decline of its older 
industries had to be offset by attracting new industry to the new towns 
where it could be accommodated, and to which the city's surplus 
population could also be moved. At the end of the day, although 
120. 
Table 2 
Houses Completed, Overspill Agreements and Other Arrangements, 
Scottish New Towns, 1958 to 1962 inclusive 
Overspill Other 
No. % of Total Arrangements Total 
East Kilbride 1,298 45.8 1,533 2,831 
Glenrothes 216 76.3 67 283 
Cumbernauld 1,191 99.2 10 1,201 
Total 2,705 65.2 1,610 4,315 
Source: Scottish Development Department 
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overall population growth is almost negligible, the increase in new 
employment has been made possible by the device of creating the conditions 
and providing the services for it in the new towns - conditions and 
services which perhaps could not have been made available in Glasgow 
itself except at much greater cost; if at all. 
The new towns, more than examples of rapid and substantial 
population transfer, were thus foci of industrial growth - almost, 
as it were, an oasis in the Scottish desert of industrial stagnation and 
decline. In terms of their ability to attract both new firms and new 
families, they combined substantial real inducements, including 
factories and houses, with considerable psychological appeal based 
on their character as new, almost "pioneer", local societies. The 
question remained, however, whether by themselves they were sufficient 
in scale to meet the challenge posed by the persistent excessive 
unemployment, ýcontinuing net emigration, and further loss of jobs in 
the traditional industries yet expected in the Central Scotland 
economy -a question to which the Scottish Development Group was 
about to turn its attention. 
Postwar Location of Industry Policy in Scotland 
In Scotland, as elsewhere in Great Britain, the execution of 
location of industry policy - the main means of encouraging the economic 
development of less prosperous regions - has been a responsibility of 
the Board of Trade. The Board, a "Great Britain" department with its 
headquarters in London and responsible to a Minister of the United 
Kingdom government, maintains a Scottish regional operation in Glasgow. 
The Scottish arm of the Board supervises, and carries out, its 
industrial location activities in Scotland; it also has the prerogative 
of advising the President of the Board of Trade on departmental policy 
and programmes within the Scottish context. Location of industry 
policy throughout Britain has had as its main purpose the relief of 
unemployment: until the Toothill Committee reported in 1961, this 
emphasis on the alleviation of excessive unemployment implied a social, 
rather than economic, purpose for this policy. 
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There are two main aspects of British industrial location 
policy as administered by the Board of Trade. The Town and Country 
Planning Act requires that an industrial development certificate 
(I. D. C. ) must be obtained from the Board before any industrial 
premises above a certain size, whether a new building or an extension 
of existing facilities, can receive approval by the local (physical) 
planning authority. In certain regions, notably Greater London and 
the West Midlands, the Board has operated a "hard" policy of not 
issuing such I. D. C. s except where the industrialist can show that his 
project cannot be carried out elsewhere. The operating assumption 
behind this aspect of location policy'is that further factory 
building in the areas affected would only contribute to an accentuation 
of congestion already considered excessive and costly in both economic 
and social terms. 
The second part of location policy consists in the Board's 
attempting to "steer" any projects for which an I. D. C. is refused, 
12 
to the less prosperous areas of the United Kingdom, by offering a range 
of incentives to the firms concerned. These less prosperous areas 
have been defined on the basis of various criteria over the years, as 
noted below, but significant parts of Scotland have always been 
prominent among the areas designated throughout Britain. In this 
sense the location of industry policy, though executed by the Board 
of Trade, a "Great Britain Department", has always had particular 
importance in Scotland as an instrument of Scottish economic development. 
Under the Distribution of Industry Act of 1945, the Scottish 
Development Area consisted of the Clyde Valley and Dundee. In 1949 
the Inverness district was added. Within the Scottish Development Area 
the Board of Trade was empowered, under Part I of the Distribution of 
l2In 
practice, I. D. C. s are seldom formally refused. Instead firms 
usually lodge an informal inquiry as to their chances of obtaining 
an I. D. C. before submitting a formal application; if their project 
is inconsistent with current Board of Trade policy they are so 
informed and encouraged to consider locating the proposed project 
in a less prosperous area. 
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Industry Act of 1945, to acquire land and build factories, to improve 
the basic services of the area including facilities for transport, 
power, lighting, housing, health and other services relevant to 
industrial development. In addition financial assistance was 
available from the Treasury in the form of grants and loans to 
undertakings already established or proposed in the development areas. 
From 1945 until 1954, the Board'of Trade had another means 
of controlling the location of factory building. 'This was the 
building licensing system which had been continued after the war in 
order to ease the reconstruction process in the face of a serious 
shortage of important raw materials. Applications to build new 
industrial premises had to be submitted in all cases during this 
immediate postwar period, and these were scrutinized from the 
distribution of industry aspect. The economic forces at work immediately 
after the war enabled the building licensing system to play a powerful 
part in making location of industry policy especially effective. 
During the period from 1945 to 1947, no less than 50 per cent of 
factory space constructed in Great Britain was diverted to the 
development areas which had 20 per cent of the British population. 
With building materials in such extremely short supply that this 
rationing system was needed, and with the release of substantial pent- 
up demand for consumer goods after the war, manufacturers were much 
more willing - indeed anxious - to go to the development areas in 
order to have an opportunity to meet the vigorous demand for their 
products. 
By these means the government's distribution of industry 
policy was pursued more energetically and on a larger scale than had 
been the case under the Special Areas legislation of the pre-war years. 
Indeed, during the years from 1945-48 the improvement in the economic 
status of the less prosperous regions brought about by World War II 
was successfully consolidated, and thus the problem created in areas 
like Clydeside during the depression of the thirties, was alleviated. 
Postwar reconstruction in the development areas was considered to be 
a critical test of regional policy when the war ended; and the 
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combination of national economic buoyancy and the use of both the 
"carrot" and the "stick" by the Board of Trade in the development 
areas enabled this test to be successfully met. In 1948 unemployment 
in Scotland stood at 2.8X. While this was somewhat higher than the 
1.0% achieved in 1944 under wartime conditions, a fairer comparison 
is perhaps with the 4.6% level reached in 1946 in the midst of the 
postwar reconstruction period. Certainly, it was a vast improvement 
on the 16.3% which had prevailed at the trough of the Great Depression. 
During the ensuing several years annual average unemployment 
remained at or below the 3% "full employment" norm which had been 
suggested during the late years of the war. This was true in Scotland 
of the years from 1948 to 1957 inclusive, the only exception being 
1950 when the rate rose slightly higher to 3.1% and 1952 when it was 
3.3%. In Great Britain, the level of unemployment was even lower 
still. Over the same period it never exceeded 2.0% and even fell as 
low as 1.1% nationally in 1955. 
Among the British development areas, however, Scotland's level 
of unemployment was relatively high. As Odber has shown13 the 
unemployment rate in Wales and the northern region - the other main 
development areas - fell more rapidly from mid-1952 to early 1956 than 
the national rate. By the latter year, the excess of the unemployment 
percentage over the national average was only 0.7% in both Wales and 
the northern region, compared to Scotland's excess of 1.5%. 
Largely as a consequence of this experience of lower unemployment 
both nationally and regionally in Britain during the decade ending in 
1957, the problem of the less prosperous regions receded into the 
background of public policy. Odber cites the lower level of annual 
capital expenditure by the Board of Trade on the provision of factories 
to rent in the development areas in this period, compared to the 1945 
13Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1959, p. 212 (Sykes) 
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to 1949 period, as evidence of this. 
14 
This change in the economic 
circumstances within which industrial location policy operated led 
to some suggestions for changing the emphasis of that policy. Among 
these were the reports of a Committee of the Scottish Council and 
of the House of Commons Select Committee on Estimates. 
The Cairncross Report 
The problem of encouraging industrial development in country 
towns and districts in Scotland was examined by a committee appointed 
by the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) which reported in 
1952.15 The Committee chose to adopt a national view of such areas; 
rather than accepting that the existence of local difficulties was 
sufficient reason for a government-sponsored programme of assistance 
to industrial location and expansion, they were concerned to establish 
in what circumstances the need of Scottish localities might coincide 
with the national (U. K. ) interest. On this basis they assumed that the 
objects of local development should be: 
(a) to accelerate the building up of new communities in 
promising locations; 
(b) to make fuller and more economical use of manpower and 
national resources that are in danger of being wasted; 
and 
(c) to arrest the decline of communities that might, with a 
little help, be restored to a thriving condition. 
14Ibid., 
p. 221, Table 1. 
Report of the Committee on Local Development in Scotland, Scottish 
Council (Development and Industry), Edinburgh 1952. This Committee 
was chaired by Professor A. K. Cairncross, and this report is 
sometimes referred to as the Cairncross Report. 
126. 
Table 3 
Unemployment, Scotland and Great Britain, 1945-1965 
(% of working population) 
Year Great Britain 
1944 0.4 
1945 1.0 
1946 2.4 
1947 3.0 
1948 1.5 
1949 1.5 
1950 1.5 
1951 1.2 
1952 2.0 
1953 1.6 
1954 1.3 
1955 1.1 
1956 1.2 
1957 1.4 
1958 2.1 
1959 2.2 
1960 1.6 
1961 1.5 
1962 2.0 
1963 2.5 
1964 1.6 
1965 1.4 
1966 1.5 
Development 
Areas Scotland 
Scotland as % of 
3.6 
3.5 
2.6 
3.2 
3.0 
2.6 
2.1 
2.1 
2.3 
1.0 
2.2 
4.6 
4.0 
2.8 
3.0 
3.1 
2.5 
3.3 
3.0 
2.8 
2.4 
2.4 
2.6 
3.7 
4.4 
3.6 
3.2 
3.8 
4.8 
3.7 
3.0 
Great Britain 
250 
220 
192 
133 
187 
200 
207 
208 
165 
188 
215 
218 
200 
186 
Source: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1959, p. 208 (Sykes) 
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The committee also noted the legitimate needs of the industrialist 
in choosing a site for a new or expanding activity, as well as the 
practical circumstances that only a limited number of new factories are 
established throughout Scotland each year. Hence, if only on practical 
grounds, ".... the government cannot simply ladle in fresh employment 
whenever it wishes out of a bottomless bucket of enterprise. ' 
6 
The Committee concluded that the over-riding need, of the local 
community, of the firm that settles there, and of the country, is for 
an enterprise that would thrive in its new setting. Applying this 
principle to its study of the government's location of industry policy, 
the committee suggested that in the past undue emphasis had been 
placed on the difficulties and dangers (especially unemployment) of 
the older areas which mainly comprised the Scottish Development Area. 
"Unemployment", they stated, "cannot be the sole criterion of policy. "17 
The main change in Government policy recommended in. the report 
was a shift away from this emphasis on unemployment as the basis for 
selecting areas where industry should be encouraged to locate. 
Industrial growth should itself become an objective instead. "If 
industrial change.... requires the building up of a community in a new 
location, then this development should take precedence over efforts 
to prop up existing communities in adjacent areas with no comparable 
advantages. " 
There are important differences between the policy which 
prevailed at the time of the Cairncross report, and that in 1963 when 
the programme for Central Scotland was formulated. For one thing, 
the geographical application of Government incentives differed somewhat, 
the Scottish Development Area having been superseded in the interim by 
161bid., 
p. 29 
17Ibid., 
p. 32 
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the smaller, development districts. What is common to both periods, 
however, is the emphasis on unemployment as a main criterion in 
determining the eligibility of particular places for Government 
assistance with industrial development. On that fundamental issue the 
Cairncross report is relevant. This broader approach was given 
considerable further impetus a decade later in the Toothill Report, 
and laid the basis for regional policy reform throughout the United 
Kingdom. 
The 1956 Select Committee on Estimates 
During 1955 the Select Committee on Estimates of the House 
of Commons conducted an examination of Development Areas policy in 
Britain. Unlike the Cairncross report, however, the Select Committee 
did not question the validity of using unemployment as the criterion 
for industrial location policy. Rather it was concerned with orienting 
the application of the policy to those areas which still suffered from 
high rates of unemployment. They noted in their report the view 
presented by the Board of Trade "... that in certain districts, 
including some of the larger towns, it could be said that there was 
no longer any general unemployment problem. But what remain to be 
cleared up were mainly small pockets of unemployment in remote 
districts . "18 They considered it anomalous that although their 
overall unemployment rates were extremely low by historical standards, 
the whole of the Development Areas were still treated as in need 
of Government financial assistance. The Select Committee also 
questioned very seriously the contention of the Board of Trade that 
these Development Areas nevertheless required further efforts to 
attract additional industry to them, first, to reduce their dependence 
on basic industries and secondly, to overcome the apparent decline of 
some other industries within them. The Select Committee concluded, 
therefore, that "... the size and boundaries of the present Development 
Areas have been preserved against future contingencies for too long. 
18House 
of Commons, Select Committee on Estimates, Report, 1956, p. xxi. 
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and are now out of date. It may well be that other districts with 
higher unemployment may be in greater need for the Government 
financial assistance available to Development Areas. " 
19 
The Committee 
thus favoured using the Board of Trade incentives to mop up the unemploy- 
ment pockets which still remained. 
The Select Committee's Report included a recommendation that 
a review of the Development Areas take place immediately with a view to 
descheduling any area or part of any area no longer in special danger 
of unemployment. At first glance this suggestion had something in 
common with the Cairncross Report in that both documents suggested 
in effect that financial assistance be made available by the Board 
of Trade not only within the existing development areas, but also to 
localities outside them. The difference between them is, however, 
fundamental. The areas which the Scottish Council Committee suggested 
should also be eligible outside the Development areas, were those which 
offered some prospects for long-term development, whether or not 
they exhibited a high unemployment rate: by extending the programme 
to such areas with some industrial potential, the Cairncross Report 
argued that unemployment in other localities nearby, where industrial 
prospects were not as good, might be relieved as a result of either 
migration or greater travel to work. The Select Committee, on the 
other hand, merely suggested that smaller districts both inside and 
outside the existing Development Areas be made eligible, but did not 
recommend any change in the former basis of determining eligibility. 
The level of local unemployment would remain the "sole criterion of 
policy". 
The basis of the Select Committee's argument rested in the 
low levels of national and regional unemployment experienced in Britain 
during the 1950's. Their implicit assumption was that the high level 
of national demand could be maintained indefinitely and that, on this 
assumption, unemployment had become an entirely local phenomenon 
19Ibid., 
p. xxii 
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requiring the application of a remedy at the local level. Industrial 
location policy was seen as the logical instrument for effecting this 
remedy. Presumably, successful pursuit of this policy at the local 
level would enable unemployment to be eliminated everywhere throughout 
the country. 
The recommendations of the Select Committee were given 
expression in legislative amendments in 1958 and 1960. It is 
paradoxical, however, that by this time the unemployment, situation 
in the country and its regions had undergone a significant change 
which rendered the basis of the Select Committee's argument obsolete. 
In 1958 unemployment in Great Britain rose to 2.1% from 1.4% a 
year earlier, and there was a slight further rise to 2.2% in 1959. 
The rise in the Scottish rate was accentuated, from 2.6% in 1957 to 
3.7% in 1958 and 4.4% in 1959. The lag between formulation of 
recommendations about Government regional policy and the execution 
of changes in that policy thus resulted in the policy changes being 
perverse in their effect. In 1958, the Development Areas were 
abandoned in favour of development districts, a change confirmed two 
years later in the Local Employment Act, just at the time when the 
level of unemployment in these Development Areas was increasing 
significantly. This contradiction between new policy and changing 
actual circumstances is also an important part of the background to 
the growth areas exercise of 1963 which was, in a sense, an attempt 
to reconcile the conflict of purpose which first emerged in 1958. 
Legislative Amendments to Location Policy 
The Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finances) Act of 
1958 marked the first shift of emphasis from larger development 
areas to small localities in British policy. It also incorporated an 
increased emphasis on making loans to businessmen locating or expanding 
in such localities rather than on building factories for let by the 
Board of Trade. Such grants or loans, moreover, were to be available 
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not only to industrial establishments but to all trades providing 
the Board of Trade were satisfied that a fall in unemployment would 
be likely to result. 
The basis for designating eligible areas contained in the Act 
was "any locality in which a high rate of unemployment exists and 
is likely to persist". The designation of such areas was left to the 
administrative discretion of the Board of Trade, however, and in- 
practice the criterion applied was a rate of 4% wholly unemployed 
over twelve months. 
Much the same basis of designation was incorporated in the 
Local Employment Act of 1960. The various Board of Trade incentives 
were to be made available to firms locating or expanding in 
development districts, defined as "any locality in Great Britain in 
which, in the opinion of the Board of Trade a high rate of unemploy- 
ment exists, or is to be expected ... and is likely to persist 
whether seasonally or generally". These development districts were 
more or less synonomous with employment exchange areas as defined 
for Ministry of Labour purposes. Again, such districts were 
designated if unemployment rose or was considered likely to rise 
imminently, above a certain level, in practice 4%. Again the 
decision on adding to the list of development districts or subtracting 
from it, was left to the Board of Trade. 
In short, the attack on unemployment in the less prosperous 
regions was to be pursued to its logical conclusion. Successful in 
the wider region, it was now to be carried on in the small districts, 
the small localities, the small pockets of unemployment where the 
problem of idle workers still remained. Against the background of 
general economic buoyancy and full employment nationally (as had 
existed in the mid-fifties), the problem had come to be seen simply 
as taking a few industrial firms into those areas, including declining 
coal mining villages, for example, where unemployment was still a 
problem. "Bringing work to the workers" was now to become a custom- 
made operation. The areas to be helped required no other characteristic 
except the relatively high pate of unemployment. 
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This was generally the framework of industrial location 
policy in its geographical application, when the Toothill Committee 
conducted its study of the Scottish economy in 1960-61. 
In the next two years, however, unemployment again rose. The 
Great Britain rate reached 2.0 per cent in 1962 and 2.5 per cent in 
1963. In Scotland the comparable figures were 3.8 per cent in 1962 
and 4.8 per cent in 1963. In Scotland's case the 1963 figure was 
a post-war record. More than anything else it was probably the 
deterioration in the national economic position, as manifested in 
the higher rates of unemployment. which provided the setting in which 
the necessity of the Government's examining the recommendations of 
the Toothill Committee for the Scottish economy, became clear. 
The Toothill Committee and Growth Areas 
The work of the Toothill Committee represents an extremely 
important stage in the post-war evolution of economic development 
policy for Scotland, as its recommendations were subsequently to be 
absorbed as well in British regional policy generally. In both cases - 
at the Scottish (regional) level and at the U. K. (national) level - 
its most significant, and best known, contribution lay in its espousal 
of the growth area concept and its successful effort to win acceptance 
for the radical change in regional development policy that it entailed. 
It is appropriate, therefore, to consider what the Toothill Report 
said, or implied, about the growth areas it was recommending as the 
new basis for Scottish development. In order to do so, it will be 
necessary, first, to review the manner of the Toothill Committee's 
establishment, and its relationship with the selection process 
conducted by the Scottish Development Group in 1963. Secondly, its 
general recommendations for the Scottish economy are analyzed to 
discover the characteristics they suggest as essential in growth 
areas. Finally, it will be convenient to note how the proposals 
advanced by the Toothill Committee eventually were related to national 
economic priorities by the National Economic Development Council. 
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The Committee Established 
The Toothill Committee was appointed by the Scottish Council 
(Development and Industry), a non-governmental association of 
Scottish industrialists, businessmen and local authority representatives 
whose object is to encourage the progress of the Scottish economy. 
In 1959 a delegation from the Council went to London to meet Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan in order to press for greater recognition 
of Scotland's peculiar economic needs in the formulation of government 
economic policy. The Conservative Government had only recently been 
re-elected, but had lost several Scottish seats to the Labour 
Opposition -a situation which caused the Prime Minister some concern. 
He asked the Scottish Council delegation to consider undertaking an 
overall survey and report on Scottish economic problems. At the same 
time, he agreed to make available the assistance of Civil Service 
assessors to the group appointed by the Council to carry out the 
survey. , 
Shortly afterwards the Scottish Council appointed a Committee 
of Inquiry under the chairmanship of its own Chairman, Sir John 
Toothill. Sir John had led the Council delegation which met the 
Prime Minister. 
Professor Thomas Wilson of Glasgow University was the 
Committee's Vice-Chairman. Apart from his own considerable personal 
contribution to the Committee's work, Professor Wilson's participation 
provided a bridge between the academic economists at the University, 
who carried out a number of studies in support of the inquiry, and 
the Committee's own staff. 
The Committee had the services of two secretaries. One of 
these, was drawn from the Scottish Council's own professional staff. 
The other was seconded from the Civil Service as part of the arrangement 
which the Prime Minister had proposed. Their joint appointments thus 
permitted the marrying together of a working knowledge of both 
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Scottish industrial experience and Government programmes and policy 
affecting the Scottish economy. The appointment of the seconded 
member of the Civil Service to this post is especially noteworthy 
in view of his subsequently becoming Secretary to the Scottish 
Development Group which selected the Scottish "growth areas" two 
years later. The participation of a senior civil servant in this way 
meant also that the Toothill Committee had the benefit of close 
consultation with the various Scottish departments of government at 
all stages of the inquiry. This was a valuable advantage. Not only 
did it mean easy access to accurate information about various government 
activities affecting the Scottish economy, which itself reduced the 
area of possible disagreement about its analytical conclusions likely 
to arise in Government circles, but it also enabled the Committee 
to make a more informed judgment regarding the likelihood of its 
recommendations for changes in policy being accepted. This latter 
aspect probably accounts in large measure for the relative ease, with 
which the Toothill Committee recommendations were subsequently adopted. 
Along with a secretary, the Civil Service supplied the Toothill 
Committee with a number of assessors drawn from senior posts in 
Scottish departments. They served as "ex officio" members, as it were, 
of the Committee of Inquiry. As senior administrators, of course, 
they were in a position both to influence the discussion in Committee 
on the basis of their Civil Service experience and knowledge, and to 
arrange for information and analysis to be made available to the Committee 
from their respective Ministries. While these assessors were not 
responsible for the conclusions reached and recommendations advanced 
by the Toothill Committee, their presence as members of the Toothill 
team ensured that the viewpoints of both the administrator and the 
policy-maker were taken into account. There were four such assessors: 
the Scottish Regional Controller, Ministry of Labour; the Scottish 
Regional Controller, Board of Trade; and a senior administrator from 
each of the Scottish Home Department and the Department of Health for 
Scotland. A fifth assessor was the General Secretary of the Scottish 
Trade Union Congress General Council. 
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In these ways the Toothill Committee became a broadly-based 
group. Appointed by a private agency representing Scottish economic 
interests, enjoying the active participation of senior civil servants 
as well as direct access to university sources of further supporting 
economic research, and with a link also with the trade union movement, 
the inquiry and report of this Committee were virtually guaranteed 
a receptive hearing. 
The Toothill Committee conducted its inquiry over the period 
from January 1960 to October 1961, and published its report late in 
1961. 
The Toothill Concept of "Growth Areas" 
The remit of the Toothill Committee had been "to review the 
present position and future prospects of the Scottish economy, to 
define the forces which control the growth and, location of manufacturing 
and other employment, to draw conclusions and to make recommendations". 
As already noted, its main proposal was the adoption of growth as the 
overriding and pervasive objective for the Scottish economy through 
the removal of any factors impeding growth and the encouragement of 
factors promoting it. In the important case of industrial location 
policy, the proposal amounted to a suggested abandonment of the 
unemployment criterion as the basis for determining which areas should 
receive government assistance with industrial development. 
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, the Toothill Report does not 
define "growth areas" in any meaningful way. In fact, the Report does 
not even contain any separate general discussion of the purposes which 
growth areas were intended to serve. The closest thing offered by the 
Committee was the following comment on how areas to be eligible for 
industrial location inducements should be defined: "If new industry 
is guided to wherever local pockets of unemployment exist without 
adequate regard to the possibilities of building up promising 
industrial centres or complexes, the full benefits to be had from 
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attracting it may be dissipated. The build-up of-industrial complexes 
and centres which offer prospects of becoming zones of growth cannot 
be the only aim but it should be one of the principal aims of policy. "20 
In the absence of any further direct treatment by the Committee of 
the technique they advanced, one cannot be precise about what character- 
istics the Committee thought growth areas should have. This is a little 
unfortunate; the idea became widely accepted during and after the 
Toothill inquiry and, in the absence of clear specifications, 
engendered a considerable variety of opinion about what growth 
centres were, and what benefits they might lead to. To. some extent 
this was inevitable: the Toothill Committee was concerned with a 
particular economy - the Scottish - and not with elaborating a new 
regional development concept in general, more abstract terms. 
Theirs was a practical inquiry designed to influence policy, not an 
academic exercise. Hence, their "growth areas" arose from their 
examination of Scottish economic problems and the need, as they saw 
it, to deal with them in a growth-promoting framework. The "growth 
areas" were to be an instrument, a technique -a crucially important 
one, but a_technique nevertheless - for achieving the wider economic 
objectives which they regarded as important for Scotland. 
Although we cannot simply quote the Toothill Report on the 
essential features and purposes of "growth areas", we can review the 
overall growth strategy the Committee proposed for Scotland in somewhat 
greater detail, and from it infer these features and purposes as far 
as Scotland was concerned. Anyone wishing to apply the technique 
thus specified should, of course, be careful to adapt it to suit the 
different circumstances and problems of the regions or areas with 
which he is concerned. 
20Scotish 
Council (Development and Industry), Inquiry into the Scottish 
Economy, 1960-61, Edinburgh, 1961. ("Toothill Report"). After 
admitting the difficulties to be encountered in achieving this aim of 
policy, the Committee did suggest that assistance to industrial 
development available in development districts should be extended as 
well to the Scottish new towns and all Glasgow overspill reception 
areas. Here then were two specific kinds of location - new towns and 
overspill reception centres - in Scotland which the Toothill Committee 
regarded as satisfying their (implicit) criteria for "promising 
industrial centres". 
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The broad framework the Toothill Committee used for their 
analysis and report was an examination of demand and supply conditions 
for the immediate future in the Scottish labour market. Their conclusion 
was that without greater growth than had been experienced historically, 
particularly since World War Two, it would be impossible to increase 
Scottish industrial production and absorb the expected expansion of 
the Scottish working population, objectives which they regarded as 
more critical than merely reducing unemployment in Scotland. While 
they avoided suggesting a specific target for the number of new jobs 
needed because of the statistical errors inherent in projecting 
available data on population and employment, they carried their analysis 
far enough to conclude that the postwar successes with Board of Trade 
industrial location policy in attracting new industry to Scotland, had 
not been sufficient to achieve these objectives: "... a great deal has 
still to be done in securing the growth of industry in Scotland before 
unemployment is dealt with and the potentialities of the economy realized. " 
For growth to be achieved on an adequate scale would also 
require considerable structural change in the Scottish economy. In 
particular, the relative deficiency of science-based industries and 
those producing consumer durables should be remedied as a means of 
overcoming the substantial dependence on shipbuilding and heavy 
engineering industries. The latter were either growing only slowly 
or actually declining. Such diversification would also reduce the 
country's exposure to the risk associated with over-dependence on some 
particular industry; if such an industry were to encounter difficulties 
due to a decline in world demand for its product, the whole regional 
economy would be adversely affected. The structural change desired 
would increase the need for attracting new firms to Scotland. But it 
also involved a new qualitative modification in the industrial location 
policy which is of special relevance to the "growth areas" concept; this 
modification - to attract science-based industries - is discussed more 
fully below. 
More rapid growth to provide employment and higher output in 
the Scottish economy, and to be accompanied by considerable industrial 
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diversification, would make it particularly imperative that investment 
in manufacturing be increased, and on a substantial scale. In addition, 
more public investment would be needed to support manufacturing's 
expansion, especially in housing, roads, educational facilities and 
airports. The need to relate government spending on these facilities 
to the requirements of faster growth, and specifically to the attraction 
and expansion of industry, was one of the most important observations 
offered by the Toothill Coumittee. This need was also an important 
factor in determining the nature and characteristics of the "growth 
areas". 
The central element in the Toothill strategy, then, was 
manufacturing expansion, seen as the key both to achieving faster 
growth throughout the Scottish economy, and to securing diversification 
of the industrial structure of the kind and degree required. It 
follows, therefore, that the main purpose of the "growth areas" 
technique was to°secure, accelerated manufacturing expansion for the 
Scottish economy. 
The Toothill Committee extended their examination on a sectoral 
basis to cover most of the main. factors usually considered as 
worthwhile supplements to industrial development policy, and a few 
others which are not usually so considered. Those they concluded 
were important in the Scottish case were expanded facilities for 
industrial training to serve the needs of the new firms, especially 
those in the industries not already represented in the Scottish 
structure; more housing to help ensure an adequate supply of workers 
for incoming firms in the right places, and to increase the mobility 
of Scottish workers; better passenger air services between Scotland 
and London and the South-East, to enable Scottish managers to maintain 
close contact with customers-and suppliers in that area; the more 
explicit pursuit of better general amenity in Scotland's industrial 
areas as a potential further attraction for new industry; and a 
closer relation between the overspill programme already underway and 
the industrial development effort for the whole country. Two others 
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were not regarded as serious problems: access to credit facilities 
was as good in Scotland as elsewhere in Britain; and costs of transport 
were considered too small a percentage of a firm's total costs to 
present a critical impediment to the establishment and successful 
operation of new firms in Scotland. 
21 
Of those factors considered important for Scottish manufacturing 
expansion most, if not all, had direct implications for the "growth 
centre" technique. It will be useful to consider the implications of 
each factor in turn, as a basis for inferring the special characteristics 
the Toothill Committee had in mind for the growth centres they 
advocated. 
The overriding general characteristic follows from the 
main Toothill conclusion that growth should be the ultimate objective 
for the Scottish economy. The growth centres thus were a technique 
basically for securing and maintaining overall economic growth not 
only within their own jurisdictional boundaries, but in the whole 
Scottish economy. Moreover, it was implicit in the proposition that 
industrial production as well as employment should be increased, that.. 
"growth" embraced both these measures of economic performance. Hence, 
the growth centres must be places where development would contribute 
not only to general employment increase in Scotland, but to initial 
and continuing increases in output as well. The third general 
characteristic follows from the need for industrial diversification, 
21The 
Toothill Report based this conclusion on an analysis of existing 
Scottish firms, most of which would not be selling on any substantial 
scale in the main British consumer market of London and the South East. 
That these costs would be critical for Scottish firms producing for 
this market is perhaps indicated by this very fact. This weakness in 
the Toothill conclusion is probably less serious, however, when it is 
applied to the science-based industries oriented to the London market 
(defence contracts) since these industries tend to produce goods with 
high value-to-bulk ratios. 
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namely that the growth centres should be places to which the newer, 
science-based industries could be persuaded or induced to come. 
22 
On this basis the growth centres advocated by the Toothill Committee 
become locations to which industry would be attracted, especially 
including some new, science-based industries, and in which their 
future growth would be facilitated: as a result, the development of 
the growth centres on such a basis would stimulate, directly and 
indirectly, the more rapid growth of both employment and output in the 
whole Scottish economy. The growth centres were thus to be primarily 
the foci of industrial growth in Scotland. 
The objective of structural change through diversification 
embedded in the Toothill strategy implied a few more specific features 
for growth centres. The main structural change needed was characterized 
as reducing Scotland's dependence on industries producing "small- 
quantity specialized" goods, such as ships and many products of the 
heavy engineering firms, by increasing Scotland's share of those 
making "large-quantity standard" items. It was in the latter'category 
that the faster-growing British industries were concentrated, while 
the group in which Scotland was strongly represented was generally slow- 
growing. Most of the "large-quantity standard" firms had displayed, 
a tendency to locate in the South East, including the so-called 
"science-based" industries. These had located there partly to be 
near large consumer markets, but partly also because during the early 
1950's the overspill new towns around London had been able to develop 
on the basis of industries established to fill defence needs occasioned 
by the programme of rearmament after the Korean War. 
23 
These defence 
suppliers were important members of the new science-based industries 
group. 
22Success 
on this score would also result in a greater diversity of 
employment opportunities being made available in Scotland. The 
Committee considered this qualitative aspect of its employment 
target extremely important. 
230ne 
Board of Trade official suggested to me that the "soft" I. D. C. 
policy pursued during the 1950's was a significant factor in enabling 
the London new towns to grow as rapidly as they did. 
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The science-based industries were especially important because 
of the role they had come to assume as sponsors of scientific and 
industrial research, and more particularly of technological advance. 
Their location in any area on a significant scale almost ensured that 
the area would benefit from the economic impact of "almost automatic 
technological advance". Conversely, to be without them might mean 
that an area would be without an increasingly important basis for 
further industrial development, namely, the new products and the new 
techniques resulting from such technological advance. On this 
reasoning the Toothill Committee concluded that a fundamental aim of 
Scottish industrial development policy should be to attract more of 
these newer, science-based industries to Scotland. 
Such firms would be valuable in another way. New ideas are 
frequently developed within a firm in greater numbers than the firm 
can itself exploit, and the resulting break-away of highly qualified 
staff to start new ventures is an ancillary benefit for an area with 
some science-based industry. Because access to qualified staff is 
so important for new ventures in these fields, a complex of such 
science-based firms has a further built-in factor favouring its 
continued future growth. The Toothill Committee suggested a regional 
complex of science-based firms could be developed in the east of 
Scotland, by encouraging the location of more firms in the electronics 
and precision industries which had already set up there during the 
postwar period. 
The problem in attracting such firms to Scotland was essentially 
to offset the obvious attraction of London and the South East for 
them. The close tie between sales and production in industries selling 
research capacity or research-developed products to Government and in 
major consumer markets, implied little likelihood that science-based 
industry would automatically disperse itself more widely around Great 
Britain. Further concentration of science-based industry in the South 
East thus seemed inevitable. The Toothill Committee argued that such 
a result could be antipathetic to both the Scottish and the national 
general interest. "The advantages of the south have to be weighed 
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against the increasing disadvantages of congestion and labour 
shortage. " In the face of these tendencies further concentration in 
the South East should be mitigated by the development of other areas 
in Great Britain. Secondly, Scotland's relative disadvantage could 
be greatly reduced if modern communications were exploited to the 
full, especially facilities for air travel to enable Scottish managers 
and salespeople to maintain close personal contact with their customers 
in the South East. Thirdly, there was still considerable scope for 
Scotland to better its attractiveness as an industrial centre: this 
would require that more attention be paid to the supply of skilled 
manpower, to industrial relations, to housing, to labour mobility, 
to assisting management in various ways, and to Government policy for 
helping firms expand or establish away from the congested areas. 
The second and third of these propositions implied certain 
characteristics for the locations to which such new, science-based 
industry was to be attracted in Scotland. If they were to be able to 
offer relatively easy access to the London market, they would have 
to be near the airports from which improved passenger services would 
operate into London. Similarly, to enable the shipment of their 
output to the South East, they should be on the main road and railway 
lines as well. They should also have available adequate supplies of 
skilled manpower for incoming industries; to ensure such availability 
the locations where industry was to be located and expanded should also 
have a sufficient supply of housing, both for new firms' key workers 
and to tap the increase in labour supply afforded by the overspill 
programme in Glasgow. Policies to improve the mobility of labour 
into such centres from other parts of Scotland would also be useful 
in this way. 
The Toothill Committee was also anxious to increase the extent 
of decision-making capacity that would accompany any new firms attracted 
to Scotland. In the long run further changes in industrial structure 
would be greatly facilitated if new undertakings had substantial 
local control of their developments, and thus a better ability to 
respond flexibly and fully to expanding opportunities or to changing 
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market conditions and changing technology. This meant attracting 
not only the production staff of a new factory, but also top management, 
design and sales staffs. And this meant providing in the selected 
growth areas for the sort of facilities, especially including 
improvements in general amenity, which would attract such personnel 
to a Scottish location and thus enable Scotland to attain a higher 
"quality of growth". Thus the growth areas were also to be centres 
of above-average amenity so as to present attractive places for "top 
management" to live and work. 
The provision of better amenity, mainly by reducing air 
pollution and clearing derelict industrial sites, in the selected 
growth centres would also serve to increase their attraction for 
mobile Scottish workers and their families. A larger supply of labour 
could thus be concentrated in these locations to serve the needs of 
the incoming and expanding manufacturing firms. The use of growth 
centres as destinations for families being moved from Glasgow would 
enable the integration of the overspill programme with the economic 
development effort too. The growth centres would also be the 
logical places in which to locate the additional training facilities 
the Toothill Committee proposed; or, the growth centres should be 
located within reasonable commuting distance of the training facilities. 
Where "on-the-job" training was contemplated it could be provided, 
of course, wherever the new or expanded firm decided to establish 
on its own premises. More fundamental than the provision of training 
facilities in this conscious build-up in the growth centres of sizeable 
pools of labour as an inducement for manufacturing firms to locate in 
Scotland, was the need to accelerate the rate of housing construction 
there. Without houses workers would not be attracted to the growth 
centres from Glasgow and elsewhere in Scotland, and without better 
quality houses neither the managerial staffs of the new, science- 
based industries nor the non-production senior staff desired as part 
of improving the "quality of growth", could be expected to choose a 
Scottish location. 
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The Committee's considerable emphasis of the role which co- 
ordinated infrastructure planning and investment might play in supporting 
a policy of accelerating the growth of the Scottish economy carried 
the further implication for the growth areas that expenditure on the 
basic facilities provided by Government should be concentrated in the 
selected locations. 
Thus the Toothill Committee implicitly suggested that growth 
centres, in order to be effective in attracting new manufacturing 
enterprises to Scotland on the scale necessary to support the total 
economic growth desired, would have to be more than simply locations 
for industrial plants. In particular, they should attract science- 
based industries. To do this they would require easy access to 
airports, road and rail networks and industrial training programmes, 
above-average amenity, sufficient supplies of skilled manpower, and 
various services required by management. A regional complex of 
science-based firms in the east of Scotland meant, presumably, at 
least one growth centre in that area. They should become the primary 
outlets for overspill population from Glasgow, and plausible alternative 
destinations for other Scots who might otherwise emigrate to the 
South or overseas. 
Although it was not made too explicit in the Toothill Report, 
the basic idea behind the growth area concept was to offset the 
attractions of London and the South East for both manufacturing firms 
and Scottish emigrants by offering, in specified localities in Scotland, 
the same sort of facilities, amenities, and even opportunities for 
future growth, they might find in the "congested" regions of Great 
Britain. This idea subsequently found more general expression in a 
report published two years later, in 1963, by the National Economic 
Development Council. 
The Influence of Toothill on NEDC 
At that time there was increasing concern throughout Great 
Britain with the country's sluggish growth performance over the 
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decade of the 1950's. The fashion of comparing the growth records of 
various countries in league tables had the effect of eroding part of 
the legitimate basis for British satisfaction at having maintained 
full, or near full, employment conditions throughout the decade, and 
led also to a sort of national guilt complex about the growth rate. 
Consequently, achievement of faster growth of the British economy 
received an increasing measure of popular and political support as 
a national economic objective. Measures to accelerate the national 
growth rate were considered on this reasoning to be desirable 
per se. 
An important manifestation of this concern with national 
growth was the establishment, in 1962, of the National Economic 
Development Council whose objects were to examine the economic 
performance of the nation, to consider the obstacles to quicker 
growth, and to increase the rate of sound growth. The theme of the 
Toothill Report was echoed in the N. E. D. C. 's discussion of regional 
questions in its 1963 Report "Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth", 
24 
which marked a recognition, at the national level, of the national 
economic benefits to be had from properly conceived regional 
development policies. 
This Report noted the consideration inherent in the industrial 
development incentives for the less prosperous areas under the Local 
Employment Act, that industry should be steered to the particular 
districts which by reason of their employment position, needed it most. 
The Report argued, however, that "... better results might be secured 
for the slowly expanding regions as a whole by identifying their 
natural growth points and seeking to attract industry to them. 
Within the bigger areas a wider choice of location than at present 
would be available to incoming firms. This would increase the 
likelihood of attracting a larger number and a greater variety of 
firms, and of stimulating the development of industrial complexes. 
Firms would then benefit from the presence of kindred industry. 
These complexes and other places especially attractive to industry 
24National 
Economic Development Council, Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth, London, H. M. S. O., 1963. 
147. 
could be developed into growth points within the less prosperous 
regions. It could be expected that the benefit of new growth in any 
part would repercuss fairly quickly throughout the region. " 
It should be noted here that the main context in, which 
N. E. D. C. discussed growth areas was that of the industrial 
development incentives provided by the Board of Trade. Infrastructure 
improvements were mentioned, it is true, but they were treated as 
a secondary, though important, supporting aspect of a growth areas 
policy. The main purpose ascribed to growth areas was that of their 
having a greater ability to attract new industrial firms to the less 
prosperous regions. 
The recommended use of infrastructure improvements as a regional 
development device, moreover, should take place especially in the growth 
areas by concentrating the provision of such improvements on the areas 
where industrial development was more likely. The N. E. D. C. Report 
also noted the important role which increased intra-regional mobility 
could play in assisting the build-up of growth areas as industrial 
locations, as well as the important contribution that a high pressure 
of demand in the country as a whole would contribute to an improvement 
in the regional problem. The N. E. D. C. Report marked the recognition 
at the national level of the contribution regional development might 
make to national growth. This change in emphasis was reflected 
also in the report's noting the contribution to further growth which 
might come not only from reducing unemployment in the less prosperous 
regions, but also from increasing activity rates there. 
"Neddy" thus took the strategy which Toothill had elaborated 
specifically for the Scottish economy, distilled its most important 
general elements, and used these in offering a more explicit, general 
formulation of the growth point idea. In Neddy's hands it became a 
technique for developing any less prosperous region, and was justified 
not in terms of Scottish needs or those of another less prosperous 
region, but as a proper means of increasing the rate of national 
economic growth. In so doing N. E. D. C. based its argument on the 
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Toothill suggestion that, if inflationary pressures were to be 
avoided in the national economy, it was essential to foster the growth 
of the less prosperous regions. It was no solution to bring people 
endlessly from the peripheral areas because they increased social 
congestion and merely further reduced activity rates in the areas they 
left. 
The N. E. D. C. Report appeared while the process of selecting 
the Central Scotland "growth areas" was still underway within the 
Scottish Development Department. It is more than likely, therefore, 
that the officials concerned in these two agencies bf the same 
Government consulted with one another while the "Neddy" report was 
being drafted. It should be remembered, however, that the acceptance 
of regional development as an integral part of national growth policy 
by an agency like N. E. D. C. represented a substantial and significant 
change and probably would not have been possible without the coherent 
argument which had been put forward in its support by the Toothill 
Committee, and which had led to substantial general support throughout 
Britain for a growth-oriented regional policy. 
CHAPTER 6 
Selecting the Growth Areas 
The legislative and institutional framework for physical 
planning and for location of industry policy in Scotland have been 
discussed in historical perspective above. These matters were among 
the detailed questions related to industrial location policy in 
Scotland which were examined by the Toothill Committee. One of their 
findings was that certain responsibilities with particular relation to 
economic development were divided between the Scottish Department of 
Health (including physical planning) and the Scottish Home Department. 
They recommended closer integration of the various departments and 
agencies concerned with economic development in Scotland, and also 
suggested there should be greater co-ordination of economic development 
measures generally. 
The Scottish Development Department Established 
Accordingly, in June 1962 a new Scottish Development Department 
was formed from certain parts of the Scottish Home Department and the 
Department of Health for Scotland. The Home Department's former 
responsibilities in connection with Local Government, Electricity, 
Roads and Industry were brought together with the Department of Health's 
former responsibilities for Housing, Town and Country Planning and the 
provision of Environmental Services. These various functions were 
all closely related, the Toothill Committee had noted, to the 
industrial development activities of the Board of Trade which would 
remain the main instrument of Scottish economic development. 
It was within this new Scottish Development Department 
that the "growth areas" exercise was to be initiated and largely 
completed. Because of the close association their senior officers 
had with the Toothill Committee, as assessors and otherwise, it was 
only to be expected that the Scottish Development Department would 
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bring to this task essentially the same diagnosis of Scotland's 
economic ills and the same prescription to cure them as the Toothill 
Report had formulated. The exercise of selecting "growth areas" for 
Central Scotland thus began from acceptance of both the Toothill 
conclusions regarding the Scottish economy and the "growth points" 
idea to which it had given birth. Although only implicit in the 
Report itself, "growth areas" by this time had been made very 
explicit indeed not only by Neddy, but also by various economic 
journalists whose imaginations had been aroused by this revolutionary 
change proposed in British regional policy. 
The Scottish Development Group 
The origins of the Scottish Development Group may be traced 
to August 1962. At that time a review was initiated, to be carried 
out within the civil service, of the implications for Government 
policy of the change in population and employment to be expected 
throughout the United Kingdom during the period to 1981. One of the 
first priorities in such an examination was to form a view about the 
likely regional distribution of the estimated future population and in 
order to do this, a projection of existing population trends in the 
several regions of the country was needed. 
As the Scottish part of this projection, the Scottish Office 
undertook, in consultation with other Departments, a study of the 
implications of adopting a policy of creating growing points in 
Scotland. This reflected a tacit assumption that Scotland would make 
a contribution to accommodating the increase expected in the United 
Kingdom population during the ensuing twenty years. But it also had 
a more specific and immediate purpose, which was to examine possible 
changes in the existing policy for the distribution of industry 
which was tied to local unemployment and was controlled by the 
unemployment statistics for Ministry of Labour local office areas. 
This led to consideration of a policy which looked at Central 
Scotland as a whole, took account of the present and future declines 
in various industries and assessed how best to realize the potentialities 
of the area under modern conditions. It would then by a redirection 
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and co-ordination of public investment seek to stimulate growth in 
those places where it was most likely to become rapidly self- 
generating. 
To co-ordinate the work of the various Departments concerned 
in undertaking the Central Scotland study a small Working Group was 
suggested, to consist initially of representatives of the Board of 
Trade, the Ministry of Labour and the Scottish Statistical Office 
under the Chairmanship of the Scottish Development Department. Mr. 
T. L. Lister, who had been one of the joint secretaries of the 
Toothill Committee, was appointed Secretary of this new Group. Other 
Departments such as the Ministries of Power and Transport might be 
called in as required. This Working Group was to become the Scottish 
Development Group. 
The task which now fell to the Scottish Development Group 
was that of working out a synthesis of the Toothill strategy for 
Scotland in which "growth areas" would be the central element, to 
serve also as the framework within which the necessary changes in 
policy could be suggested. 
The Initiation of the Selection Process 
There were actually two separate original sources from which 
the growth areas were derived; hence, the selection process was 
carried out, as it were, in two parts. These two parts were both 
initiated within the physical planning division, although not 
simultaneously. By the time the results of the division's analysis 
had been passed to the Scottish Development Group in the form of 
suggested possible growth areas from which a further selection and 
refinement could be made, however, the two parts had been grafted 
together into a single group of eligible areas. The first part of 
the initial exercise consisted in the search for what, for want of 
a better term, may be styled "growth areas proper", and may be divided 
into three stages, as below. The second part, which was begun 
somewhat later than the first, involved the identification of 
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"rehabilitation areas" whose characteristics differed in important 
respects from those of the "growth areas proper". Subsequently, 
nevertheless, both kinds of areas came to be represented among the 
growth areas announced in the White Paper of November 1963. 
PART I- "GROWTH AREAS PROPER" 
Three stages may be discerned in the initial analysis which 
eventually led to the selection of "growth areas proper", as follows: 
Stage One - Areas with Physical Potential 
The initial analysis was conducted within the physical planning 
division of the Scottish Development Department. As already noted, 
this division has responsibilities under the Town and Country Planning 
Act in connection with the land use planning of Scotland. It reviews 
the Quinquennial Development Plans which must be submitted by local 
authorities throughout the country for approval by the Secretary of 
State and is, therefore, concerned with the attempt to achieve mutual 
consistency among such plans within the context of the Secretary of 
State's plans for the physical development of Scotland as a whole. 
Until this time Scotland had been divided, for these purposes, 
into two physical planning regions, each being the responsibility of 
a separate unit within the physical planning division. The West 
region consisted of the Clyde Valley and the South West of Scotland; 
the East and North region, of the Forth Valley, the Borders, the 
North East and the Highlands and Islands. Under this arrangement 
the planning of Glasgow and its environs was treated, roughly, as 
one large city region; and that of Edinburgh was treated as another, 
separate and smaller, city region within the East and North region. 
Now, however, the physical planning division was reorganized 
and the former regional breakdown was abandoned in favour of two 
regions: a) a new Central Scotland region, and b) a composite region 
including the South West, the North East, the Borders, and the Highlands 
and Islands. The effect of this was to make the land use planning of 
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the Glasgow and Edinburgh city regions both part of the planning 
of Central Scotland as a whole. Since the main emphasis of the 
Scottish Development Department's work in this field appears to have 
been concentrated previously on the difficult, complicated problem 
of Glasgow itself, the change represented also a decision to pay 
increased attention to the eastern part of the Central Belt, both in 
order to deal with its own peculiar problems and as. a further outlet 
for the "overspill" programme designed to relieve Glasgow's housing 
shortage. In this way, presumably, it was also hoped that the wider 
approach might lend itself to finding solutions for both the eastern 
and western halves of the Central Belt that were complementary and 
mutually consistent. 
One of the first tasks in the physical planning of the new 
Central Scotland region was to devise an overall strategy for its 
long term physical development. The initial step was the 
preparation of an up-to-date assessment of the physical development 
potential of Central Scotland. At this stage it appears that the 
main requirement was to specify potential in terms of the Central 
Belt's capacity to accommodate additional population, expected to 
arise as a result of continuing progress with the Glasgow "overspill" 
programme, and also from expected population growth throughout the 
region. Accordingly, a series of studies was initiated to determine 
this potential through an identification of particular areas where 
the housing and other physical facilities required by an increasing 
population could be located. In this, as one would expect, the 
concern was with finding areas where such facilities could be 
provided without incurring unreasonable or unnecessary costs. 
In this first stage of the selection process, four types of 
"limiting factors" were used to eliminate those parts of Central 
Scotland in which physical development was essentially impracticable. 
Such areas were discarded in order to concentrate the search for suitable 
locations for development on the more promising part of the whole 
region. In other words, a straight "knockout" system was used whereby 
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areas "disqualified" on one of the counts noted below were thereby 
eliminated from further consideration regardless of how well they may 
have scored on any of the criteria subsequently applied at later 
stages of the selection process. (The nature of the limiting factors 
applied suggests, however, that the eliminated areas would be unlikely 
to score very high on the other criteria used; and a casual. inspection 
of the areas eventually chosen confirms that this is the case. ) In 
general, the use of the "knockout" method made this part of the 
selection process rather different from a "linear programming" method 
wherein the selected areas would be those which showed the highest 
all-round score based on all criteria used. 
Four types of "limiting factors" prohibiting or limiting 
physical development on any scale were applied, one at a time, in 
more or less the following order: 
(1) Elevation, Exposure and Climate. Unimproved moorland, 
and areas more than 650 feet above sea level, representing 
nearly half the study area were thus eliminated. Areas 
over 650 feet have an annual rainfall well above average 
in Central Scotland. "Optimum conditions" were 
considered to exist at elevations below 400 to 450 feet 
where the existing cities and urban concentrations are 
also to be found. Unimproved moorland, while it may 
offer the possibility of development in the long-term 
future, is not really a sensible proposition as long 
as there are alternative possibilities for siting 
development in areas with fewer inherent difficulties 
such as very high-cost drainage systems. 
(2) Mineral Workings. About one-fifth of the study area was 
underlain with mineral workings and thus liable perhaps 
to subsidence as a result, mainly, of coal mining 
operations. At this stage, this factor was NOT applied 
to eliminate any areas, but to indicate that in certain 
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areas physical development should not be attempted 
without a prior mineral assessment. The effect of 
applying this limiting factor however was ultimately to 
eliminate a considerable part of the survey region. 
(3) Safeguarding Areas. Because of the nature or the 
security classification of certain, especially defence 
or defence-related, establishments within Central 
Scotland, the areas surrounding these establishments 
simply were not available for physical development 
in the absence of a change in policy or special permission 
from the defence authorities. In one particular case 
the possibility of securing such permission was 
subsequently canvassed by the Scottish Development Group. 
But in general a judgment was reached at this stage in 
the process that physical development on the scale 
contemplated was impracticable in such safeguarding 
areas. 
(4) High-Quality Agricultural, or Amenity, Land. Certain 
particular areas were identified under these headings 
and omitted from further consideration, their preservation 
being accepted as a necessary constraint on future 
physical development planning. Several fairly large" 
areas within Central Scotland were disqualified on this 
count. This in itself indicated that Central Scotland 
was not pressing on the margin of its land capacity and 
could afford, as it were, to retain certain areas whose 
scenic and other qualities were considered well worth 
preservation. Indeed, it was argued that the preservation 
of such areas was an important pre-requisite in attracting 
new industrialists to move into the area. This 
consideration applied, for example, in the case of 
Edinburgh's green belt where preservation had been a 
matter of deliberate planning plicy, and to certain 
other areas near Glasgow and Edinburgh needed as a 
"reserve" against future overspill. 
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Up to this point the selection process had involved the use 
of the sieve map technique familiar to geographers and physical 
planners. Moreover, the factors considered so far were essentially 
physical in nature. What had resulted was substantially a selection 
of areas where development was not restricted by prior commitments 
or difficult conditions, and where the potential capacity to 
accommodate population was considerable. Basically, the available 
virgin sites had been identified. 
Stage Two - Centres Exhibiting Population and Employment Increases 
The task of selection was not to remain entirely a physical 
planner's exercise, however. In August 1962 it was decided that the 
physical planning study - the identification of areas of potential 
growth - should be placed within a framework to be determined by 
certain economic studies to be carried out. The effect of this 
decision was to broaden the framework for the' selection process so 
as to include certain explicitly economic criteria in the basis of 
selection along with the physical planning criteria. Thus the 
purpose of choosing areas became broader than the listing of places 
where new physical facilities could be located, a change which, in 
effect, meant that the range of possible choice would be narrowed 
through the application of the explicitly economic criteria. 
As a result of the criticisms the Toothill Committee had 
made of industrial location policy, a general acceptance was now 
evident for the policy of developing growing points which the Toothill 
Committee had advocated. Accordingly, two further stages, in the 
selection process were carried out. The factors employed in these 
stages were essentially economic in nature, either explicitly or 
implicitly. 
The second stage of the selection process consisted of an 
examination of population and employment trends between 1951 and 1961 
(1952 to 1961 in the case of employment) to determine which areas within 
Central Scotland had demonstrated growth in these respects in the 
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immediate past. (The employment data were actually the figures 
on insured population made available on an employment exchange basis 
by the Ministry of Labour. ) More specifically, areas which had 
experienced a population increase of 10 per cent or more (when the 
Central Belt increase over the same period was 3.1 per cent) and an 
employment increase of 6 per cent or more (Central Belt - -0.01 per 
cent) were identified. The results of applying these two measures of 
past growth were also compared, in order to distinguish areas of 
population growth only or of employment growth only, from those where 
both population and employment had exhibited expansionary tendencies. 
The analysis at this stage was conditioned also by such other factors 
as the existence of overspill agreements with Glasgow (presumably in 
assessing the nature of population increases) and the location of 
recent industrial enterprises in overspill reception areas. 
No further analysis was apparently undertaken to assess the 
underlying factors which had caused these particular areas to 
experience more rapid population and employment increase than Central 
Scotland generally. Nor was there any attempt made to examine whether 
the basis of such experience during the 1950's would continue to apply 
in the future. These matters will be discussed more fully below. 
This second stage of the selection process largely paralleled 
the first stage. It resulted in an additional group of possible growth 
areas selected essentially from the populated towns and burghs in 
Central Scotland as the basis of greatest recent expansion. This 
additional group was largely, although not completely, independent 
of the areas which had been left in the running after the physical 
"limiting factors" had been applied. To put it another way, the 
identification of areas where population and employment had grown 
most rapidly did not result in any more areas being eliminated from 
further consideration as possible growth areas but added to the total 
to be considered. The disqualification of areas identified by both 
these processes had now to await subsequent stages of the selection 
process. 
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Stage Three - Areas with Increasing Potential 
The third stage was a further choice of areas based on 
yet another set of criteria. It consisted in an explicit consideration 
of change in the basic infrastructure expected to take place in 
future in the Central Belt. Specifically, it involved taking into 
account the pattern of road communications expected to result from 
decisions already made about motorway and dual carriageway construction, 
and the impact these would have in improving communications within 
Central Scotland and beyond. In particular, location on or near the 
planned motorway and dual carriageway system, was expected to operate 
as a further, substantial inducement to new industrial enterprises to 
locate in Scotland. Perhaps the greatest weight was attached, in this 
respect, to the Forth and Tay Road Bridges for the effect they would 
have in shifting the centre of gravity eastward within the Central 
Belt. 
A second factor, apparently physical but clearly economic as 
well, used here was the location of large level sites available for 
possible future industrial development of an extensive sort, such as 
the coastal areas south of Irvine and north of Grangemouth. 
The assessment of these physical changes likely to enhance the 
growth potential of certain areas in the future, served to shorten the 
list of possible growth areas. In the relatively compact geographic 
setting of Central Scotland the effect of applying these three sets 
of criteria was largely to identify two different types of possible 
growth areas. First, there were those which, by virtue of their 
location in relation to the region's existing or proposed communications 
network, had better chances of rapid growth in the future. Some 
others also fell into the latter category because they had available 
large tracts of land suitable for future industrial development on an 
extensive basis. The areas of this latter type were, in effect, a 
positive translation into particular terms, and some further refinement, 
of what had resulted from applying the general, negative "limiting 
factors" in the first stage of the selection process. Secondly, 
there were those areas which had exhibited prominent employment and 
Population growth in the immediate past. 
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The application of these three sets of factors had resulted 
in the identification of areas "which are both physically capable of 
sizeable expansion and which have shown indications of potential economic 
growth or are strategically located for future development". These 
became the so-called "areas of search": 
(1) Kinross (population potential first estimate 100,000) 
(2) Glenrothes/Tayport (50,000) 
(3) Grangemouth/Falkirk/Alloä (50,000) 
(4) Livingston (100,000) 
(5) Midlothian (up to 50,000) 
(6) North Ayrshire (100,000) 
(7) Cumnock (20,000) 
These are more or less synonymous with the first type of possible 
growth area mentioned above. These "areas of search" did not include 
any of the second type, that is, those centres which had experienced 
rapid population and employment growth in the immediate past, such 
as the new towns of East Kilbride and Cumbernauld. These latter were 
not objects for search, since their inclusion had already been 
explicitly recommended in the Toothill Report. 
Together these seven "areas of search" were estimated to be 
capable, in conjunction with the new towns, of accommodating the 
expected increase in the population of Central Scotland, on the 
following basis: 
Population changes expected, 1961-81: 
Allowance in local authority statutory development plans 300,000 
(including remaining capacity, 4 New Towns, 252,000) 
Estimated Capacity Need, including: 
Overspill from Glasgow, etc. 100,000 to 150,000 
Population increase if no drift 
of emigration to Midlands, South400,000 to 500,000 750,000 
Additional Capacity to be provided in 
Growth areas 360,000 
Additional Capacity to be provided in 
Growth areas outside Central Scotland 100,000 
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Beyond this point in the selection process, further refinements 
were a matter for discussion and negotiation rather than something to 
result from the application of precisely elaborated formulae. What 
the physical planning division had done was to reduce the survey area 
to a number of possible growth areas from which a further selection 
might be made, either by weighting the various criteria which had 
already been employed in the physical planners' exercise, or on the 
basis of whatever other considerations seemed appropriate. 
PART II - "REHABILITATION AREAS" -A Supplementary Source 
Since the purpose of selecting growth areas was to encourage 
the industrial development of Central Scotland, some attention also 
had to be paid to the present population distribution in absolute 
terms. Glasgow and Edinburgh had been deliberately omitted, of 
course. So had other reasonably large population centres within 
Central Scotland. The existing larger labour market areas, consequently, 
were poorly represented. By and large, the areas nominated on the 
basis of the criteria already outlined, consisted of either virgin 
sites or of relatively small population centres, such as the New Towns, 
whose growth had been especially rapid in percentage terms but which 
did not account for anything more than a fraction of the total 
population of Central Scotland. Further consideration was given, 
therefore, to the possibility of including some of the older urban 
industrial areas among the locations on which the boost to development 
was to be concentrated. 
Accordingly, as the second part of the selection process, the 
possibility was examined of including the older urban industrial 
areas of Central Scotland, and of bringing them more specifically 
within the scope of the proposed development programme for Central 
Scotland. Such areas became known as "rehabilitation areas". A 
number of these areas were subsequently to be designated as growth 
areas and included in the programme announced in the White Paper of 
November 1963; the way in which they first arose is, therefore, an 
important additional aspect of the whole selection process. 
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A part of Central Scotland's industrial heritage is a certain 
amount of land dereliction, the result mainly of coal and shale mining, 
which is also associated with declining industrial areas and localized 
heavy unemployment. The amount of (man-made) dereliction of land was 
estimated by the physical planners, conservatively, at 15,000 to 
16,000 acres. Approximately 75 per cent of this total was found to 
be concentrated in the mining counties of Lanarkshire, Fife and West 
Lothian. 
The West Lothian problem was one aspect being considered at 
that time by a team of social scientists and regional planners from 
the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh engaged in preparing the 
Lothians Regional Survey and Plan. This area included the New Town 
of Livingston, which had been designated by the Secretary of State a 
few months previously. 
In Fife 80 per cent of the County's derelict land was 
concentrated within the 23 square miles of the Cowdenbeath-Lochgelly 
area. A regional programme of rehabilitation within an area between the 
New Town of Glenrothes, the large burghs of Kirkcaldy and Dunfermline, 
might be associated with a further expansion of Glenrothes and other 
elements of regeneration in the area such as the new industrial 
estate at Donibristle, the Forth Road Bridge and improvement of the 
Inverkeithing-Perth Road, and the proposed private New Town development 
at Dalgetty Bay. The existing population of Fife was some 326,000 
with nearly 6,000 unemployed. 
Over 80 per cent of Lanarkshire's derelict land was located 
within some 80 square miles of industrial North Lanarkshire (adjacent 
to Glasgow), including the large burghs of Coatbridge, Airdrie, 
Rutherglen, Hamilton and Motherwell, and the County industrial areas 
of Cambuslang, Uddingston, Bellshill and Blantyre. The population 
of the County was 330,000 with nearly 12,000 unemployed in December 1962. 
While population concentration ruled out this area for growth on New 
Town lines such as that of Livingston or Glenrothes, there were other 
elements of regeneration to which a regional programme of rehabilitation 
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could give a further impetus; such were the existing industrial 
estates at Newhouse, Blantyre and Chapelhall, together with additional 
land to be acquired by the Board of Trade at Bellshill, the strip 
mill at Ravenscraig, and comprehensive redevelopment which was already 
proceeding at Cambuslang and for which proposals were being prepared 
at Bellshill, Hamilton, Coatbridge and Motherwell. The major road 
improvements to A8 and A74, which pass through the area, would them- 
selves make use of mining waste and road construction and would add 
further point to the rehabilitation of adjoining areas. 
Thus in this case particular areas were selected and identified 
as being in need of rehabilitation of an urban renewal kind, involving 
physical and economic rehabilitation. These were then given particular 
attention to determine what action was. needed in order to make them 
suitable locations for new physical facilities. Because of their 
existing population and heavy unemployment,, however, any additional 
physical facilities would consist mainly in new industrial enterprises 
and social capital, and the replacement (rather than the initial provision) 
of housing. Successful development along these lines was not expected 
to contribute much, on a net basis, to the accommodation of the natural 
population increase expected in Central Scotland as a whole. 
The argument used here,. it should be noted, was expressed in 
terms of the physical problem of derelict land. It was also accepted, 
however, that these areas required economic rehabilitation as well. 
Furthermore, North Lanarkshire, for one, by virtue of the number of 
new factories attracted, there during the postwar period in a more or 
less successful effort to stem the decline of the region's older 
industries, had even demonstrated some propensity for growth. 
, 
To some extent, therefore, the planners' criterion of derelict 
land was a reflection of two other factors, namely, industrial decline 
and relatively heavy unemployment. Looked at in the narrow terms of 
the particular locations or areas themselves, it might be concluded 
that because decline is the opposite of growth, the basis of 
selection had been modified considerably in order to include the 
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"rehabilitation areas" in the exercise at all. The validity of this 
argument needs to be examined however within the wider regional 
context: it is more important to ask whether the inclusion. of the 
so-called "rehabilitation areas" added to, or detracted from, the 
chances of securing the desired objectives of development in Central 
Scotland as a whole. This is a question to which I shall return 
below. 
An attempt was made to relate these "rehabilitation areas" 
to the "growth areas proper" within a regional context in, which one 
group could be seen as complementary to the other. Thus the proposals 
for major development at Glenrothes and Kinross and those for a 
programme of rehabilitation of the derelict coal mining areas of 
Central Fife together formed a programme of development and 
rehabilitation similar to that of Livingston and within an area which 
lies fully within development districts currently scheduled. The 
proposals for the Grangemouth/Falkirk complex envisaged that this 
area would draw on Western Fife and in conjunction with Livingston, 
on Lanarkshire. 
The main emphasis up to this point in the growth areas selection 
process had been on determining the potential, in the largely physical 
sense, for further development in Central Scotland. This was reflected 
in the one case, in the search for areas where the possibility existed 
for the substantial build-up of new housing accommodation as well as 
new physical facilities for industry, and, in the case of the 
"rehabilitation areas", where the need to reduce the incidence of 
dereliction offered the prospect of making available large areas capable, 
as a result, of accommodating new physical development. The scale of 
the opportunity for such physical development was different in the 
two cases, and a conclusion was necessarily reached that the "rehabilitation 
areas" offered potential sufficient only to meet new industrial 
demands. New housing accommodation was, therefore, not to be 
contemplated except as replacement of housing already there. This 
difference in the physical aspects of the two types of areas reflected, 
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of course, the different sort of problem in economic development each 
represented: the one as prospective sites for both new population 
and new industry, the other as places where new industrial developments 
were desired to provide work for those already living there. The 
common thread at this general level, paralleling the similar availability 
of industrial sites at the physical development level, was thus the 
need for new industrial activity. 
Choice and Further Refinement 
The discussion to this point has perhaps over-emphasized the 
role of the physical planner in the first two parts of the selection 
process. In fact, as already noted, the criteria employed in reducing 
the whole of Central Scotland to the so-called "areas of search" had 
included some factors which were not entirely physical in nature. 
Those engaged in carrying out these parts of the exercise were aware 
as well of its wider purposes and had already begun to apply, at 
least implicitly, more general criteria together with those of a 
clearly physical type. It was also true that the opportunity was 
used to examine the results of the exercise as they began to emerge, 
to make suggestions and modifications as it progressed, and thus to 
ensure that the result would conform more closely to the main purpose 
of selecting the growth areas. One example of such change was the 
inclusion of the "rehabilitation areas" in the analysis. 
For these reasons too the separation of the whole selection 
process into separate parts, as is done here, is somewhat artificial. 
The whole exercise was telescoped into a rather short period of weeks 
and it is perhaps impossible to establish a clear sequence of events 
as they occurred. Moreover the exercise was being conducted against 
the background of the Toothill Committee Report and the discussions 
it provoked regarding the role of growth areas in the future of the 
Scottish economy. It is even more difficult, therefore, to say at 
what particular point and in what order each of the various criteria 
employed throughout the whole selection process was applied. Indeed, 
it would perhaps be quite unrealistic to expect that, in the give and 
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take of continuing discussion and consultation among the several 
Departments and agencies involved, anything like a neat formula could 
have been rigidly used. It is also questionable, of course, whether 
the application of such a formula - if one were available - would in 
fact yield results any better than those actually achieved. 
The purpose of the study was to indicate how the proposed new 
policy - of creating growing points in Central Scotland - might be 
implemented and what its effect might be on different parts of the area 
and on established Government policy in related fields. The study 
would deal initially with Central Scotland only. 
It is important to note, in this connection, that even at 
this early stage in the exercise, the growth areas were seen not as a 
policy in themselves but as one particular means, albeit a very 
important one, of giving effect to a whole new approach to the economic 
development planning of Central Scotland. The idea was explicitly to get 
away from the former ties between location of industry policy and 
localized unemployment, but more generally also to expand the frame- 
work for policy to comprehend not only the incidence of unemployment, 
but also any and all factors which bear upon the economic status 
and future development of the whole area. 
The economic studies also carried out included the following: 
(1) An assessment of the future prospects of declining 
industries, the identification of the locations to be 
particularly affected and an estimate of the reduction 
in employment likely to occur. 
(2) A parallel assessment of the industries which were 
likely to expand and the locations in which they were 
likely to develop. 
(3) An assessment of the future labour resources in terms 
of numbers, ages and skills likely to be available as a 
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basis for new growth. This was modified to take 
account of the expected effects of the programme of 
overspill building in New Towns and other areas. 
(4) An examination of current migration and the assessment 
of reasonable targets for its reduction. 
(5) An examination of the economics of transport in Central 
Scotland with a view to identifying areas which were 
beat placed for new development. 
The economic studies were parallel to the physical planning 
studies already discussed: 
(1) the identification of areas of potential growth and 
an estimate of their capacity, within a framework 
determined by the economic studies. 
(2) an estimate of the changes in the availability of 
land for development consequent on the reduction of 
coal mining activity. 
(3) an assessment of current physical planning policies 
in relation to Green Belts and their effect on potential 
growing areas and to the planned provision, building and 
in prospect, for town development expansions in New 
Towns. 
(4) an examination of the areas of industrial decline and an 
assessment of what rehabilitation was necessary and 
appropriate to establish them at a lower level of 
economic activity; identifying areas or sub-areas where 
the planned abandonment of communities no longer viable 
could be anticipated. (This item presumably led to the 
identification of "rehabilitation areas" already discussed) 
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(5) an examination of communications-to ensure efficient 
inter-communication throughout the Central Belt and 
facilitate, the movement of goods and population 
essential to the. new policy. 
(6) an examination of environmental services in relation to 
the selected areas. 
In this way the examination of physical potential which had 
already been begun was made a part of the more comprehensive 
examination of Government policy for Central Scotland. This 
examination of existing policy was seen to include the following: 
(1) The planning of housing. In a regional context a much 
closer control of the location of new housing development 
would be necessary so that new houses would be built in 
areas with prospects of growth rather than in outdated 
communities. 
(2) Road planning and development would have to be co-ordinated 
to create the right conditions for growth and to link 
the growing points to the main motorway grid. 
(3) Environmental services such as water supply would also 
have to be co-ordinated, and the efforts of several 
local authorities concerted to this purpose in some cases. 
(4) The whole structure of Local Government in Scotland 
might have to be examined. In particular, conflicts of 
jurisdiction as well as of policy at local level would 
have to be avoided in growing points comprised of 
several local authority areas. 
(5) A new approach to the assistance to industry policy 
would particularly involve a greater concentration of 
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Government assistance on the larger projects which 
can be the basis of future growth. At the same time, 
a realistic assessment would have to be made of the 
effect of the "growth" policy on the existing 
development districts. 
(6) The rundown of some areas would require comprehensive 
efforts of clearance and rehabilitation to avoid abandoned 
areas being left derelict. 
A Favourable Consensus for Growth Areas 
The nature of the general study now proposed was conditioned 
largely by the recommendations of the Toothill Committee. Moreover, 
the Toothill Report was being used by the official opposition of 
the day as a basis for urging the Government to do a more effective 
job in encouraging the economic development of Scotland. The report 
had also received a very favourable reception in Press circles, and 
given rise to considerable publicity about the economic circumstances 
and problems of the Scottish economy. Its proposals for concentrating 
on areas with growth prospects rather than adhering rigidly to 
localized unemployment as the sole criterion for location of industry 
policy, in particular, had helped make "growing points" a meaningful 
concept for a very wide audience. The basic idea behind the concept 
was clear enough; one chooses areas with good prospects of growth, 
and encourages them to grow further, thereby building, as it were, on 
success already achieved. 
Nevertheless, there arose a variety of interpretations as to 
the purpose which growth areas, or growing points, were intended to 
serve. Thus the physical planner looked upon them as locations for 
new development of various kinds, largely on virgin sites where the 
scope for architectural and engineering innovation was virtually 
liberated. Communities vied with one another for designation as 
growing points as a matter of local pride, and often in the belief 
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that the purpose of growth was largely local. Some economists 
looked upon growing points as cities in which the rapid and substantial 
buildup of all types of economic activity would create external 
economies for industry at a truly wonderful rate. 
In short, the idea of growth points was almost universally 
accepted, even although the nature and purpose of such growth points 
differed somewhat according to the bias or professional training of 
particular individuals or groups. 
Secondly, the connection between the Toothill Committee and 
the Scottish Development Group also took a direct form, as a result 
mainly of the Toothill Committee having had the assistance of 
assessors drawn from the Scottish Development Department who were 
now returned there. 
The pressure mounted on the Government at this time was 
considerably reinforced also by the heavier unemployment which 
occurred during the winter of 1962/63, partly as a result of an 
unusually heavy snowfall in certain regions of the country, including 
Scotland. The rise in national unemployment as usual pushed regional 
unemployment rates to even higher levels. Although these rates rose 
still higher in the former "pockets of unemployment", the problem 
spread at the same time to other parts of the less prosperous 
regions, including Scotland, and thus made the pockets less visible 
than when the national unemployment rate was low. A more general 
remedy was then seen to be required than mopping up excess labour in 
small pockets. 
The Scottish Development Group completed its general study 
early in the summer of 1963. Based on the physical planning studies 
already discussed above, the further refinement of the growth area 
concept and the selection of growth areas for Central Scotland was 
carried out in the interval between December 1962 and the early 
summer of 1963. 
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The Scottish Development Group's Choice 
At this stage the process of selecting growth areas for 
Central Scotland became intermeshed with the more general aspects of 
the development programme in which they were to be the central 
technique. Consequently, the steps in the selection process are less 
easily identified. What is more important, criteria were employed 
which are more a function of the particular requirements and 
conditions of Central Scotland from a development viewpoint than a 
framework suited to general application elsewhere. There are nevertheless 
important general lessons also to be drawn from this, more pragmatic 
part of the selection process. 
The purpose of the Central Scotland development programme 
was to help the Scottish economy achieve certain explicit objectives 
by 1981. In the end these objectives and their implications provided 
the basis too for finally determining which locations would be 
designated as "growth areas" in Central Scotland. In other words, 
the framework of objectives was the means of deciding, sometimes 
implicitly, about the questions - fundamental to any consideration 
of a growth centres policy - of size, timing and overall scale. What 
size should growth areas be? At what pace should they be developed? 
Should all be developed at once, and at the same pace? And what total 
contribution should they be expected to make to achieving the 
regional objectives? 
In discussing these questions, it will be convenient to begin 
with the matter of overall scale, then to consider timing, and 
finally to look at the size of the selected growth areas. 
Overall Scale. It was assumed that the population of Scotland 
would increase by approximately 450,000 persons between the 1961 
Census and 1981. Behind this assumption lay an implicit proposed 
target for the development programme (and for British regional policy) 
of reducing net emigration from Scotland - by four-fifths of levels 
recently experienced in the case of net emigration to other U. K. 
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regions, and by one-third of the recent flow to overseas countries. 
In addition, space provision would be necessary for an estimated 
300,000 persons to be displaced by the continuing programme of 
overspill from Glasgow and other congested areas. Thus in terms 
of new housing and other services the total demand foreseen in the 
whole of Scotland was that necessary to accommodate a total of some 
750,000 people over the period to 1981. 
To meet it, there was the existing provision in the Development 
Plans of local authorities and the New Towns, already approved by the 
Secretary of State, for some 300,000 persons. This left some 450,000 
for which further capacity would have to be supplied. It was 
concluded that the growth areas being selected in Central Scotland 
should be capable of accommodating in total more than 350,000 of 
this number, leaving a balance of up to 100,000 to be located in 
other Scottish regions. 
Thus the number of people for whom new housing would be 
needed by 1981 set an upper limit to the scale of total expansion to 
be planned in growth areas. 
Timing. The population increase expected over two decades 
cannot be catered for all at once, of course, since it results from 
a continuing process of growth which must be accommodated as it 
occurs over time. It is not usually practicable, therefore, to deal 
with population (and employment) growth with a system of population 
centres conceived of in terms of specified standards of size, 
internal structure, and other characteristics. Rather, one is typically 
concerned with marginal increments (or decrements) to a base that 
is usually much larger in absolute terms, and it is thus virtually 
impossible to ignore the larger entity in order to concentrate on 
influencing the (much smaller) adjustments taking place in it. This 
sort of consideration operated in several ways in the case of the 
Central Scotland development programme, and one of the most important 
was through its proposed timing. At what rate should the physical 
and other facilities contemplated be developed in order to match the 
expected flow of population increase during the twenty year period? 
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Such a question could only be answered on the basis of 
practical considerations affecting the putting in place of the requisite 
physical facilities. It. thus quickly became a matter of deciding the 
place at which auch facilities could be made available. Since not all 
the "growth areas" under consideration could be developed to the point 
of providing additional accommodation at the same speed, or on the 
same scale,. the need to specify a timing scale became a criterion 
for choosing among them. 
In resolving the timing considerations, the rate at which 
the supply of industrial sites could be expanded, became the critical 
factor. This reflected the central element in the development 
strategy - that of attracting new industrial firms to Central 
Scotland. - 
The supply of industrial sites could be expanded more 
readily: in the older, already industrialized areas, and in the New 
Towns, than on virgin sites. 
From the application of the criteria implicit in determining 
the overall scale,. and the timing of the development programme, there 
emerged the following recommended "growth areas" (with their estimated 
population expansion by 1981): 
1. Vale of Leven (3,000) 
2. North Lanarkshire 
3. West and Central Fife (27,000) 
4. East Kilbride (44,000) 
5. Cumbernauld (58,500) 
6. Glenrothes (55,600) 
7. Livingston (and the rehabilitation (73,450) 
and development area surrounding it) 
8. Irvine (51,700) 
9. Grangemouth/Falkirk (26,000) 
(Subsequently, numbers 3 and 6 were combined as "Central 
Fife and Glenrothes"). 
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Size. The size which growth areas should be is a question 
of considerable interest for economists, probably to a considerable 
extent because of their continuing quest for optimum results and their 
traditional interest in "optimum size" firms. To date, however, 
economists have not reached any firm general conclusions about the 
optimum size for towns and cities (nor, indeed, have they reached 
any for industrial firms). -'To be fair, the question has arisen only 
recently and has not consumed that much economists' energy as yet. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that economic theory is nearly 
silent on this question. The recent interest in it, however, does 
justify a brief comment here. 
It will by now be clear to the reader that size did not 
figure explicitly in the selection of the Scottish "growth areas". 
The size of those in the above list was no more than a function of 
the population increase they could accommodate over the twenty year 
period foreseen by the development programme, constrained by the 
total population increase to be accommodated in this way, as an objective 
of the programme, and further constrained also by the more general 
criteria applied in the earlier part of the selection process. Thus 
the size of the specific areas themselves, was treated only in terms 
of their (marginal) capacity for population increase. Their absolute 
size was not an important consideration de facto. 
1 
Although the size of the growth areas was not treated 
directly, it was considered that entirely new developments should 
be, planned on more or less the same scale as the existing new towns, 
at least initially. These had been conceived, since the earliest 
consideration of East Kilbride, as centres of no more than 50,000, 
mainly because they were considered as outlets for Glasgow overspill 
1In 
part, 'this was due to the relationship seen to exist between the 
selected, "growth areas" and the major Scottish cities of Glasgow and 
Edinburgh. 
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population. Irvine, whose designation as the fifth New Town 
followed some time after the announcement of the Central Scotland 
programme, was planned eventually to accommodate 55.000. Among the 
"growth areas" listed above, only Livingston exceeded this order of 
expansion and then only on the basis of its being combined with the 
surrounding rehabilitation area. It remained for the consultants who 
subsequently prepared the more detailed development plan for this 
particular growth area, the Lothians as it then came to be called, 
to suggest a significant increase in scale. The effort then became 
to make Livingston not another new town, but rather, as The Economist 
styled it; "A New City for the Lothians". 
2 
Glasgow, Edinburgh and the "Growth Areas". An extremely 
important aspect of the Scottish "growth areas" consisted in the 
nature of the relationship between them and the major cities of 
Glasgow and Edinburgh. Neither of the latter was selected as a 
"growth area" itself - Glasgow because its further development had to 
await continued progress with the overspill programme before an 
accelerated industrial development effort could be implemented there 
to offset the city's over-dependence on the heavy industry the Clyde 
Valley planners had termed "immovable", and Edinburgh in view of its 
limited capacity (in terms of land) for industrial development and 
more especially because of the desire to preserve Edinburgh's 
special character. Yet both were acknowledged to be vital to the 
2Still 
more recently, there has been a further expansion in the scale 
of new city development policy in Scotland. A major new development 
on Tayside, more or less contiguous with the Central Belt, is being 
examined to accommodate a city of 250,000 by the end of the century. 
This is one of three such possible developments in Great Britain, the 
others studied being for Severnside and Humberside. All are considered 
necessary to accommodate the increase in the Great Britain population 
expected by the year 2000, and the inclusion of the Tayside proposals 
tacitly recognizes not only that the Scottish population will continue 
to increase after 1981, but also that Scotland is one region which 
can accommodate the anticipated overspill population from London and 
the South East, where further expansion on this scale is not 
considered so desirable. 
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success of the development programme, and therefore to the "growth 
areas". Their services and facilities were considered an essential 
background to the economic, social and educational status of the 
country as a whole, and to the Central Belt in particular. 
Throughout the postwar period the emphasis had been on 
moving people out of Glasgow. This would continue, and one important 
role of the "growth areas" was to accommodate the population thus 
displaced and also use it as part of the basis for attracting new 
industries to Scotland. A more novel element suggested for policy 
was much greater attention to the role which such "growth areas" 
might serve by extending the borders of the Glasgow and Edinburgh 
labour markets. If workers could live in Glasgow and. commute to 
East Kilbride, if others could live in Cumbernauld and commute to 
Glasgow, still others probably would travel to work from Livingston 
to Edinburgh (or vice versa) and, at another level, workers from 
various places in Fife might find it convenient to travel to work 
in Glenrothes. 
The growth areas form extensions, to a greater or lesser 
degree, to the zones of metropolitan influence exercised by Glasgow 
and Edinburgh, and, given the communication improvements recommended, 
could be conveniently grouped as follows: 
Total prospective Travel time 
Metropolitan Growth population in complex to centre 
Centre Areas in 1981 (000's) (min. ) 
Glasgow (Vale of Leven ) 35 
(Cumbernauld ) 35 
(North Lanarkshi re) 2,480 30 
(East Kilbride ) 35 
(Irvine ) 50 
Glasgow (Grangemouth ) 45 
and ( ) 300 
Edinburgh (Falkirk ) 35 
Edinburgh (Livingston ) 30 
(Glenrothes ) 1,250 50 
(Central Fife ) 35 
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The compactness of the whole central Scotland region also meant 
that attracting new industries, particularly the managerial, design 
and research staffs desired as part of improving the "quality of growth", 
to the newer "growth areas" which could themselves offer only limited 
services and cultural facilities, would be considerably facilitated 
by the proximity of Glasgow and Edinburgh. Thus the "growth areas" 
would serve, when developed, to knit the whole of Central Scotland 
together into one large labour market. In this way the problem of 
conflict between the designated and the non-designated areas would 
be eased; in the fairly compact Central Belt most of the latter were 
within daily travelling distance of one or the other of the "growth 
areas". Workers in a non-selected locality could commute fairly 
readily to new jobs opening up in a nearby selected area. 
A particular aspect of this, important in its own right, was 
the attention paid to the transportation and other infrastructure 
improvements incorporated in the development programme for the area 
south and west of Glasgow. The Clyde Tunnel had not only added 
another river crossing to the City's internal communications network; 
it would also open up the recreation facilities of Loch Lomond, 
the Trossachs and the Highlands immediately north of Glasgow to 
residents on the south side of the Clyde. Ayrshire would thereby be 
drawn into much closer association with the Glasgow City Region, 
especially after the approaches to the Tunnel were completed. The 
planned construction of the high level bridge further down river at 
Erskine would also serve to, link Clydebank, the Vale of Leven and 
other north side areas to the west of Glasgow with places like Renfrew 
on the south side and North Ayrshire as well. Even further afield from 
the City, Greenock and Port Glasgow would be brought into closer contact 
with Glasgow through the electrification of the railway line between 
them. The reduction in the travelling time from Greenock to Central 
Glasgow to approximately 30 minutes would enable more workers from 
these towns on the lower reaches of the Clyde, where employment expansion 
is particularly difficult, to commute to jobs in Glasgow. They would 
also be a source of labour supply whenever expansion of the motor 
industry at Linwood took place in future. In these ways the whole 
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area to the south and west of Glasgow would become one large urban 
labour market. Here the main influence of the development programme 
for Central Scotland would not take the form of the "growth areas" 
themselves, but would consist in the infrastructure improvements 
designed to help knit the whole region together, and thus give 
substantial support to the successful development of the "growth 
areas". 
The Result 
What had emerged from the entire selection process were eight 
"growth areas" for Central Scotland, classified in three broad 
categories: 
l) Four rehabilitation areas, the inclusion of which was 
supported by the value ascribed to them as poles of 
attraction for new industrial development in the first 
phase of the programme, i. e., the Vale of Leven, North 
and the Lothians. Lanarkshire, Central Fife, 
3 
(2) The four existing New Towns of East Kilbride, Cumbernauld, 
Glenrothes3 and Livingston3, which experienced both population 
and employment growth well above the Central Scotland average 
over the decade to 1961. In Livingston's case, of course, 
there had not been the same rate of past growth but rapid 
future build-up was already a matter of Government policy. 
(3) Two fairly extensive areas, Irvine and Grangemouth/Falkirk, 
selected from the "areas of search" described above. These 
locations were already urbanized to some extent but never- 
theless contained large areas of land suitable for 
further extensive development and therefore capable of 
accommodating both industry and housing. 
3Central Fife and Glenrothes were combined as a single "growth area". 
So too were Livingston and the Lothians area. 
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The identified growth areas were to form focal points of 
especially vigorous economic development which would help to create 
a favourable climate of growth in the wider catchment areas associated 
with them, and this and other growth associated with the modernization 
of the regional infrastructure recommended would help to promote the 
general regeneration of the economy of Central Scotland. The primary 
objectives from the Scottish viewpoint of the whole plan were a 
reduction of unemployment, the replacement of jobs lost in the expected 
further decline of the older basic industries, and a substantial 
reduction in the volume of net and gross emigration. One of the 
requisites for successful implementation of the proposals for Central 
Scotland, however, would be a favourable environment of national 
economic growth and expansion. 
Here there was significance in the N. E. D. C. 's recognition 
that properly designed regional development policies can be justified 
on the basis of national economic considerations -a proposition 
which had been strongly urged by the Toothill Committee. Such 
national economic considerations were an important further guide 
in working out the recommended development programme for Central 
Scotland. 
Consideration and Approval 
On the first of August 1963 the Prime Minister told the House 
of Commons that the Central Scotland report (together with the report 
prepared by the Lord President on the North-East of England) had 
been received by the Government. 
The Scottish proposals were considered simultaneously with this 
similar report prepared on the North-East of England. Pressure was 
still being exerted at this time by the Opposition for the Government 
to do something with the Toothill report, and there was general 
concern with the relatively high level of unemployment prevalent in 
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Scotland. These general influences provided a background to the 
Government's consideration of the proposals as a result of which 
White Papers were prepared for Central Scotland and the North-East 
of England. Both of these were published in November 1963. 
CHAPTER 7 
Financial Inducements as an Element of Regional Policy for Scotland 
Financial Inducements, for a lagging region, are a means of 
husbanding its resources. To demonstrate this proposition, let us 
consider how - and how well - Scotland has fared in its quest for 
new industry during the recent past. The time period I have chosen 
for purposes of this analysis is roughly the decade preceding the 
Toothill Report, that is, 1954 to 1966.1 
Manufacturing Employment in Central Scotland, 1954 to 19662 
In the process of selecting "growth areas" in Central 
Scotland, reference was had to the percentage rates of increase 
which took place in two variables - population and insured population - 
in a number of areas from which a choice was made. Both these 
indicators measure change at the macro level and really reveal very 
little about the forces or factors which have caused the change to 
occur. Total population especially is a weak measure because there 
is no necessary correlation between population growth and economic 
growth. Insured population, which is a proxy for total employment in 
all types of economic activity, is better but still suffers from 
being overly general in scope. Since the purpose of the "growth areas" 
11 
am greatly indebted, for the ideas developed herein, to three former 
colleagues in the University of Glasgow, namely, Dr. S. C. Orr, Dr. 
L. C. Hunter, and Mr. I. D. MacBain. I wish also to acknowledge the 
very considerable assistance given me by Mr. Peter Smith, who put 
up with my many questions, over many cups of coffee, in the 
University's College Club, regarding the operations and policy of 
the Scottish Development Department. 
2The 
chronology outlined in this chapter is derived from James D. 
McCallum, "A review History of British Regional Policy", in Economic 
Research Relevant to the Formulation of National Urban Development 
Strategies: A conference, sponsored by Resources for the Future, Inc. 
of Washington, D. C. and the University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, 
at Wolfson Hall of the University, August 30,1971 - September 3,1971; 
and from an equally sound, though less formalized version given me by 
Mr. Michael Miller, my colleague in the Department of Political Economy, 
University of Glasgow during the 1965-66 academic year. 
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exercise (or of the regional economic strategy of which it formed a 
part) was to accelerate the rate of growth of employment in 
manufacturing, it may be illuminating to examine recent changes in 
this variable on the assumption that their recent experience with, 
manufacturing employment may provide some further basis for assessing 
whether the selected locations are capable of stimulating overall 
regional growth in the future. It perhaps ought to be stressed, 
however, that these data were not explicitly used by the Scottish 
Development Group in selecting the "growth areas" in 1963, but have 
only recently become available. 
The "growth areas" are considered a tool for regional 
development, and their effectiveness must be judged by the results 
attained in the wider region and not merely by whether they themselves 
expand. Neither will it do, therefore,. to. examine their recent changes 
in manufacturing employment in vacuo; these must also be related to 
the regional context in which they took place. Hence, the analysis 
must begin with changes since 1954 in Central Scotland as a whole, and 
then proceed by a series of stages to a consideration of the particular 
role of "growth areas" in the immediate past. Finally, against this 
background an attempt is made to assess whether the "growth areas" 
strategy is a reasonable method of fostering the further economic 
development of Central Scotland. 
Scope and Coverage 
l ll ý 
The following analysis is based on data compiled by Miss W. F. M. 
Lorimer, Senior Research Officer, Board of Trade, Glasgow from "L" 
returns, and kindly made available to me. Such returns are made 
annually by all manufacturing firms employing 100 or more persons and 
by a 25 per cent sample of all establishments employing fewer than 
100 persons. (Until the mid-1950's they were received from firms 
employing 11 or more persons. ) The value-of these data for present 
purposes is that they permit an analysis of employment changes in 
manufacturing by employment exchange area and thus give ,a more detailed 
picture of the geographic pattern of change in Scottish manufacturing 
since 1954, than is provided by data referring only to Scotland totals. 
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The figures examined here refer to Central Scotland. To a 
considerable extent, of course, the changes taking place there are 
broadly indicative of the general pattern of change in the whole 
Scottish economy since, as the White Paper of November 1963 noted, "... 
here 90 per cent of Scotland's existing employment in manufacturing 
industry is found". (p. 13). Data have been tabulated for four 
years - 1954 because it happens to be the first year for which 
these figures are available; 1960 to coincide with the replacement 
of the Distribution of Industry Acts by the Local Employment Act; 
1963 because: a) the Local Employment Act was amended and "free 
depreciation" became available in development districts under the 
Finance Act, and b) the Central Scotland "growth areas" were 
announced, that year; and 1966 because: a) the introduction of the 
Industrial Development Act marked a significant change in the forms 
of assistance available to development areas, and b) it is the latest 
for which data are available. All figures refer to the numbers 
employed in manufacturing establishments in May of the year concerned. 
Overall Change, 1954 to 1966 
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of manufacturing 
employment in Central Scotland during this whole period has been its 
overall stability. From 1954 to 1966 there was an increase of 19,527 
which, converted to percentage terms, becomes 3.3 per cent over 
twelve years - or something less than 0.3% as an annual average rate 
of growth. This cannot be considered much more than negligible. 
Even greater net stability marked the interval between 1954 
and 1960, with some 592,000 persons in manufacturing employment in 
both these years. During the subsequent three years, from 1960 to 
1963, a decline of almost 17,000 occurred. Then came a relatively 
rapid increase of 37,000 by 1966 - which not only offset the 1960-63 
decrease but accounted for more than the whole increase of 19,527 since 
1954. In other words, such growth as there has been between 1954 and 
1966, occurred entirely in the last three years of the period. 
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Sources of Change 
These are all net changes, of course. They are compounded from 
(a) increases resulting from the opening of new establishments, 
(b) decreases resulting from the closure of existing 
establishments, 
(c) increases due to expansion of existing firms, and 
(d) increases due to decline of other existing firms. 
An indication of the importance of a) can be gained from Table 5, and 
of b) from Table 6. Although separate data are not available for c) 
and d), we can infer their joint net effect by subtracting (a) + b)) 
from the net totals discussed above. Thus: 
1954-60 1960-63 1963-66 1954-66 
1. Total Net Change -581 -16,900 +37,008 +19,527 
2. Resulting from: a) +15,871 +14,772 +33,048 +63,691 
3. b) -20,242 -31,411 -26,747 -78,400 
4. c) + d) i. e. l. -(2 + 3) + 3,790 -261 +30,707 +34,236 
For the full twelve year period, the net increase of 19,527 manufacturing 
jobs was the result of: 
- an increase of 63,691 in new establishments; 
-a decrease of 78,400 due to the closure of some 677 
establishments; 
-a (net) increase of 34,236 from the expansion of existing 
establishments. (Some existing establishments doubtless 
would have reduced their employment, but the exact size 
of this variable is unknown. We know only that increases 
in expanding establishments exceeded decreases in declining 
establishments by 34,236. ) 
on the simple (and probably false) assumption that these discernible 
forces are neither interrelated nor interdependent, the general 
conclusion might be drawn here that the "birth" of new manufacturing 
establishments in Central Scotland, when combined with the expansion 
of "indigenous" establishments, more than compensated for the loss 
of former jobs through the "death" of previously existing establishments. 
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As with the net overall change already discussed, however, this 
pattern diverges from sub-period to sub-period. From 1954 to 1960, 
new establishments contributed an additional 15,871 jobs, and 
existing factories took on 3,790 more workers (net); but these gains were 
effectively cancelled out by the loss of 20,242 jobs in establishments 
which ceased production. From 1960 to 1963, there arose 14,772 jobs 
in new establishments; but the net change in existing factories turned 
negative (-261) and of more importance, the loss of jobs from 
operations which ceased, accelerated to 31,411 - half as much again 
as during the (longer) 1954-60 interval. From 1963 to 1966, the start 
of production in new establishments accounted for additional employment 
of 33,048, and this gain was accompanied by a (net) increase almost 
as large (30,707) in existing factories; consequently, although the 
loss of employment attributable to factories going out of production 
was still substantial at 26,747, the net result was a gain of 37,008 
in total manufacturing employment. 
One obvious, but often ignored, aspect of these changes is 
that some growth, and some decline, occurred in all three periods 
on the gross basis. As might be expected, the greatest net gain 
occurred in 1963-66 when both jobs in new establishments and the net 
increase in existing establishments were at peak levels; while the 
greatest net decrease came in 1960-63, when the loss of employment 
due to closures was greater than in either of the other two sub- 
periods. 
Changes by Sub-Areas 
Another basis for examining the relative importance of gross 
additions and subtractions would be to adopt a geographic framework 
and see which sub-areas within Central Scotland experienced increases, 
and which decreases, in manufacturing employment. This may cast 
some light on the differential rates of growth achieved from one area, 
or type of area, to another, which bears, of course, upon the whole "growth 
areas" argument. Thus: 
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1954-60 1960-63 1963-66 1954-66 
1. Glasgow City Region 
A. City -12,120 -20,232 - 3,395 -35,747 
B. Rest of Metrop. Area + 8,269 - 4,946 +21,037 +24,360 
C. Rest of City Region - 1,048 + 528 + 5,618 + 5,098 
- 4,899 -24,650 +23,260 - 6,289 
2. Falkirk-Stirling-Alloa + 1,587 - 115 - 382 + 1,090 
3. Edinburgh, Fife and the + 2,757 + 6,089 +11,953 +20,799 Lothians 
4. Northern Fife and Dundee - 26 + 1,776 + 2,177 + 3,927 
CENTRAL SCOTLAND - 581 -16,900 +37,008 +19,527 
Again, the pattern of growth becomes more complicated on the decomposed 
basis. To take the whole period from 1954 to 1966, for example, the net 
increase of 19,527 manufacturing jobs was the consequence of change on 
a much greater scale than this single statistic suggests. Only one 
of the areas distinguished in the table exhibited a net overall 
decline of manufacturing employment; not surprisingly, it was Glasgow 
where a loss of 35,747 jobs occurred. All the others had net increases: 
the largest (24,360) was outside the City of Glasgow but within the 
metropolitan region, mainly in North Lanarkshire, followed by Edinburgh 
and the Lothians, with 20,799. 
In only two areas - Glasgow City, and Edinburgh and the 
Lothians - was the direction of net change uniform in all three sub- 
periods, however, Glasgow losing manufacturing jobs and Edinburgh 
gaining them. From 1954 to 1960, declines occurred in the peripheral 
areas (1C) of the Glasgow City Region as well as in the City itself; 
but the growth of employment in Falkirk-Stirling-Alloa, as well as in 
Edinburgh and North Lanarkshire, all but compensated for these. 
From 1960 to 1963, the most substantial attrition (20,232) took 
place in Glasgow, and extended also to the rest of the metropolitan 
area where a further decline of 4,496 occurred. There was a small 
fall too in Falkirk-Stirling-Alloa. On the other hand, employment 
growth was accelerated (6,089) in Edinburgh, and increases occurred 
both in the periphery of the Glasgow City Region (528) and, more 
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significantly, in Fife and Dundee (1,776). The net result of all 
these changes was a decline of 16,900 for Central Scotland as a 
whole. 
From 1963 to 1966, growth of employment became the order 
of the day in all areas except Glasgow, where the rate of decline 
slackened, and Falkirk-Stirling-Alloa, where a further marginal 
decline took place. The biggest absolute increases were in the 
Glasgow metropolitan area outside the city (21,037), and the 
Edinburgh region (11,953). Expansion again occurred also, and at an 
accelerated rate, in the periphery of the Glasgow City Region (5,618) 
and in Fife and Dundee (2,177). The net result was an overall 
increase of 37,008. 
Thus the general pattern which emerges isya continuing decline 
of manufacturing employment in Glasgow itself as a consequence probably 
of the decline of its basic industries and to some extent also, of 
the movement of firms to new premises outside the city under the 
"overspill" programme. This loss in Glasgow is accompanied by some 
growth of factory employment elsewhere in Central Scotland, sometimes 
as a simultaneous effect of "overspill" and sometimes as a result of 
other, perhaps unrelated, forces operating. in the areas of expansion. 
Because of its sheer size, the changes in Glasgow largely determine 
the net result in Central Scotland: it is no accident that the sub- 
period of greatest net decline, 1960-63, was also when Glasgow's 
manufacturing employment declined to the greatest extent. Growth, on 
the other hand, has not been strong enough even in 1963-66 to embrace 
Glasgow City itself. Nevertheless it was the rest of the Glasgow 
metropolitan area, or the immediate suburbs of the city and especially 
North Lanarkshire, which made the largest absolute contribution to 
regional employment growth, both in the long pull from 1954 to 1966 
and in the sub-period of greatest net expansion from 1963 to 1966. 
Next to Glasgow and its immediate environs, even the fairly substantial 
increases which occurred in Edinburgh and the Lothians are of 
secondary importance in absolute terms. 
190. 
Change by Source and Sub-Area 
We may now combine these two approaches to examining the 
nature of recent changes in manufacturing employment in Central 
Scotland and consider which sources of change were important in each 
of the main sub-areas. The figures are tabulated in Table 7. 
Glasgow City. New establishments have appeared even in 
Glasgow, and their contribution to employment growth was greatest 
in the 1963-66 sub-period. But over the whole 1954-66 period, the 
loss of jobs from closing factories was four times as much as the new 
establishments added. The switch from net contraction to net expansion 
of employment in existing firms which occurred in 1963-66, is also 
noteworthy. 
Rest of Glasgow Metropolitan Area. The employment added in 
new establishments was greater here from 1954 to 1966 than in any 
other area. Yet the (net) expansion of jobs in existing employment 
was just as important in making its overall record one of net growth. 
It was the presence of these growth forces which distinguished this 
area from Glasgow itself, inasmuch as the attrition of old jobs was 
only one-third less. It would appear that the temporary weakening - 
due perhaps to cyclical contraction - of these forces caused the 
lapse into net decline experienced (only) in 1960-63. 
Rest of Glasgow City Region. In areas which were relatively 
undeveloped industrially, the dominant feature was an accelerating 
growth of employment in new establishments. Most recently, previously 
existing factories in the area had also been employing more workers, 
while the loss from factory closures had been steady and modest by 
comparison. The result was some 5,000 new jobs (net) over the 
1954-66 period, mainly since 1963. 
Falkirk-Stirling-Alloa. The rapid postwar buildup of petro- 
chemical industries at Grangemouth appeared to have run its course, 
at least as far as employment is concerned, by the mid-1950's. Since 
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Table 7 
ges in Manufacturing Employment, Central Scotland , by Sub-Area 
and by Period, 1954 to 1966 
1954-60 1960-63 1963-66 1954-66 
I. A. Glasgow City 
1. Total Net Change -12,120 -20,232 - 3,395 -35,747 
2. Resulting from a) 2,932 1,700 3,798 8,430 
3. b) - 7,452 -15,055 -11,252 -33,759 
4. (c + d) i. e. 1-2-3 - 7,600 - 6,877 + 4,059 -10,418 
I. B. Rest of Glw. Metrop. Area 
1. + 8,269 - 4,946 +21,037 +24,360 
2. 6,219 4,946 13,165 24,330 
3. - 5,558 - 8,954 - 8,669 -23,181 
4. + 7,608 - 938 +16,541 +23,211 
I. C. Rest of Glw. City Region 
1. - 1,048 + 528 + 5,618 + 5,098 
2. 1,343 1,478 4,773 7,594 
3. - 1,715 - 1,015 - 1,056 - 3,786 
4. - 676 + 65 + 1,901 + 1,290 
II. Falkirk-Stirling-Alloa 
1. + 1,587 - 115 - 382 + 1,090 
2. 1,703 804 1,862 4,369 
3. - 792 - 1,024 - 2,104 - 3,920 
4. + 676 + 105 - 140 + 641 
III. Edinburgh and Lothians 
1. + 2,757 + 6,089 +11,953 +20,799 
2. 2,404 4,146 7,642 14,192 
3. - 2,924 - 4,038 - 2,460 - 9,422 
4. + 3,277 + 5,981 + 6,771 +16,029 
IV. Fife and Dundee 
1. - 26 + 1,776 + 2,177 + 3,927 
2. 1,270 1,698 1,808 4,776 
3. - 1,801 - 1,325 - 1,206 - 4,332 
4. + 505 + 1,403 + 1,575 + 3,484 
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then total manufacturing employment has been generally stable. 
Most of the gains from new establishments and expansion of existing 
ones from 1954 to 1966 had been counterbalanced by losses in those 
which closed. The latter seemed, moreover, to be occurring at an 
increasing rate while the net change in existing establishments 
turned negative in 1963-66. On the other hand, over twice as many 
jobs were provided in new establishments since 1963, than in the 
prior three years. 
Edinburgh, Fife and the Lothians. The forces behind the 
second largest net absolute increase in manufacturing employment 
differed from those observed in the immediate suburbs of Glasgow 
City, mainly in that the loss of former jobs was quantitatively 
less significant in Edinburgh compared to either of the two sources 
of expansion. Over the whole 1954-66 period, only 9,422 workers 
were affected by factory closures -a figure exceeded by the 14,192 
jobs in new ones, and even more so by the 16,029 which resulted from 
indigenous (net) expansion. Only the pace of growth altered (upwards) 
over time, the only trace of the 1960-1963 slowdown which occurred in 
every other area being more jobs lost from closures. Yet even this 
was more than compensated by the gains in new establishments and in 
existing ones, either of which would have sufficed for the purpose. 
Northern Fife and Dundee. In terms of total manufacturing 
employment this area is one-sixth larger than the peripheral part of 
the Glasgow city region. Its net'increase from 1954 to 1966 was 
three-quarters as great. Increasingly apparent growth tendencies 
are indicated in the rising contribution of new establishments, and 
increasing absolute gains from (net) indigenous expansion. Losses 
through factory closures had also declined over time. From virtually 
no overall change in 1954-60, there was a swing to growth in 1960-63 
which became more rapid in 1963-66. 
Areas Selected for Policy Purposes 
The next step is to examine the comparable changes in two 
particular types of area within Central Scotland which have been 
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given importance in the context of location of industry policy, 
and about which there has been much discussion and debate in academic 
as well as in government circles. From 1958 until 1966, Board of 
Trade inducements were available in the so-called development 
districts, which were Ministry of Labour employment exchange areas 
where unemployment exceeded 4% of the insured population. In 1963 
the Government announced its intention to give differentially 
favourable treatment to the industrial development of certain growth 
areas in Central Scotland. Data are available on the net change of 
manufacturing employment in both these types of area in Central 
Scotland for the period under review. These will now be examined. 
It should perhaps be emphasized that the purpose of this examination 
is not only to assess the validity of either development districts 
or growth areas as a tool of regional policy, but also to determine 
the significance of each (and the switch from one to the other) against 
the background of Central Scotland's peculiar difficulties and stage 
of economic development. 
Development Districts. Data on these are contained in Table 8, 
classified on more or less the same sub-area basis used above. The 
main difference, of course, is that by their very nature the designated 
development districts usually comprised only a part of each sub-area: 
the "coverage" of manufacturing employment in any one of them depended 
on a combination of a) what proportion of the total sub-area had been 
given development district status, and b) what proportion of the sub- 
area's manufacturing establishments were located within the development 
districts. If Central Scotland were a microcosm of the general pattern 
for Great Brittain, then only a few employment exchange areas, where 
the unemployment rate was a specified amount in excess of the national 
average, would be designated. Because Central Scotland's unemployment 
level was compared for policy purposes not with its internal average, 
however, but with the lower Great Britain average, this region was 
not a microcosm of the national picture. Instead, 80 per cent 
of its manufacturing employment was designated as within development 
districts, thus making most of Scotland's most dynamic region eligible 
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for what, in other British development districts, is usually regarded 
as a special form of extra assistance available to difficult outlying - 
and typically small - localities. In Scotland, the Local Employment 
Act was thus more a tool of national economic development. 
The main explanation for this apparent paradox is that the 
whole of the Glasgow metropolitan area was a development district. 
(To attain a parallel situation in Great Britain generally would 
require the similar designation of London and the South East! ) 
Outside metropolitan Glasgow, the development districts contained, 
in May 1960, some 108,000 of a total manufacturing employment of 
222,500 or routhly 49 per cent - still a rather substantial proportion 
for purportedly atypical areas. 
In all development districts taken together, there was a net 
increase of manufacturing employment between 1954 and 1966 of some 
3,000 persons, as may be seen from the following, tabulation: 
Development Districts in; 1954-60 1960-63 1963-66 1954-66 
Glasgow City -12,120 -20,232 - 3,395 -35,747 
Rest of Glasgow Metropolitan + 8,269 - 4,946 +21,037 +24,360 Area 
Elsewhere in City Region - 2,631 + 1,040 + 3,009 + 1,418 
Glasgow City Region - 6,482 -24,138 +20,651 - 9,969 
FALKIRK GROUPa + 42 - 1,135 - 242 - 1,335 
BATHGATE GROUPb - 406 + 3,523 + 3,679" + 6,796 
Fife County - 559 + 183 + 4,372 + 3,996 
DUNDEE-BROUGHTY FERRY - 54 + 1,571 + 2,047 + 3,564 
- 7,459 -19,996 +30,507 + 3,052 
aincl. the employment exchange areas of Falkirk, Bonnybridge, 
Grangemouth, Bo'ness and Linlithgow. 
bincl. 
the employment exchange areas of Bathgate'. Büxburn, East 
Calder and West Calder. This was designated only in August, 1963. 
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This net gain fell short of the comparable figure for 
Central Scotland by some 16,500, mainly because of the omission 
from the development districts of the following employment exchange 
areas, which experienced net expansion of manufacturing employment: 
Net Increase 
1954-66 
Edinburgh-Leith-Portobello 7,312 
Kilmarnock 3,399 
Stirling 1,577 
Ayr 1,292 
Alloa 1,029 
Because they covered such a large proportion of total manufacturing 
in Central Scotland, it is not surprising that the development districts 
displayed much the same pattern of change during the three sub-periods 
as the region as a whole. From 1954 to 1960 and again from 1960 to 
1963, their net decline was more substantial. From 1963 to 1966 
their net increase was not as great. But in all three periods the 
direction of change corresponded with that experienced in the wider 
region. As the table indicates over the whole 1954 to 1966 period the 
largest net increase among development districts took place in 
metropolitan Glasgow outside the city itself (as already discussed). 
In the Bathgate group, largely as a result of the attraction of the 
British Motor Corporation (B. M. C. ) to Scotland in 1960-61, the net 
expansion was also considerable, although only a quarter as great. 
Net increases, approaching 4,000 in each case, also occurred in Fife 
and in Dundee. 
Growth Areas. The-nature and purpose of growth areas have 
been discussed elsewhere. One aspect of them was that they represented 
a further selection from the designated development districts of those 
thought to offer greatest promise as suitable locations for further 
industrial development which, in the process, would exert a "leading" 
influence on the economic development of the whole region of Central 
Scotland. Thus Glasgow was not chosen chiefly because of the scarcity 
of adequate land for further physical development, or because policy 
already explicitly included an attempt to "overspill" population and 
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industry out of the city. Since Edinburgh had already been excluded 
from development district status by virtue of its low unemployment 
rate, the growth areas could not include either of the two major 
population centres in the Central Scotland region. 
The choice of "growth areas" was rather more selective than 
this, of course. As a result, they contained a much smaller fraction 
of regional manufacturing employment than the development districts. 
Whereas the latter contained 80% of the regional total, the "growth 
areas" together had 19.6% in May of the year in which they were chosen 
(1963). This is what one would expect, of course, since a fundamental 
purpose of them was to concentrate the development effort, including 
the infrastructure programme, in the selected areas in the belief 
that greater overall results would thereby be obtained in the whole 
region. That they have themselves grown, at least in terms of 
manufacturing employment, is indicated by the rising tendency of 
their share of the regional total - from 16.6% in 1954 to 22.3% by 1966. 
Data on the net change in manufacturing employment in the 
"growth areas" are given in Table 9. These may be summarized on the 
same basis used above, as follows: 
Growth Areas 1954-60 1960-63 1963-66 1954-66 
Centred on Glasgow + 9,925 + 1,385 +17,121 +28,431 
Grangemouth-Falkirk + 847 - 637 - 827 - 617 
Centred on Edinburgh - 790 + 3,617 + 7,282 +10,109 
TOTAL + 9,982 + 4,365 +23,576 +37,923 
Perhaps the most striking difference between this pattern and 
that exhibited in the region generally, is the consistency of growth. 
There have been increases in all three sub-periods, even in 1954-60 
when the regional total showed little net change and in 1960-63 when 
there was a regional net loss of 17,000 jobs. In the more expansionary 
1963-66 interval, the growth areas accounted for two-thirds of the 
regional (net) gain of 37,000 jobs. 
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The "growth areas" centred on Glasgow thus accounted for 
roughly three times as much of the net increase as the others. 
Apart from a lapse during 1960-63, the main thrust had come from 
North Lanarkshire which contributed over 17,000 to the "growth areas" 
total (net) gain from 1954 to 1966. This was almost twice as much 
as occurred in East Kilbride (+6,050) and Cumbernauld (3,768) together, 
although the new towns had received rather more attention in academic, 
as well as public, discussion. These three growth areas were the only 
ones to achieve net growth of manufacturing employment in all three 
sub-periods. 
The main forces behind the growth areas centred on Edinburgh 
were, in 1960-63, the location of B. M. C. at Bathgate and, in 1963-66, 
its further growth combined with a swing to net expansion in Central 
Fife and Glenrothes. 
Among individual growth areas, only the Vale of Leven and 
Grangemouth-Falkirk experienced net decreases in manufacturing 
employment in two of the three sub-periods distinguished. Two others - 
Livingston and Central Fife - did so in 1954-60. Only one, Grangemouth- 
Falkirk, failed to grow between 1963 and 1966. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Between 1954 and 1966 total manufacturing employment in 
Central Scotland was remarkably stable at approximately 600,000 
persons. A more detailed examination of available data nevertheless 
reveals a pattern of considerable change, both in terms of the 
"birth" and "death" of factory establishments and the growth and 
decline of others, and in terms of expanding and contracting areas 
within the region. 
We may deal first with the birth, death, growth and decline 
of factories. By 1966 new establishments which came into production 
since 1954 were employing 64,000 workers; those which ceased operations 
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in the same interval displaced another 78,000; while the (net) 
expansion of other previously existing establishments added 34,000 
jobs. It is sometimes assumed that economic change takes place in 
an area in one direction only, that the area is either growing or 
declining and all its activities are following the general tendency. 
Central Scotland at least does not conform to such a pattern. A 
somewhat more sophisticated approach - which finds favour, for 
example, among those who analyze economic change in terms of changes 
in an area's industrial structure - is to compare the rate at which 
new activities are set up with the speed with which other industries 
decline. In this context it is sometimes suggested that a more rapid, 
or a more substantial, buildup of new activities would have resulted 
in a greater net increase (or smaller net decrease) in, say, the 
area's total employment. 
3 
The implicit assumption then used is, of 
course, that one gross flow can be increased while the other is held 
constant. In Central Scotland's case, for example, it would be 
assumed that the number of jobs resulting from new establishments 
would have been increased by suitable efforts, so that more than 
64,000 additional workers would have found work in them between 1954 
and 1966 without, at the same time, affecting either the displacement 
of 78,000 former jobs through establishments closing down or the net 
creation of 34,000 more in other existing establishments. 
It may be, however, that the interdependence between these flows 
is greater than this argument supposes. If there were a substantial 
"reservoir" of labour employed inefficiently, and therefore only 
marginally, in an area's existing activities, the rate of decline in 
these industries might well depend very directly on the rate at which 
new activities could be established. The latter would simply draw 
the workers they require from the over-endowed existing industries, 
3A 
versioa of this assumption appears to have underlain the Toothill 
Committee's recommendation that Board of Trade location of industry policy for Scotland should be mounted on a greater scale. 
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which would consequently decline in employment. The result would 
be that as fast as new industry were attracted, old industries would 
decline. 
4 
In terms of employment, the net result in auch a situation, 
would be overall stability. Such stability would be maintained, 
moreover, until such time as the available reservoir of underemployed 
labour were exhausted and further growth could only be fuelled, as 
it were, by other sources increasing the supply of the labour 
factor. 5 
If this alternative hypothesis were valid, it would have 
important implications for policy. Pursuit of industrial location 
policy on a grander scale would still be justified if the ultimate 
objectives were judged to be to increase total employment in Central 
Scotland. But it would have to be recognized that some considerable 
time may elapse before the "reservoir" of underemployed labour is 
fully used, and net overall increases could then occur. Meanwhile, 
the prospect would be continued overall stability of employment. 
If, however, the objective of policy is simply to prevent a decline 
of total employment, the case is not so clear for increasing the 
scale of the industrial location programme. Indeed, as long as the 
"reservoir" continues as an entirely offsetting influence, an equally 
valid case could then be made for reducing the programme, since the 
resulting smaller flow of jobs in new factories would be accompanied 
by a similarly reduced loss of jobs in closing factories, and overall 
employment stability would nevertheless continue. Then the real - 
choice for the policy makers would rest between an industrial location 
policy pursued with relatively little (or no) vigour and carried on 
indefinitely, and one pursued on a massive scale until such time as 
the"reservoir" of underuaed labour was transferred to new activities. 
The latter course would not quite represent a once-and-for-all alternative, 
however, since an industrial location policy might still be required, 
afterwards, to maintain a continuing net expansion of employment. 
4No 
account is here taken of the effect on average productivity, 
output and income, one of which would seem likely to rise in 
circumstances such as are here posited. 
5Unemployment, higher activity rate or a reduction in net emigration, 
for example. 
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It is this elasticity of labour supply from its declining 
industries which mainly distinguishes an already industrialized area 
characterized by stagnation, higher unemployment and lower average 
output and income, from an underdeveloped region with no industrial 
tradition. In the latter an employment multiplier model of the 
Keynesian type may be more easily applied than in the former, although 
even in an underdeveloped region the expansionary process may be 
slowed (or even frustrated) by virtue of the fact that the labour 
to be absorbed in the secondary and subsequent phases is not likely 
to be as easily taken up as the already trained, cyclically displaced 
workers of trade cycle theory. 
Examination by sub-region of the changes between 1954 and 1966 
in Central Scotland's manufacturing employment reveals that Glasgow 
City experienced consistent net decline amounting in total to a net 
loss of almost 36,000 jobs. This is what one would expect, since 
Glasgow is the location of most of the shipbuilding and other heavy 
industries which constitute Central Scotland's declining activities. 
It also suffers from a plain shortage of land suitable for physical 
development. All the other sub-regions have undergone net expansion 
of manufacturing employment, but in total (56,000) this was just 
sufficient to compensate for Glasgow's decrease and leave a small net 
increase for the whole region. This pattern does not quite make 
Glasgow the location of declining industries and the sub-regions 
outside Glasgow synonymous with expanding industries, however, since 
the other areas, also had their declining industries and some of the 
new manufacturing establishments even located in Glasgow City. But 
in general it does accord fairly well with the popular notion of Glasgow 
"overspilling" not only its population, but also its existing industry 
(and, in effect and more importantly, the new industry attracted to 
its wider hinterland) beyond its own borders. 
That Glasgow remains a vital economic location within Central 
Scotland is indicated by the fact that, among the other sub-regions it 
was the immediately adjacent North Lanarkshire which accounted for the 
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largest net expansion of manufacturing employment. Beside it the 
contributions of the new towns - East Kilbride and Cumbernauld - are 
much less formidable than is usually supposed. 
The inclusion of Glasgow among the development districts 
designated within Central Scotland, moreover, meant that they 
experienced much the same pattern of change as the whole region, 
although the net overall result was somewhat smaller numerically due 
to the omission of expanding areas auch as Edinburgh, Kilmarnock, 
Stirling, Ayr and Alloa. It was also Glasgow's eligibility for 
development district status which rendered them typical, rather than 
atypical, of Central Scotland generally, and thereby made Central 
Scotland no parallel to South-East England, even although it serves 
for Scotland the dominant economic function in much the same way as 
the South East does for the whole British economy. 
In the development districts generally as well as in Central 
Scotland, the pattern of change in manufacturing employment varied 
somewhat among the three sub-periods examined. From 1954 to 1960, 
there was a net decline which became greater in the subsequent three 
year interval. It was only from 1963 to 1966 that net expansion 
occurred and then on a scale sufficient to more than offset the total 
decline experienced in the two previous sub-periods. 
The "growth areas" selected in 1963, however, have undergone 
net growth as a group consistently in all three sub-periods. Those 
centred on Glasgow accounted for two-thirds of the net increase which 
took place from 1954 to 1966 in all "growth areas", thanks mainly to 
the contribution made by North Lanarkshire. It is noteworthy, however, 
that this particular "growth area" did not fulfil the usual conception 
of "growth areas" as relatively virgin sites where brand new 
developments can be established on a fairly large scale, and where 
growth can then take place rapidly, unimpeded by difficulties resulting 
either from physical limitations or from the need simultaneously to 
phase out declining activities. Economic and physical development in 
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North Lanarkshire has faced, and continues to face, just these problems; 
and the results between 1954 and 1966 were sufficiently encouraging to 
suggest that such problems need not prove insurmountable. What is 
probably required - in physical development terms - is the undramatic 
solution of combining this kind of development with the build-up of 
new towns on virgin sites, in suitable proportions, on a scale 
sufficient for the purpose. The latter, however, essentially involves 
a consideration of regional economic objectives. 
Although the "growth areas", taken together, were locations of 
consistent net expansion of manufacturing employment in Central 
Scotland, they were not uniformly so. Four of the eight selected, 
declined from 1954 to 1960, and there were two which experienced net 
reductions from 1960 to 1963. Since then Grangemouth-Falkirk was the 
only one whose manufacturing employment had decreased by 1966. In 
fact, only North Lanarkshire and the two older new towns, East Kilbride 
and Cumbernauld, expanded in this respect in all three sub-periods; 
because of their importance relative to the total, it was their 
experience which set the pattern for all "growth areas" together. 
The diversity of experience among individual "growth areas" 
from 1954 to 1966, and from one sub-period to another, suggests that 
changes in manufacturing employment - if they had been used in the 
selection process - would not have been either a perfect criterion 
or one which yielded absolutely clear results. The actual choice of 
"growth areas" would have remained a matter for discretionary 
judgment, to be rendered in the light of various theoretic and 
practical considerations. 
Additional Observations 
From the above analysis we may draw a number of more general 
conclusions, or observations, regarding regional development policy 
and programs, as follows. 
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A lagging region apparently must be capable of exercising 
its "will to develop", to paraphrase Sir Arthur Lewis. 
Generally speaking, that requires that its various institutions 
co-operate with one another in the pursuit of new industry to augment 
its economic base, and/or to replace its declining industries. This 
applies, in particular, to its various governmental agencies. In 
Scotland's case, it has taken the form of an enduring relationship 
between the Board of Trade, whose operations in Scotland have been 
the subject of this Chapter, and the Scottish Development Department. 
The combined efforts of these two agencies of the British 
Government, for such they are, have achieved more than noteworthy 
success in bringing "new industry" to Scotland, and, if I may be 
permitted a personal observation, will probably continue to have 
useful results - for Britain and Scotland both. 
There is an important lesson here for other lagging regions, 
which goes beyond the scope of this Chapter. 
CHAPTER 8 
An Assessment of the Scottish Growth Areas 
The White Paper published in November 1963 on Central Scotland 
had profound repercussions beyond Great Britain, particularly in 
countries where Governments, on the one hand, and economists, physical 
development planners and other specialists on the other, are concerned 
with regional development. Foreign observers were excited by the 
positive character of the growth areas policy and by the implicit 
rejection of localized unemployment as the sole criterion for regional 
development programmes. The chasm which had previously existed 
between the continued development of more prosperous, sometimes 
congested regions like South East England (and the Midlands) and 
the lack of economic progress in the more peripheral, less prosperous 
regions like Scotland (and Northern Ireland and Wales), was bridged with 
recognition that the costs of further development in the former could 
be reduced or avoided by paying increased attention to the 
potentialities of the latter. 
The growth areas may be seen largely as a means of seeking 
to achieve this purpose - the crucial element in the strategy of 
industrial development proposed for Central Scotland. They were not 
an end in themselves but rather a means to this wider objective. 
Their essential characteristics consisted, therefore, in their 
advantages over other areas as locations for industrial expansion. 
This largely follows from the fact that the primary purpose of the S. D. G. 
exercise was a faster rate of industrial development in Central Scotland, 
the pursuit of which would provide the setting for seeking to achieve 
a number of other, secondary objectives which the growth areas might 
also be able to serve. Thus, for example, accelerated build-up of 
housing accommodation in the growth area would also accommodate more 
Glasgow overspill and perhaps also help retain a larger number of 
Scottish young people who might otherwise be tempted to emigrate. 
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These were ancillary objectives, however, compared to the recognized 
need of making adequate supplies of labour available in the growth 
areas to the industries which it was hoped would locate or expand 
there. Similarly, the recommended programme of rehabilitation of 
derelict land in certain of the growth areas was greatly spurred 
by the consideration that additional industrial sites could be provided 
in this particular way. The whole programme of improving the 
communications network was seen as offering the two-fold advantage 
of increasing the extent of travel-to-work areas and thus enabling 
prospective industrial employers to draw on a larger labour supply, 
and also of improving the accessibility of the various growth centres 
to their Scottish, British or overseas markets. Improvements proposed 
in environmental services as, for example, in the case of water 
supplies, were also conditioned by a desire to provide in advance 
for the needs of incoming and expanding industry and thereby to 
enhance the likelihood of the desired industrial development taking 
place. 
This does not deny the value or validity of these further 
benefits of growth areas policy. Such factors as the longstanding 
pressure to relieve Glasgow's housing problem, the desire to reduce 
net emigration from Scotland, and the accepted need to improve 
Scotland's image through better amenity, not only helped secure wider 
support for growth areas, but also constituted legitimate policy 
purposes. As such, however, they served to reinforce the basic 
consideration that a growth areas policy would result in greater 
industrial expansion for the Scottish economy. 
The proposals, moreover, were formulated within the wider 
framework of location of industry policy for Great Britain. As 
already noted, an important side of this policy consists in the 
industrial development certificate which is used to control the further 
industrial expansion of Greater London and the Midlands. Within this 
context the challenge to Scottish industrial developers is largely 
that of making Scotland more attractive to prospective industrialists 
than other less prosperous British regions, to which the Board 
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of Trade also seeks to divert industrial expansion from "congested" 
regions by means of financial inducements and capital assistance to 
firms denied a certificate to expand in situ. This fact, incidentally, 
is the main reason why the Scottish growth areas cannot be discussed 
solely in terms of the advantages they provide to firms already 
located there, but must be considered rather in terms of their 
greater ability than other areas to attract newcomer firms. Another 
influence in this direction arises from the fact that the problem in 
Central Scotland is not the build-up of new industry in a previously 
non-industrialized area, but rather that of offsetting the decline 
of the older heavy industries with the establishment of alternative 
types of new industry. Since the opportunities for transferring 
capital, technical or managerial resources from these older sectors 
into the newer science-based industries, for example, are necessarily 
limited, the need to rely on the attraction of new types of economic 
activity from outside is thereby increased. 
Necessary Characteristics 
The main purpose of the Scottish growth areas, it has been 
argued above, was to secure the accelerated industrial expansion of 
Central Scotland by attracting the newer, science-based industries, 
as a means of securing a faster rate of economic growth throughout 
the Scottish economy. It was this essential purpose which implicitly 
determined the necessary characteristics of the Scottish growth areas 
which survived the selection process. These may be considered in 
turn: 
(1) They had to be eligible for the various forms of financial 
assistance available under the Local Employment Acts and 
the Finance Act of 1963 (free depreciation) from the Board 
of Trade. This meant, in effect, that the growth areas 
must also be development districts. There is no doubt 
that at the time the Scottish Development Group was choosing 
its growth areas from among the "areas of search" 
identified by the physical planners, a screening out factor 
was the status of the area in this particular respect. 
209. 
In a sense, the choice of growth areas involved selecting 
the most promising areas from among the list of development 
districts already designated by the Board of Trade. 
(2) Each growth area had to have a reasonably ample supply 
of industrial sites. This second characteristic was common 
to all the growth areas, applying even to those areas 
where there did not exist sufficient land resources to 
permit the accommodation of an overall population increase 
over the planning period. This is of course an obvious need 
in areas where industrial development is contemplated. 
Nevertheless it is an important one in the present case; 
for instance, the immediate need for such sites to carry 
out the early stages of the proposed development programme 
largely accounts for the inclusion of the "rehabilitation 
areas" to supplement the New Towns. Also, the availability 
of industrial sites in each of the growth areas is further 
indication that industrial attraction was an important 
purpose of the whole exercise with Scotland, as it were, 
hoping to "get a jump" on other less prosperous regions 
of Great Britain by capitalizing on the advantage of 
readily available sites to industrialists at the point 
when they are actually contemplating a new location. 
(3) The third necessary characteristic of the Scottish growth 
areas was access to a large potential labour supply. This 
might be in the form of a large local population, or it 
might involve either present or potential access to a wider 
labour market, On this particular score, it perhaps should 
be noted that North Lanarkshire is by far the most suitable 
growth area, both by virtue of its large share of the 
total Central Scotland population and by virtue of its 
proximity to Glasgow's large labour supply. The various 
proposed improvements in the communications network of 
Central Scotland, especially in the roads, were designed 
to increase the access of employers to the available labour 
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supply, by, in effect, extending the size of the 
effective labour market for each growth area. A recent 
survey1 of firms locating in Scotland indicates, 
moreover, that the availability of suitable labour is 
perhaps the most important reason for choosing a Scottish 
location. It seems clear, incidentally, that some of 
the growth areas selected in 1963 are better placed in 
this respect than others. 
Ancillary Features 
Certain other characteristics apply to some, though not all, 
of the Scottish growth areas. Perhaps the most important of these 
was the prospect of constructing additional housing accommodation. 
The long term potential in this respect was probably greatest in 
Grangemouth/Falkirk and Irvine, while the short term acceleration in 
the provision of new housing was mainly expected to come from a 
continuation of the work already underway in the three older Scottish 
New Towns of East Kilbride, Cumbernauld and Glenrothes. Livingston 
and the rehabilitation and development area related to it would be 
able to make a substantial contribution during the medium term. 
Housing, of course, satisfies several needs. Its availability 
serves as a further inducement to the attraction of industry, both 
in terms of expanding the supply of labour potentially available to 
the incoming industrialist, and also in terms of meeting his own 
needs and those of his key executives for living accommodation. In 
the Scottish case, it also serves the continuing programme of 
Glasgow overspill and redeployment. Most important, perhaps, in view 
of the large size of the public share of total housing construction in 
Scotland, housing serves wider social and political purposes. 
Housing potential was not quite a necessary characteristic of the 
Scottish growth areas since North Lanarkshire and the Vale of Leven 
did not have it; nevertheless in those areas where housing build-up 
could be contemplated on a considerable scale, this feature was seen 
to represent an important particular advantage. 
G. C. Cameron and B. D. Clark Industrial Movement and the Regional Problem University of Glasgow Social and Economic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 5, 1966. 
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N 
Taken together and in a longer view, the eight growth areas 
together represented clear evidence that further development on an 
extensive physical scale was certainly possible in Central Scotland 
for a long time to come. Because the exercise of selecting the 
areas had begun from a complete canvas of the regions total land 
resources, an inventory of available sub-regions had been compiled 
which included a number of large sites capable of substantial 
development as locations for housing, industry and the other facilities 
required by modern, urban society. Moreover, not all these were 
included in the eight "growth areas" actually selected for the 1963-81 
programme. Hence, whatever factors might limit the pace of economic 
progress in Central Scotland in the foreseeable future, such limitation 
would not be due to a mere shortage of available land. 
Which of the available areas where physical development could 
be sited, were named as "growth areas" was then largely a result of 
applying other considerations inherent in the nature of the type of 
programme contemplated. The pursuit of an economic development programme 
based primarily on industrial expansion meant that the growth areas, 
in addition to the mere availability of land, must offer advantages 
as locations for new industrial firms. Chief among these, as has been 
argued above, were eligibility for Board of Trade assistance, suitable 
factory premises constructed on the available industrial sites, and 
access to adequate supplies of necessary labour. 
It was the need to provide new industrial premises - the 
second of these - throughout the planning period at an appropriate 
pace which led into consideration of what phasing of the programme 
was required. Thus, in the first phase it was expected that the older 
New Towns would carry the burden of providing both industrial sites and 
new housing accommodation. In the second phase, Livingston and its 
surrounding area, Grangemouth/Falkirk and Irvine would begin to make 
an impact while . n. the third phase, the newer virgin sites would 
come into play. The phasing again reflected the importance of the 
attraction of new industry as the basis for improving the economy of 
Central Scotland. 
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Another ancillary feature of the Scottish "growth areas" was, 
in general, advantageous location on the land communications sytem 
and, hence, better access to airports and seaports as well. This 
followed partly from the criteria employed in the selection process, 
when certain areas were identified on the basis of this particular 
factor. It was also the result of the development programme itself. 
For an important aspect of this latter consisted in the acceleration 
and elaboration of various elements in the continuing programme to 
improve the network of surface communications, sea and air facilities 
serving Central Scotland. The specific purpose was to enhance the 
advantages of the region as an industrial location by co-ordinating 
auch improvements to the maximum benefit of the selected growth areas. 
The growth areas, therefore, besides having access thereby to larger 
potential labour markets, would also enjoy better transportation 
links to facilitate the shipment of their output to markets within 
and beyond Central Scotland. In some cases, this advantage could 
be had in a new town where the lack of congestion might reinforce 
the advantage of being able to receive raw materials from further 
afield and to dispatch final products to distant markets, with 
relative ease. In others, most particularly in North Lanarkshire, 
availability of good transport might be combined with direct access 
to a large local labour market. The need to provide good, reliable 
facilities for both goods transport and personal travel had been 
stressed by the Toothill Committee as a part of industrial 
development promotion. 
From the viewpoint of incoming industry, the proposed co- 
ordination of the provision of environmental services such as water 
supplies which was also a specific part of the "infrastructure" 
aspect of the programme, offered similar potential benefits. 
On a somewhat more general level, the eight growth areas 
possessed a further ancillary feature of some importance to their main 
purpose. This consisted in the fact that they together offered the 
prospective industrialist a range of possible sites, each with 
certain particular characteristics. The purist may be bothered by the 
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diversity evident among the growth areas as indicative of a lack of 
consistency but if so, he would miss the point of the whole exercise. 
"Industry" is made up of a wide variety of types of activity, and the 
factors affecting the location of each may differ widely. What suits 
a chemical firm may differ considerably from a location chosen by a 
firm manufacturing clothing, for example. The clothing manufacturer 
could be accommodated in premises on an industrial estate in a built-up 
area, while the chemical firm would more likely require a large site 
in an area where land was more plentiful (and less expensive), and 
which was not densely populated. If both these types of industry 
were desired, then the growth areas should be selected in such a way 
as to meet both sets of requirements. In Central Scotland's case 
the growth areas did include locations like Grangemouth where land 
was extensively available, as well as others such as North Lanarkshire 
which could accommodate the clothing firm in a new factory built, if 
necessary, to the latter's 
own specifications. For this reason 
the lack of perfect similarity between the eight growth areas 
represented a further potential advantage for Central Scotland in 
the effort to attract an increased share of geographically mobile 
industrial firms at the expense of other competing British regions. 
2 
On this general basis the required characteristics for the 
selected growth areas also take on greater credibility than when 
applied to particular examples. It had been recognized that, if they 
were to meet the quantified population and employment objectives for 
Central Scotland, the growth areas must: 
2The 
encouragement, on a limited basis, of some industrial development 
in the localities not selected as growth areas, can also be considered 
as a similar, further complementary feature of the policy. If a firm 
wished to locate in a small, relatively isolated locality and thereby 
become the dominant local industry, and would not be at any compensating 
disadvantage as a result, its acquisition for the Scottish economy 
would be desirable; and the opportunity to offer a few sites in such 
localities represented an enlargement of the range of possible choice 
which Central Scotland could offer the prospective industrialist, and 
which might help to give this region an advantage over other, 
competing British regions. 
214. 
(a) be undertaken on a large scale; 
(b) possess fast momentum; 
(c) have a good prospect of leading to the development of 
a major industrial complex; 
(d) come under the influence of a major, metropolitan-type 
conurbation, the centre of which provides a range of 
facilities, professional services and cultural amenities 
necessary to sustain a high standard of living. 
The first three of these points essentially derive from the need to 
achieve proper scale in the development programme, that is, to 
ensure that there are sufficient growth areas to accommodate the 
desired increase of new industrial activity on which the whole 
programme is centred. The last is a recognition that the growth 
areas are related in important ways, to the major cities of the 
Central Scotland region. While, on the one hand, they were established 
to attract new activity to the region, on the other they would serve 
to accommodate the expansion which is desired from within the region 
and which is also dependent to some extent on success with the 
attraction of new activity from outside. Glasgow and Edinburgh 
were seen to be, in many ways, the real growth nuclei of the economy' 
of Central Scotland. 
One may ask, to recapitulate the main characteristics of the 
growth areas selected, why the so-called rehabilitation areas emerged 
at all among them. The answer to that lies partly in the success 
which had already been achieved in some of them in attracting industry. 
North Lanarkshire, in particular, was a large urban labour market 
area in which the Board of Trade had had considerable success throughout 
the postwar period in attracting new industry of various types. This 
success is not reflected in the overall statistics of employment change 
for North Lanarkshire, largely because the data are usually cited on 
a net basis and the industry introduced had been offset by the 
continuing decline of the area's older basic industries. Nevertheless 
it seems fair to cite the success with attracting the new firms as 
an indication that the programme of the Board of Trade was effective. 
The Board of Trade's view was that, given the importance of the 
215. 
availability of labour as an attraction to new industrialists, it 
would be wrong to place the whole emphasis on the New Towns (which 
together represent a small fraction of the total Scottish population) 
and on new virgin sites. In neither of these cases could a labour supply 
be made available on the same scale as soon as in North Lanarkshire. 
A second factor here was doubtless that these rehabilitation 
areas possessed the main necessary characteristics of the growth 
areas selected. They were eligible for Board of Trade assistance as 
development districts. They did possess a number of suitable industrial 
sites which could be made available on reasonably short notice, and 
they were, as already mentioned, the centres of very large labour 
market areas or had good access to others nearby. 
Wider Objectives 
If, as has been suggested, the main characteristics necessary 
in Scottish growth areas are simply available industrial sites, an 
adequate supply of labour, and eligibility for grants and loans from 
the Board of Trade, then one may ask why there had to be all the fuss 
about selecting them. The answer perhaps is that the selection process 
itself was not all that important; what was important was the 
examination of the various activities of the Scottish Departments 
and of the Great Britain Departments in their Scottish operations 
within a single comprehensive framework and in relation to the 
overall objective of securing a faster rate of economic growth in 
Central Scotland. It also lies in the greater importance of the 
various proposals which were advanced in order to assist and enforce 
the build-up of the Scottish growth areas to the point where they 
could sustain the brunt of the Central Scotland regional development 
effort. It is clear that the process of selection was essentially 
pragmatic, involving the exercise of informed judgment based on 
considerable consultation with the various Departments and agencies 
involved in the execution of Government programmes related to 
Scotland's economic development, and reflecting also the wide ranging 
proposals which had been advanced by the Toothill Committee following 
its examination of the Scottish economy a few years earlier. Again, 
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the growth areas. and still less the process of selecting them, 
were not the end purpose of the whole exercise. They served rather 
throughout the course of the exercise as a focus for considering the 
wider proposals under review and, in the end provided similarly a 
means of seeking to achieve the objectives of the regional development 
programme thus elaborated. 
Concluding Observations 
The emergence of "growth areas" from the Central Scotland 
review of 1963 represented an important step in the evolution of 
British regional policy. Building effectively on the proposals 
advanced for the Scottish economy by the Toothill Committee two 
years earlier, the Scottish Development Group produced a set of 
interrelated measures embracing virtually every aspect of Government 
social capital investment in this regional economy, 
3 
and related 
each to the primary economic objective of achieving a faster rate of 
increase in manufacturing employment through the attraction of new 
manufacturing industry. Not only were the various aspects of the 
infrastructure programme fitted into the programme from this viewpoint, 
but the opportunity was also used to assess the adequacy of training 
facilities available to industry and of financial assistance for those 
undergoing such training. As a result, substance was given to the 
proposition that regional development policy consisted of much 
more than simply the system of controls and inducements operated 
by the Board of Trade to effect redistribution of industry. The 
problems of each region had been analyzed, and proposals framed for 
their solution which were consistent with national economic policy; 
these proposals extended to most aspects of Government activity 
affecting the region's economic progress. 
3That is, the regional economy of Central Scotland. It should be 
noted that the resulting development programme was not a programme 
for Scotland as a whole, but concentrated on the Central Belt. 
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A Comparison with the "Growth Pole" Concept 
This reorientation and elaboration of regional policy was the 
main contribution of the pioneering work in 1963. The "growth 
areas" which simultaneously resulted were, by comparison, an incidental 
result although an important one. They were essentially a means of 
implementing the new, more comprehensive approach to regional development 
which provided, in the process, a geographical focus for the effort 
to stimulate the expansion of a whole region, and thereby made such 
an ambitious task not only more plausible, but also more manageable. 
If properly selected, the "growth areas" should be capable of leading 
the way to faster development for the whole region, and accelerated 
growth for the nation. As specified locations for new social 
capital facilities, they would enable the development agencies more 
easily to co-ordinate and mutually consolidate, rather than diffuse, 
their efforts. 
The conclusion has been reached, in Chapter 5, that the 
"growth areas" were mainly attractive places in which new industrial 
firms could locate. This in itself distinguishes them from the 
"growth pole" concept sometimes suggested as a basis for encouraging 
economic development. 
Such "growth poles" were originally conceived by Francois 
Perroux in terms not of specified areas, but of certain leading 
industries whose growth induced further growth in other industries 
and sectors of the economy. The concept has been largely appropriated 
by regional economics, and is usually applied to particular geographical 
areas which in the past have exhibited more pronounced growth tendencies 
than other areas in the same region or country. It has also been 
adapted for policy purposes as an instrument for more rapidly developing 
the larger region in which the growth pole is situated. It is within 
this particular context that the theoretical merits of a "growth pole" 
approach to economic development planning have been elaborated. 
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Cameron and Reid have analyzed the Central Scotland "growth 
areas" within this sort of theoretical framework. 
4 
It is significant 
that they do so in terms of two particular aspects, namely, the 
possibility that industrial firms will grow more rapidly if located 
in a "growth area" than elsewhere, and the potential opportunity for 
government - as the supplier of infrastructure - to economise on 
its expenditure outlays in the wider region by concentrating their 
provision on the selected "growth areas". Their conclusion on the 
first aspect is that the small size and advanced state of development 
of Central Scotland preclude firms growing more rapidly through 
obtaining greater technical or external economies in a "growth area" 
than elsewhere in the region. 
5 
In the course of reaching this 
conclusion, they implicitly reject the proposition that the main 
purpose of "growth areas" was to attract more firms to Scotland by 
diverting industrial growth from other British regions. They assume 
the effect of this kind of growth is completely "diversionary" and 
of no net benefit to the nation as a whole, seemingly ignoring both 
the argument about the interdependence of the nuclear (South East 
England) and peripheral economies already discussed, and the possibility 
that conditions in Scotland - including the availability of a greater 
potential labour supply, for example, -might enable greater subsequent 
expansion of the migrant industry than would be possible in the region 
from which it was diverted. 
However that may be, the conclusion which emerges from the 
analysis of the "growth areas" selection exercise in Chapter 5 
above is that their main purpose was precisely to enable Central 
Scotland to attract an increased share of migrant industry from other 
regions or from abroad. To assess Scottish "growth areas" solely in 
terms of the external economies they generate for existing firms is to 
ignore their most important aspect. 
ACameron 
and Reid, 92. cit. 
. There is, however, no necessary relation between a firm's costs and its rate of employment expansion. 
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The proposition that Government outlays are more effective 
when concentrated on a few particular areas rather than widely 
diffused, thus permitting a better return in terms of growth 
generated, is apt enough. It should be remembered, on the other 
hand, that some of the infrastructure expenditures represent public 
consumption as well as investment in aid of future development. 
Improved highways are not simply an incentive to industry; they also 
permit increased, and more extensive, pleasure motoring by the ordinary 
citizen -taxpayer, or permit him easier access to'other facilities he 
may wish to enjoy. Given some success with an economic development 
programme, the community's preference may well be for further 
increases in outlays for roads and other infrastructure facilities - 
not because still more growth is desired, but in order to enjoy a 
higher standard of jpublic) consumption as part of the fruits of past 
growth. The economy desired in terms of securing maximum benefit from 
investment in roads at an earlier stage, would then be in conflict with 
the community's preference for better roads to permit higher consumption 
standards. 
This inherent conflict between consumption and investment 
aspects of expenditure programmes on public facilities makes it 
difficult to measure their "costs" and "benefits". The conflict is 
more clearly evident in a developed industrial economy such as Central 
Scotland than it would be in an underdeveloped region or country. 
But the line between costs and benefits is nearly always blurred when 
one is considering such expenditure programmes as elements in a 
programme of overall economic development. 
As Cameron and Reid have also stated, the Scottish "growth 
areas" were "more than anything else the integration of various strands 
of social and economic policy". But the key to this integration has 
been shown above to lie in accelerated attraction of particular types 
of new industrial activity to Central Scotland, which the "growth 
areas" were intended both to stimulate and to accommodate. Faster 
growth of existing firms, like the easier resolution of Glasgow's 
overspill problem, were further, ancillary benefits which might also 
result from this major primary objective being successfully achieved. 
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Their analysis of possible technical and external economies 
for existing firms as a basis for their faster growth in "growth 
areas" led Cameron and Reid ultimately to surmise, because the selected 
"growth areas" offered no significant advantages in these respects over 
other locations in a region which is "small enough to be considered 
all one growth area", that "growth areas will give growth of employment 
not through the faster growth of firms which settle there, but 
because they are likely to be more successful in attracting migrant 
firms". By a systematic, although somewhat academic, examination 
of the various possible ways a "growth area" might lead to faster 
industrial growth, they thus arrived at a correct inference as to 
the main specific purpose which the Central Scotland programme was 
designed to fulfil. 
New industrial complexes were desired by the planners in 1963 
but were not examined thoroughly. They hoped also that migrant 
industry attracted to the "growth areas" would include some firma 
with "breeder" potential. There was no specification in the selection 
process of the likelihood of attracting either interrelated industry 
complexes or "breeder" firms to the various growth areas, however, 
and neither was there any explicit attempt to measure their likely 
incidence from place to place. 
In the process, however, of examining the effects of "growth 
areas" and regional policy on existing industry, Cameron and Reid 
have also pointed out an important weakness which still remains inherent 
in the new approach to regional development. The effort continues 
to be based on the attraction of new industrial activity from outside 
as though it were the only possible source of new dynamism for the 
less prosperous regions. Yet this degree of reliance on exogenous 
sources of regional growth may be misplaced or overdone. It is 
conceivable that latent new dynamics are waiting to be discovered 
within the existing fabric of the Scottish economy, and called into 
effective play by a still further extension of regional policy to 
comprehend not only industrial location programmes reinforced by 
concerted and co-ordinated infrastructure improvements, but in 
addition. measures to stimulate and sustain the growth forces already 
latent within, for example, the non-manufacturing sectors of the 
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Scottish economy and perhaps also within the hitherto slow-growing 
heavier industries. 6 
It is even possible that continued emphasis on the attraction 
of migrant firms, as the main instrument of regional economic 
improvement may distract the region from more promising avenues for 
expansion, and thus frustrate the whole purpose of regional economic 
development. The habit may easily be acquired, by entrepreneur and 
politician alike, of thinking always in terms of attracting new 
industries whenever a problem arises within the regional economy. 
Sometimes, however, such problems may be more easily solved through 
a greater effort to utilize the region's own talents and resources 
without rendering a plea for "outside" assistance. The Toothill 
Committee was quite explicit on the need for regional participation. 
"Much of Scotland's hope for diversification and new growth in the 
future must ... be translated in the face of all the difficulties 
into a vigorous and purposeful demonstration of initiative and enter- 
prise by her own people. "7 
Validity of Criteria Used in Selection 
Most of the criteria directly applied in the selection of 
the "growth areas" reflected the purely physical aspects of their 
main necessary characteristics as suitable locations for new 
industrial enterprises within the industrial and cultural "zones of 
influence" centred on Glasgow and Edinburgh. In the earlier stages 
of the process these criteria largely reflected the requirement that 
each "growth area" possess an adequate supply of suitable industrial 
sites. 
6One 
recent example of the possibilities that might exist is the 
Geddes Committee's discovery that shipbuilding is, after all, a 
"growth industry". 
7Toothill Report, para 03.53, page 38. 
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In the end too, the selection process proved more pragmatic 
than scientific. In certain particular cases, however, areas qualified 
partly because of a high score in terms of both population increase 
and employment increase during the recent past. This is the closest 
approximation to an objectively economic test of an area's capacity 
for future growth, which was used in the course of the selection 
process. The question therefore arises, how valid is this particular 
test? 
The first point to be noted perhaps is that past trends are 
no guarantee of future success. The data employed here covered 
roughly the decade ending in 1961, and served to identify the three 
older New Towns essentially, together with Grangemouth/Falkirk and 
Irvine. The dynamism evident at Irvine was especially impressive. 
But the fact that these particular areas had experienced population 
and employment expansion during the previous ten years is no 
indication in itself that there would be similar increases in the 
next ten years. To support such a proposition it would be necessary 
to demonstrate that the factors underlying the past growth would 
continue to operate during the immediate future. 
Secondly, population and employment data are limited in 
themselves as indicators of past growth. 
8 They provide what is 
largely a measure of the result of expansion having occurred, and say 
very little about the forces that may have caused the growth in the 
first place. There was some protection built into the device of 
requiring an area to exhibit both population and employment growth before 
it could be designated, thus avoiding the inclusion - for example - 
of areas which had grown in population only as a result of their 
being dormitory communities and perhaps representing, therefore, an 
overspill effect of industrial growth having occurred elsewhere. But 
an examination of growth forces in the past, and the likelihood of 
The employment data used were actually insured population. 
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their operating on a similar scale in future, requires a much deeper 
examination than this. Of course, it ought to be admitted that in 
the special circumstances of Central Scotland, with the New Towns 
offering one of the obviously important outlets for population and 
employment growth, it can be argued that there is every likelihood 
that further growth will occur there as long as physical capacity 
exists: but this is not a justification for using population and 
employment growth as tests of inherent growth capacity. 
Thirdly, indices of percentage change may be misleading. 
This seems to have been the case in a number of the Scottish towns 
and cities; in particular, the percentage growth rate in the New 
Towns reflected what was an extremely small amount of absolute 
population change. It comprised only a very small fraction of the 
total Scottish population change over this period. 
Another problem arises particularly in the case of the 
employment data, from the fact that the data used were net figures. 
Substantial employment increases on the gross basis were evident 
in a number of other areas, for example in North Lanarkshire, but these 
were offset as a result of the decline in the older industries. The 
geographical accident of the growth having occurred in the New Town 
without its having been offset by a decline there simply because there 
was nothing there to decline, does not appear to be sufficient basis 
for saying that the further capacity of the New Towns for employment 
growth is greater than that of other areas into which firms have also 
been attracted, and which now employ an absolutely larger number of 
persons than the total of those employed in all the New Towns. 
The Prospects for Success 
What about the chances for faster growth in the future in 
the Scottish growth areas? 
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In the first place, the Government decisions to support the 
development of these particular areas will obviously help to ensure 
that these areas themselves do grow. There will be a noticeable 
expansion of jobs and housing which probably will be impressive in 
percentage terms, especially in the New Towns being or to be designated 
on largely virgin sites since they will be starting from a base that 
is zero or extremely small. 
The critical variable, however, is still the rate at which 
industrial development may occur. In respect of the rate of industrial 
attraction particularly, the important causal factors here are largely 
exogenous as far as Scotland is concerned. As the Toothill Committee 
pointed out, much will continue to depend on the rate of expansion 
in the national economy; much will continue to depend also on the 
continued operations of the I. D. C. policy of restraining the growth 
which might otherwise occur in the industrialized areas in the 
Midlands and the South-East of England, and thus "freeing" it for 
diversion to Scotland and other less prosperous regions. 
Nevertheless, the co-ordination of infrastructure planning 
and expenditure which has resulted from the 1963 selection process 
ought to make a considerable positive contribution to the future 
development of the Scottish economy. These expenditures will be 
important in raising aggregate demand themselves, and they seem likely 
also to serve the more crucial purpose of making Central Scotland 
a more attractive location for new industrialists. 
Within the wider framework of the Central Scotland region, 
the more general approach used in devising the Central Scotland 
programme of examining the whole range of social capital investment 
programmes as they affect the industrial and economic development 
of the region, seems also to offer greater promise of success in 
the long run. 
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Finally, the considerable publicity value for Scotland of 
the whole exercise, or more particularly the announcement of the 
change in policy to incorporate the widely accepted and publicized 
"growth areas", should not be discounted. 
9 
This publicity resulted 
in making more British firms aware of the potentialities of a 
Scottish location, and probably had something to do with the accelerated 
rate at which new industrial firms were attracted to Scotland in the 
ensuing two or three years. Moreover, as a result partly of shifting 
the emphasis from elimination of unemployment to stimulation of growth, 
regional policy had been made substantially more respectable at the 
national level. An important incidental benefit in this respect was 
a greater disposition on the part of civil servants in Whitehall to 
treat regional development sympathetically. 
ýv 
9Similar 
gains were obtained by the North-East of England from their 
having been the subject of a similar exercise conducted simultaneously 
under the auspices of Lord Hailsham. 
CHAPTER 9 
Canada's Atlantic Provinces: A Maladjusted Region 
Introduction 
Canada's Atlantic Region' constitutes the four easternmost 
provinces of the country - Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are charter members of the 
Canadian Confederation of 1867. Prince Edward Island became a 
province shortly thereafter, in 1873, while Newfoundland did not 
join. Canada until 1949. Each of these four provinces is a separate 
political unit within the federal system and has its own Lieutenant- 
Governor as the Queen's representative, Legislative Assembly, 
Provincial Government (and Cabinet), and provincial civil service. 
These governments have certain responsibilities under the British 
North America Act of 1867 which established the Canadian nation, and 
they include important instruments for economic development within 
their own borders. The capital city of each province is a seat of 
junior government; and the four-province Atlantic region is, therefore, 
a political and administrative amalgam, whatever its claim to economic 
homogeneity may be. 
The land area of this region is large by comparison with other 
parts of the economically developed world. Its 193,466 square miles 
are only some five per cent of Canada's total, but if Newfoundland 
Labrador is omitted, the remaining land area - in which most of the 
population of the four provinces resides - is approximately equal to 
the 93,018 square miles which comprise the total land area of the 
United Kingdom. Distance is thus a relatively important factor in 
1The 
others, from east to west, are Quebec; Ontario; the Prairie 
Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta; and British Columbia. 
The Yukon and Northwest Territories are sometimes treated as a sixth 
Canadian region. 
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economic development, both internally and externally. Within the 
region, the population tends to be scattered in villages and small 
towns along the lengthy coastline. External distances are also 
significantly greater: from Halifax, the largest population centre 
in the region, to Montreal at the nearer end of the main Canadian 
consumer market in Ontario and Quebec, is about 850 miles by road, 
or more than twice the distance between Glasgow and London. 
In contrast with the densely populated British Isles, 
however, there was in 1966 an estimated population in the Canadian 
Atlantic Provinces of just over two million persons. The Atlantic 
region thus contained roughly 10 per cent of the national population 
of approximately 20 million. 
The Atlantic Provinces are a lagging region within the 
Canadian economy, exhibiting the characteristic symptoms of higher 
unemployment and underemployment, lower participation rates, 
persistent net emigration, slower growth, and lower average income 
and output. Tables 10 and 11 below provide several indices of 
this disparity between the region and the nation. 
Personal income is the most comprehensive measure of 
aggregate economic activity that is published by the Dominion 
Bureau of Statistics for Canadian provinces and regions on a 
regular basis. Although it includes transfer payments, it nevertheless 
provides a rough basis for comparing the overall economic status of 
various provinces and regions. Table 10 includes an index (column 3) 
which relates the value of personal income per capita in each of the 
Atlantic Provinces to the comparable Canadian figure. For the 
Atlantic Region as a whole the value of this index in 1964 was 68, 
indicating that per capita income in the Atlantic Provinces was only 
68 per cent of per capita income in Canada as a whole. This has been 
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Table 10 
Population and Personal Income per Capita, Atlantic Provinces, 1964 
Population Personal Income Per Capita 
(000's) Index 
(Canada - 100) 
Newfoundland 491 
Prince Edward Island 107 
Nova Scotia 762 
New Brunswick 617 
1,065 58 
1,224 67 
1,362 75 
1,246 
4TLANTIC PROVINCES 1,977 1,245 
68 
68 
SOURCE: Dominion Bureau of Statistics (D. B. S. ) 
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Table 11 
Indexes of Disparity, Atlantic Provinces Compared to Canada 
Index, Atlantic Provinces 
(Canada - 100) 
Persons employed/Total population 80 
Labour force participation rate 87 
Unemployment as Z of labour force 173 
Seasonal unemployment, males 450 
Earndd income per employed person 82 
Net value of commodity production per capita 49 
Net value of manufacturing production per capita 34 
SOURCE: D. B. S. 
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an enduring relationship covering the whole period since 1926, the 
first year for which these data are available, with personal income 
per capita in the Atlantic Provinces remaining at or near two-thirds 
of the national figure. 
2 
The indices in Table 11 serve to indicate what are well-known 
and well-documented facts concerning the economy of Canada's Atlantic 
Provinces - an economy in which fewer persons, relatively, participate 
in productive economic activities and consequently achieve lower 
relative standards of income and output. Two of the indexes also 
attest to the fact that the region has a labour surplus, as reflected 
in higher unemployment and a much greater incidence of seasonal 
unemployment. 
The region's legacy is not one of industrial decline, 
but of the loss of former trading advantages under a now-outmoded 
technology. Because its difficulties are of long standing and 
rather deepseated, it will be in order to review the economic 
history of the region as a background to the examination, in Chapter 10, 
of the present structure and interregional relations of the Atlantic 
Provinces economy. 
Historical Background 
The Atlantic region's economic history covers a rather long 
period by North American standards, which may be dated from 1497. 
John Cabot's voyage of that year attracted the attention of Europeans 
to the cod fisheries, and this resource provided the initial basis 
for development of the regional economy by European settlers in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
2For further examination of the lack of convergence in income 
levels in Canada since 1926, see Economic Council of Canada, 
Second Annual Review, Towards Sustained and Balanced Economic 
Growth, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, December, 1965, as well as 
S. E. Chernick, Interregional Disparities in Income, Staff Study 
No. 14, Economic Council of Canada, Queen's Printer, 1966. 
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Timber was next, and from the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century until roughly one hundred years ago, the region enjoyed its 
economic hey-day, the so-called "Golden Age". This was the era of 
wood, wind and water which still evokes misty-eyed memories of a 
prosperous long ago on the part of many Maritimers. 
3 
Under the 
mantle of a protective British mercantile policy, Maritime Provinces 
cod were sold in the British West Indies, and Maritime timber found 
ready markets in Britain. The goods involved in this "triangular 
trade" were carried in wooden bottoms and with accessible timber 
resources, it was not long before an extensive shipbuilding industry 
developed. The Maritimes soon also assumed a major role in the 
carrying trade, and by the middle of the nineteenth century had become 
a major commercial maritime power, standing fourth in the world in 
registered tonnage. A feature of the regional economy during the 
"Golden Age" was its integration in a pattern of international trade 
conducted under British sponsorship and with British protection, which 
assured the opportunity for exploitation of the region's available 
resources. It is noteworthy that foodstuffs were largely imported 
at this time to meet the needs of a population whose working members 
were mainly engaged in production for external markets. 
The institutional arrangements behind this Maritime prosperity 
began to be undermined in 1830, when American ships were admitted to 
trade with the British West Indies. In 1850 Britain adopted complete 
free trade and Maritime timber lost its former tariff preference -a 
fundamental alteration of the trading system, and framework of policy, 
into which the Maritimes had been so well integrated. 
0 
Nevertheless the Maritimes retained a prosperous status for 
a time after 1850. Keirstead has pointed out that the basis of its 
3The 
term "Maritimere" refers to residents of the three Maritime 
Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. 
No similarly convenient term has yet emerged to describe residents 
of the region since it was enlarged to four provinces by 
Newfoundland's addition in 1949. 
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manufacturing at this time was its transportation advantage with 
respect to the New England States and expanding purchasing power 
in the local market, protected by distance and poor transport from 
other possible North American competitors, combined with a natural 
advantage and accumulated managerial and labour skills in the chief 
industry of lumbering and wooden shipbuilding. 
4 
The mantle of 
British protection had been temporarily replaced by access to the 
New England market under the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. 
Technical change was a more telling factor, however, 
in removing the basis of the region's prosperity. The wood, wind 
and water basis of ocean transportation was to be replaced by steel 
and steam as a result of the Industrial Revolution. There were then 
fewer natural advantages for the Maritimes, and the remote, thinly 
populated region was not able to maintain its importance in ship- 
building and the carrying trade. In 1867 the Cunard Lines removed 
Halifax, the firm's original home base, from its listed ports of call 
because cargo volumes were no longer sufficient to justify bringing 
the larger, more expensive steel vessels there to load. 
The same year Nova Scotia and New Brunswick joined Ontario 
and Quebec in the new Confederation of Canada. Within Confederation, 
the three Maritime Provinces suffered further economic setbacks. The 
then accessible forest resources became depleted. Meat canning and 
refrigeration developments cut into the traditional markets for 
fish and, more particularly, the West Indies market for dried fish 
became depressed as other sources of sugar began to be exploited in 
competition with the West Indies. Coal, which had been shipped to 
the United States during the Civil War, was no longer in great demand 
when the War ended and new, more economic coal mines could be opened in 
the U. S. 
4B. 
S. Keiratead, The Theory of Economic Change, Macmillan, Toronto, 
1948, p. 269. 
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The great hope which the pro-Confederation spokesmen held 
out had been access for Maritime manufacturers to the markets of 
Ontario and Quebec. A confident belief that manufacturing would 
grow led regional entrepreneurs to undertake considerable investment 
and expansion during the first two decades after Confederation. 
New capital investment in manufacturing, for example, increased by 1891 
to almost three times its 1871 level. 
5 
But the optimistic outlook for 
Maritime manufacturing was to prove unjustified by events, as a new 
framework of policy emerged. 
In 1878 Canada adopted the National Policy, consisting of 
three means of providing the new nation with an economic identity. 
First, a transcontinental railway would be built to connect the west 
to the east. Secondly, the west would be settled by immigration, not 
only to strengthen the Dominion's claim to the west, but also to 
provide freight for the railways. Finally, protective tariffs would 
be imposed on manufactured goods to encourage the development of 
secondary manufacturing and strengthen the east-west flow of trade, 
and in the process utilize the excess capacity of the railroads. 
The major employment and income effects of the National 
Policy were conferred on the central provinces. Although the 
Maritimes participated in the railway boom and enjoyed the attendant 
benefits of the development of Nova Scotia's coal, and iron and steel 
industries, these effects were much lese pronounced and much less 
cumulating than those in central Canada. In part, this was because 
the process of nation-building gave the Maritimes an even more 
remote and peripheral statue within Canada; in manufacturing, for 
example, location in Ontario became logical not only because the 
largest concentrations of populations were there, but also because 
5Keiratead, 
op. cit., p. 279. 
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Ontario was, for many lines, the most economic location from which 
to supply a relatively small and geographically scattered national 
market. Between 1891 and 1911, the period when the Vest was being 
opened up, nearly all the natural increase in population in the 
Maritime Provinces was offset by the flow of emigration to other 
regions. By the latter date the region's share of the national 
population was 12-1/2%, compared to 18% in 1871.6 It was not long, 
therefore, before Maritimere found their new status as Canadians 
somewhat unwelcome and many longed for the return of the prosperous, 
sea-oriented economy they had enjoyed during the "Golden Age". 
The 1920's were a period of reasserted growth for the 
Canadian economy following a brief recession at the end of World 
War I. New developments in hydro-electric power production, in 
mineral production, in pulp and paper, and the greater use of the 
internal combustion engine, all contributed to progress which was 
felt mainly in the central provinces and British Columbia. Again, 
however, the Maritime Provinces remained essentially on the fringe of 
this national growth. "Lacking the resources for the new dynamic 
elements of growth, the two industries which had prospered in the 
early period, coal mining and primary iron and steel, failed to 
provide the necessary substitute. "7 
It was also during the 1920's that a comprehensive national 
attempt to examine the economic position of the Maritime Provinces 
within Confederation was undertaken. As a result of representations 
by various legislatures, Boards of Trade and other public bodies 
6Keirstead, 
2. cit., p. 282. 
7R. 
D. Howland, Some Regional Aspects of Canada's Economic Development, 
a study for The Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, 
Ottawa, Queen's Printer, November 1957, p. 61. 
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that the interests of the Maritime Provinces had suffered from certain 
legislative and administrative measures adopted from time to time by 
the successive Parliaments and Governments of Canada, the federal 
government established a Royal Commission on Maritime Claims. It 
was asked to look into these claims and submit recommendations to 
afford relief from the conditions which prompted the complaints. 
The Commission considered a whole range of subjects including 
transportation and railway freight rates, port development and export 
trade, trade policy, the coal and steel industries, agriculture and 
migration, the fisheries, a geological survey, tourist traffic, and 
statistics. on the overriding issue, the economic position of the 
Maritimes within the young nation, the Report concluded that 
Confederation was not of itself responsible for the slower economic 
development of the Maritimes. Changes in the area's economic 
structure were unrelated to the fact of Confederation and would have 
taken place even if the Maritimes had remained independent units, 
being the result of such other factors as the abrogation of the 
Reciprocity Treaty with the U. S. (in 1866), the conclusion of the 
American Civil War, and other changes over sixty years in commerce, 
industry and economics. 
The Commission concluded that the potential of the Maritimes 
was greater then, in 1926, than it had been in 1867. 
Nevertheless. the polarization of manufacturing industry in 
central Canada continued until the onset of World War II. This 
process was accompanied by the closing down. sometimes by competitors 
in central Canada who bought them out, of many small-scale establishments 
in the Maritime Provinces engaged in a variety of industries. Keirstead 
found that in this period "the only Maritime industry to record real 
growth, comparable with that of its Ontario (or Quebec) rival, was 
pulp and paper, in which very marked particular advantages were 
enjoyed in the Maritimes, advantages not the least of which is the 
transport advantage to the New England, New York and British markets, 
as in the 'good old days'. "8 
8 
Keirstead, p. cit., p. 299. 
236. 
The Second World War gave some stimulus to manufacturing 
production in the Maritimes, but the effect on capital-formation was 
only slight. After the War, the shipbuilding industry which had 
expanded most, declined; and there was no indication that the process 
of industrial concentration in central Canada had stopped or was 
likely to be reversed. The pulp and paper industry remained the only 
branch of manufacturing whose growth seemed assured. 
During the decade following World War II the maturing 
Canadian economy enjoyed one of the greatest expansions in its 
history. From Montreal to the west, rapid development proceeded 
practically uninterrupted and was highlighted by spectacular resource 
projects such as aluminum in Kitimat, British Columbia; iron ore in 
Quebec; uranium in Ontario; and petroleum in the Prairie Provinces. 
But from Montreal east, the story was rather different: the 
Maritimes and Newfoundland shared only to a limited extent in the 
unprecedented prosperity. With the nation enjoying "full employment" 
by Canadian standards, at a rate ranging between 3 and 4-1/2 per cent 
during the mid-fifties, the Atlantic Provinces had, even with 
considerable net emigration to central Canada, unemployment from 
5-1/2 to 6-1/2 per cent. 
The economic position of the Atlantic Provinces in the mid- 
1950's was that of a region which had not been successfully integrated 
into the national economy. Despite, or perhaps because of, substantial 
territorial expansion and economic growth in Canada generally, the 
Atlantic region had still to complete a transition from the prosperous, 
sea-oriented local economy largely self-sufficient in terms of 
manufactures and food it was in the mid-nineteenth century, to an 
integral part of a new, larger economic system. In the absence of 
a "new dynamic" to support regional growth from within, the tendency 
for external developments consequent upon the opening of the Prairie 
frontier and the coming to maturity of the national economy, had 
mainly been adverse. Thus the task of adjustment and integration 
became progressively more formidable since the time of Confederation. 
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Any analysis of economic change must take into account the 
framework of public policy under which change occurs. This require- 
ment is no lees valid in the case of the Canadian Atlantic Provinces; 
indeed, a consideration of policy is crucial to a proper understanding 
of the region's present position. During the "Golden Age" the 
Maritimes economy had prospered within a system of triangular trade 
carried on under a system of British sponsorship and with British 
protection under the colonial preference system and the Navigation 
Laws. White pine was the resource basis for the region's prosperity, 
but that prosperity could not have been attained without the access 
to extra-regional markets which the policy framework permitted and 
facilitated. With the British abandonment of this system in 1850, 
the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 with the United States provided an 
effective substitute until its abrogation in 1866, enabling free 
entry for Maritime fish, lumber and coal into United States markets. 
Joining Confederation provided the Maritime Provinces with an opportunity 
to serve instead the larger Canadian market but events were to 
demonstrate that successful exploitation of this market was not assured. 
The emphasis of policy for the new nation was, of necessity, 
on national growth and development. The National Policy, as already 
noted, entailed generally adverse effects for the Maritime Provinces 
because of their peripheral location relative to an expanding 
continental territory, and because their resource base was competitive 
with, rather than complementary to, that of the region in which they 
entertained their greatest hopes for finding alternative markets. 
Special policies to redress these difficulties were directed 
mainly towards improving the transportation facilities available for 
moving goods to central Canadian markets. The Intercolonial Railway 
was built in the early years after Confederation and, in recognition 
of the circuitous route decided upon for security reasons, freight 
rates were set relatively low. 
9 Again, the Maritime Freight Rates 
9Howland, 
op. cit., p. 184. 
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Act of 1928, enacted to implement one of the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission on Maritime Claims. was designed to re-establish 
these special freight rate advantages. Certain tariffs were reduced 
on imported goods entering Canada over Canadian ports in an attempt 
to offset the erosion of advantages for Maritime ports which had 
resulted from the establishment of railway links between eastern U. S. 
ports and central Canada. In 1928 also, special subsidies on the 
movement of Maritime:. coal to central Canadian markets were introduced 
by the federal government. All these measures were essentially piece- 
meal, intended to overcome some particular difficulty which arose, 
as it were, partly as a consequence of the National Policy: they did 
not add up to a comprehensive development policy for the Maritime 
Provinces. Such stop-gap measures aside, the region was left to its 
own devices to contend with the powerful economic forces which, 
although not the result of Confederation itself, were not at all 
conducive to the successful integration of the Maritimes in the 
Canadian economy. In Hirschmanns terminology, the "polarization" 
effects of Canadian nation-building were pronounced and substantial 
while, in the Atlantic Provinces case, the "trickling down" effects 
were especially weak. 
In the mid-1950's the problems of the region were again subject 
matter for a federal inquiry. The Royal Commission on Canada's 
Economic Prospects, in addition to its public hearings within the 
region and elsewhere, sponsored Howland's comparative study of regional 
economic development which gave special consideration to the Atlantic 
region. The Final Report of the Commission also reviewed the prospects 
facing the Atlantic Provinces economy, and made a number of policy 
recommendations to the federal government. 
At this time, Canada's economic prospects were bright indeed. 
The Royal Commission's own report reflected the prevailing national 
optimism based upon a decade of vigorous, sustained expansion in 
the Canadian economy. Moreover, its forecast for the future Canadian 
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economy consisted largely in an apparently sensible extrapolation 
of past trends to 1981. The problems noted by the Commission largely 
involved problems associated with growth, rather than problems of 
generating it. Thus relieved of the need to consider serious national 
economic problems, the Commission was able to pay more attention to 
regional aspects: in this sense, the Gordon Commission came at a 
propitious time from the viewpoint of regional policy. Moreover, 
when a review of economic prospects by region revealed that only 
the Atlantic Provinces required special remedial measures to assure 
its greater participation in national growth, 
10 
the way was effectively 
cleared for the federal government's subsequent adoption of special 
regional development policies to be applicable only in this 
particular region. 
Recent Research into Regional Probleme 
Within the Atlantic region dissatisfaction with economic 
circumstances was undergoing an important change of emphasis at this 
time. With emerging recognition that the Atlantic region had not 
participated' very actively in the rapid postwar Canadian growth, 
there was a renewed interest in analyzing the region's difficulties more 
carefully. A number of studies of the regional economy were under- 
taken, which shed new light on the economic problems confronting the 
Atlantic Provinces. One example of this was Howland's attempt to 
account for the difference in per capita income in 1951 as between 
Ontario and the Atlantic region. At that time the difference of $615 
in personal income included a margin of $545 in "earned income", or 
about 89 per cent of the total gap. 
11 By standardizing the Atlantic 
region to the Ontario level for each factor considered, he concluded 
that the disparity could be accounted for, as follows: 
10See 
Howland, op. cit., Chapter 3. 
1-Howland, 
oQ. cit., p. 156. The "earned income" component of 
personal income includes wages and salaries; farm net income; net 
income of unincorporated business; military pay and allowances. 
Interest and dividends, and government transfer payments, are also 
included in total personal income. 
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Total disparity 545 100 
Proportion ascribed to differences in: 
1. The relative size of the labour force 158 29 
A. Due to different age distribution 
of the population 103 19 
B. Due to the lower participation of 
the working age population in the 
Atlantic Provinces 55 10 
2. The weeks worked per annum by paid worke rs 55 10 
3. The occupational or industrial pattern 65 12 
4. Rates of earnings 267 49 
(Source: Howland, op. cit., Table 50, p. 158) 
The factors cited are not independent; for example, the rates 
of earnings are influenced by the occupational or industrial pattern, 
areas with high-productivity industries having high wages and those 
with low-productivity industries having low wages. Similarly, regions 
with a predominance of seasonal activities are likely to exhibit a 
lower level of weeks worked. According to the argument offered in 
Chapters 2 and 3 above, these differences in per capita income reflected 
primarily a difference in factor equipment arising from the interregional 
localization of economic activity (which has favoured Ontario in the 
event), modified to some extent by the lack of complete mobility of 
the labour factor from the Atlantic Provinces to Ontario. 
If one region has a proportionally greater factor equipment 
than another and higher average income, it is apt, also, to display 
greater productivity per capita across the whole range of its output. 
This will be especially likely if the two regions are not closely 
interrelated in terms of, production and trade. It was not surprising, 
therefore, for Howland to find that, in 1953, net value of production 
per worker in the Atlantic Provinces was only 52.1 per cent of the 
Ontario level and that only in electric power was productivity greater 
than in Ontario. 12 
12Howland, 
op. cit., Table 60, p. 171. A significant proportion of Ontario's electricity needs is supplied from Quebec. 
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Although Howland concluded his analysis of the region's 
economic problems with some suggestions for policy, 
13 
the main 
value of his survey lay in its further specification of the income 
disparity between the Atlantic Provinces and Ontario. He did not 
offer either a general explanation of the cause of regional 
difficulties (except on an historical bass ), or any comprehensive 
proposals for overcoming them. Further study of the nature of the 
region's economic circumstances, particularly its relations with 
other regions (especially Ontario), would be necessary before tentative 
policy suggestions could be supplanted by definitive recommendations. 
It is significant that an improved capacity for such further study 
began to develop within the Atlantic Provinces about the same time 
the Gordon Commission was at work. 
The region's provincial governments were becoming more aware 
of the need to improve economic conditions within their borders. 
One means open to them which had assumed increasing importance 
during the Second World War and the postwar period, was the equalization 
grants made by the federal government under the federal-provincial 
tax rental arrangements. The purpose of these was largely to enable 
the low-income provinces to provide a standard of provincial services 
in fields of provincial responsibility such as education, health, 
social security, and highway construction, more or less comparable to 
the standard available to residents of the richer provinces. Another 
form of federal aid to the provinces consisted in various conditional 
grants to encourage the provinces to undertake programs in these and 
other fields. Both types of federal assistance involved an expansion 
of government expenditure in each province, and hence a rise in the 
level of provincial economic activity. If one result was to direct 
provincial resources into certain types of activity considered 
important by Ottawa for reasons of national health, unity or cohesion, 
another was to broaden the sphere of provincial government decision- 
making, at least financially. Eventually, the provincial governments 
13These influenced the recommendations advanced by the Gordon 
Commission in its Final Report. See below. 
242. 
came to recognize a greater need to tailor their fiscal operations 
to changing economic conditions, and later to provincial development 
priorities. At this time the main result of this increased 
recognition of developmental responsibilities on the part of 
provincial governments was to improve the climate within the region 
for informed analysis of regional problems. 
An important initiative in this respect was the establishment, 
in 1954, of the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (A. P. E. C. ). The 
Council combined a variety of activities to promote accelerated 
development of the regional economy with a program of continuing 
economic research designed to reveal more clearly the factors which 
influenced the region's economic position within the nation. 
Incorporated as a private organization financed mainly by membership 
contributions by firms and individuals, the Council enjoyed the moral 
backing of the four provincial governments. A. P. E. C. 's policy 
proposals, based largely on its research efforts, were to play a 
useful part in moulding a regional consensus and in persuading 
Ottawa, in particular, to alter its policy towards the Atlantic 
Provinces economy. 
The most important of the A. P. E. C. studies14 was that 
conducted by its Director of Research, A. C. Parks, "The Economy 
of the Atlantic Provinces, 1940-58" and published in 1960. It is 
primarily a survey of overall trends in gross output and employment 
on a sector by sector basis in each of the four provinces, between 
1940 and 1958. 
14Others 
included: F. E. Lounabury, The Food and Fish Processing 
Industries of the Atlantic Provinces, 1960. 
Financing Industrial Development in the Atlantic 
Provinces, 1960. 
, Secondary Manufacturing in the Atlantic Provinces, 1961. 
A. P. E. C., Area Development Policies in Western Europe and the 
United States, 1961. 
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Parks concluded that the underdeveloped nature of the 
regional economy is to be distinguished from the situation of the 
underdeveloped countries by the presence of a well-defined middle 
class, a well-organized money market from which capital is available 
to expanding sectors, stable industries, growing output and productivity, 
and other characteristics of a dynamic economy. There is a similarity, 
however, in the surplus of population on the land who have neither the 
resources to expand their output nor the opportunity to shift to other 
occupations. 
In terms of gross product per capita, the Atlantic Provinces 
had approximately held their position within the Canadian economy 
during the 1940 to 1958 period. Since 1940 on a per capita basis, 
gross provincial product had increased by 1957 by 45 per cent in 
Nova Scotia, 46 per cent in New Brunswick, and 49 per cent in Prince 
Edward Island. Over a somewhat shorter interval, from 1949 to 1957, 
Newfoundland's figure rose 21 per cent. 
15 
The strongest growth tendencies affected sectors, like pulp 
and paper and minerals, which are based on the region's natural 
resources. Location of such industries at or near the raw material 
source, and the region's proximity to markets in the United States and 
western Europe, were favourable factors for the region. on the other 
hand, only very modest growth took place in "other manufacturing". 
16 
It was this slow growth in manufacturing which largely prevented 
the movement of population from labour surplus sectors to the extent 
that this shift has occurred in other parts of Canada. 
15 Nevertheless, in 1958 the per capita GPP/GNP ratio was only 41.1% 
in Newfoundland, 47.9% in Prince Edward Island, 62.4% in Nova Scotia, 
53.2% in New Brunswick. 
16All 
manufacturing except mineral processing, pulp and paper, wood 
using and fish processing. These were linked with primary operations 
in the sectoral analysis in Parks' study. 
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Parks found little likelihood of any pronounced change in 
the labour absorptive capacity of regional manufacturing in future. 
This prognosis left the regional economy with three avenues of possible 
adjustment: 
(1) a continuation of present tendencies of rising output 
per capita, modest employment increases in minerals 
and pulp and paper, decreases in employment in 
fisheries and agriculture, perhaps no deterioration in 
the relative regional/national position or, given some 
deterioration, more pronounced net emigration; 
(2) a deliberate effort to increase mobility and thus 
facilitate the movement of surplus labour from subsistence 
areas, either interregionally or intraregionally; 
(3) the creation of employment opportunities within the 
region to absorb all or a substantial part of the surplus 
labour from subsistence sectors of the economy. This 
would require public policies to compensate for the 
serious locational disadvantages manufacturing industries 
would face in the Atlantic region. 
Another significant research development was the establishment 
of the Atlantic Provinces Research Board in 1958. The new agency, 
under the joint auspices of the four provincial governments and 
comprised of civil servants nominated by each province together with 
representatives of the Maritimes Transportation Commission and the 
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, was given the task of sponsoring 
studies at regional level of economic problems of common concern to 
the four provinces. 
In 1960 the new Board arranged for Professor A. K. Cairncross 
of the University of Glasgow to undertake a study of "the effects of 
monetary policy on the economy of the Atlantic Provinces, and to 
245. 
recommend methods by which it might be made flexible so as to meet 
the particular needs of these Provinces. " 
17 
The Atlantic Provinces had felt the effects of the 1956- 
1957 and 1959 "tight money" policies imposed by The Bank of Canada 
to restrain the inflationary growth of the Canadian economy. 
Regional interests were disturbed that there was no method of 
protecting the region, where unemployment rather than inflation 
was the pressing problem, from the full effects of this national 
policy. Accordingly the original purpose in requesting Professor 
Cairncross to examine the situation, was to determine the extent 
of influence the tight money policy had had in preventing economic 
growth and development in the region, and on the basis of his 
conclusions, to suggest what type of modifications might be made in 
monetary policy in order to protect the region from similar occurrences 
in future. Professor Cairncross found that a shortage of investment 
opportunities was a stronger deterrent to faster development than 
monetary restraint, and therefore devoted the second part of his 
report to a consideration of the role that development policy could 
play. His recommendations were to give a considerable and significant 
impetus to government economic policy at both the federal and 
provincial levels. 
Cairncross argued that there is no need to take a deterministic 
view of regional economic development. Rapid national growth is likely 
to be impossible without divergencies in regional growth rates, but 
there is nevertheless scope for helping the laggards. The grounds for 
federal government help with industrial development in such regions are, 
first, the probability of a labour surplus after allowing for migration 
elsewhere; and second, "the probability that, for a limited range of 
industries, costs of production would not rise perceptibly (except 
17A. 
K. Cairncroee, Economic Development and the Atlantic Provinces, 
Atlantic Provinces Research Board, Fredericton, February 1961, p. 1. 
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perhaps in the first year or two) if a location in the Atlantic 
Provinces were selected in preference to a location in central 
Canada. " 18 The criterion for federal aid with such a program should 
not be disparity in income levels or in rates of growth but rather 
the waste of man-power and the loss of production resulting from 
local unemployment. 
19 
After documenting various aspects of the economic position 
of the region relative to Canada generally, Cairacross concluded: 
"The main lag in development is precisely in the labour 
market. There are fewer employment opportunities. fewer 
opportunities of steady, fulltime employment, and above all, 
fewer opportunities of employment in those pursuits where 
labour productivity is relatively high. For lack of 
alternative employment, a large proportion of the labour 
force remains in the subsistence sector with a low 
average cash income; a further proportion, capable of 
taking paid employment, is unable to find it. The same 
forces lie behind the low level of output and income and 
the correspondingly low level of private investment; man- 
power is not fully used or is used in occupations where 
productivity and earnings are below the national average. 
Not that the explanation lies entirely on the side of 
demand; the mere existence of a chronic labour surplus is 
usually sufficient to generate obstacles to development 
in the habits and outlook of the population. The pace of 
work becomes slowed down where unemployment is a frequent 
recurrence: why hurry towards idleness or work under 
pressure when others could lend a hand? Ambition is curbed, 
the response to economic incentives is blunted, mobility 
is reduced and hopes of a higher standard of living are 
stifled. Thus even the opportunities that plainly exist 
may be neglected and the failure of the community may be 
attributed to apathy, laziness or lack of enterprise. It 
is only when a sustained demand for labour begins to 
transform the situation and the difficulties on the side 
of supply gradually melt away that. the superficiality of 
any diagnosis of this kind becomes fully apparent. i2v 
18lbid., 
p. 19, para 90. 
191bid., 
p. 19, pare 90. 
20Ibid., p. 22, para 98. 
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The Cairncross Report was published early in 1961. Its value 
lay mainly in his emphasis on the possibilities of regional development, 
a marked change from the more forlorn conclusions about future prospects 
contained in many of the earlier studies of the region's economic 
difficulties. The report had a strong influence on the attitudes 
of provincial governments towards the region's economic development, 
and was used by them in advocating changes in federal policy. The 
report had focused attention, as noted above, on the need for 
development policy in the broad regional sense, rather than particular 
measures to deal with problems in particular industries. The 
pressure for policy reform mounted within the region at this time, 
and was successful in bringing about certain changes in regional 
development policy at the federal level. 
The role of federal policy will be discussed generally in 
Chapter 11, and that of the Provinces in Chapter 12. In Chapter 13, 
a detailed analysis is made of the role played by the Atlantic Develop- 
ment Board, a federal agency established specifically to foster the 
economic growth and'development of the Atlantic Region. First, 
however, it is necessary, to consider more carefully the present 
structure-and interregional relations of the regional economy -a 
task taken up in the next Chapter. 
CHAPTER 10 
THE STRUCTURE AND INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS OF 
THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES ECONOMY 
The lagging relationship of the Atlantic Provinces economy 
to the national economy has already been noted. Of more importance 
in understanding the workings of the regional economy is some 
knowledge of the region's economic structure, and of its relations 
with other regions and other countries. By these means it may also 
be possible to discover which forces and factors are significant 
determinants of change in the region's economic status. 
There are several possible ways of examining the structure 
of an economy. Perhaps the best detailed means is to conduct inter- 
industry flow studies, or input-output analysis, and thus discover 
the intersectoral relationships which exist. Such an approach 
requires a large volume of statistical data which is not at present 
available in published form, and is in any case beyond the scope 
of the present study. 
Less exact impressions of structure can be gained by examining 
production and employment data for the various sectors of a regional 
economy. Gross Provincial Product estimates were used by Parks in 
his historical study of the Atlantic Provinces' economy, 
1 but these 
involved imputing provincial shares of gross national product on the 
basis of formulae for each component. Unfortunately, they do not 
provide accurate measures of intraregional sector relationships at 
any one time. They are useful in measuring longer-term trends in the 
various sectors, the purpose for which they were constructed by Parks. 
A. C. Parka, The Economy of Canada's Atlantic Provinces, 1940-1958, 
prepared by Atlantic Provinces Economic Council for the Atlantic 
Provinces Research Board, Halifax and Fredericton, 1960. 
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The purpose of examining structural relations for this 
study is simply to determine which particular sectors are important 
in the Atlantic Provinces. Such an indication of relative importance 
may suggest which particular types of economic activity have 
prospered and grown in the past, which have not, and may give some 
lead as to why some activities have expanded while others have not. 
At any rate, the kind of glimpse at the region's economic structure 
required at this relatively simple level, can be had by examining 
data on output by sector and employment by sector. 
Output can be measured on the basis of gross value or net 
value. Gross value of production represents the total value of 
production when it leaves the industry, or sector, to which the data 
apply. It includes, in addition to the "value added" in the 
particular sector involved, the cost of materials and other inputs 
purchased by that sector from other sectors. For this reason gross 
value is not an accurate measure of the economic activity actually 
occurring in the particular sector. A manufacturing plant, for 
example, might purchase $10 million of components and produce output 
valued at $12 million. The "gross value of production" of $12 
million would overstate activity in the plant by six times. A better 
indication of activity in this case would be the "net value of 
production" of $2 million. For this reason net value of production 
data will be used here. 
Net value of production is obtained by "... deduction from 
gross value of production, exclusive of excise and manufacturers' 
sales taxes, the cost of purchased materials, fuel and electricity. "2 
Data are compiled annually by industry by province. From these, 
figures for the "value added" in the commodity-producing industries 
of the four provinces which comprise the Atlantic region can be 
computed. Data of this kind for Canada and the Atlantic Provinces 
in 1951 and 1961 are contained in Table 12. 
ZD. 
B. S., Survey of Production. 
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Net Value of Commodity-Producing Industries, 
Atlantic Provinces and Canada, 1951 & 1961 
Table 12 
1951 
Agriculture 
Forestry 
Fisheries 
Trapping 
Mining 
Electric Power 
Manufactures 
Construction 
Atlantic Provinces 
million % of total 
81.3 10.7 
99.7 13.2 
44.7 5.9 
0.3 0.0 
79.6 10.5 
23.9 3.2 
298.8 39.5 
128.8 17.0 
Canada 
million X of total 
2,480.5 18.8 
660.4 5.0 
102.0 0.8 
19.8 0.2 
770.1 5.8 
363.6 2.8 
6,940.9 52.7 
1,831.9 13.9 
TOTALS 
Agriculture 
Forestry 
Fisheries 
Trapping 
Mining 
Electric Power 
Manufactures 
Construction 
TOTALS 
1 
Excludes Newfoundland 
757.2 100.0 13,169.4 100.0 
1961 
64.9 6.2 
67.4 6.4 
54.9 5.3 
0.4 0.0 
107.0 10.2 
59.0 5.6 
395.1 37.8 
295.8 28.3 
1,715.5 8.9 
666.4 3.4 
110.2 0.6 
11.7 0.1 
1,562.0 8.1 
840.4 4.3 
10,690.1 55.4 
3,700.9 19.2 
1,044.6 100.0 19,297.1 100.0 
SOURCE: Computed from D. B. S.. Survey of Production, 61-202. 
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Canada has long been considered primarily a producer of raw 
materials and it is in resource industries that she has had her 
greatest success as an exporting nation. Yet it is apparent from Table 12 
that the Atlantic Provinces are even more heavily dependent upon 
primary industries. In 1951 agriculture. forestry, fisheries and mining 
together accounted for 40.3 per cent of the net value of commodity 
production In the region, compared to 30.6 per cent of these primary 
industries (including trapping) in Canada as a whole. By 1961 the 
national percentage had fallen to 21.1 per cent; the share of primary 
activities in regional production had also fallen, but was still 
markedly higher at 28.1 per cent. 
Construction activity also accounts for a larger share of 
total activity, on a "value added" basis, in the Atlantic region 
than in the nation. It represented 17.0 per cent as against 13.9 
per cent in 1951; by 1961 both percentages were higher still, but 
construction's 28.3 per cent of total goods production in the region 
was almost half as much again as its 19.2 per cent in Canada generally. 
Electric powers share was not significantly different as 
between the region and the country. 
The greater strength of the construction and resource-based 
industries in the Atlantic Provinces is, however, more apparent 
than real. The above figures reflect not so much greater regional 
development in primary activities as underdevelopment in regional 
manufacturing. In Canada manufactures accounted for 52.7 per cent 
of the total net value of commodity production in 1951, -a figure 
which rose to 55.4 per cent a decade later. In 1951 manufacturing 
in the Atlantic Provinces represented only 39.5 per cent of total 
goods production, and this percentage fell somewhat by 1961 to 37.8 
per cent. This was because, although the value of manufacturing 
production in the Atlantic region increased by 32.2 per cent between 
1951 and 1961, this rate of increase was not only considerably lower 
than the Canadian rate of manufacturing expansion of 54.0 per cent 
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over the same period, but also less than the 38.0 per cent rate of 
increase in total goods production within the region. 
Thus we gain an impression of the Atlantic Provinces as an 
economy whose dependence upon primary or resource-based industries 
is relatively greater than Canada generally, where manufacturing 
seems not to have assumed the same degree of importance because it 
has not developed to the same extent, and in which construction 
output recently accounted for almost one-quarter of total goods 
production measured on a "value added" basis. 
The data we have used cover only part of the productive 
process carried on in the Atlantic Provinces since they are restricted 
to commodity-producing industries. They thus omit any reference to 
the service industries, which have come recently to be recognized as 
important sources of employment and income not only in the Atlantic 
Provinces but elsewhere. These industries are also important sources 
of output despite the difficulties to be encountered in any attempt 
to measure the-value of the intangible production they supply. 
Parks, in his study, used estimates of total regional employment from 
the DBS Labour Force Survey to calculate the numbers employed in 
service industries as a group, but the lack of more detailed data 
prevented him from carrying out further analysis of a set of economic 
activities which accounted, on his reckoning, for over 51 per cent 
of total regional employment in 1957.3 
The general shortage of data on the service industries has 
inevitably led economists to focus their analysis on the sectors 
which produce tangible goods. To take one example, Professor 
Cairncross's conclusions regarding future employment prospects were 
framed in a model encompassing the primary industries as basic to 
the regional economy: "it is the natural resources of the area, 
the land, the trees, the mineral ores, the fish, and so on, that are 
3Parks, 
op. cit. 
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the basis of the economy as it now exists, " supported to some extent 
by manufacturing industries which are "not so numerous nor so large 
as to turn the area ipso facto into a manufacturing centre. "4 Within 
this framework the service industries were seen as "a shadow cast by 
other productive pursuits rather than endowed with a vitality of 
their own that would outlast the disappearance of primary occupations. "5 
Professor Cairncross did note certain important exceptions 
to his general proposition that the resource-based industries were 
basic to the Atlantic Provinces, namely, tourism and defence services. 
But he chose not to develop the significance which these particular 
service industries may have for the regional economyo any further. 
An examination of these, and perhaps other, service industries to 
determine whether any of them are in any sense as "basic" to the 
regional economy as the resource-based industries will be one of the 
purposes of the analysis which follows. 
Employment by Sector 
Another means of assessing the structure of an economy is 
by examining the industrial distribution of total employment. The 
difficulty in doing so is frequently a scarcity of data suitable for 
the purpose. The Labour Force Survey, which is the basis for the 
officially recognized monthly estimates of employment and unemployment 
in Canada, unfortunately, does not yield a break-down of total 
employment by industry except at the national level and, therefore, 
cannot be used in examining the structure of the regional economy of 
the Atlantic Provinces. 
4Cairncrosa, A. K., 2. cit., p. 24. 
5Ibid. 
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Of much greater promise in this connection are the more 
detailed data on labour force collected as part of the decennial 
Census of Canada. Data on Census labour force from the 1961 Census 
are contained in Table 14. The main difference between these data 
and those on net value of production analyzed above is that they provide 
a complete coverage of all types of economic activity, including the 
various service industries. They thus provide a basis for examining 
the whole structure of the Atlantic Provinces' economy, of comparing 
it with the national economy, in terms of the single, but important, 
variable of the number of persons engaged in each type of activity. 
An attempt will be made here in the course of analyzing these 
data to ascertain which are key sectors of the regional economy, 
without necessarily adhering to the proposition that employment in 
service activities is dependent upon employment in the production of 
goods. By the same token, neither the proposition that the regional 
economy is necessarily dependent upon its resource industries as the 
key to future development, nor the argument that manufacturing must 
play an increasingly important role if output, employment and 
income are to be raised, will be taken for granted. Instead the 
purpose will simply be to see which types of economic activity are 
important to the regional economy at present and which have grown 
most substantially in the recent past, in the hope that these 
observations will provide some indication as to which are likely to 
be important in future. 
There are of course some limitations to these data which 
should be borne in mind. For one thing they refer to labour force, 
which includes both employment and unemployment, and their use as a 
proxy for employment implicitly assumes that unemployment is spread 
evenly across all types of economic activity within the region and 
also within the Canadian economy with which it is being compared. 
Secondly, Census data refer to a particular point in time 
and provide a snapshot of a situation which may change rapidly, and 
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which may not be representative of the situation which usually 
prevailed even during the Census year. One must assume that such 
risks are more or less equal from one Census year to another when 
the comparison is drawn between 1951 and 1961, for example, as is 
done in Table 13, and also from one area or geographic unit to another 
when the comparison is made at the same point in time, even although 
this assumption is seriously open to question. In spite of these 
limitations, it seems reasonable to expect that such comparisons will 
provide a reasonable indication of broad trends and tendencies. 
The labour force of the Atlantic Provinces in 1961 consisted 
of 561,632 persons. As Table 13 indicates, over 60 percent of these 
were engaged in service producing industries, or over half as much 
again as were engaged in commodity production. Moreover the 
percentage in service producing industries was even greater than was 
the case in Canada as a whole. Thus, at least in terms of the labour 
force attached to them, the service producing industries as a group 
were rather more important than the commodity producing industries, 
and accounted for a larger proportion of the total regional labour 
force than of the national labour force. 
Within the goods producing sector the labour force attached 
to the resource-based industries accounted for a larger share 
(16.9 per cent) of the regional total than in Canada generally 
(14.0 per cent). On the other hand, only 13.9 per cent of the 
regional labour force was in manufacturing, compared to 21.7 per cent 
for the whole country. The share of construction in the total was 
broadly equal as between the region and the nation. 
Within the services producing sector, there were three branches 
occupying a relatively more important position in the region than in 
the country at large. Of these, public administration and defence 
was the most notable with 12.4 per cent of the regional labour force 
compared to 7.5 per cent nationally. Transportation, communication 
and other utilities also accounted for a larger share (11.5 per cent) 
256. 
Table 13 
Census Labour Force, Commodity-Producing and 
Service-Producing Industries, Canada and Atlantic Provinces, 
1961 
Commodity-producing 
industries 
Canada 
Number % of total 
2,743,289 42.4 
Atlantic Provinces 
Number % of total 
210,794 37.5 
Service-producing 
industries 3,569.968 55.2 
Industry unspecified 158.593 2.4 
- undefined i 
TOTALS 6.471.850 100.0 
338,643 60.5 
12,195 2.0 
561,632 100.0 
SOURCE: Census of Canada. 
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of the regional than of the national total (9.3 per cent); the 
marginally higher share of the regional labour force attached to 
retail and wholesale trade is probably not significant. In the 
region, community, business and professional services accounted for 
a slightly smaller proportion (18.3 per cent) of the total labour force 
than in Canada generally (19.5 per cent). In the less significant 
finance, insurance and real estate branch there was a relatively greater 
shortfall between the region's 2.1 per cent and the nation's 3.5 
per cent. 
The use of location quotients, as set out in column 6 of 
Table 14, enables this sort of analysis to be carried a stage 
further. This technique has been developed within the framework 
of the so-called "economic base" study. The "economic base" is 
usually defined as that part of a local economy which produces 
goods and services for sale to individuals, firms or public bodies 
located outside the local economy. The industries which "export" 
their output, or part of their output, are considered basic to the 
local economy because they are the main determinants of population 
and income growth in the area. The amount of income which they 
earn from outside sources determines the size of the local market 
for goods and services produced by the area's non-basic industries, that 
is, those which do not "export" any proportion of their output. This 
second group of industries, which supply only local needs, are 
sometimes called "residentiary industries". 
The location quotient is the ratio of the percentage of the 
labour force engaged in a given industry in the Atlantic Provinces 
to the percentage of the labour force engaged in the same industry 
in the nation as a whole. A location quotient greater than unity for 
a particular industry is taken to mean that the regional industry is 
a net exporter of its output. If the location quotient is unity the 
industry is considered self-sufficient, while a quotient of less 
than unity means this industry's output is not sufficient to meet 
regional demand and additional quantities of the good or service 
it produces must be "imported" into the region. 
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From the location quotient, an "export quotient" is derived 
as a basis for classifying the region's industry into basic 
industries and non-basic, or residentiary, industries. For example, 
if the location quotient of a particular industry were five, the 
export quotient would be calculated as follows: 
551.5" 
. 80 - 80% 
This would be taken to mean that 80 percent of those employed in 
this industry could be said to work for the region's "export" 
market. A location quotient greater than one means the industry 
is an export (or basic) industry, while the export quotient 
indicates the proportion of that industry engaged in "exporting". 
From Table 14 it can be seen that the primary sectors of 
forestry, fishing and mining all had location quotients greater than 
unity in 1961 and were thus sources of "export" earnings for the 
Atlantic Region economy. The proportion of workers engaged in 
production for the export market, as reflected in the export quotient, 
was highest in fishing at 85 per cent. In forestry, 57 per cent of 
workers apparently produced for the export market while in mining 
the proportion was 34 per cent. 
Agriculture, with a location quotient of 0.64, was the only 
primary sector which was not a net exporter of its output. 
The location quotient for all manufacturing industries as 
a group was also well below unity. In fact, there were only three 
of the total of twenty individual manufacturing industries listed, 
which had quotients greater than unity. These were food and beverages 
(1.38). wood products (1.19), and paper and allied products (1.24). 
The remainder all followed the general pattern of being residentiary 
demand-serving industries. 
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The size of the regional construction sector, with a location 
quotient of 1.02, was apparently just adequate to meet the demands 
placed upon it within the region. It was thus neither an exporting 
nor an importing industry on this basis. This is, of course, what 
one might expect since construction demand is usually met mainly 
through the use of local (labour) resources. 
6 
A location quotient of 1.23 for the transportation, 
communication and other utilities sector is probably a reflection 
mainly of relatively greater distances within the regional economy, 
rather than an indication that the transportation industry exports 
part of its output. The Atlantic Provinces are characterized by the 
difficult transportation problems inherent in a lengthy coastline, 
scattered population, and two island provinces - problems which 
require the allocation of relatively greater manpower and other 
resources for their solution. A certain proportion of the costs 
thereby incurred have been met through the payment of subsidies or 
transport subventions of one kind or another by the federal government 
and in that sense, the sector has been an "earner" of export receipts 
for the regional economy to a limited extent! 
Among the other services sectors of the regional economy, 
Trade; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; and Community, Business 
and Personal Services had location quotients that virtually equalled 
unity or fell below it. Within these sectors, a few industries' 
location quotients exceeded unity, however; including wholesale trade; 
education; health and welfare services; and religious organizations. 
Of these, the most significant are probably education and health and 
welfare services. For reasons which are discussed further below, 
each of these may be an important source not only of "export 
earnings", but also of growth in the regional economy. 
6The 
construction industry probably relies on external sources for 
some of the equipment it uses and for part of the plant and machinery 
it puts in place, but these capital requirements are not reflected 
in the concept of the location quotient, which is based upon labour 
input only. 
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Public administration and defence is a key sector for this 
regional economy. Here the location quotient for the entire sector 
was 1.66, indicating that almost 40 per cent of those engaged in 
such employment were producing for the export market. This is 
especially the case with Federal Administration, where the location 
quotient of 2.14 implied that over 53 per cent so employed were 
satisfying demand external to the Atlantic Region. There is a 
certain logic to this conclusion, since in 1961 approximately 
two-thirds of the Canadian Navy was located in Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
and the Canadian Army a few years earlier had established a large new 
training base at Camp Gagetown in New Brunswick. Thus the Atlantic 
Region found itself "exporting" defence services, as well as 89 
per cent of the products of "Other Government offices". to markets 
in other regions of the Canadian economy. The region was a net 
supplier of such defence services to the rest of Canada. 
In 1961, then, the key sectors of the Atlantic Provinces' 
economy consisted of Forestry, Fishing, Mining, and Public 
Administration and Defence. On these sectors the regional economy 
was therefore based, with the level of activity in other sectors 
being dependent on the level of activity in these four basic 
sectors. In a balance of payments sense, these four sectors probably 
would have contributed a net surplus which offset, or helped to 
offset, the deficit attributable to other, non-basic sectors. Such 
net export earnings in these sectors made it possible for the region 
to import manufactured goods (especially) and the products of other 
sectors in which the region was not self-sufficient. These four 
sectors were probably not enough by themselves to offset the total 
"deficit" attributable to other sectors as the region also benefited 
over this period from a net inflow of government transfer payments, 
tax "equalization" payments, and cost-sharing grants from the federal 
government to the four provincial governments. Nevertheless, each 
represents a key sector for the Atlantic Provinces -a sector whose 
future development seems likely to have important repercussive effects 
throughout this regional economy. 
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Recent Growth in the Atlantic Provinces 
The use of location quotients provides a picture of the 
Atlantic Provinces economy which is essentially static. It is 
also necessary to consider the forces promoting change in the 
recent past as a further means of determining what makes this 
regional economy tick - to discover, if possible, what sources of 
dynamism and growth have operated and are likely to operate in future. 
For this purpose Table 15 has been constructed to show the changes 
in Census labour force which have occurred between 1951 and 1961 in 
various sectors of the regional economy, and in Canada generally. 
This is the same classification of sectors as was used above for 
the location quotient analysis to determine which are the region's 
basic sectors. Analysis of these data should reveal which sectors, and 
which industries, have experienced the most rapid growth - in terms 
of labour force - during the 1950's in the Atlantic Provinces. 
Comparable data for Canada are included to provide a standard of 
comparison for the rates of change experienced in the Atlantic region 
during this period. 
Table 15 reveals that the Atlantic Provinces labour force 
increased from 529,808 persons in 1951 to 561,632 persons in 1961 - 
an increase of 31,824 or 6.0 per cent. This rate of overall increase 
was considerably slower than the 22.4 per cent experienced in Canada 
as a whole during the same period. 
"Basic" Sectors 
Of the four "basic sectors identified above, only Public 
Administration and Defence demonstrated any capacity for employment 
expansion over this period. The labour force in this key sector rose 
by 27,839 persons or 66.3 per cent over this period, or by almost 
enough to account for the total increase in the regional labour force. 
Within the sector, the largest increase was in defence services, where 
a doubling of the labour force so engaged resulted in an addition to 
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the regional labour force of 20.760 persons. As already noted, this 
growth would have resulted mainly from the political decision to 
concentrate additional defence personnel in the Atlantic Provinces, 
especially in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. 
The other three key sectors all experienced substantial 
labour force declines over this period, as follows: 
Change 
Number Per Cent 
Forestry -10,948 -33.4 
Fishing -12,650 -36.9 
Mining - 4,402 -21.5 
TOTAL, these sectors -28,000 -32.2 
These decreases were largely the result of secular decline in coal 
mining, and a process of rationalization within Forestry and Fishing, 
and were probably accompanied by increasing per capita income and 
output for those remaining in the sectors. Yet the fact remains that 
these key sectors were definitely not sources of additional employment 
over the decade of the 1950's. Yet they remained key sectors in the 
location quotient sense, continuing to serve as earners of export 
revenues for the regional economy in 1961. Indeed, it can be argued 
that if they had not continued to release labour by becoming more 
efficient and more productive during this period, they could not have 
remained as effective as earners of export income. for the region. 
There is thus a need to distinguish between these three key sectors of 
Forestry, Fishing and Mining, and the fourth, Public Administration 
and Defence. The three resource sectors are important sources of 
external earnings for the regional economy, and are therefore 
important to the region's balance of payments. But none has been a 
source of recent growth in labour force (employment), although they 
have probably contributed increasing income to the regional economy. 
Public Administration and Defence, on the other hand, is not only a 
key sector which serves as part of the region's economic base; but it 
also has been a source of labour force (employment) growth in the recent 
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past. Whether it continues to do so will continue to depend on the 
results of the decision-making process in the political sphere, 
rather than on any internal economic forces or events. It is clearly 
a sector whose future fortunes are directly linked with public policy 
decisions. 
When the labour force changes for all four basic sectors 
(as of 1961) are taken together, the effect is a net change between 
1951 and 1961 of virtually nil - with the decline of 28,000 in 
Forestry, Fishing and Mining off-setting the growth of 27,839 in 
Public Administration and Defence. There is thus still a need to 
account for the overall increase, already noted, of 31,824 in the 
regional labour force over the decade of the 19501x. To do so we 
must proceed to an examination of the labour force changes which 
occurred in the regions "non-basic" sectors. 
"Non-basic" Sectors 
It is important to emphasize that a "non-basic" sector, by 
our definition, is one in which the percentage of the regional labour 
force is less than the corresponding percentage the same industry 
represents in the national economy. The notion behind this concept 
is that in sectors where this ratio is less than unity. the region 
is required to "import" part of its demand from other regions of the 
national economy, or from abroad. Those engaged in such "non-basic" 
sectors are able, however, to supply part of the region's demand; 
they are thus residentiary demand-serving industries. In the 
Atlantic Provinces, as elsewhere, such "non-basic" sectors may be 
commodity-producing industries or service-producing industries. 
The "non-basic" commodity-producing sectors in the Atlantic 
Provinces were Agriculture, Manufacturing and Construction. 
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Between 1951 and 1961 Agriculture experienced a substantial 
decline of 31,153-persons in its labour force, from 66,509 to 35,356. 
This represented a decrease of 47 per cent, a rate more than twice 
as rapid as the 22 per cent decline experienced nationally. As with 
Fishing and Forestry, this decline was the result of continuing 
rationalization of the region's farming activity, accompanied by a 
trend toward larger individual units and greater mechanization. In 
this way per capita output and income probably increased for those 
remaining in the sector. Nevertheless the sector clearly failed 
to support any additional employment and was thus not a force for 
growth in the regional economy. 
The Census labour force attached to Manufacturing also declined 
during the 1950's, by 3,305 persons. The change represented a 
decrease of 6 per cent, whereas the labour force in Manufacturing 
in Canada as a whole increased by 8 per cent. Within the sector the 
largest absolute changes took place in food and beverages, which 
increased by 4,608 persons; in textiles, which declined by 1,796 
persons; and in wood industries, which declined by 6,325 persons. 
The most severe decline, in relative terms, occurred in clothing 
industries which decreased by 54 per cent (928 persons). On the 
other hand, there were also some instances of rapid relative growth, 
notably chemicals and chemical products, which increased by 79 per cent 
(581 persons); knitting mills, 55 per cent (368 persons); petroleum 
and coal products, 54 per cent (375 persons); printing, publishing 
and allied industries, 32 per cent (865 persons); and non-metallic 
mineral products. 21 per cent (377 persons). 
Unlike Agriculture and Manufacturing, Construction was a 
strong growth sector during the 19501,. Its labour force increased 
by 8,237 persons or 27.5 per cent. Of this total increase, 5,467 
was in building construction and the remaining 2,770 in highway 
construction. Although this was a remarkable rate of growth compared 
to other sectors of the regional economy, it should be noted that it 
was slower than the 35 per cent rate of expansion in Construction's 
labour force attained in Canada as a whole. 
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These changes in the "non-basic", commodity-producing 
sectors of the Atlantic Provinces economy may be summarized as 
follows: 
Chance 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Total, these sectors 
Number Percent 
-31,153 -46.8 
- 3,305 - 4.1 
+ 8,237 +27.5 
+26,221 -14.7 
The "non-basic", service-producing sectors of the Atlantic 
Provinces economy were Transportation, Communication and other 
Utilities; Trade; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; and Community, 
Business and Personal Service Industries. The Census labour force 
increased in all four of these sectors between 1951 and 1961. 
In Transportation, Communication and Other Utilities the 
increase was 5,557 persons -a rate of 9.4 per cent. This rate 
of growth was slower than the 20.6 achieved in Canada as a whole; 
similarly, for each branch of the sector the regional growth was 
slower than the national rate. The biggest absolute increases within 
the regional sector were in communication, 3,948 persons; and in 
electric power, gas and water utilities, 1,221 persons. 
The labour force engaged in Trade in the region increased by 
16,071 persona or almost 22 per cent - again a lower rate than the 
33 per cent attained at. the national level. Retail Trade accounted 
for 12,569 of this total gain, while the labour force in Wholesale 
Trade increased by 3,502 persons. 
The rate of growth in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, 
at 59 per cent, was much the same as between the Atlantic Provinces 
and Canada generally. For the region it meant an increase to the 
labour force in this sector of 4,249 persons. 
272. 
Community, Business and Personal Service Industries also 
experienced slower labour force growth in the region than in the nation 
as a whole, 38 per cent compared to 59 per cent. This resulted in an 
absolute increase of 28,542 persons for the regional sector. The 
main contributors to this gain were education and related services 
(9,392 persons); health services (10,658); and personal services 
(4,514). It is noteworthy that the supply of both education and 
health services is dependent in one way or another upon provincial 
government financing. The schools system is operated, directly or 
indirectly, by provincial governments, while provision of the capital 
facilities required to provide health care is also increasingly a 
provincial government responsibility. With higher federal- 
provincial shared-cost programs in the health field especially, and 
increasing tax equalization payments from the federal government, 
the provincial governments of the Atlantic Region were thereby enabled 
to provide more and better services in both fields during the 1950's. 
In a sense, therefore, the expansion of these two service-producing 
industries in the region was promoted and assisted by an increasing 
flow of financial resources from Ottawa to the four provincial 
capitals. Such financial transfers, of course, represent a positive 
contribution to the interregional balance of payments. It will be 
recalled that, on our definition, both education and health were 
also "basic" industries of the regional economy in 1961. Now we 
see that each also represented during the 1950's a mechanism for the 
transmission of growth in employment from external sources to the 
regional economy. 
The overall changes in the Atlantic Provinces "non-basic", 
service-producing sectors may now be summarized. 
Transportation, Communication & 
Other Utilities 
Trade 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
Community, Business & Personal 
Services 
Change 
Number *Per Cent 
+ 5,557 + 9.4 
+16,071 +21.8 
+ 4,249 +58.5 
+28,542 +38.4 
+54,419 +25.4 
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We may now draw together a summary of the labour force 
changes which occurred in the Atlantic Provinces economy between 
1951 and 1961. For this purpose the classifications we have adopted 
in this chapter of "basic" and "non-basic" sectors, and commodity- 
producing and service-producing sectors, will be used. The summary 
consists of Tableý16. 
The table suggests some real structural weaknesses in 
the Atlantic Provinces economy. As far as employment is concerned, 
the "basic" sectors have not been growing although they probably 
have contributed increasing income during the 1950's decade. 
Secondly, the employment growth which occurred in one of them, 
Public Administration and Defence, would have been the direct result 
of a federal government decision to concentrate additional defence 
facilities and personnel in the Atlantic region. This can hardly 
be interpreted as evidence of any growth trend in this key sector. ' 
Thirdly, while there was employment growth in the "non-basic" 
sectors which was probably the result of additional income being 
available for spending within the region, it is perhaps significant 
that this expansion occurred in service-producing activities and did 
not result from growth of the commodity-producing industries. The 
impression suggested is of a region which increasingly relies on 
"taking in each other's washing" to provide much of its economic 
activity. The decline in employment in the "non-basic". commodity- 
producing sectors underlines this point - suggesting that few, if any, 
of such industries were developing to the point where they could 
even begin to export part of their output to other regions. 
Fourthly, of the "non-basic", service-producing industries 
which did experience employment, in two cases - education and health - 
the growth was made possible by demand-supporting financial transfers 
of one kind or another to the region by other regions through the 
federal government. Indeed, these two industries had grown 
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Table 16 
Changes in Census Labour Force, Atlantic Provinces, 
1951 to 1961 
"Basic", Service-Producing 
(Public Administration & Defence) 
"Basic", Commodity-Producing 
"Basic" Sectors 
"Non-basic", Commodity-Producing 
"Non-basic", service-producing 
"Non-Basic" Sectors 
Industry unspecified or undefined 
(balancing factor) 
TOTAL 
Change 
Number Per Cent 
+27,839 +66.3 
-28,000 -32.2 
- 161 - 
-26,221 -14.7 
+54,419 +25.4 
+28,198 - 
+ 3,787 
Z+31 824 +0 
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sufficiently by 1961 perhaps to warrant reclassification to the 
"basic" category of industries. Like public administration and 
defence, however, their future growth will depend more on decision- 
making in the public policy sphere than upon any "market" forces or 
factors affecting the regional economy itself. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The Atlantic Provinces, a lagging economic region in Canada 
with a population of approximately two million persons, has 
development problems which are of long standing. The region's per 
capita income has remained at two-thirds of the national level since 
1926 when these data were first recorded. Economic activity within 
the region is oriented toward the resource-based sectors of fishing, 
forestry and farming, but many such operations are of the subsistence 
variety. The region may be characterized as underdeveloped, and in 
particular does not possess a modern manufacturing sector. 
The purpose of this Chapter has been twofold, namely, to 
examine the structure of this regional economy in an effort to 
determine the key, or "pasic", sectors at the present time; and to 
discover which sectors have exhibited the strongest growth tendencies 
in the recent past. In these ways it was hoped that a method would 
be found for deducing a model of this regional economy which would 
be broadly valid. If possible, such a model should also provide some 
indication of the interregional relations of the Atlantic Provinces 
economy, which would enable its adaptation to analysis by the criteria 
which are implicit in the theoretical findings of Part I. 
Structural relations were examined indirectly with the aid 
of two kinds of data: the net value of commodity-producing industries 
in the regional and Canadian economies for 1951 and 1961, and Census 
labour force in all sectors for both economies in the same years. The 
net value data confirmed the region's dependence on resource-based 
activities and the relatively underdeveloped state of its manufacturing 
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sector. But the limitation of these data is that they do not 
extend to the region's service industries. This limitation does not 
apply to the Census labour force data next analyzed, which revealed 
that over 60 per cent of the region's labour force were engaged in 
service-producing industries in 1961. 
With the aid of "location quotients" calculated for each 
sector and industry from the comparative Census labour force data 
for the Atlantic Provinces and Canada, four sectors were identified 
as "basic" to the regional economy. These were Forestry, Fishing, 
Mining. and Public Administration and Defence. Such "basic" sectors 
are those which employ a greater proportion of the regional labour 
force than of the total Canadian labour force and are therefore 
considered to "export" part of their output to markets outside the 
regional economy. They are considered as forming the "economic 
base" of the Atlantic Provinces, and each is thus a key sector as 
far as growth and development are concerned. 
Recent growth in the regional economy was examined through 
further analysis of the same Census labour force data for 1951 as 
well as for 1961. The "basic" and '. 'non-basic" sectors were treated 
separately for this purpose. 
Of the four "basic" sectors, only Public Administration 
and Defence demonstrated any capacity for employment expansion 
during the 1950's. This was largely the result of public policy 
decisions to concentrate more Navy personnel in Nova Scotia and to 
establish a large, new Army training base in New Brunswick. The 
labour force attached to the other three sectors declined considerably, 
in Mining as a result of several coal mine closures and in Fishing 
and Forestry due to a continuing process of mechanization and 
rationalization in these sectors. The result of these divergent trends 
among the four "basic" sectors was virtually no change in their total 
labour force. Thus the "economic base" of the regional economy failed 
to provide any additional employment over the decade of the 1950's. 
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Among the "non-basic" sectors of the commodity-producing 
type, only Construction increased its labour force. Agriculture 
and Manufacturing both had employment declines. This resulted in a 
total decrease for the group of some 26,000 workers. 
But there were increases in all four "non-basic" sectors 
of the service-producing type, namely, Transportation, 
Communication and Other Utilities; Trade; Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate; and Community, Business and Personal Services 
Industries. The rates of growth were slower in all these cases, 
however. than in the same sector for Canada generally. 
The analysis also revealed that, in addition to the four 
key sectors already identified, education and health services were 
industries which formed part of the region's "economic base" and 
which also experienced overall employment growth during the 1950's. 
This growth was related, however, to an increasing flow of financial 
resources from the federal government to the four provincial 
governments of the Atlantic Region, and was not due to any new source 
of dynamism internal to the region itself. 
The picture which emerges from the analysis in this chapter 
is of an underdeveloped, lagging region which did not possess during 
the 1950's sufficient internal dynamism to be able to generate 
growth, at least in employment, within its "basic" sectors. Output 
in all four such key sectors increased over this period and in all 
probability, the additional "export" income earned in this way 
provided the wherewithal to support a rising regional demand for the 
goods and services produced by the region's "non-basic" sectors. 
The scale of this increase in externally-fed demand was, moreover, 
adequate to sustain a total labour force increase in these "non-basic" 
sectors of almost 32,000 persons during the decade. Thus total 
employment did expand within the regional economy. 
0 
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Nevertheless it must be recognized that growth in the Public 
Administration and Defence sector was essentially the result of 
conscious public policy decisions related to the location of national 
defence establishments and manpower. It is quite likely that these 
decisions were affected by a recognition on the part of the policy 
makers of the need to sustain the Atlantic Provinces economy in this 
way. One important means of transmitting growth from other Canadian 
regions to the Atlantic Provinces thus lay in the locational decisions 
of the federal government. 
Nor was the role of government restricted to this particular 
sphere. We have already noted that education and health services, 
two parts of the service-producing sectors, could both be considered 
as extensions of the region's "economic base" on the definition used 
here, and that both contributed additional employment to the regional 
economy over the period under review. We have also noted that the 
expansion of each was tied in one way or another to financing by the 
federal government of programs executed by the provincial governments 
of the Atlantic Region. By their expansion growth was also transmitted 
from other regions of the Canadian economy through the medium of the 
federal government. 
If, as was argued in Chapter 3, the essential purpose of 
regional economic development is the interregional transmission of 
growth, then an important agent in this regard for the Atlantic 
Provinces has been the federal government. Ottawa has supported 
regional expansion in defence, education and health and these sectors 
have thereby become key ones for the regional economy. But their 
further growth and development will remain a continuing federal 
government responsibility, since they are not sectors which are 
likely ever to become self-sustaining. 
Growth has also been transmitted, of course, to the Atlantic 
Provinces economy through increased sales of its fish, pulp and paper, 
and minerals to other regions and foreign markets. The trend of 
rising output in these sectors seems likely to continue as well, but 
279. 
the tendency will at the same time be toward further rationalization 
and increased productivity per man, especially in Forestry and Fishing. 
These sectors, therefore, offer little prospect for expanding 
employment in the region's "economic base", although their increasing 
earnings will probably continue to support some employment expansion 
in the region's "non-basic" activities. 
The Atlantic Provinces economy, thereforep must find a new 
dynamic to replace the several noteworthy public policy decisions 
which sustained its employment growth during the 1950's, if it is to 
alter its status as a lagging region. Continued reliance on a 
helpful federal government will not do either, since this role is 
one which Ottawa would have to go on playing indefinitely: the 
sectors whose expansion it has brought about cannot be expected to 
achieve self-sustaining growth and so the whole process must be 
repeated every now and again just to maintain a rate of overall 
employment growth sufficient to prevent the region's relative position 
within the Canadian economy from becoming any worse. If the region 
is to find a path of growth along which it can progress and develop, 
it should be in some sector whose internal dynamism can be developed 
and encouraged. Since the region's other "basic" sectors are already 
subject to trends of rising productivity and higher output but lower 
labour requirements, the remaining, untested possibility would seem 
to be through the expansion of the region's underdeveloped manufacturing 
sector. 
CHAPTER 11 
The Gordon Commission and the Atlantic Provinces 
i Perspective on Federal Policy 
As already noted, the general impact of federal economic 
policy on the Atlantic Provinces has been adverse over the years 
since Confederation. There were, however, a number of particular 
measures and programmes designed to alleviate the region's economic 
difficulties. The Duncan Commission's report' led, for example, to 
the enactment of the Maritime Freight Rates Act of 1927, designed to 
enable Maritimeiproducers to achieve a greater penetration of central 
Canadian markets, and also to a more specific variation of the same 
theme, namely, the payment of federal subventions on the transport 
of Maritime coal to markets in Ontario and western Quebec, in order 
to maintain employment in an industry of regional importance. These 
forms of assistance were intended to provide first aid on an ad hoc 
basis. Their purpose was essentially to prevent the region's position 
from deteriorating further by maintaining the existing level of income 
and employment. They were not, and were not conceived to be, a 
comprehensive programme aimed at improving the region's overall economic 
prospects. 
Until the outbreak of World War II such ad hoc measures were 
the main element in federal economic policy towards the Maritime 
Provinces. Another, related field was federal-provincial fiscal 
relations in which Ottawa's main prewar concern was, again, with 
supplementing other sources of provincial revenues so as to enable 
1This is the term commonly used to refer to the Royal Commission 
on Maritime Claims, which was mentioned in Chapter 9 above, after 
its Chairman, Sir Andrew Rae Duncan. 
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the poorer junior governments to carry out their constitutional 
responsibilities. Indeed, federal-provincial fiscal relations were 
the main issue considered by the Rowell-Sirois Commission which 
reported in 1940.2 
The War brought a degree of economic prosperity to the 
Maritime provinces. In a sense, it was the federal government which 
was directly responsible for the concentration and buildup of military 
and naval operations, and expenditures, in the area. Canada's 
support of the Allied cause thus temporarily provided the Maritime 
provinces with a field of economic activity in which, because of their 
relative proximity to the European theatre of war and their access 
to ocean transport, the region had considerable locational advantages. 
But when the war ended, there was no comparable sphere into which Ottawa 
could transfer the resources it had been using in the Maritimes to 
support the war effort. 
During the postwar years the federal government provided 
increasing support to various types of economic activity, but 
especially to the development of natural resources. The vehicle often 
used for this purpose was joint federal-provincial programmes with 
Ottawa meeting a share, usually 50%, of the expenditures involved. 
The Maritime Provinces participated in some of these programmes. 
Howland, writing in the mid 1950's referred to the reclamation of 
marshland areas in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick for agricultural 
purposes, the assistance on the movement of feed grain, the forest 
inventory, and the development of port facilities in the region, 
and to various research activities supported by the federal government. 
He also noted, however, that the benefits from such programmes were 
felt more strongly in provinces outside the Atlantic region. 
2 Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report, 
Ottawa, King's Printer, 1940. 
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Thus although the range of federal measures of assistance 
had been broadened to include some programmes designed to encourage 
economic development based on certain natural resources, there was 
still no overall economic policy for the Atlantic Provinces when 
Howland undertook his analysis in the mid 1950's. 
Howland's Proposals 
We have already noted, in Chapter 9, the significance of 
Howland's economic analysis. His policy conclusions are no less 
important. Not only were they the result of the most comprehensive 
analysis of the regional problem then undertaken, but they were also, 
through the influence they had on the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects itself, to have a profound 
impact on subsequent federal policy towards the Atlantic Region. 
This was perhaps due as much as anything else, to the existence of 
a policy vacuum on Ottawa's part. In any event it will be useful to 
consider Howland's policy conclusions, and the argument in support 
of them, in some detail. 
We have already noted that Howland's review of the future 
outlook for Canada's six major economic regions indicated favourable 
growth prospects except in the cases of the North and the Atlantic 
Provinces. This prompted him to recognize the need for a special or 
exceptional programme for the Atlantic Region. 
Howland found that the disparity in average personal incomes 
in the Atlantic Provinces below the national average was associated 
largely with the "disproportionately large number of people engaged 
in marginal or sub-marginal activities in these provinces. The low 
productivity of those engaged in these sections of the farming, 
fishing and logging industries of the region seriously affects the 
level of economic performance in these provinces and is highly 
contributory to the low regional average of personal income. 13 Yet 
-Howland, o2. cit., pp. 5-6. 
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he proposed that these same activitiest characterized by marginal 
or sub-marginal operations, -should be the main basis of future 
regional development. "The most important promise of improved 
economic performance appears to lie in increased rationalization of 
the primary resource industries and the more extensive processing 
of the products of these industries .... the problem is basically 
one of attracting capital to these industries. "4 Such an approach 
would lay the foundation for more diversified development as well as 
for higher personal incomes. 
The conclusion that the resource industries must be developed, 
even although they contain the bulk of the marginal or sub-marginal 
activities associated with the lower level of average personal 
income, does not follow inherently from a consideration of the 
regional problem itself. The solution, from a regional viewpoint, might 
rather be to transfer some of the surplus labour from marginal 
activities in the resource sectors to non-resource activities. While 
there is some recognition of this in Howland's suggestion that there 
should be more extensive processing of the products of the resource 
industries, this only goes part of the way to providing a logical 
basis for his argument. Of greater importance in this respect were 
national economic considerations and the way these were seen to 
impinge on the circumstances of the Atlantic region. One of these 
premises is that the bulk of Canadian manufacturing will continue to be 
concentrated in the central provinces. "The pattern of regional economic 
growth in Canada also directs attention to the resource industries 
of the Atlantic Provinces, for these industries under existing 
circumstances-must-be-expected to be the effective dynamic factor 
of growth in the outlying regions. Closely associated with such 
industries would be the ports and other transportation facilities of 
the Atlantic Region, for these are intimately related to the future 
progress of Canada's import and export trade. "5 
41bid., 
p. 192. 
5Ibid., 
p. 6. Italics mine. 
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A second major premise was that the existing tariff structure 
in Canada which, among other things, cut the Atlantic Provinces off 
from the free trade they had once enjoyed with the United States, and 
especially New England, would be more or less maintained. 
Historically, there is no doubt that the protective tariff 
has been a necessary element in the process of developing Canadian 
manufacturing industry. From the purely Atlantic Provinces stand- 
point, however, its effects have been to raise the price of consumer 
goods manufactured in central Canada, on the one hand, and to the 
extent that the tariff has provoked retaliatory action by the United 
States in particular, to limit, on the other hand, the degree of 
processing which may be undertaken of regional natural resources 
before they are exported to the American market. Howland's assumption, 
and the Commission's conclusion was to the effect, as far as the 
Atlantic Region was concerned, that no relaxation of these limits 
on further processing could be contemplated. 
Howland's basic strategy for regional economic development 
in the Atlantic Provinces may thus be briefly summarized as follows. 
The problem of surplus labour in the resource industries, as reflected 
in the heavy incidence of marginal or sub-marginal activities in 
these sectors was to be resolved through the rationalization of the 
same industries and through the more extensive processing of the 
products of these industries. The region, by implication, could not 
expect to export the products of non-resource-based manufacturing 
on any appreciable scale because of the expectation that Canadian 
manufacturing industry will continue to be concentrated in the central 
regions. This foundation for more diversified development would 
lead to secondary effects in other economic activities serving 
entirely regional markets on a sufficient scale to solve the region's 
difficulties. 
Howland's faith in this last aspect was based on his 
conclusions that local market possibilities were not exhausted, that 
further diversification of economic activity would accompany increases 
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in population and the expansion of incomes, and that continued 
military expenditures in the region would stimulate some local 
manufacturing activity as well as cause an expansion in the region's 
service industries. "Developments of this nature, if they are on 
a sufficiently large scale, can facilitate sound economic growth, 
notably by providing alternative occupations for those engaged in 
industries of declining importance or by attracting manpower away 
from low-income occupations., 
6 
Since such developments, however, 
were not an integral part of the basic strategy outlined by Howland, 
the question may well be asked, can they be on a sufficiently large 
scale? 
Howland was emphatic in his insistence on natural resources 
as the base of future development: 
"The long-term and ultimately effective solution 
of the problem must be expected to come from further 
resource development. The core of the problem is the 
creation of conditions which will attract capital into 
such development. It is thus important to relate improve- 
ments in transportation or other public services, such as 
power, to this purpose. It has been recognized, for 
example, that the transportation problem of the region 
includes the provision of more adequate facilities of 
all forms of transportation. The adequacy of these 
facilities and of the charges made for the services rendered 
with or without government aid, must be measured, 
according to this approach, by reference to specific 
movements of products of the region to specified markets. 
The aids given would thus be directed to improving the 
comparative advantages of the region in respect of its 
particular resources. "7 
Against this formulation of the regional strategy, Howland 
concludes that the policy issues revolved largely around three 
subjects: first, the matter of increasing capital investment in the 
area; secondly, problems associated with the greater mobility of the 
6Ibid., 
p. 192. 
7Ibid., 
pp. 6-7. 
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population; and thirdly, questions of transportation and communication. 
His conclusions in these respects may be briefly summarized. 
There was a "basic need" for increased capital investment 
including expenditures for exploration and development of the 
resources of the region. Past experience indicated that conditions 
in the Atlantic Region had not proved conducive to the attraction 
of private enterprise. The direct approach to the encouragement of 
capital investment through tax incentives and other means was 
rejected in favour of indirect encouragement by improving the 
standards of basic services and facilities so as to give'some 
support to greater private endeavour. "It is generally accepted 
in Canada that the most desirable approach is the more comprehensive 
one of improving the economic environment in which capital has to 
operate. The provincial governments of the region emphasized to 
the Commission the need of the area for increased capital, and it 
is apparent from their representations that they share a common view 
that this basic approach is the most important one. "8 
Howland's examination of labour mobility was essentially 
an analysis of the statistics of Canadian migration since 1921. 
Between then and 1955 net emigration from the Maritime Provinces 
amounted to 212,000 persons, or 21.2 per cent of the 1921 Maritime 
Provinces population. This degree of interregional mobility was 
exceeded among Canadian regions only by the Prairies over this period. 
Interregional mobility was relatively high among professional and 
clerical workers in the Atlantic Region, and a relatively greater 
proportion of young people were involved. Nevertheless, there was 
a certain "past rigidity" of the existing income disparity. Howland 
contended that there will be a need in future for greater mobility 
not necessarily outside the region but internally as well. 
8Ibid., 
p. '194. 
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Transportation, Howland noted, had been and would continue 
to be important in the process of Canadian national development. 
The special circumstances of the Atlantic Provinces in this regard 
consisted in a certain lag in development of some forms of 
transportation and communication, the limited growth of port 
facilities, recent and prospective railway freight rate charges, and 
the problematical impact of the St. Lawrence Seaway on the region. 
The problem consisted of more than merely freight rates; "... great 
importance is attached to the question of improved transportation 
and communication facilities as well as to adjustments in freight 
rates, and ... these improvements must be considered vital 
in any 
programme of improved industrial efficiency and economic growth. "9 
Beyond noting that the heavy expenditures on resource 
explorations and additional transportation and other services 
required was beyond the financial capacity of the provincial 
governments, Howland did not make any specific recommendations 
regarding the legislative and institutional changes necessary to give 
effect to his general policy proposals. This gap was subsequently 
filled, however, by the recommendations advanced by the Commission 
itself . 
The Gordon Commission 
The Commission based its recommendations for the Atlantic 
Provinces largely on Howland's analysis and suggestions. His 
conclusion that this region, and the North, were the only ones whose 
prospects were not assured by the likelihood of national economic 
expansion, was repeated in the Final Report. 
10 
His observation 
about the subsistance primary activities representing a main reason 
9Ibid., 
pp. 200-201. 
'°Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Final Report, 
Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1957, p. 401. 
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for the region's lower level of average incomes per capita, was 
also made a main premise in the Commission's own argument about the 
course of policy action to be desired. 
11 
Whereas Howland proceeded, in his line of reasoning, from 
this observation directly to the proposition that rationalization 
of such primary activities as farming, fishing and logging was 
necessary, and would require the attraction of new capital to these 
(and other) resource-based industries, however, the Commission 
proceeded on a somewhat more general view of the role of new capital 
investment: 
"The lower levels of investment per worker are reflected 
in the lower levels of earned income in the Atlantic Region. If 
the rate of capital investment could be increased the earned income 
per capita would also increase. "12 There was no insistence here on 
attracting capital only to certain specified industries; the 
Commission seemed to favour a general increase in new investment in 
the region, in any kind of economic activity. 
Thus the existence of surplus labour in the region, as 
manifested in the greater incidence of subsistence primary activities, 
led the Commission to recognize a need to increase new capital 
investment, - as it were, to provide the labour factor with more 
of the capital factor with which to combine in efficient production. 
On this basis the Commission reached its most important general 
conclusion about regional economic policy: 
"An objective of economic policy should be to 
integrate and improve the basic economic framework of 
the Atlantic region, including in particular the 
transportation facilities of the area with a view to 
facilitating and encouraging economic growth within the 
11Ibid., 
pp. 403-4. 
12Ibid., 
p. 404. 
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region. ... what is needed we believe is a bold 
comprehensive and coordinated approach to the underlying 
problems of the region in order to make the best 
possible use of the resources of the area and to improve 
transportation and other basic services. "13 
Up to this point the Commission was dealing with the nature 
of the economic problem itself, and was not yet focusing on the role 
which the federal government should play in attempts to solve the 
problem. The reference to transportation aside, its conclusion is 
both logical and reasonable, if not, in the light of Howland's 
analysis, almost obvious. 
The reference to transportation was partly in anticipation 
of its subsequent recommendations, but may more fairly be interpreted 
as a natural reflection of the historical concern in this region 
with the transportation aspects of its economic difficulties. The 
Commission had received a large volume of representations from 
regional interests in such matters. Most of these submissions from 
the region had dealt with particular improvements to the transportation 
system including a system of trunk highways, increased federal 
assistance with the Trans Canada Highway, the proposed "Corridor" 
road across the State of Maine to connect New Brunswick to Sherbrooke, 
Quebec, the New Brunswick-Prince Edward Island causeway, additional 
port facilities at Saint John, Halifax, and St. John's, Newfoundland, 
and a greatly expanded system of roads in Newfoundland. While noting 
the evidence that the transportation facilities of the Atlantic Region 
were in need of improvement, the Commission did not consider it had 
sufficient evidence to make positive proposals and suggested "... that 
the whole question of an improved but integrated system of transportation 
in the Atlantic Region should be examined carefully and in detail with 
proper consideration being given to the costs involved in providing 
any new facilities and to the losses being incurred in the operating 
of existing services. ... such a study should include a re-examination 
of the present effects of the Maritime Freight Rates Act. "14 
131bid. 
14Ibid., 
p. 408. 
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In considering the prospects for expanding capital investment 
in the regional economy, the Commission canvassed the possibilities 
in certain specific sectors. In agriculture, the Commission noted 
the general need throughout Canada for better land use and that to 
the extent the Atlantic Provinces benefited from their proposals for 
consolidation of farm holdings into larger units, higher incomes in 
this regional sector would result. In coal mining, the mechanization 
programme then underway was expected to be completed by 1960 and to 
result in a substantial increase in output per man-hour. The 
Commission noted the implication of this programme as being that, if 
there were to be no decrease in employment, there would be an increase 
in total production of two million more tons per year; or, if 
production were to be maintained at the existing level, there would 
be a reduction in total employment in the industry from eleven 
thousand to seven thousand. The problem therefore was either to find 
markets for the additional potential output or be faced with the 
necessity of transferring 4,000 displaced miners to alternative 
occupations. The Commission noted that the present federal subsidies 
on the movement of Maritime coal would have to be increased if the 
Montreal and eastern Ontario markets were to be retained. "However, 
the most logical market for Nova Scotia coal would seem to be the 
Atlantic region. We suggest therefore that the emphasis of the present 
subsidy arrangements should be modified in order to give priority 
to the greatest possible use of Nova Scotia coal in this region. We 
believe that changes in the present subsidy arrangements should 
include incentives designed to encourage the use of Nova Scotia coal 
in the generation of thermal power in the Atlantic region. " 
15 
Although the Commission did not accept Howland's insistence 
on the resource industry as the only possible field for new capital 
investment, neither did it rule this possibility out. Its suggestions 
in this regard were rather tentative. "One obvious and highly 
15lbid., 
p. 410. 
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desirable step in the direction of increasing the role of new 
capital investment in the region is the development of a more 
adequate knowledge of the natural resources of the area., 
16 
The 
geological mapping of the region should be completed to expedite 
mineral exploration, and further knowledge of the forestry, fisheries 
and hydro-power resources should be sought. 
The Commission's consideration of the role of electric power 
was also in the context of the need to attract new capital to the 
region. But the Commission also saw a need to relate the provision 
of this form of energy to the problems being encountered in the 
Nova Scotia coal industry. "If federal assistance is required in 
connection with any power development programme, we suggest that 
such programme be related to the needs and requirements of the coal 
industry in Nova Scotia. "17 
Thus far the Commission had been arguing the case for new 
capital investment throughout the various sectors of the regional 
economy and relating the prospects for attracting such capital to 
the problems facing certain key regional industries. When it came 
to making its specific policy proposals, however, the Commission 
re-introduced the priority for the resource industries which was 
explicit in Howland's prognosis but which had not been a part of 
the Commission's own (stated) reasoning about the regional economic 
problem. This insertion of the priority for resource development 
is evident from the first sentence of the following extract from 
the Final Report, which is quoted at some length because of its 
importance in influencing subsequent federal policy: 
"There is, then, a need in the Atlantic Provinces 
for considerable expenditures of capital on basic public 
facilities designed to encourage development of the 
resources of the region. These would include, but should 
161bid., 
p. 407. 
17Ibid., 
p. 409. 
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not be limited to, the provision or reconstruction of 
adequate power and co-ordinated transportation services. 
The cost involved in providing these needed services, however, 
would seem to be beyond the financial competence of the 
provincial governments concerned. In view of this, we 
suggest that the Federal Government agree to contribute 
a substantial sum for capital projects in the Atlantic 
area to be spread over a relatively short period of years. 
The purpose would be to cover the costs of necessary 
capital investment, some or all of which would normally 
be the responsibility of the provincial governments. To 
this special contribution might be added during the specified 
period some or all of the considerable sums now being spent 
in one or other of the Atlantic provinces each year by 
various departments of the federal government on such 
things as docks and wharves, transportation including 
ferry and coastal shipping, subsidies, the development of 
marshland areas and the construction of (limited) public 
buildings. The objective would be to co-ordinate all 
capital expenditures and subsidies in the area other than 
those on projects which are national in their scope and 
application such as the proposed land use classification 
scheme, the Trans-Canada Highway and assistance to people 
who are unable to make a reasonable living where they are 
and who wish to be relocated elsewhere. In this way, such 
capital expenditures, including the proposed capital grants, 
could be allocated in a co-ordinated manner designed to 
strengthen the basic economic structure of the area as a 
whole. 
"The expenditure of federal funds in this way should of 
course be made and supervised by an appropriate agency of the 
Federal Government. With this in mind, we suggest that 
the Federal Government establish a Capital Projects 
Commission for the Atlantic Provinces, or some other 
appropriate agency. We do not suggest that the proposed 
commission or agency be a permanent addition to the existing 
governmental machinery. On the contrary, we believe the 
needed facilities should be provided over a reasonably 
short period and that the capital expenditures involved 
should not be regarded as a permanent addition to the 
resources of the Atlantic area. Accordingly, we suggest 
that when the proposed commission or agency is established 
it be given a limited life and be disbanded at the expiration 
of that time. However, inasmuch as some of the capital 
expenditures in question may be self-liquidating in whole 
or in part, it would be necessary to make provision for the 
continued administration of projects initiated by the 
Commission or other agency. 
"The proposed commission or other agency, and the 
staff which it would require, should first prepare an 
over-all co-ordinated plan, including a list of priorities 
in connection with the proposed expenditures. Once this 
was approved by the Federal Government, the commission or 
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agency referred to should be responsible for the 
implementation of the proposals, including supervision 
of the expenditures involved. 
"If such a plan is to be successful, it would be 
important to secure the full co-operation and support of 
the four provincial governments concerned. They, or their 
advisers, should be asked to make proposals and to suggest 
priorities for capital expenditures by the proposed 
commission or other agency. Presumably, the commission 
or other agency would pay particular attention to projects 
that might be recommended jointly by the four provincial 
Premiers with a view to strengthening the economic fabric 
of the area as a whole. In addition, individual provincial 
governments might be expected to make recommendations to the 
commission or other agency respecting projects which might 
be of particular importance to their own provinces but which 
might not otherwise benefit the Atlantic area. Final 
responsibility for determining priorities, however, should 
rest with the proposed commission or other agency, subject 
to the approval of the Federal Government. "10 
The validity of the Commission's conclusion that "considerable 
expenditures of capital on basic public facilities" are needed is 
hard to assess, largely because the Commission did not attempt to 
quantify overall economic objectives for the Atlantic region. Its 
whole analysis is, therefore, open-ended and rather indeterminate. 
What does seem clear, however, is that the Commission accepted Howland's 
suggestion, noted above, that the improvement of the general economic 
environment in which capital has to operate by means of enhanced 
"basic public facilities", is to be preferred over the direct stimulation 
of private investment by means of tax incentives and other inducements. 
The quick, substantial expansion of public facilities was proposed 
as a worthwhile means of effecting the necessary transformation of 
the economic climate, which would facilitate and encourage the entry 
of new private capital to the regional economy. 
The cost of such expansion in public services was not 
estimated except by way of noting that it was probably "beyond the 
financial competence of the provincial governments. " This is likely 
18Ibid., 
pp. 410-411 
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true; but in the absence of such an estimate, it is not at all 
clear that it is within the financial competence of the Federal 
Government! And there is the further question, especially 
appropriate for such an ambitious and expensive programme, of the 
benefits that may be expected to follow. The Commission assumed 
these would exceed the costs, even although they had no information 
about either. 
Another point to be noted about this major analytical 
conclusion, and the policy proposals to which it gives rise, is 
that the perspective used throughout is that of the Federal Government. 
This would perhaps be no bad thing, in a unitary system where the 
central government must have the final say in weighing national 
against regional considerations. In a federal system it is much 
less valid, especially when the provincial governments have important 
responsibilities for economic development under the constitution. This 
is not pointed out in order to raise constitutional issues, but rather, 
to make clear that the Commission placed its emphasis on what the 
Federal Government could contribute to the resolution of Atlantic 
Provinces economic difficulties, and not on how these difficulties 
could best be surmounted by the combined action of both the Federal 
Government and the four Provincial Governments concerned. 
This federal perspective is maintained in the further, 
incidental proposals the Commission also made. Each of these, it 
must be emphasized, was seen as a potential auxiliary influence in 
promoting the region's economic growth which would support the effects 
mainly to be achieved through the work of the proposed Capital Projects 
Commission. There are three such proposals, each couched in rather 
tentative terms in the Final Report; 
(1) that "a greater measure of decentralization of government 
purchasing policies would be beneficial to local areas"; 
19 
19 
Ibid., p. 411. 
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(2) that, "if it should prove possible to place a 
greater number of defence orders with manufacturing 
concerns in the Atlantic region without substantially 
adding to costs, the resulting benefits might more than 
justify the additional effort and perhaps inconvenience 
involved"; 20 
(3) that. "if the railways were able to work out their 
purchasing programmes more evenly over a longer period, 
this would be of great benefit to the car manufacturing 
industry in Nova Scotia and help to stabilize employment 
in that area. " 
21 
These actions, together with the results expected to follow 
from the improvements in basic public facilities to be carried out 
by the Capital Projects Commission, were expected by the Gordon 
Commission to achieve some results in terms of the health of the 
regional economy. Such effects, in summary, were expected to 
include greater efficiency and higher average incomes in the primary 
resource activities as marginal and submarginal operations were 
improved (or removed); some further processing of the region's natural 
resources, although the Commission did not say very clearly whether 
these would be offered for sale in export markets or in central Canada; 
and the indirect effect of these changes in expanding the regional 
market for locally-produced manufactured goods and for services of 
various kinds. Because it did not attempt either to quantify the 
expected effects across all sectors of the regional economy, in terms 
of employment changes for example, or to formulate overall objectives 
for the region (quantitatively or qualitatively) beyond the espousal 
of the resource industries already noted, it is difficult to be 
precise in examining the economic merits of the course of change 
recommended, or the likelihood of its being carried out. A further 
20Ibid., 
pp. 411-412. 
21Ibid., 
p. 412. 
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difficulty in this regard is that the Commission did not suggest 
any date by which the execution of its proposals should be completed. 
It is clear, however, from its final series of related 
recommendations that the Commission expected the main burden of 
regional adjustment to continue to be borne by labour migration, 
and possibly that such migration would have to be on a scale even 
greater than had been the case in the past. "The adoption of the 
measures which we have suggested, if vigorously supported by the 
people of the Atlantic region, would, we believe, result in a 
higher rate of economic growth in the area. However, whether or not 
such suggestions are put into force there is bound to be some 
dislocation of the labour force in the Atlantic region ... as workers 
transfer to more strongly developing sections of the regional 
economy... " 
22 
The Commission had considered the problem of marginal 
agriculture in its national context, and had made certain proposals 
designed to assist mobility of labour out of such activities and 
into other occupations. The resolution of the Atlantic Provinces' 
problem in this regard would be eased to some extent by such 
national measures. The Commission also expressed particular concern 
for any coal miners who might be displaced, perhaps as a result of 
the mechanization programme then underway. It was inclined to 
relate the costs of assisting the transfer of such coal miners to 
other activities to the costs incurred under the existing programme 
of coal transportation subventions; again, it may also be noted, 
however, the Commission revealed a certain pessimistic note about 
the likelihood of being able to accommodate this transfer from 
coalmining to other sectors. "We suggest that on economic grounds 
alone, having regard to the amount of the present subsidy, there would 
be every justification for paying the full amount of the transportation 
22Ibid., 
p. 412. 
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costs of all the members of any families who may be willing to move 
to other parts of Nova Scotia or elsewhere in Canada, for assistance 
in the provision of housing; and for training in other occupations, 
possibly in co-operation with industry. " 
23 
The same pessimism is notable in the Commission's concluding 
observation on the outlook for the Atlantic region: 
"To a considerable extent the dimensions of this 
problem of occupations and geographic mobility in the 
Atlantic region will be decided by the general strength 
of future economic development in the area. If the pace 
of investment is increased substantially and if there is 
a reasonable development of diversified occupations the 
process of adjustment will be much more readily accomplished 
and will be no more than is normal in Canada. This is 
highly desirable. If the pace of development, however, 
does not prove sufficient to facilitate such an adjustment 
easily, then those who may wish to re-establish themselves 
in other occupations elsewhere should, we suggest, be, 
Although the Commission's pessimism is revealed, it would 
be unfair to characterize their proposals for the region as consisting 
mainly of a suggestion that financial aid be given to the wholesale 
movement out of the Atlantic Provinces of the region's surplus labour. 
Such a characterization was implicit in the journalistic reaction 
which followed publication of the Commission's Final Report and was 
unfair and unbalanced. In fact, the Commission's suggestions for 
improving labour mobility were advanced on a "wait and see" basis, as 
a course to be resorted to if the more essential items in the 
Commission's list of recommendations, were to prove insufficient 
for the purpose. Of more fundamental importance is the question 
of whether the objectives framed (implicitly) by the Commission for 
the regional economy were suitable, and the related further question 
of whether the improvements in "basic public services" to be effected 
by the Capital Projects Commission, were adequate for the purpose. 
23Ibid., 
pp. 412-3. 
24 
Ibid., p. 413. 
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As to the specific matter of labour mobility, there is no 
question that any measures to increase adaptability, skill levels 
and willingness to accept change, are to be desired. It would be 
helpful in devising policy for labour mobility, as for other 
aspects of economic change, however, to have a much more precise 
formulation of the extent of the reliance to be placed on this 
particular adjustment mechanism. Such a formulation is impossible 
to make without a statement of regional objectives, preferably in 
quantitative terms, for the regional economy; and this, as already 
noted, was lacking from the Commission's analysis and conclusions. 
The Commission did identify an important manifestation of the 
lack of balance in the region's labour market. It suggested a need 
to increase efficiency in the resource industries where this manifes- 
tation was found. It then recognized that success with this (particular) 
objective would increase the excess of supply over demand in the regional 
labour market. Its solution was to hope for sufficient expansion 
of alternative occupations elsewhere within the regional economy 
(including from further processing of the products of the resource 
industries), and failing that, to accept the logical necessity of 
transferring the surplus of labour to alternative activities in other 
regions of the Canadian economy. 
The Gordon Commission's recommendations for the Atlantic 
Provinces were to play an extremely important role several years 
later in the formation and operations of the Atlantic Development 
Board. In particular, the Board's avoidance of direct assistance to 
industrial development in the Atlantic Region may be traced to the 
failure of the Gordon Commission to recognize the manufacturing sector 
as an important instrument for accelerating this region's economic 
development. The performance of the Atlantic Development Board is 
examined at'some length in Chapter 13 below. The following chapter 
considers the role of the provincial governments in Canadian regional 
development. 
CHAPTER 12 
The Economic Role of Provincial Governments 
The analysis and recommendations of the Gordon Commission 
regarding the Atlantic regional economy had been presented within 
a national context and clearly revealed a federal government 
perspective. In some ways this is perhaps the best possible framework 
for regional analysis since it direct attention to the national 
consequences of regional economic policy and, as noted in Chapter 4, 
the various regions of a country may be seen as competing with one 
another for a limited supply of national resources. At the same 
time, however, an absolute insistence upon a national view may be 
excessive and likely to distort both analysis and policy. In Canada 
this danger is usually reduced by virtue of its being a federal 
state in which the Provinces have certain expenditure responsibilities 
and certain taxation powers under the British North America Act. 
When Confederation was agreed in the 1860's, the main source 
of government revenue then available was the customs tariff. In order 
to prevent the Provinces from imposing provincial tariffs and other 
indirect taxes as barriers to the interprovincial trade needed to 
sustain the new nation, the power of collecting customs duties was 
reserved to the federal government by limiting the provincial 
governments' taxation powers to direct taxes within their own 
boundaries. The federal government was given unlimited taxation 
powers by the B. N. A. Act. 
One implication of this division of taxation powers was that, 
even in the beginning, the Provinces were left with expenditure 
requirements far in excess of their revenues, and the terms of union 
provided for per capita subsidies to be paid the Provinces by the 
federal government. Since 1867 the fields of provincial responsibility - 
chiefly education, social welfare, justice, and local public works - 
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have assumed increasing importance, with the result that the 
Provinces came to need even greater subsidies from Ottawa. Federal- 
Provincial fiscal relations are, in fact, a subject of continuing 
debate and no permanent solution, acceptable to all eleven governments 
involved, has yet emerged. The Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial 
Relations (The Rowell-Sirois Commission), established by Ottawa in 
1937, was an attempt to untangle the complicated tax system which 
had developed over the years since Confederation; but its conclusions 
were unacceptable to some of the Provinces and its recommendations, 
therefore, have never been fully implemented. Its main suggestions 
had been that the federal government assume all provincial debt and 
take over the full costs of relief in return for the sole right to 
levy income and inheritance taxes. 
1 
Equalization Payments and Special Grants 
Instead there have been a series of tax-sharing agreements 
between the federal government and the Provinces, the first prompted 
largely by the wartime demands on revenue and the consequent need 
to avoid competition for the tax dollar. The Wartime Tax Agreements 
were in effect from 1942 to 1947. Since then, further arrangements 
have been negotiated at five year intervals, the latest covering 
the five years ending March 31,1977. Under the present arrangements 
both the federal government and the Provinces levy direct taxes on 
the incomes of persons and corporations, and succession duties. 
Because the yields from these vary on a per capita basis from Province 
to Province, the agreements also provide for the federal government 
to make "equalization" payments to the Provinces. These latter are 
based on a formula designed to raise a Province's yield from the 
three standard taxes (each at a specified percentage of federal 
1Canadian 
Tax Foundation, "Tax Memo", No. 31, May 1962, p. 2 (from 
which much of the information about federal-provincial fiscal 
relations in this Chapter is drawn). 
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collections in the Province) plus its yield from 50% of natural 
resource revenues, to the national average per capita yield from 
these sources. In fiscal 1964-65, payments under this heading to 
the four Atlantic Provinces' governments together amounted to $68.5 
million, or over 20 per cent of their total net general revenue. 
2 
The object of such payments by Ottawa is to enable the poorer 
Provinces to provide a standard of provincial government services 
more or less comparable with that available to Canadian residents 
in the wealthier Provinces. They are thus based on some recognition 
of "fiscal need" - the difference between the Provinces' taxable 
capacities and their expenditure requirements. 
3 
Another important source of revenue for the four provincial 
governments of the Atlantic region consists in the Atlantic Provinces 
Adjustment Grants, which were inaugurated in 1957 as part of the 
Federal-Provincial Tax Sharing Arrangements negotiated that year. 
These further payments by Ottawa were continued under the 1962-67 
arrangements at an annual rate of $35 million. In fiscal 1964-65 
this amount represented another 10 per cent of the total net general 
revenue of the four Provinces together. 
Newfoundland also received a further special grant of $8 million 
annually to enable it to maintain its public services at the level 
prevailing in the other Atlantic Provinces. 
These three categories of federal unconditional grants, 
together with several smaller items under the same general heading, 
constituted 36.9 per cent of total net general revenue of the four 
Atlantic Provincial governments in 1964-65. The total of all federal 
unconditional grants was $124.6 million. 
2Canadian 
Tax Foundation, Provincial Finances 1965, Table 9A, p. 12. 
3For 
a thorough discussion of this concept and a systematic estimate 
of the Canadian magnitudes involved see Eric J. Hanson, Fiscal Needs 
of the Canadian Provinces, Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, 1961. 
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In addition, the federal government makes conditional 
grants available to the Provinces for such purposes as agriculture 
and forestry, vocational training, old age assistance, blind and 
disabled persons allowances, unemployment assistance, health grants, 
hospital insurance, Trans Canada Highway construction, airport 
development, construction of roads to underdeveloped mining and 
forest resource areas, development of camping grounds and picnic 
areas, civil defence, and winter works. Such grants have the effect 
of increasing the size of total expenditures on the programs involved 
beyond what is available from provincial government sources, and 
hence represent an addition to a poor Province's resources. They 
can, and often do, have the further effect of directing Provincial 
expenditures away from other purposes to those where they will 
"attract" federal cost-sharing expenditures; in this way, their 
indirect negative effect in reducing outlays on other programs which 
come under provincial jurisdiction, may be significant. It is likely 
to be greater in poor than in rich Provinces. There has been little 
examination of these grants, partly because data on them have only 
recently come to light. Yet total conditional grants by Ottawa to 
the Provinces amounted to $860 million in 1963-64; and of this 
amount, $105 million was paid to the Atlantic Provinces. 
4 
This is 
in the order of 80 per cent as much again as these Provinces 
received in unconditional grants. 
5 
Thus the provincial governments in the Atlantic region are 
extremely dependent, financially, on the federal government at 
Ottawa which provides over one-third of all provincial revenue. 
Moreover, by means of conditional grants programs, the federal 
government is in a position to influence the allocation of perhaps 
another one-quarter of provincial government expenditures. Both 
these forms of federal payments to the Provinces enable the provincial 
4Canadian 
Tax Foundation, The National Finances, 1965-66, ' Table 69, p. 139. 
5This 
relates the 1963-64 figure for conditional grants to the 
1964-65 figure for unconditional grants. If the 1964-65 figures 
were available the ratio would probably be higher. 
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governments to provide a higher standard of public services for 
their residents than would otherwise be available. Such services 
mainly include health, welfare, highways and education - all of 
which may be considered as benefits which accrue from economic 
development and growth. In the case of low-income areas like the 
Atlantic region, such benefits are the result of national economic 
progress and are made available to the residents of the low-income 
region on grounds of social equity in accordance with the national 
view on such matters. For such regions, in other words, they are 
not the result of internal economic progress. 
Although it is true that some of the services mentioned, 
especially education, have recently been recognized as having 
investment as well as consumption aspects, this recognition has not 
been an explicit factor in the substantial growth of Canadian 
federal payments to the Provinces during the postwar period. The 
emphasis has been almost entirely on enabling the poor Provinces to 
supply their residents with the same sort of services as are available 
in the rich Provinces. One "economic" effect of this approach, however, 
has been to place education and health among the fastest growing 
sectors of employment in the Atlantic region during the 1950's. 
Another implication of this approach, apparently, is that 
an important role of the provincial governments in Canada - at least 
in the low-income regions - is as agents of the federal government 
in distributing the benefits of national economic growth. In this, 
however, a fair interpretation of the provincial government role 
under Canadian conditions? What other responsibilities, if any, 
should the Provinces be expected to carry? 
The Development Powers of Provinces 
This is not the place to undertake a review of all the 
issues in federal-provincial relations; there is a vast literature 
on the varying interpretations which have been placed on the 
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provisions of the British North America Act, and a long history of 
differences in view as between the federal and provincial governments 
in various spheres of government activity. What does concern us here 
are the nature and extent of provincial government responsibilities 
vis-a-vis the economic development of the Atlantic region. Do the 
Provinces have a role to play in this sphere? If so, what powers 
do they have available to carry it out? How well do they exercise 
such powers in this context? What additional programs might they 
undertake in order to encourage economic development within their 
borders? 
These are large questions and cannot be fully answered 
without a careful examination of all the factors involved. For the 
present, we may deal briefly with whether the Provinces are concerned 
with economic development, and what actions in this sphere rest 
within their field of constitutional responsibility. 
For this purpose it is necessary to distinguish between 
stabilization policy and development policy. Stabilization involves 
maintaining the smooth operation of the economy at or near full 
employment so as to avoid violent fluctuations leading either to 
serious unemployment or to inflation; as such it is normally thought 
to include both monetary and fiscal policy. The economic theory 
which guides the operation of stabilization policy is based largely 
on Keynes, and has been refined and generally well adapted for 
practical use. It is widely recognized that stabilization policy is 
ideally a function of the federal government because of the need to 
apply it nationally. The recent increases in the provincial-municipal 
share of total government expenditure in Canada has necessitated the 
establishment of regular joint federal-provincial consultative 
arrangements to help achieve coordination between the two levels of 
government in the formulation and execution of stabilization policy. 
Development policy (or growth policy) comprehends a wide 
variety of government actions which influence the long-term development 
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(and growth) of the economy. In Canada, while development projects 
requiring government aid or participation, like the railways in the 
nineteenth century or the St. Lawrence Seaway in the twentieth, have 
been an important element in national growth, the attempt to consider 
in a comprehensive way all the factors which may influence long-term 
growth and development is very recent. Moreover, the available economic 
theory on development planning is less certain, and thus offers less 
clear guidance to the policy-maker, than Keynesian theory provides for 
stabilization policy. The work of the Economic Council of Canada has 
been pioneering in this sense; it is too soon yet to say what exact 
framework for development policy will emerge. Nevertheless it already 
seems clear that development policy will comprehend a wider variety 
of action perhaps encompassing the whole range of government activities 
at all levels. One indication of this is the recent emergence of the 
approach which treats government expenditures on education as partly 
a type of investment likely to increase the productive capacity of 
the economy in future, as well as a form of consumption which benefits 
only the recipient. 
Education is one field which has been explicitly reserved 
to the Provinces under the B. N. A. Act. Here, then, is one area where 
the provincial governments may affect future economic development, 
both within and beyond their borders because of the greater mobility 
of the educated members of the population. The formal education and 
training of its children and young people is a function which the 
Canadian constitution has entrusted to its provincial governments. 
It is they who have a much greater ability than the federal government, 
therefore, to affect the quality of the labour factor. 
A provincial government also has extensive powers to control 
the terms and conditions under which its natural resources - another 
of the three main factors of production - are exploited. It grants 
mineral exploration and' development rights. It manages the forest 
resources on Crown lands, sometimes selling the forest harvest to 
private interests for "stumpage" and other fees, sometimes selling 
land to the companies for their management and use under agreed 
terms and conditions. It provides advisory and other services to 
farmers. 
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A provincial government may, if it chooses, also influence 
the capital factor. It does so directly through the investment which 
it carries out itself, mainly in the construction of roads and other 
public works. The latter may include the development of electric 
power generating and transmitting facilities when these are operated 
by publicly owned utilities. It does so indirectly, not only through 
the encouragement which improved highway and power facilities may give 
to private investment, but perhaps also by offering inducements to 
encourage greater private investment in various spheres. Indeed, 
industrial development is a responsibility which the provincial govern- 
ments, especially in the low-income regions, consider their own special 
challenge. It is really part of a wider sphere since, through its 
development agencies and by offering incentives, a provincial government 
can influence the evolution of the structure of the whole provincial 
economy. 
Thus the range of provincial powers is sufficiently broad 
to enable a provincial government to influence all three of the factors 
of production. Provinces, therefore, do have a role to play in the 
formulation and execution of economic development policy. Although 
it is a limited role, it is by no means negligible. This would be so 
even if the Provinces only influenced the labour factor through the 
education they provide but, as we have seen, they do more than that. 
The limits on the Provinces' role are partly constitutional, 
partly financial, and partly the result of their own decision. The 
constitutional limits consist in the fields of jurisdiction which 
have been made a federal responsibility (such as the regulation of 
trade and commerce; unemployment insurance; defence; navigation and 
shipping; the fisheries; currency, banking, and note issue), those 
which the Provinces share with the federal government (agriculture, 
for example), and those in which their exclusive legislative powers 
are limited in some particular way. (In education, for example, the 
B. N. A. Act imposes certain restrictions relating to the establishment 
of schools by religious minorities. ) 
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The financial limits are also of three main types. First, 
the provinces are prevented from imposing indirect taxation by the 
B. N. A. Act. 
6 
Secondly, they are limited by the combined size of 
their own capacity to raise revenue from direct taxation within 
their boundaries and of the unconditional grants they receive from 
the federal government. Thirdly, they are limited by being confronted, 
within these two sets of limits, by the basic economic problem of 
unlimited wants and scarce means. In short, they can only do so 
much at any one time. What they choose to do will be determined, 
at least implicitly, by the priorities they set or accept. 
It is, incidentally, within this third sphere that the 
conditional grants offered by the federal government exert their 
influence. Under certain headings a Province can obtain federal 
assistance, most often on a matching basis. Each dollar of 
Provincial revenue allocated under such headings will "attract" 
another federal dollar; each dollar diverted to other purposes will 
not. Hence, the headings selected by the federal government for 
special assistance may exert a stronger claim to Provincial priority 
than other programs for which the Province is alone responsible, as 
Provincial allocations in these directions have the effect of further 
increasing provincially-administered programs by the amount of federal 
assistance so "attracted". These federal conditional grants also 
represent a direct expansion of total Provincial income. For a low- 
income Province, the temptation to allocate as much of Provincial 
revenue as possible to the federally selected activities, may be'hard 
indeed to resist. 
Thus, in addition to the three types of limits on the exercise 
of Provincial responsibilities in connection with economic development, 
6Nevertheless 
many of them impose a retail sales tax made possible 
by the Courts' having ruled that such taxes are indirect taxes on 
the ground that the retailer acts as the collection agent of the 
Province! 
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there is the further possible complication that Provincial development 
priorities may be compromised. Of course, it is possible that the 
federal assessment of priorities is more reasonable, either from a 
Provincial or from a national, viewpoint. But this cannot be 
determined without an empirical examination of practical cases. The 
danger of Ottawa's compromising legitimate Provincial priorities in 
this way ought, at least, to be recognized. 
As a source of Provincial government revenues, the importance 
of federal contributions to shared cost programs undertaken by the 
Provinces has been increasing. Such conditional grants, as they are 
also called, represented 8.8 per cent of total provincial-municipal 
revenue in the three Maritime Provinces in the 1959-60 fiscal year. 
Ten years later, in fiscal 1969-70, this proportion had increased 
to 13.8 per cent. 
7 
Generally speaking, the main factor in the growth 
of shared cost programs has been increasing expenditures for education 
and health services. Such programs are mainly a reflection of 
national social priorities in Canada, and are usually provided in 
accordance with standards established at the national level. As a 
result, the growth of such expenditures is difficult to resist, 
especially by the low-income Provinces in the Atlantic Region. 
Moreover, their continued growth has meant a corresponding reduction 
in the total Provincial resources available for programs intended to 
accelerate economic development. 
In 1968 the federal government adopted a policy of cutting 
back on shared cost programs with the Provinces, as a means of freeing 
additional resources for use in the development efforts of the Depart- 
ment of Regional Economic Expansion, which was established a year 
later. To the extent that the shared cost programs are subject to 
built-in growth factors, this cut-back policy will be more difficult 
7Computed from Table IV-6, page 39 in James H. Lynn, Public Finance 
in the Maritime Provinces, a report prepared for the Maritime 
Union Study, Fredericton, N. B., January 1970. 
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to put into effect. The outcome might well prove to be a continuing, 
if slower, increase in those shared cost programs which reflect social 
priorities. 
Provincial Expenditures 
Some indication of the composition and growth of provincial 
government expenditures, is given in Table 17. 
For the four Atlantic Provinces together the largest 
categories of Provincial expenditures in 1965 were education (24 per 
cent of the total), transportation and communications (23 per cent) 
and health (19 per cent). These three thus accounted in total for 
two-thirds of all provincial government spending in the region. The 
same three categories represented an even larger share of Ontario's 
total, almost three-quarters (73.2 per cent). Within this group, the 
Atlantic region devoted a larger share of its total spending to 
transportation and communications (Ontario's share was 21.5 per cent) 
but a smaller proportion to each of education and health (30 per 
cent and 23 per cent in Ontario respectively). In fiscal 1965 
transportation and communications was the second largest of the 
three categories in the Atlantic region, whereas in Ontario it ranked 
only third in the (implicit) order of priorities behind health as 
well as education. At this level of aggregation one cannot, of 
course, press such broad comparisons too far. The comparative growth 
records over the preceding decade may be more revealing. 
The percentage increase in total provincial expenditures 
in the Atlantic Provinces between 1955 and 1965 was markedly less, 
at 154 per cent, than the relative rise of 241 per cent in Ontario. 
In fact, the relative increase in the Atlantic region exceeded 
Ontario's only in the minor categories of unconditional grants to 
local authorities, "other", and debt charges. 
8 
In each of the major 
8The 
last would reflect a greater need to supplement taxation and 
other revenues through borrowing and is not, therefore, cause for 
cheering! 
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categories, however, Ontario's percentage increase substantially 
exceeded the Atlantic region's comparable gain. Spending on health rose 
by 406 per cent in Ontario (275% in the Atlantic region), on education 
by 351 per cent (1982), and on transportation and communications by 
175% (76%). To some extent, of course, these disparities in the 
rates of increase may be attributed largely to Ontario's faster rate 
of population growth over the decade. 
Nevertheless, on a per capita basis the gap between Ontario 
and the Atlantic Provinces is substantial, as evidenced by the data 
in Table 18. 
The enlargement of the Provinces' financial capacity during 
the past decade, made possible partly by the Atlantic Provinces 
Adjustment Grants and the special grants to Newfoundland but more 
importantly by the growth of health services and education programs, 
has increased the need for provincial governments to accept greater 
responsibility for influencing economic development, not only provincially 
but nationally. More particularly, there is a greatly increased need 
for Provinces to get their priorities right and also to seek the 
maximum results through the efficient administration of provincially- 
mounted programs. It is encouraging to note that an increasing 
recognition of these possibilities and needs has been evident among 
the provincial governments of the Atlantic region. Indeed, this 
recognition was one of the factors which prompted them to seek the 
special adjustment and Newfoundland grants in the mid-1950's. 
Similarly, it led them to press Ottawa for the enactment in 1958 of 
the Atlantic Provinces Power Development Act, which enabled federal 
loan assistance to get the Beechwood hydroelectric power project 
underway in New Brunswick. Another manifestation of their greater 
sense of responsibility for economic development was the joint 
initiative of the four Premiers in commissioning the examination in 
1960 of the impact of national monetary policy on Atlantic regional 
development by Professor Cairncross, which has been discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
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Table 18 
Provincial-Municipal Government Expenditure 
" Per Capita on Selected Functions 
(averages for fiscal 1961-62 and 1962-63) 
Resources 
Education Health Transport & Other Total 
$ 
Ontario 112 80 71 10 298 
Prince Edward Island 90 49 90 15 244 
New Brunswick 67 57 62 14 200 
Newfoundland 69 58 50 12 189 
Nova Scotia 75 56 47 9 187 
Source:. Economic Council of Canada, -Second Annual Review, Towards 
Sustained and Balanced Growth, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 
December 1965, Table 5-16, p. 133. The Economic Council 
refers to these functions as "growth-related"; the figures 
shown include federal contributions to shared-cost programs 
(conditional grants). 
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The region's provincial governments also pursued programs 
of. industrial development more vigorously during this period. This 
field is a Provincial responsibility under the Canadian constitution, 
and each Canadian Province maintains a department which is responsible 
for attracting new industry and for the provision of advice and 
technical information. The Industrial Development Loan Board, 
established in 1947, makes direct loans to small industry in 
Newfoundland, and also guarantees bank loans for prescribed purposes; 
aid to large industries may be arranged at Cabinet level. The P. E. I. 
government extends similar assistance under its Industrial Establishments 
Promotion Act of 1954. New Brunswick's program of aid to industry 
dates from 1952 and also includes direct and guaranteed loans for 
new resource-using, employment-creating undertakings; in 1959 the 
New Brunswick Development Corporation was established and authorized 
to provide more extensive facilities, including the preparation of 
sites and the provision of factory premises. Nova Scotia's program 
has been vigorously pursued since 1944, and again includes direct 
and guaranteed loans for new capital facilities for manufacturing 
and tourist accommodation. In 1957 the Province established Industrial 
Estates Limited as a Crown corporation with powers mainly to provide 
buildings for lease to industrial tenants; this agency has had a 
considerable degree of success in attracting new industries to the 
Province. 
9 
Provincial Pressures for New Federal Policy 
During 1961 and 1962 there was a concerted effort by the 
Provinces in the Atlantic region, aided and abetted by the Atlantic 
Provinces Economic Council, to persuade Ottawa to take a broader view 
of the economic difficulties of the Atlantic region and to fashion 
new policy instruments for the purpose. The Council mounted a sustained 
9For 
a more complete description of provincial programs in this field, 
see Canadian Tax Foundation, Provincial Finances, 1965, Chapter 11. 
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program of publicity in support of direct federal government 
participation in a "bold, massive and well co-ordinated" development 
program for the region. The program should be aimed at meeting the 
"need for industrial expansion... in order to provide employment for 
a steadily increasing labour force and thus to raise per capita 
levels of output and income... "10 Expansion of the region's 
underdeveloped manufacturing sector would require concerted action 
by all concerned. "Governments must take the initiative, and it is 
imperative that the Federal Government be active in formulating, 
financing and administering a regional development program. "11 
At the annual conference of Atlantic Provinces' Premiers 
in December 1961, the Council proposed: 
(1) the establishment by the federal government of a capital 
fund for the Atlantic Provinces from which grants might 
be paid to the provincial governments to assist in economic 
development by means of cornerstone industries, industrial 
estates, or similar measures to encourage the location 
and expansion of industry, together with an appropriate 
agency to administer this policy; and 
(2) the establishment of a federal agency to expand public 
investment in the Atlantic Provinces, similar to the 
Capital Projects Commission recommended by the Gordon 
Commission in its 1957 report. 
12 
10Atlantic 
Provinces Economic Council, "Incentives for Manufacturing 
Industries", Pamphlet No. 2, February 1962, p. 5. 
11Ibid. 
12Atlantic 
Provinces Economic Council, Submission to Atlantic 
Premiers' Conference, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, 
November 1961 Italics mine). 
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The first proposal was clearly an attempt to have the federal government 
become directly involved in a program of industrial development 
within the region. The agency proposed to administer grants to be 
paid to the Provinces was expected, presumably, to exert some 
influence in the formulation, execution, and perhaps the coordination, 
of the programs to be undertaken by each Province with federal 
financial assistance. 
The second recommendation involved both a degree of agreement 
with the Gordon Commission's conclusion that public capital facilities 
in the region should be improved, and a desire to have some means of 
objective, independent appraisal for the range of public works 
projects suggested from time to time. In addition to the Corridor 
Road across the State of Maine, and the New Brunswick-Prince Edward 
Island Causeway, another spectacular project then being mooted in 
some quarters as a panacea for the region's economic difficulties, 
was the Chignecto Canal. This canal, which has been proposed 
intermittently for several decades, would cut through the isthmus of 
Chignecto which joins Nova Scotia to New Brunswick, and thereby 
link the Bay of Fundy with Northumberland Strait and the Gulf of 
St. Lawrence. Against the background of pressures for this and other 
major capital projects, the A. P. E. C. submission noted: 
"At the present time, a number of such projects clearly 
need the objective, independent study that such a body 
would provide. Events in recent years have indicated 
the need for one body charged with the responsibility 
of having these projects assessed and reporting upon 
them to governments and to the public. i13 
The Council presented another submission to the Premiers in 
July 1962, soon after "austerity" measures had been announced by the 
federal government, which noted: "The rapid expansion of public and 
private-investment in the region will require considerable forethought 
and planning. As a consequence, the framework for channeling aid to 
the Atlantic Provinces should be created, and studies got underway 
as soon as possible. " 
13Ibid. 
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Because of the lack of published information, the substance 
of discussions between the Atlantic Premiers and the federal government 
must remain matter for speculation. There seems little doubt, however, 
that the Premiers pressed Ottawa at this time for greater federal 
intervention in the economic development of the region. Whether they 
pressed for the same sort of intervention as had been suggested by 
A. P. E. C. is, however, impossible to say. 
In the Throne Speech that autumn, the Federal Government 
announced its intention to establish the Atlantic Development Board. 
The new federal agency marked a significant step in the evolution of 
Canadian regional policy. The federal government, in effect, had 
accepted the need to undertake special additional measures to 
encourage the economic development of this particular problem region. 
This discrimination marked a change from the normal approach favoured 
by Ottawa of treating all provinces and regions "equally" through 
programs available throughout the whole country. Moreover, the new 
Board was given powers and responsibilities of potentially greater 
extent than had been conferred on regional development agencies in 
other countries. The Board, therefore, deserves special examination 
in this study, and its. functions and performance are analyzed in some 
detail in Chapter 13. 
Summary and Conclusions 
To recapitulate, the Provinces, by the end of the 1950's, 
had come to accept an increased responsibility for stimulating 
economic development within their borders. The enlarged financial 
resources available to them as a result of the Atlantic Provinces 
Adjustment Grants, the special Newfoundland grants, and the federal 
equalization grants, had also expanded the area within which they 
could exercise this responsibility. This in turn led them to 
identify a further need for federal financial intervention in the 
field of stimulating economic, and especially industrial, development, 
partly because further financial support was considered necessary and 
could only come from Ottawa, and partly also in the hope that the 
federal government could bring about some regional coordination of the 
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development programs of four separate, thinly populated, provinces. 
The industrial development of the Atlantic Provinces probably would 
be less difficult if approached on an overall regional basis rather 
than attempted in an uncoordinated fashion by four separate 
provincial governments. 
The review of the policy background in this Chapter has 
shown that the approach to economic policy formulation for the 
Atlantic Region has undergone a distinct change in emphasis during 
the postwar period, and especially during the decade since 1955. 
The federal government first recognized that the region's economic 
prospects could not be assured simply by rapid national growth and 
development on the scale achieved during the first postwar decade. 
Next, it made special extra unconditional grants available to the 
provincial governments in the region so that they could provide a 
standard of public services available to regional residents more or 
less comparable with that available elsewhere in Canada; in doing so 
Ottawa effected a redistribution of the benefits of national growth 
so that these were enjoyed in the Atlantic region to an extent 
greater than the region's own economic achievement could support. 
More recently, the federal government has accepted a further role, 
that of stimulating the accelerated development of this region by 
direct means. Although several important additions have been made 
to the range of policy instruments available to Ottawa, it remains, 
however, for the federal government to enunciate an overall policy 
for this purpose. 
On the Provinces' part, the postwar period has witnessed 
the emergence of a more active approach to economic development 
matters within their purview. In part this is due to the substantial 
enlargement of Provincial expenditures to which the increased federal 
grants have contributed. To some extent also, it reflects a degree 
of dissatisfaction with the economic role given the Atlantic Provinces 
by Confederation and its aftermath -a dissatisfaction intensified 
by the region's failure to participate fully in the rapid national 
growth enjoyed in the first postwar decade. The Provinces have sought 
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to influence their economic destinies through a variety of development 
programs, including measures to secure greater industrial development. 
If there is insufficient coordination of such programs among the 
four Provinces involved, there is perhaps also cause for hope in 
the considerable agreement among the Provinces about the need for 
greater federal participation in development policy, which has been 
an important factor in having enabled them to press their case with 
Ottawa rather effectively over the past decade. 
As might be expected, there is still some area of disagreement 
between Ottawa and the Provinces about the objectives which should 
guide the regional development program and the means which should 
be used to achieve them. To some extent this conflict is largely 
a hangover of the difference between the Gordon Commission's 
diagnosis and recommendations on the one hand, and those of Professor 
Cairncross on the other. The willingness of both levels of government 
to engage in such a program as evidenced by the initiatives each has 
undertaken, however, suggests that such remaining conflicts will 
not be impossible of resolution. 
CHAPTER 13 
The Atlantic Development Board: An Appraisall 
by 
F. T. Walton* 
I 
During his visit to Canada in 1960 to assess the impact of 
"tight money" policies on the economic development of the Atlantic 
Provinces, Professor A. K. Cairncross was impressed with the sympathetic 
attitude of federal government officials towards the economic plight 
of Canada's four easternmost provinces; nevertheless, he found 
a certain lack of continuity and focus in Ottawa's approach: 
"No one doubts that there is a regional problem in Canada; 
but no one seems to know where the responsibility rests, 
within the federal government, for studying the problem and 
framing proposals for dealing with it. This does not mean 
that it is not studied or that proposals are not framed. 
On the contrary, I found great interest in it in Ottawa and 
many constructive proposals had obviously been discussed. 
But there is a disposition, natural under a federal regime, 
to leave the initiative to the provinces. Perhaps this is 
inevitable. I see no reason why it should be. It would be 
a great advance if the federal government, accepting its 
responsibility for maintaining regional balance, tried to 
II 
am grateful to Mr. J. T. Hughes of the Department of Political 
Economy, University of Glasgow, for his comments on an earlier 
draft. Although this article owes much to discussions with my 
colleagues in the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council prior to my 
present appointment, the views expressed are entirely my own 
responsibility and do not necessarily reflect the views of A. P. E. C. 
or anybody else. 
*This Chapter appeared first in The Business Quarterly, University 
of Western Ontario, School of Business Administration, London, 
Canada, as "Atlantic Development: An Appraisal", Summer, 1968. 
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work out, in conjunction with the provinces, a policy for 
regional development. No one supposes that such a policy 
would be other than tentative. But there should be more 
to it than haggling over equalization grants; and there 
should be some section of the federal government which would 
concern itself with the policy and would be the natural 
focus of discussion with the provincial administrations. "2 
When the Atlantic Development Board was created in December 
1962, many observers expected it to assume this role. The Board was 
first given an entirely advisory function, its main object being 
defined as "to inquire into and report. . upon measures and projects 
for fostering the economic growth and development of the Atlantic 
region of Canada... " to its Minister -a senior member of the Cabinet 
from an Atlantic Province constituency, capable of speaking for the 
general economic interest of the four-province region. The Board 
was given a broad field within which to examine regional development 
problems and to frame recommendations. 
one might conclude that "fostering the economic growth and 
development" of the Atlantic region had been accepted as an objective 
of federal economic policy, and that the means of pursuing this 
objective were to be decided at Cabinet level. No such policy was 
suggested at the time the legislation was introduced except in very 
general terms, 
3 
probably because the Government expected the new 
Board to submit recommendations in this regard when it had had time 
to complete a general review of the current state and future prospects 
of the regional economy. The very establishment of the Board suggested, 
of course, that the Government was disposed to consider favourably any 
action proposed by the A. D. B. No expenditure commitments were contained 
in the legislation, as would be expected with an advisory board. The 
2A. 
K. Cairncross, ' Economic Development and the Atlantic Provinces, 
Atlantic Provinces Research Board, Fredericton, February 1961, p. 33. 
3For 
example, Hon. H. J. Flemming, when sponsoring the original Bill 
in the House of Commons, observed, "The Atlantic Provinces have 
special problems requiring special attention. " 
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degree of formal independence from the Government of the day given 
the Board suggests that its assessments would offer effective 
guidance not only for the federal government but also for the 
Provinces and other regional interests. Moreover, its purely 
advisory function left the Board little option but to proceed with 
the formulation of proposals for an overall policy for regional 
development, for the Government to consider as a possible basis for 
legislative and other action. 
These potential opportunities became academic before the 
Board had really begun to function, however, with the enactment of 
amendments to the original legislation in July 1963. 
The Board ceased to be a purely advisory agency with the 
establishment of an Atlantic Development Fund of up to $100 million, 
the disbursement of which became its responsibility. The Board's 
function was thereby broadened to include "operating", as well as 
advisory, responsibilities. No longer was the Board restricted to 
providing advice to the Minister, and thus the Cabinet, relative to 
the economic growth and development of the Atlantic-region. Henceforth 
it was also to frame recommendations for the disbursement of a $100 
million Fund and to become involved in the day-to-day administrative 
problems of receiving and assessing proposals for disbursements from 
the Fund. The successful combination of such a "line" function with 
essentially "staff" responsibilities is acknowledged by administrative 
experts to be difficult, especially in an agency with a small staff. 
Paradoxically, the Board's horizon as an advisory body was 
broadened by another subsection in the same amending Act which 
authorized it to: 
"prepare, in consultation with the Economic Council of 
Canada, an overall co-ordinated plan for the promotion 
of the economic growth of the Atlantic region. " 
It may be assumed that such a plan was desired by the Government for 
the purpose of guiding and co-ordinating federal economic policies 
vis-a-vis the Atlantic Provinces. 
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II 
The Atlantic Development Fund 
The Atlantic Development Fund was established as a special 
account in the Consolidated Revenue Fund. To it would be credited 
payments made by the Minister of Finance on the recommendation of 
the Minister designated for the purposes of the A. D. B. Act. Disburse- 
ments by the Board on such programs and projects would be charged to 
this Fund. 
A total limit on such payments into the Fund was established, 
namely, one hundred million dollars. 
4 
Moreover, such payments 
cannot be made except for "a program or project... that has been 
approved by the Governor-in-Council. " Thus Cabinet approval is 
required for all programs and projects to be supported from the Fund, 
and the Atlantic Development Board remains an advisory agency in 
that sense. The Board has no authority to make expenditures, even 
from the Fund, without prior Cabinet approval. 
The advantages of the Fund thus consist in (a) its statutory 
authorization which permits payments to be made into it without their 
having to be included in regular Parliamentary appropriations; and 
(b) the general commitment by Parliament to allocate up to $100 million 
to assisting economic growth and development in the Atlantic region. 
The establishment of the Fund was an open invitation for public 
and private agencies in the Atlantic provinces to submit proposed 
programs and projects for federal financial assistance. Provincial 
governments had their suggestions, as one would expect; local 
government units, business firms and private individuals also joined 
the rush to qualify for some of the new largesse. 
41n 
1966 the authorized limit was raised to $150 million by means 
of an amendment to the A. D. B. Act. 
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Thus, although the Board remained an entirely advisory body 
with no autonomous authority to make expenditures even from the Fund, 
it was given the task of receiving representations from regional 
interests - public and private - on all manner of schemes considered 
by their proponents to be crucial to the future economic growth and 
development of the region. Moreover, it was given this task 
unaccompanied by a statement of policy from Parliament, or the 
Government, as to what particular objectives were sought for the 
Atlantic Provinces economy. This lack of any clear guidance from 
the Government is underlined by the inclusion of the enabling clause 
authorizing the Board itself to prepare a "plan" for promoting the 
region's economic growth. 
In the absence of a clearly defined federal policy regarding 
the Atlantic Provinces, and since a certain amount of study and 
planning are usually desirable before action takes place, the 
decision to create the Atlantic Development Fund and to charge the 
A. D. B. with assessing proposals for its use, appears to have been 
unwise. It at least had the effect of postponing the formulation 
of an overall federal policy for the Atlantic region, which had 
appeared much more likely to emerge as a result of the original 
legislation. The damage may prove much worse if in authorizing 
commitments from the Fund the Government has established precedents 
which tend to compromise whatever policy may eventually be adopted, 
or if the Board itself and its staff become wedded to the "operational" 
approach which has been receiving so much emphasis in its first years 
of existence. 
It might be argued, on the other hand, that the creation of 
the Fund made possible the granting of federal assistance to a number 
of large projects which, otherwise, might not have been forthcoming. 
This argument depends on the assumption that such assistance could 
only be provided from the Fund and not from Parliamentary appropriations 
in the normal way. Such an assumption is hardly valid. 
326. 
III 
The Board's Opportunity 
The establishment of the Fund distracted the Atlantic 
Development Board from its broad tasks of advising the federal 
government on the general nature and significance of economic 
problems in the Atlantic region and of framing recommendations regarding 
the future development of these four provinces. Nevertheless it seems 
worthwhile to consider whether, without the distraction imposed by 
the Fund, it might have been expected to undertake a more ambitious 
role. 
It seems clear that the Board had been established largely 
in response to pressures which arose within the Atlantic region itself, 
and not as a result of any careful appraisal undertaken in Ottawa of 
the need for new regional policy, either by Members of Parliament or 
the Government's economic advisers in the Civil Service. This is 
indicated in the fact that the new regional agency was established 
to deal with the Atlantic Provinces, while none was set up for the 
other major Canadian regions. More significantly, it was reflected 
in the inclusion in the Act of the authority, as discussed above, for 
the new Board itself to initiate the federal assessment of the 
regional problem and the policy changes needed to deal with it. There 
were no arbitrary constraints imposed on it by its terms of reference; 
the Board was left to decide itself upon the scope of its researches 
and upon the manner in which such researches should be pursued. In 
short, in advising the federal government on Atlantic regional 
development, the Board was given a clear field and substantial freedom 
to explore it. 
5 
5This 
view of the Board's scope is reiterated in its Annual Report 
for the fiscal year 1964-65: "It (the Board) thus has the knowledge, 
the interest and the freedom to pioneer regional development policy. " (p. 11) 
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At the same time, the Board was also free to secure co-operation 
and assistance from the provincial governments and other regional 
interests. These "regionalists" could be expected to have some 
knowledge and understanding of regional economic difficulties from 
their long direct experience with them; moreover, the Board could 
hope that its role as federal adviser on such matters would place it 
in a position to exert some leadership in studying regional problems 
and devising solutions in a broad, comprehensive context. In this 
way the Board might even assist in achieving greater co-operation and 
consistency among the various development efforts at the provincial 
level. The creation of the A. D. B. was welcomed by all regional 
interests, especially the four provinces, so there is little basis 
for expecting the region to frustrate its purposes through unwillingness 
to co-operate. 
In addition, the Board had the advantage of a frame of 
reference at the Atlantic Provinces, or regional, level broader, than 
the level imposed on each provincial government by the British North 
America Act. Imaginative and flexible pursuit of its planning 
responsibilities within this wider framework, in close collaboration 
with the provincial governments, offered the promise of a more 
sensible overall approach to the problems of a major economic region 
than had hitherto been possible under 
'a 
division of provincial 
responsibilities among four separate units, each responsible for 
only a part of the whole area. 
If there are shortcomings to be found in the Board's actual 
performance, therefore, the major share of responsibility must rest 
either with the Government for establishing the Fund too soon and 
thereby distracting the Board from its advisory tasks, or, probably 
to a lesser extent, with the Board itself for interpreting its 
advisory-planning role too narrowly. 
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IV 
The Use of the Fund - An Assessment 
As at March 31,1966 the projects "approved by the Governor- 
in-Council"6 involved a total allocation from the Fund of $76.7 million. 
Of this total, $24.5 million had been spent as at March 31,1966, 
mostly during the preceding fiscal year. 
Actual expenditures are, however, less important than 
expenditure commitments which reflect the order of priorities the 
Board has followed. 
The overriding impression to be gained from a review of the 
allocations from the Fund is the great preference the Board has 
displayed for projects involving the provision of basic capital 
facilities. Some of these are on a large scale, most notably the 
hydroelectric generating facilities and the highways construction 
programs. Even in the case of the assistance the Board has rendered 
to industrial expansion and development, the insistence on the laying 
of watermains and sewer pipes as the chief, almost only, form of 
assistance, is remarkable. 
The Board has especially emphasized the role which adequate 
supplies, of electric power should play in economic development, 
directing almost half the available Fund to expanding and improving 
electricity generating capacity throughout the region. The largest 
grants, $20 million each, are for the Mactaquac project on the St. 
John River in New Brunswick, and the Bay d'Espoir project on 
Newfoundland's south coast. 
6This 
is the wording used in Statement 1, Appendix I of the 1964-65 
and 1965-66 Annual Reports, which comprise the reports of the 
Auditor-General. Presumably, such approval is synonymous with 
"payments into the Fund" (as a separate account within the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund; see above, page 324). No outward flow 
of funds is effected until disbursements are made by the Board. 
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Table 19 
Commitments from the Atlantic Development Fund and 
Actual Expenditures by Category, as at March 31,1966 
Approved by the Funds 
Governor-in-Council Disbursed 
$$ 
1. Electric Power 48,412,800 17,446,308 
2. Transportation 10,675,000 5,657,459 
3. Industrial Research 3,000,000 132,589 
4. Other basic services to industry 14,613,269 1,261,620 
TOTAL* 76,706,069 24,501,698 
*also includes "Sundry expenditures" of $5,000 approved, $3,722 disbursed 
Source: Atlantic Development Board, Annual Reports for 1964-65 
and 1965-66, Appendix I. 
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Another $10.7 million has been allocated from the Fund for 
assistance to highway construction, chiefly the upgrading of existing 
trunk highways. This program is being followed by further federal 
aid of $30 million to highway building over a three-year period. 
These latter expenditures will not be a charge on the Atlantic 
Development Fund, however, but will come from special annual 
appropriations by Parliament to the A. D. B. 
The $3 million for assistance to industrial research will 
provide new capital facilities for the Nova Scotia Research Foundation 
and the New Brunswick Research and Productivity Council. Both these 
organizations are-provincial government agencies engaged in various 
aspects of applied scientific and industrial research. 
The Board has preferred an indirect approach to the stimulation 
of industrial development in the Atlantic region. The chief means 
it has used is the provision of financial assistance with the basic 
services required by newly locating or expanding industrial 
enterprises. More recently it has also allocated some'funds to 
developing industrial parks in certain selected localities. It 
has avoided becoming committed, however, to any overall industrial 
development policy, either in the region generally or in any one of 
the four provinces. Indeed, in Nova Scotia's case it has withstood 
requests by the Provincial Government to give general support to a 
scheme for attracting new industries to that province. 
Table 20 indicates the main categories of the $14.6 million 
allocation for industrial development purposes. 
Over half its industrial development commitments have been 
made to alleviate the Board's concern with ensuring "adequate supplies 
of pure fresh water for industry", and with "the protection of these 
supplies from pollution of both municipal and industrial origin., 
7 
A. D. B., Annual Report, 1964-65, p. 21. 
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Table 20 
Commitments from the Atlantic Development Fund 
for "Other basic services to industry", by 
Category, as at March 31,1966 
Approved by the Funds 
Governor-in-Council Disbursed 
$$ 
Water supply and/or sewage systems 
at various locations 
- Newfoundland 4,890,067 
- Maritime Provinces 3,018,869 
Abatement of industrial water 
7,908,936 
pollution 2,010,000 
Industrial park facilities 3,528,327 
Miscellaneous 1,166,006 
31,674 
1,073,472 
1,105,146 
9,356 
116,174 
30,944 
TOTAL 14,613,269 1,261,620 
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Most of the assistance is for some 24 fish processing firms. A 
number of these are already "located in the areas where fishing is 
the only source of income for the communities, and where the 
communities have no adequate water supplies". 
8 
Three are newly 
locating enterprises, and the Board's grants will enable the 
municipal authority to build necessary water and sewerage facilities. 
Of the $7.9 million total involved, some $5.1 of the grants were the 
direct consequence of "... the introduction in 1964 of new federal 
regulations requiring a higher standard of purity for water used to 
process fish for export". 
9 
These grants apparently were made piece-meal, without 
sufficient attention being paid to their overall effects on employment 
and efficiency in this important regional industry. It would be 
deplorable if, in fact, the Board has thereby missed an opportunity 
to conduct such an overall appraisal. 
The Board's keen interest in water pollution problems has 
led it to set aside a further $2 million from the Fund to be utilized 
for assistance to industry in reducing pollution. 
Prior to 1965-66 the Board had been reluctant to engage in 
the direct stimulation of industrial development. Its only 
speculative venture in this field was an allocation of $118,327 to 
assist with the establishment of an industrial park at Summerside, 
Prince Edward Island to be "... used by manufacturing industries". 
10 
Even here, % bowever", the form of the Board's assistance had been 
specified as funds "... to finance water and sewage mains to connect 
the industrial park to the municipal facilities at Summerside". 
11 
8Ibid. 
9A. 
D.. B., Annual Report, 1965-66, p. 20. 
10A. 
D. B. Annual Report, 1964-65, p. 23. 
11Ibid. 
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During 1965-66, however, the Board committed a total of over 
$3.4 million to assist the development of industrial parks in five 
more Atlantic Provinces' locations: 
Amount 
Dorchester Point, New Brunswick 1,500,000 
Stellarton, Nova Scotia 700,000 
Lakeside, Nova Scotia 560,000 
Saint John, New Brunswick 450,000 
Truro, Nova Scotia 200,000 
3,410,000 
This assistance is intended to relieve municipalities of part of the 
burden of providing industrial land properly serviced with (once 
again) water and sewerage facilities, road and rail access, and 
electric power connections. It may also recognize that, to the 
extent that industrial parks are successful in attracting employment 
and income, the benefits will extend beyond the particular localities 
directly affected. The centres selected have been chosen in 
consultation with the provincial governments, and after obtaining 
the advice of outside consultants. The Board's aid is to be rendered 
through the provincial government in each case under terms and 
conditions stipulated by agreements negotiated for the purpose. 
V 
Planning 
As already noted, the Atlantic Development Board Act, as 
amended, includes a provision that the Board may "prepare in 
consultation with the Economic Council of Canada, an overall co- 
ordinated plan for the promotion of the economic growth of the 
Atlantic region. " 
12 
12Section 5, An Act to amend the Atlantic Development Board Act, 
12 Elizabeth II, Chapter 5, Statutes of Canada, 1963. 
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There are many senses in which the terms "economic plan" 
and "economic planning" may be used. At one end of the spectrum 
there is the very detailed plan in which all decisions are made at 
the centre, a model which the Russian economy resembles to some extent. 
At the other end, a "plan" may be more simply defined as a set of 
related measures designed to achieve some stated objective or 
objectives. In between, numerous permutations and combinations are 
possible. 
This variety of possible meanings should be borne in mind in 
assessing the role which the A. D. B. may play in "planning" the 
economic growth of the Atlantic region. Because the Board's "plan" 
can only be implemented through the joint actions of five governments, 
however, a general approach would appear necessary and desirable, 
at least in. the first instance. 
Unfortunately, little real indication of the Board's 
intentions has been given in its annual reports. We are told a 
certain amount about the organizational changes imposed by this new 
responsibility: a committee of Board members has been appointed, a 
Planning Division has been established as part of the staff, and 
certain economic studies have been commissioned. One of these 
consisted in an attempt to construct input-output tables showing the 
flow of goods and services within the regional economy - which may 
suggest the Board envisages a rather detailed type of planning. All 
of this remains a matter for conjecture, however, pending a clearer 
statement from the Board. 
The Board's planning function cannot be carried out in 
isolation. on the one hand, it is necessary that its regional plan 
be integrated at some stage with the national. objectives and policy 
proposals already advanced by the Economic Council of Canada. On the 
other hand, it is equally essential that the same regional plan not 
differ substantially from what provincial governments' plans envisage 
within their own jurisdictions. If these conditions are not met, the 
A. D. B. 's regional plan, however sophisticated or theoretically sound 
it may seem to be, is unlikely to be of much practical use. 
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The Board, therefore, must enlist the cooperation of both the 
Economic Council and the provincial governments at all stages of the 
planning process. Cooperation throughout the process with the Economic 
Council is required of the Board by its own Act. It is noteworthy, 
incidentally, that the Economic Council has thus far restricted 
itself to broad pronouncements and recommendations about economic 
policy at the national level without becoming involved in detailed 
planning. Neither does it have to administer anything resembling 
the Atlantic Development Fund. Consequently the Economic Council, 
itself the junior of the A. D. B. by several months, has issued three 
annual reviews in which it has advanced a broad policy strategy to 
foster national economic growth and development, and has also published 
a series of competent research studies on various related matters, 
while the A. D. B. 's annual reports say essentially very little about 
either the problems or the prospects of the Atlantic region. 
The Board's annual report for 1965-66 contains a section on 
planning which comments on the context in which it must operate, the 
end uses to which it will be put, and the immediate objectives which 
faced the Planning Division in June 1965. 
"The Planning Division role is thus seen as the creation of 
as effective an instrument as possible for joint federal-provincial 
economic planning, as well as for the formulation of a set of 
comprehensive and coherent policy proposals for the economic development 
of the region. 
"It will take some time before the initial formulation of 
guidelines can be completed; however, during this period, it is 
anticipated that the work of the Planning Division will become 
increasingly useful in guiding the decisions which must be taken by 
the Board in pursuing its more immediate obiective of improving the 
infrastructure of the region. "13 
13A. 
D. B. Annual Report, 1965-66, p. 16. Italics mine. 
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An important first step in planning of any kind is the 
formulation of objectives or goals. The Atlantic Development Board 
has the advantage of guidance in this task from the Economic Council's 
objectives for the national economy. Its regional goals should, of 
course, also take explicit account of the Atlantic region's own 
peculiar circumstances. In this goal-setting stage, no less than in 
subsequent stages of the planning process, enlisting the cooperation 
of the provinces will be absolutely imperative. This seems to be 
recognized by the Board which notes the need "to achieve as close a 
working relationship as possible with federal and provincial government 
agencies in preparing economic guidelines. " 
14 
Whatever their intentions and hopes for close cooperation in 
this regard may be, however, they cannot be helped by the Board's 
published conclusions about the strategy of development which should 
be followed. These differ fundamentally from the most recent general 
policy conclusions offered by agencies within the region. 
By the Board's interpretation, the "general consensus on the 
broad development strategy... in which all agencies, public and 
private, might be expected to participate"15 consists of: 
1. major investment in infrastructure - water, power and 
transportation; 
2. assisting present industry to achieve higher productivity; 
3. intensifying the investigation and utilization of resources; 
4. up-grading of labour force'skills; 
5. encouraging, by a variety of incentives, the growth of 
secondary industry. 
14Ibid. 
Italics mine. 
15Ibid., 
p. 11. 
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The creation of the Fund and, to some extent, events have resulted 
in the Board's placing earliest and major emphasis on infrastructural 
improvements. But economic planning is designed to reduce the 
pressure of events by tailoring economic development to particular 
ends or in particular directions, with a view to attaining a set of 
desired objectives. It is thus essential for the Board to inquire 
whether its policy of infrastructural improvements is consistent with 
such objectives. Before this can be done, objectives must be 
discussed and a consensus won on these: that the Board has failed to 
do so as yet is perhaps its most serious shortcoming. 
Two agencies within the Atlantic region - Nova Scotia's 
Voluntary Economic Planning Board and the Atlantic Provinces Economic 
Council - have offered sets of objectives which are very similar, 
one with the other. Moreover, both sets are quite compatible with 
those proposed for Canada by the Economic Council. Yet each differs 
in fundamental respects from what the Atlantic Development Board 
contends is a "general consensus" about development strategy. 
The Nova Scotia plan proposes as goals: 
"1. the highest possible rate of growth with an equitable 
distribution of per capita income; 
"2. the highest possible level of employment; 
"3. the achievement of the highest possible increase in- 
productivity; 
"4. the development of all the resources of the province 
to the highest point of efficiency; and 
"5. the achievement of a climate, both economic and 
political, that will encourage the development of 
"16 new industries and the expansion of existing industries. 
16Voluntary 
Economic Planning Board, Nova Scotia: First Plan for 
Economic Development to 1968, Halifax, Queen's Printer, 
February 1966, p. 7. 
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Relating these to the'changes in the sectoral structure of employment 
within the province, it concludes that the proper strategy for Nova 
Scotia "... will consist mainly of greater expansion in the size and 
importance of secondary manufacturing and the service industries". 
17 
The A. P. E. C. documentl8 discusses regional objectives in the 
light of the Economic Council's national goals, offers some 
quantification of their implications for employment, unemployment, 
productivity, output, and exports at the regional level, and concludes: 
"The central purpose of economic development in the 
Atlantic region for the immediate future, then, is 
increased employment through the establishment and 
expansion of economic activitie$9which show good 
promise of becoming efficient. il 
Thus both these assessments, one conducted under the auspices 
of a provincial government by its economic planning organization, the 
other issued by a private organization with some claim to being a 
spokesman for the general regional interest, differ pointedly from 
the A. D. B. 's "general consensus". The main differences are in the 
treatment of manufacturing and service industries, given priority 
position in both the Nova Scotia plan and the A. P. E. C. document but 
mentioned last (and not very emphatically) by the A. D. B.; and in the 
much greater emphasis given increased employment as an objective in 
the Nova Scotia and A. P. E. C. documents. Indeed, both A. P. E. C. and the 
Nova Scotia planners attempt, on the basis of demographic trends and 
other factors, to quantify this objective in terms of the number of 
new jobs needed in the medium term. 
17Ibid., 
p. 8. 
18Atlantic 
Provinces Economic Council, Toward a Strategy for the 
Economic Development of the Atlantic Provinces, Fredericton and 
Halifax (mimeographed), October 1965. 
191bid., 
p. 21. 
339. 
The Atlantic Development Board, after more than four years in 
being, has not attempted to quantify any of its objectives. What is 
more remarkable, it has not published even an-unquantified general 
assessment of the economic situation in the Atlantic Provinces: its 
performance in this respect is deplorable compared with its national 
counterpart, the Economic Council of Canada whose annual reviews have 
provided an entirely new focus for assessing national economic progress 
and policy. Neither of these two exercises is beyond the resources of 
the Board organization, nor should they await the perfection of the 
planning instrument which the Planning Division has apparently set out 
to devise. Each is a necessary and integral step in the early stages 
of any economic planning process. Perfection of the machinery is not 
to be ruled out, of course, but it does seem more likely to result in 
the fullness of time from a-series of approximations worked out to 
take account of changing circumstances and trends than from any initial 
effort, however prolonged, painstaking and sophisticated it may attempt 
to be. 
There are, after all, at least two major advantages to be 
gained from an early - less deliberate but nevertheless realistic - 
assessment by the Board of overall needs. One arises from the fact 
that the Board is already in the process of injecting a flow of 
expenditures into the region which totalled almost $120 million20 on 
the latest available reckoning. This scale of expenditure is bound, 
if nothing else, to sustain a high level of aggregate demand in the region 
for several years ahead. Such expenditure should, however, be related 
to more explicit regional economic objectives than the Board has 
enunciated to date. Secondly, the Board has a duty to advise on how 
20Commitments from the Fund as at March 31,1966 of $76.7 million, 
plus $12 million subsequently announced for a thermal generating 
electric power plant in Nova Scotia, plus the separate program 
of $30 million for highways construction. 
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the current influx of young school leavers to the regional labour 
force21 can best be integrated in the economic development process. 
This surge of "young blood" is not only a challenge but an 
opportunity - without a greater sense of urgency in the A. D. B. 's 
planning effort, the opportunity is in danger of being lost. 
It is high time the Board enunciated a long-term strategy 
based upon a fairly careful, although necessarily general, study of 
the region's economic problems and prospects. Indeed, this assessment 
of the regional problem and the Board's proposed objectives should become 
the basis for a White Paper on federal economic policy for the 
Atlantic Provinces. It is over four years since the Atlantic Development 
Board was created to fashion such an overall federal policy and surely 
not too soon, therefore, for the Board and the Government which it 
has a responsibility to advise, to set Out publicly the main conclusions 
they have reached regarding the future of a major economic region in 
which one-tenth of all Canadians live. 
The Board might also consider making some of the results of 
its research program available to a wider audience. The problem of 
Atlantic regional development has always been of great interest in 
Canada but, despite the pioneering studies conducted over the past 
decade by the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, university scholars 
and others, there is still a lack of readily available literature. 
Moreover, regional development problems and policies are increasingly 
the subject of study by scholars in other countries: in comparative 
studies at the international level, this lack of literature often 
precludes the inclusion of Canadian problems in such analysis. The 
Atlantic Development Board, in addition to the studies conducted by 
its own staff, has commissioned a considerable number of special 
21 For documentation of this projection and its implications, seethe 
Economic Council of Canada's First Annual Review, Economic Goals 
for Canada to 1970, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, December 1964 and 
A. P. E. C., Towards a Strategy, Halifax and Fredericton, October, 1965. 
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studies by university scholars and other professional consultants. 
22 
Not all these would be of interest, or suited, to a wider audience, 
of course. But many would; and the Board is in a unique position to 
advance the study of the problem which is its own concern, and thereby 
perhaps stimulate other proposals for its solution, by publishing 
those of its studies which are of sufficient standard to merit it. 
A related further venture for the Board would be to sponsor 
the publication of selected readings drawn from past studies. The 
assembly and review of this material presumably will be an integral 
part of the Planning Division's work: if so, it would not involve 
much further effort to arrange publication of the more important 
contributions made over the years. 
Publication of analysis and findings would also aid the 
continuing dialogue between the A. D. B. and the Provinces which is 
perhaps the only way to resolve the conflict of purpose evident 
between them in their tentative conclusions about development 
strategy. This sort of informed discussion of regional difficulties 
and programs could also be fostered by the Board's making its annual 
report a vehicle for the purpose. The Board's task is too far-reaching 
for it to limit its publications to the statutory requirement of an 
annual report to Parliament. 
It may be noted, finally, that shortcomings in its performance 
to date do not constitute an argument for a return to the circumstances 
which prevailed before the Atlantic Development Board was established. 
Certainly Professor Cairncross would find a much better situation 
in Ottawa than he did in 1960. Expenditures are being made with the 
deliberate intention of stimulating the development of the Atlantic 
22The 
Board's expenditures on technical and economic surveys and 
studies amounted to $518,985 in fiscal 1964-65, and to $456,306 
in 1965-66. 
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Provinces, and hence positive discussions concerning this regional 
economy are taking place among the various federal departments and 
agencies involved. The Board provides a focus for these discussions 
as well as for the four provincial governments seeking federal aid 
or advice. This clearing house role should not be over-emphasized, 
however, since the Board is also in the unique position of being able 
to exert leadership for the whole regional development program, 
both on the other federal agencies involved and in bringing the 
four provinces and Ottawa together in a common effort. As it gains 
experience and overcomes its early difficulties the Board may yet 
fulfill its own stated promise "to pioneer regional development 
policy. " 
University of Glasgow, 
March 1967. ' 
CHAPTER 14 
Financial Incentives for Regional Industrial Development 
I have argued, in previous chapters, that the prime purpose 
of regional economic development in Canada's Atlantic Provinces should 
be to effect a profound change in the region's economic structure 
through a substantial expansion of its manufacturing sector. This 
task is a formidable one, both in view of the narrow size of the 
region's present manufacturing base, and because of the region's 
considerable locational disadvantages relative to other Canadian 
regions in serving the main consumer markets of Ontario and Quebec. 
Yet the need for new manufacturing industries persists. 
In the terms of interregional economic relations as discussed 
in Part I above, what is required is the additional capital and 
entrepreneurship to the supply of factor equipment available to the 
Atlantic Region economy, in order to enable it to produce a greater 
volume of manufactured commodities for sale in the richer regions 
of Ontario and Quebec. The increased trade in commodities thus 
attained would become, potentially, an important mechanism for the 
interregional transmission of growth to the Atlantic Region, as 
suggested in Chapter 3. The additions to capital and entrepreneurship 
thus obtained would be combined, of course, with the region's own 
excess supply of labour and thus serve also to reduce the extent of 
unemployment and underemployment. If, their transfer could be secured 
in such a way as not to reduce the supply of these forms of factor 
equipment in the rich regions, the result could be a higher total 
level of output in the interregional economic system. Thus it is not 
necessarily a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, but of making better 
use of "excess" (or marginal) supplies of capital and entrepreneurship 
by transferring them from the rich and growing region to the poor and 
stagnant region. 
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The transfer of capital and entrepreneurship should not be 
approached on a general basis, but can be concentrated on the 
manufacturing sector. This sector can reasonably be expected, if 
given an adequate stimulus, to "lead" the further growth and develop- 
ment of the Atlantic Region economy. So it is manufacturing capital 
and manufacturing entrepreneurship which are the critical needs as 
far as the interregional transfer of capital equipment is concerned. 
The Nature and Purpose of Incentives 
It is important to view incentives for industrial development 
in the above perspective. Their purpose is not so much to reduce 
the operating costs of the desired manufacturing industry in the 
poor region to competitive levels, although this incidental objective 
is usually necessary also; the real test of their effectiveness, 
however, is whether they bring about the desired transfer of 
manufacturing capital and manufacturing entrepreneurship from the 
rich to the poor regions. 
Of course, it would be possible - at least theoretically - to, 
augment any region's supply of factor equipment from internal sources. 
Thus manufacturing capital might be expanded by increasing regional 
saving and/or by allocating an enlarged portion of such saving to 
manufacturing investment. It might also be hoped that, over time, 
the region's indigenous supply of manufacturing entrepreneurship 
would develop and increase. These are likely to be extremely time- 
consuming methods of achieving economic development in the poor region 
and would amount, within a national economy or interregional economic 
system, to unnecessarily forcing each region to develop entirely on 
the basis of its own internal resources. 
Industrial development incentives, if properly conceived and 
implemented, offer an alternative method of increasing the poor 
region's supply of manufacturing capital and manufacturing entrepren- 
eurship by transferring these types of factor equipment to the poor 
region from other regions within the national economy. Such incentives 
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thus afford a possible short-cut to achieving the industrial 
development of the poor region. Instead of reducing the cost structure 
of the region's own manufacturing industry, the incentives can be 
aimed as well at manufacturing enterprises in the rich region in the 
hope of attracting their interest in investment opportunities in the 
poor region. Such investment opportunities, of course, are means 
by which manufacturing capital and manufacturing entrepreneurship 
can be transferred from one region to the other. 
Thus the purpose of industrial development incentives is to 
increase investment in manufacturing in the poor region by 
influencing the locational decisions of manufacturers in the rich 
region and thereby securing some displacement of their total invest- 
ment toward the poor regions. 
With the increasing tendency of national manufacturing firms 
to finance their expansions through the use of retained earnings, 
such incentives have become more necessary as an instrument for 
regional industrial development. If only manufacturing capital were 
needed in the poor region, the national banking system would provide 
an effective alternative, lending to borrowers in the poor region the 
necessary wherewithal to "import" new capital equipment from the rich 
region. But capital and entrepreneurship are both needed. In today's 
complex, modern society where national and multi-national firms 
exercise the greatest control over modern technology and its develop- 
ment, the main source of knowledge about such technology - and the 
greatest familiarity with existing marketing channels - tends to lie 
with large corporate. enterprises operating at the national level. If 
the poor region is to base its manufacturing development on modern 
technology and to have the necessary access to substantial marketing 
channels for its new products, then it must somehow tap this major 
source of existing entrepreneurship - the existing national (or 
international) manufacturing firm. 
In this sense industrial development of the poor region 
becomes primarily the attraction of new manufacturing plants from 
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other regions and other countries. Incentives, if they are to be used 
for this purpose, must therefore be designed to influence the 
locational decisions of manufacturers in other regions. Among other 
things, this requires the active participation of the national 
government if the industrial development incentives are to apply 
to firms outside the poor region, which are, outside the jurisdiction 
of Provincial or regional governments. 
The Locational Decision 
The essential element in attracting new industry to a poor 
region is an ability to influence the decision of manufacturing 
entrepreneurs to establish new or expanded factories by somehow 
enticing them to choose a location in the poor region. One of the 
most important, although also one of the most neglected, prerequisites 
for industrialization is this ability to affect the decisions being 
made by manufacturing firms. If a poor region is to achieve any 
success in attracting new industry, it simply must develop - and 
exercise - some sort of mechanism for influencing a sufficient number 
of the locational decisions currently being made in the manufacturing 
sector of the total, or national, economy. If, at the same time, the 
poor region lacks a manufacturing tradition and therefore cannot rely 
on indigenous expansion as a significant source of new manufacturing 
employment because it therefore lacks a sufficient internal supply 
of manufacturing entrepreneurs, the task becomes essentially that of 
influencing the locational decisions of manufacturing firms in other 
regions. To many of these firms the idea of establishing new 
production facilities in the poor region is likely to seem a remote 
possibility, perhaps even a strange suggestion. For many such firms 
will not be disposed even to consider locating their new factory in the 
poor region. 
I 
1See, 
for example, R. E. George, Costs in Manufacturing in Alternative 
Locations: Nova Scotia compared to Ontario. Halifax (mimeographed), 1965. 
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This is a neglected aspect of industrial development planning 
in Canada, where the emphasis has been on the form which financial 
and other inducements to the attraction of industry should take. 
Yet, obviously, any program of such inducements should be aimed at a 
recognizable and defined target. It is necessary, in short, to 
consider whose locational decisions need to be influenced before 
one can choose the type and range of incentives to be offered in a 
sensible way. Are these decisions currently being made within the 
poor region, elsewhere in the same country, or in some other country 
or group of countries? 
There is probably no firm, conclusive answer to this question 
for any region desiring industrial expansion. But some approximation 
to an answer would be a desirable aspect of formulating an 
appropriate industrial development strategy. 
This aspect-of the problem has been touched upon by Thomas 
Wilson in his Financial Assistance with Regional Development2 when 
he emphasized the importance to accelerated regional development 
of maintaining a high and sustained rate of national economic growth. 
Rapid national growth is a prerequisite for achieving progress 
with the economic development of less prosperous regions. Translated 
to the particulars of the industrial sector, this criterion may be 
interpreted as stressing the need for adequate expansion in the 
manufacturing sector of the national economy as a necessary basis for 
diverting some of that expansion to the less prosperous regions. 
Indeed, if manufacturing is not undergoing some expansion at the 
national level, there would appear to be little chance of expanding 
manufacturing employment and output in the less prosperous regions. 
With such a climate of expansion in the nations manufacturing 
sector, however, the strategy for regional industrial development 
2 
Thomas Wilson, Financial Assistance with Regional Development, 
Atlantic Provinces Research Board, Fredericton, 1964. 
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should incorporate a mechanism for somehow persuading more national 
manufacturing firms to locate their new factories in the poor region. 
In practical terms, however, we lack a proper appreciation 
of the problem parameters. For example, there is no estimate 
available of how many locational decisions are made each year, on 
average, by Canadian manufacturing firms and therefore we do not 
know the total number of such decisions that might be influenced 
by regional location policy. This situation may be contrasted with 
the Scottish case, where the Toothill Committee3 estimated in 1961 that, 
on average, some forty firms came to Scotland each year to establish 
new factory premises. Nor, in a country whose manufacturing 
activity is carried out to a great extent by subsidiaries of United 
States firms, can we be sure that the really important locational 
decisions are not mainly made by the American parent companies in 
their U. S. head offices. 
In the absence of hard statistical information along these 
lines, it is possible merely to theorize about the sort of industrial 
development strategy which would be appropriate to the circumstances 
of Canada's Atlantic Region. For this purpose it may be useful to denote 
three groups of locational decisions: 
(a) those made by manufacturing firms within the Atlantic 
Region; 
(b) those made by Canadian manufacturing firms located in 
other regions (chiefly Ontario and Quebec); 
(c) those made by manufacturing' firms located in other 
countries than Canada, but involving the choice of a 
location within Canada for new production facilities. 
The strategy of location policy is likely to vary among 
these three categories. Group (a) is likely to be easiest to 
influence by public policy carried out at the regional or provincial 
3See 
Chapter 5. 
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level. For firms already operating in the poor region, there will 
be relatively little need to persuade them to consider a regional 
location through, for example, a program of publicity concerning 
the advantages of the area. With these latter these regional firms 
will be familiar by direct experience (as they will be also with 
the area's disadvantages). The main need rather will be to encourage 
such firms to expand their markets, to innovate into new product 
lines, and generally to develop the scope and quality of their 
entrepreneurial capability. Assistance may take a variety of forms, 
of which financial inducements are perhaps not so important - especially 
if it is intended that subsidization be avoided and efficiency is to 
be encouraged. The sort of assistance appropriate to this group of 
firms is more likely to consist of various extension-type services 
provided by a provincial or regional government and its agencies that 
will help such regional firms to recognize, and develop, their 
expansion potential. 
These forms of assistance should be more forthcoming for 
firms which stand reasonable chances of exploiting non-regional 
markets. It is not so appropriate to make them available to firms 
which merely serve a residentiary demand, and have little real prospects 
of breaking into extra-regional markets. 
Group (b) is perhaps the most important to consider. For 
the industrial development of a poor region is likely to come about 
as a "trickling-down" effect (to use Hirschman's terminology) of 
the growth that is taking place in a richer region. There is also 
the consideration that this group of locational decisions can be 
influenced by a national government even if they are not affected 
critically by the policy of the provincial or regional government in 
the poor region itself. Indeed, the greater chances for success if 
the national government is involved is the most powerful argument, 
in pragmatic terms, for making regional industrial development a 
goal of national economic policy. 
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Entrepreneurs in national manufacturing firms are not likely 
to be well acquainted with the potential strengths of a poor region 
as a location for new industrial enterprises. It would seem, 
therefore, that the prime element in a strategy for regional 
industrial development based on influencing the decisions of 
national manufacturing firms (located at present in other, richer 
regions of the national economy) is some method of making such firms 
take a hard, serious look at the possibility of establishing branch 
operations in the poor regions. In the U. K. the system of industrial 
development certificates (I. D. C. 's) serves this purpose. In certain, 
"congested" regions of the British economy, notably London and the 
Midlands, I. D. C. 's are hard to get from the authorities in the Board 
of Trade, while in the so-called "development areas" they are easy to 
come by. Once a firm in a congested region is made aware that an 
I. D. C. will be hard to get, an attempt can then be made by Board of 
Trade officials to persuade the firm to consider locating its expanded 
facilities in a development area - e. g., in Scotland, Wales or 
Northern Ireland. The next step is for the firm's representatives 
to visit these less prosperous' regions to see at first hand what the 
possibilities are for establishing new production facilities there. 
It then becomes possible for development agencies and officials in 
these areas to come into direct contact with manufacturers with a 
definite and direct interest in expanding their enterprises into the 
less prosperous region. They can make their best efforts to induce 
such firms to choose a location in their region by direct contact 
and can deal with such firms on a specific basis by attempting to 
satisfy each firm's special requirements. Thus the I. D. C. serves to 
bring the development agencies of less prosperous regions into direct, 
meaningful contact with firms actually contemplating investment in new 
manufacturing facilities. 
Canada, however, does not have a counterpart to the British 
I. D. C. system. Moreover, in a federation where the attraction of new 
industry is a provincial government responsibility, it is very unlikely 
that the federal government would be willing to impose this sort of 
351. 
control on the expansion of industry in the wealthier, and more 
industrialized, provinces. Thus provincial governments in poor regions 
must adopt some alternative method of inducing national manufacturing 
firms to consider locating their expansion facilities within their 
borders. This alternative is likely to consist of either a suitable 
publicity program emphasizing the advantages of the region as a 
manufacturing location, or the offer of financial incentives as a 
means of overcoming the area's locational disadvantages. Usually 
some combination of the two will be implemented. But it should be 
emphasized that the ability of the poor region to attract the real 
interest of national manufacturing firms is likely to depend to a 
greater extent, at least in the first instance, on an effective 
advertising program than on the scheme of financial incentives which 
it offers. 
A further possibility which has much to commend it, would be 
for the national government to make financial incentives available 
to national manufacturing firms on the express condition that they 
erect their new productive facilities in the poor region. This would 
have the effect of making the industrialization of the poor region a 
national economic objective. Such a policy is more likely to exert an 
impact on national manufacturing firms than any program of publicity 
mounted by a provincial government. But there may be political 
resistance to such an approach by the federal government in view of 
the objections to it that may be encountered in the richer provinces 
where the incentives scheme would not apply. 
Thus a regional industrial development strategy based upon an 
attempt to influence the expansion plans of national manufacturing 
firms will consist, in Canadian circumstances, of two sorts of 
approaches. At the provincial level, the emphasis should be on an 
effective publicity program to make the region's manufacturing 
potential better known to national entrepreneurs, supported by suitable 
financial incentives. At the federal level, if possible, it should also 
include a scheme of financial incentives for manufacturing investment 
conditional upon such investments being made in the poor region(s). 
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For location decisions in Group (c), the same sort of strategy 
could be adopted. Firms in other countries are even less likely than 
national manufacturing firms to have a sound, adequate knowledge of 
the poor region's industrial potential. They are also less likely to 
be influenced by a provincial government's publicity program. It is 
certain, at the same time, that they cannot be forced to consider a 
location in a poor region for any new Canadian operation they may 
have in mind. Here too the best the provincial government can do is hope 
to interest them, in the first instance, in considering such a location - 
and this will depend, as with Group (b) firms, mainly on an effective 
publicity program stressing the advantages of the poor region as a 
location for new industry. Again, also, the province can back up this 
program with the offer of some scheme of financial incentives. As with 
Group (b) also, the provincial effort will be greatly strengthened if 
the federal government actively encourages, through a regional industrial 
incentives scheme, or otherwise, foreign investors establishing new 
Canadian enterprises, to locate their facilities in the poor regions. 
Financial Incentives for Regional Development in Canada 
In Canada many provinces conduct regular publicity programs 
designed partly to interest potential industrial investors in a 
location within their borders. All provinces also provide loans and 
other types of financial assistance to firms establishing new 
manufacturing facilities or expanding existing activities. 
Since 1960 the federal government has also gradually become 
involved in providing fiscal or financial incentives designed to induce 
increased investment in manufacturing in certain less prosperous regions. 
The first move into this type of regional policy came in the 
supplementary budget of December, 1961. A "double depreciation" program 
was instituted to permit a faster write-off of assets acquired to 
produce a product "not ordinarily" manufactured in certain areas of 
the country where unemployment was high. The allowance was equal 
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to the maximum normal depreciation in the first year of the asset's 
existence, but it could be applied in any of the first three years 
after the asset was acquired, or spread over the three-year period. 
To qualify for this type of assistance, areas were required 
to make application to the federal Department of Labour for designation 
as a "surplus manpower area". Twenty-four (24) areas within the Atlantic 
Provinces submitted applications under the program, and as of May 22,1963 
eleven (11) had been designated. 
4 
Thus the program was not actually 
designed to attract industry to the whole Atlantic Region, but only 
to those areas within the region which had applied for, and received, 
designation as "surplus manpower areas". By their very nature these 
areas, moreover, were likely to be the greatest problem areas, with 
the heaviest unemployment, rather than those locations within the 
region with the greatest potential for industrial development. 
Once an area had been designated, firms intending to 
manufacture a new product there were further required to apply to 
the federal Department of Trade and Commerce for certification that 
they qualified for the "double depreciation" assistance. If granted 
this certification, they could then claim the "double depreciation" 
in their annual income tax returns to the Department of National 
Revenue. The administratively cumbersome aspect of the application 
procedure was a further source of criticism for the "double depreciation" 
program. 
The program was short-lived, and it is difficult to assess 
its impact in terms of industrial development on the Atlantic Region. 
APEC reported in its Submission to the Royal Commission on Taxation 
that, as of May 22,1963, the total value of assets approved in the 
region for double depreciation under this program was $7,210,386.5 
4APEC, 
Submission to the Royal Commission on Taxation, Ottawa, 
November 1963 (mimeographed), pp. 28-29. 
5Ibid., 
p. 29. 
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In the Budget of June 1963, a new federal program of 
incentives to manufacturing industries locating in slow growth 
regions was announced. New manufacturing and processing enterprises 
locating in areas of slower growth were to be granted a three-year 
exemption from corporation income taxes. In addition to this "tax 
holiday", such firms were to be permitted, in the fourth and fifth 
years of their operation, to write off the cost of new machinery and 
equipment - in other words, at the rate of 50 percent per annum on a 
straight line basis. Finally, such firms were to be permitted to 
write off the cost of new buildings located in areas of slower growth 
6 
at the rate of 20 per cent per annum, or in as little as five years. 
The instrument for implementing this revised incentives 
program was the new Area Development Agency within a new Department 
of Industry, and its powers were defined in the Department of Industry 
Act, which received royal assent on July 22,1963.7 These powers 
included the preparation and execution of programs and projects to 
improve the economic development of designated areas. 
One of the first tasks undertaken by the new Area Development 
Agency was to recommend which areas should be designated as eligible 
for the new "tax holiday". Accordingly, in September 1963 the 
Government announced the designation of thirty-five areas within 
Canada as "areas of slow growth". The criteria for selecting these 
areas essentially were high levels of unemployment and slow rates of 
growth. Again, the program did not apply to the whole of the Atlantic 
Region because a number of areas within the region had not experienced 
sufficiently high unemployment or sufficiently slow growth and, 
therefore, were not designated. 
6The 
normal write-off under Canadian income tax law is 5 or 10% p. a. 
for buildings on a diminishing balance basis, and 20% p. a. for new 
machinery and equipment, also on a diminishing balance basis. 
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Elizabeth II, c. 3, pp. 59-63. 
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This new program was criticized mainly on two grounds. 
8 
First, 
it was pointed out that the areas designated had been selected by 
reference to criteria which virtually ensured they had particularly 
bleak records of unemployment and growth, without sufficient attention 
having been paid to their prospects for successful development. It 
was argued, especially in an Atlantic Region context, that the most 
promising centres within the region, were not eligible for the tax 
incentives offered. Secondly, it was argued that the provision of 
an income tax holiday would not be likely to have the desired effect 
of stimulating new industrial investment in the designated areas, 
since new manufacturing plants would probably not earn profits at such 
an early stage of their operations. It was not a form of aid which 
would outlast the initial, difficult, settling-in period for new 
plants. 
Professor Thomas Wilson advanced several recommendations in 
his 1964 report to the Atlantic Provinces Premiers which may be 
quoted here: 
(a) "... the proper procedure is to ensure that the areas 
chosen are large enough to include within them what 
are likely centres of industrial growth. Within these 
larger development areas, public investment should be 
so planned as to foster the expansion of the centres of 
growth and special measures, including assistance with 
housing, should be devised in order to facilitate the 
movement of labour towards them. "9 
(b) "In general, direct grants are to be preferred to tax 
inducements. The value of grants can be better assessed 
beforehand, and their receipt will help a firm during 
the difficult settling-in period. Grants can also be 
used more selectively than tax incentives. It is, 
therefore, recommended that the federal government 
8See, 
e. g., APEC, op. cit.; T. Wilson, Financial Assistance with 
Regional Development, Atlantic Provinces Research Board, Fredericton, 
1964,, pp. 20-44, and Brewis, T. N., Regional Economic Policies in 
Canada, Macmillan, 1969, Chapter 7. 
9Wilson, 
op. cit., p. 69 
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should provide grants towards the cost of fixed 
capital in the Atlantic Provinces in preference to 
the remission of corporation tax. ... The value of 
the grants should not be reduced by a corresponding 
deduction from the amount a firm can claim in 
subsequent years against depreciation. " 
Although the nature of the tax concessions was changed, 
and although the individual areas no longer had to apply for 
designation, the changes did not remove the basis for the earlier 
criticism that the program concentrated on small areas of heavy 
unemployment (or slow growth in employment). This criticism was 
contained in the A. P. E. C. submission to the Royal Commission on 
Taxation, and was among several comments on this program made 
by Professor Wilson in his report to the Atlantic Provinces Research 
Board in 1964. Professor Wilson went further, however, and suggested 
that even if the whole Atlantic region were designated, "the concession 
would still have been too small" because many new manufacturing operations 
are unlikely to attain a profitable level of operation only three years 
after their establishment. 
12 
This consideration is the more important 
too, he noted, since the tax holiday did not apply to extensions of 
existing factories. For these and other reasons, largely concerned 
with administrative and accounting difficulties, "a tax holiday is 
not a satisfactory substitute" for other possible inducement devices. 
The alternative favoured by Professor Wilson was direct capital 
grants. Proposals based on Professor Wilson's recommendations 
were submitted by the Nova Scotia Government to the Atlantic Develop- 
ment Board in 1964.13 
101bid., 
pp. 70-71. 
11 
Ibid., pp. 61-2. 
12Ibid., 
p. 44. 
13Government 
of Nova Scotia, Submission to the Atlantic Development 
Board, 1964 (mimeographed). 
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In August, 1965, the federal government issued a new list 
of regions qualified under the Area Development Agency program 
chosen on the basis of a new formula which included low family 
incomes as well as high unemployment and slow employment growth, 
in the criteria for designation. On this basis the whole of the 
Atlantic region except the Halifax-Dartmouth labour market area in 
Nova Scotia and Fredericton and Saint John areas in New Brunswick, 
became eligible for assistance. The form of assistance was also 
changed from corporation tax concessions to direct capital grants. 
14 
The grants - one-third of the first $250,000 of capital investment, 
one-quarter of the next $750,000, and one-fifth of any excess over 
$1,000,000, subject to a maximum grant of $5 million - would apply 
to buildings, equipment, water supply, sewage disposal facilities, 
electric power supply, and company-owned wharves and docks. In 
line with Professor Wilson's recommendation, both new firms and 
expansions of existing firms were made eligible to receive them, 
provided the expansion creates income and employment opportunities. 
The changes also incorporated Professor Wilson's further suggestion 
that the grants not be deducted from the capital against which capital 
cost allowances may be claimed for tax purposes. 
15 
Thus direct grants for income and employment generating 
capital investment by new or expanding manufacturing and processing 
firms became available from the federal government throughout 
the whole Atlantic region with the three exceptions of the Fredericton, 
Saint John, and Halifax-Dartmouth labour market areas. The omission 
14The "Tax holiday" would continue to be available until March 
31,1967. Also, firms which so preferred could claim the 
equivalent value of the new capital grants as deductions from 
their income tax liabilities in lieu of accepting direct cash 
grants from the Government. 
15The 
Chronicle-Herald, Halifax, August 6,1965. 
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of the Halifax-Dartmouth'and Saint John "growth centres" from the 
industrial assistance program was criticized at the time by the 
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council. A. P. E. C. noted that these 
two areas were the most populous and the most industrialized centres 
in the entire region, which helped to explain the fact that they 
had higher incomes and lower unemployment than most other areas. 
"Their growth has greatly assisted economic adjustment 
in the region in the past", he said, "by providing jobs 
not only for their own residents but also for former 
rural residents seeking new jobs in the city. 
"Moreover, their growth has resulted in higher income 
and more jobs throughout the wider economic areas which 
surround them. "16 
This revised program of ADA capital grants remained in 
existence until 1969 when the Regional Development Incentives Act 
was passed. Our purpose here is not to assess its overall impact 
on a nationwide basis, but simply to consider the effect it has had 
on the economy of the Atlantic Region. For this purpose it must be 
borne in mind that the program was never designed to meet the 
specific'industrial development needs of the Atlantic Region, although 
the designation of the entire region with the exception of the 
Halifax-Dartmouth, Saint John and Fredericton labour market areas 
made it tempting to consider it a reasonable approximation to such 
a regional program. This was especially the case since the Atlantic 
Development Board - another federal agency whose operations were 
discussed in Chapter 13 above - possessed the power to make equivalent 
assistance to industrial development available in those parts of the 
16As 
reported in The Chronicle-Herald, Halifax, August 7.1965. 
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Atlantic region which had been omitted from the ADA program. 
Nevertheless the fact remains that the ADA incentives were not 
designed particularly to augment the industrial structure of this 
regional economy, but were intended mainly to bring new jobs and 
income to (generally smaller) areas where unemployment was high, 
growth was slow, and family incomes were below average. 
Some indication of the contribution made by the ADA program 
to industrial development in the Atlantic Provinces is contained in 
Table 21. 
Table 21 reveals that some 16,000 jobs were created in the 
Atlantic region under the ADA program. This figure is based upon 
estimates of prospective employment reported by assisted firms to 
the ADA authorities at the time of making application. As such 
it may understate or overstate the number of jobs actually provided 
eventually in the assisted plants. A more serious limitation is 
that some of these jobs would have been created anyway in those cases 
where the new investment would have taken place in the absence of 
the ADA program. 
In summary, perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the ADA 
program, insofar as it applied to the Atlantic Provinces, was its 
failure to incorporate a "growth centres" approach to industrial 
development. Professor Wilson, in his 1964 report, had based his 
recommendation regarding the specific types of incentives to be employed, 
on the general principle that industrial development assistance should 
be available in the major population centres in the region, to which 
migrants from the depressed rural areas could be attracted, and whose 
growth should be fostered by a policy of concentrating the provision 
of infrastructure in such growth centres. Such a policy is necessary 
as a means of persuading prospective industrialists to establish new 
production facilities in less prosperous regions, for it is only in 
the more progressive urban environments of such regions that there is 
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any real hope of finding, or creating, the sort of economic conditions 
within which new industries can take root, grow and prosper. only in 
such growth centres can new industrial firms begin to duplicate the 
"external economies" already available to them in the major population 
centres of the rich regions. Such "external economies" are perhaps 
far more important than any financial incentives in determining the 
location of new manufacturing enterprises. 
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CHAPTER 15 
New Measures: The Department of Regional Economic Expansion 
It is necessary now to make some note of the more recent 
changes which have taken place in Canadian regional policy, to 
assess their significance for the Atlantic Provinces - the region 
with which I have been particularly concerned, and to comment 
briefly - and generally - on the extent to which these changes are 
consistent with the recommendations advanced in previous chapters. 
These changes may be discussed under four main headings: 
(a) the establishment, by the federal government, of a 
new Department of Regional Economic Expansion; 
(b) the institution of a new program of financial 
incentives for industry under the Regional Development 
Incentives Act; 
(c) the designation of certain "special areas" to be the 
subject of more intensive federal-provincial development 
planning and expenditure programs; and 
(d) the establishment of an Atlantic Development Council 
to take over responsibilities somewhat similar to 
those formerly carried by the Atlantic Development Board. 
The Department of Regional Economic Expansion 
Canada elected another Liberal Government in April 1968, this 
time with a new leader in the person of Pierre Elliott Trudeau. One 
of the principal themes during the preceding election campaign was the 
need to promote greater national unity. In a post-election interview 
362 
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the new Prime Minister cited three main policy issues whose successful 
resolution would be necessary if the goal of greater national unity 
was to be achieved: 
(1) the fear in a lot of French-Canadians that their 
cultural identity was being destroyed; 
(2) the under-development of the Atlantic Provinces; 
(3) a sense of alienation which had developed at the 
other end of the country, because of the increased 
affluence and because of the geographic distance. 
1 
The elevation of the problems confronting the Atlantic Provinces' 
economy to the same high order of priority accorded the difficulties 
associated with French Canada, is significant in itself, but the 
statement seemed also to reflect the intentions of the newly elected 
Government for their legislative programme. It appeared also the 
emphasis was to be placed on promoting development rather than 
welfare in the Atlantic region: "... if the underdevelopment of the 
Atlantic Provinces is not corrected - not by charity or by subsidies 
but by helping them become areas of economic growth - then the unity 
of the country is almost as surely destroyed as it would be by the 
French-English confrontation., 
2 
The following year a new federal Department of Regional Economic 
Expansion was established, under the authority of Part IV of the 
Government Organization Act, 1969.3 This legislation gave the Minister 
of Regional Economic Expansion broad powers relating to "economic 
expansion and social adjustment in areas requiring special measures 
to improve opportunities for productive employment and access to those 
lInterview 
of Prime Minister Trudeau by Peter Newman, as reported 
in Saint John, N. B., "Telegraph Journal", April 27,1968. 
Ibid., 
3Chapter 28, Statutes of Canada, 1968-69,17-18 
Elizabeth II, assented to 28th March, 1969. 
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opportunities. " It also provided for the integration within the 
new Department of a number of separate regional development programs 
authorized by earlier legislation and administered previously by 
various federal departments and agencies. These included the 
financial incentives for regional development offered by the Area 
Development Agency, discussed in Chapter 14 above. In general, the 
new Department represented an effort to combine, and coordinate, all 
federal programs and legislation relating to regional economic 
development in Canada. It would be concerned with all regions of the 
country, including the Atlantic Provinces. 
In a statement to the House of Commons on March 21,1969, 
the Minister-designate of Regional Economic Expansion, Hon. Jean 
Marchand, outlined the programs which his new Department intended to 
pursue, as follows: 
(1) to improve opportunities for industrial employment, 
new legislation would be introduced to replace the ADA 
program. "This program will be especially important 
for Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and eastern Quebec, 
though it will be of considerable importance to slow 
growth areas in all provinces. " 
(2) to work out, with the provinces, plans for the economic 
and social development of the main centres within slow- 
growth regions. Federal resources would be made available 
to help these centres respond to growth opportunities. 
(3) plans to encourage and help the development of medium 
sized and small towns as trading centres and smaller 
industrial centres, especially on the prairies. 
(4) with provinces and local groups, plans for development 
and adjustment in rural areas of eastern Canada, 
including the further improvement of those already 
undertaken under the Fund for Rural Economic Development 
Act, 1966. 
(5) the P. E. I. plan, covering a whole province, is a special 
case. There will be another special plan for a whole 
province in the case of Newfoundland. 
(6) with provincial co-operation and local involvement, 
special plans to combat the problems of areas where 
Indian and Metis people are a large proportion of the 
population. 
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(7) improved transportation will be an important element of 
the proposed Newfoundland plan. There will also be a 
long-range transportation plan for Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick that will include federal assistance for trunk 4 
highways and federal action for some major port development. 
(8) resource development programs on the prairies, to be 
coordinated eventually with social development programs. 
(9) rural resource development and rationalization in Ontario 
and British Columbia through the Agricultural and Rural 
Development Act. 
(10) to work with the provinces in certain areas where tourism 
offers one of the main prospects for improved employment 
and earnings. 
In concluding his statement the Minister noted that the new 
department is, "in effect, merely a framework". The success, of its 
efforts would depend upon the availability of financial resources, 
the soundness of the various plans and programs, the co-operation of 
other federal departments and agencies, and the co-operation of the 
provincial governments concerned. 
That the new government intended to attach a high priority to 
its regional development program was indicated not only by the Prime 
Minister's statement already referred to, but also by the appointment 
of Honourable Jean Marchand to be Minister of Regional Economic 
Expansion. Mr. Marchand is a senior member of the Government, the 
acknowledged leader of the Quebec wing in the federal Cabinet, and a 
close confidant of the Prime Minister himself. 
4The 
new Minister of Regional Economic Expansion went on to say: "I 
think one point that was raised many times during the debate was some 
Hon. Members were afraid that what we were spending now, partly 
through the Atlantic Development Board, on infrastructures would be 
eliminated in future. This is not true. I hope we will spend more 
than we have been spending for this purpose under A. D. B. because 
there is no doubt in my mind that it is useless to think of economic 
development for certain regions or cities if the infrastructures 
in those regions or cities are not built or rebuilt. Therefore, we 
require authority to do this. It is clear from the statute that 
public works and facilities are available to this end. As I say, we 
do not intend to do less than the A. D. B. used to do in the Maritimes; 
I hope it will be more, much more. " 
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The Regional Development Incentives Act 
As Mr. Marchand had noted, the legislation establishing the 
new Department provided a framework, but did not specify very clearly 
the nature of the development program to be pursued in the Atlantic 
Provinces and other regions of the Canadian economy. The first major 
indication of the type of program contemplated came with the passage 
of the Regional Development Incentives Act, which was assented to 9th 
July, 1969. 
This act authorized the Minister of Regional Economic 
Expansion to award development incentives to firms proposing to 
establish a new facility or to expand or modernize an existing 
facility in a designated region, subject to the Act and regulations 
made thereunder. The program was to run from August 7,1969 to 
December 31,1976. 
"Designated regions" were to be determined by the Governor- 
in-Council after consultation with the Province(s) concerned, for a 
period to be specified in the order. They might comprise the whole 
of a province, or any portion thereof not less than 5,000 square 
miles in size. To be designated, a region would have to be considered 
"to require special measures to facilitate economic expansion and 
social adjustment". This would involve the application of two more 
specific criteria, namely: 
(1) existing opportunities for productive employment in the 
region would have to be exceptionally inadequate; and 
(2) the provision of development incentives under this Act 
for the establishment of new facilities or the expansion 
or modernization of existing facilities in the region 
could be expected to make a significant contribution to 
"economic expansion and social adjustment" within the 
region. 
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On August 7,1969 the Minister announced the boundaries of 
the regions designated, by the Governor-in-Council, for the period 
from August 7,1969 to July 1,1972. Some regions were designated 
in all ten provinces. In the case of the Atlantic Provinces the 
entire region, with the exception of Newfoundland Labrador, was 
designated. Thus, to all practical intents and purposes, the Regional 
Development Incentives Act was made applicable throughout the Atlantic 
region and became in effect, the main, basic part of federal regional 
development policy there. 
Under the legislation there would be two types of development 
incentive: 
(1) a primary development incentive available for the 
establishment, expansion or modernization of a 
facility; and 
(2) for a new facility, or the expansion of an existing 
facility to enable the manufacturing or processing of 
a product not previously manufactured or processed in 
the operation, a secondary development incentive. 
Maximum amounts were established for both types of incentive. For 
the primary development incentive, the maximum would be 20 per cent 
of approved capital costs or $6,000,000, whichever is less. Secondary 
development incentives were not to exceed 5 per cent of approved 
capital costs, plus $5,000 "for each job determined by the Minister 
to have been created directly in the operation". 
In cases where both primary and secondary incentives could 
be awarded, total assistance was not to exceed: 
(a) $30,000 "for each job determined by the Minister to 
have been created directly in the operation"; 
(b) $12,000,000; or 
(c) one-half of the capital to be employed in the operation; 
whichever is least. 
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Unlike the previous grants provided by the Area Development 
Agency, the development incentives under the new legislation were 
not to be awarded automatically on the basis of any clearly specified 
formula. Rather, one important feature of the new program consisted 
in the considerable discretion afforded the Minister of Regional 
Economic Expansion in evaluating applications and awarding grants. 
Perhaps the most pointed aspect of his discretionary powers lies in 
his authority to determine the amount of the incentive to be awarded 
in each particular case. In addition to stipulating the maximum 
amounts that may be awarded, the Act requires that the Minister take 
the following factors into account when determining the amount of 
an individual grant: 
(a) the extent of the contribution that the establishment, 
expansion or modernization of the facility would make 
to economic expansion and social adjustment in the 
designated region; 
(b) the probable cost to provincial, municipal or other 
public authorities of providing services or utilities 
required for or in connection with the facility; 
(c) the amount or present value of any federal, provincial 
or municipal assistance given or to be given, other than 
under this Act, in respect of the establishment, expansion 
or modernization of the facility; 
(d) the probable cost of preventing or eliminating any 
, significant air, water or 
other pollution that could result 
from the establishment, expansion or modernization of the 
facility; 
(e) in the case of any proposal to establish or expand a 
facility constituting the necessary components of a 
processing operation, whether the resources to be 
exploited would be adequate, on a sustained-yield basis, 
to support the facility together with existing facilities 
that utilize the same resources; and 
(f) such other factors relating to the economic and social 
benefits and costs of the facility as the Minister 
considers relevant. 
369. 
These factors, although seemingly rather general in nature, 
do provide some guidelines for the Minister to follow in awarding 
incentives. But the inclusion of the last, "residual" factor clearly 
gives the Minister great scope for introducing other factors as well. 
The overall effect would seem to be that the Minister, and his 
Departmental officials, are in a position to exercise considerable 
discretion in the awarding of grants. Conversely, of course, he 
would also be able to adopt a closely regulated or highly legalistic 
method of administration if he should choose to do so. Thus the actual 
operation of the grants' program would be guided largely by Ministerial, 
or Government, policy, and therefore subject to change from time to 
time, rather than dictated by the legislation itself. 
The definition of "facility" given in the Act indicates that 
the development incentives program is aimed mainly at secondary 
manufacturing. "Facility" means the structures, machinery and 
equipment that constitute the necessary components of a manufacturing 
or processing operation, other than an initial processing operation 
in a resource-based industry. It would appear from the Regulations 
that the latter clause is intended primarily to exclude the production 
of mineral concentrates from ores, the manufacture of wood pulp and 
newsprint, and oil refining, from eligibility under the program. 
Thus the Regional Development Incentives Act provides a 
program of capital grants to manufacturing and processing operations 
establishing, expanding or modernizing facilities that applies 
throughout the Atlantic Provinces (except Newfoundland Labrador). The 
amount of each grant is related to the size of the capital investment 
involved, and in some cases also the number of jobs to be created, but 
subject in all cases to the discretion of the Minister of Regional 
Economic Expansion (and his officials). In the case of newly 
established facilities, the grants may run as high as 50 per cent 
of the capital to be employed in the operation - which is a level of 
assistance that is high by comparison with grants offered under regional 
development programs in other countries. 
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The Regional Development Incentives Act is generally intended 
to affect the location of manufacturing investment, to direct some 
industrial expansion from growth regions to the development regions. 
Although the industrial development certificate (I. D. C. ) used in 
Britain to prevent the expansion of industry in certain "congested" 
regions is not incorporated in the Canadian program, it could well 
prove to be the case that provision of grants as high as 50 per cent 
of capital costs, is sufficiently generous to serve as an effective 
substitute. 
It is not generally recognized that the program is also 
likely to raise the level of manufacturing investment in Canada 
generally. Thus, for example, some firms in Toronto may well have 
projects they could carry out but in which - to put it in Keynesian 
terms - the marginal efficiency of capital is less than the rate of 
interest. Without the incentives program, these projects would simply 
not be undertaken. With the incentives, however, the marginal 
efficiency of capital is increased, and more projects now become 
profitable, only on condition that they be located in other regions. 
To the extent that firms in the expansion regions respond to these 
additional investment opportunities, the effect of the incentives 
program can be to raise the level of industrial investment in the 
national economy. 
"Special Areas" and Growth Centres 
The Government Organization Act, 1969, also provides for 
the designation, by the Governor-in-Council, of so-called "special 
areas". These would be designated after consultation with the 
provincial government concerned. They are described in the legislation 
as "any area ... that is determined to require, 
by reason of the 
exceptional inadequacy of opportunities for productive employment of 
the people of that area or of the region of which that area is a part, 
special measures to facilitate economic expansion and social adjustment". 
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Section 25 of the Act further authorizes the Minister of 
Regional Economic Expansion to formulate plans "for the economic 
expansion and social adjustment" of special areas and, subject to 
the approval of the Governor-in-Council, to provide for coordination 
in the implementation of those plans by other federal departments 
and agencies and to carry out aspects of those plans which cannot 
be undertaken by other federal departments and agencies. The 
formulation of such plans is to be done in cooperation with other 
federal departments and agencies, and the Act stipulates there is to 
be "appropriate cooperation" with the Provinces concerned in both the 
formulation and implementation of plans for special areas. 
In addition, the Minister is authorized under Section 26 to 
formulate a plan of "economic expansion and social adjustment" in 
a special area jointly with the provincial government concerned. With 
the approval of the Governor-in-Council, he may also enter into an 
agreement with a Province for the joint carrying out of such a plan. 
Such federal-provincial agreements may provide for the use of the 
services and facilities of other federal departments and agencies, 
for federal sharing of the costs of programs and projects to be under- 
taken by the provincial government, and for the joint federal-provincial 
incorporation of an agency (or agencies) to implement or undertake 
programs and projects in the "special area". These federal-provincial 
special-purpose agencies would be jointly controlled by Canada and 
the provincial government concerned. 
Section 27 provides specific authorization for the Minister, 
with the approval of the Governor-in-Council, to enter into agreements 
with the provinces for the payment of grants or loans towards the 
capital cost of establishing, expanding or modernizing "any work 
or facility" for the economic expansion of a special area. Before 
such agreements can be entered into, however, the Minister must be 
satisfied both that the project concerned is essential-to the 
successful implementation of a "special area" plan, and that assistance 
is required to enable the project to be carried out. 
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Finally, the Minister is empowered by Section 28 also to 
provide certain kinds of assistance towards the establishment, 
expansion or modernization of "commercial undertakings" in a special 
area. As with the capital assistance to provincial government works 
and facilities, the Minister must be satisfied both that the project 
concerned is essential to the successful implementation of a "special 
area plan", and that special assistance is required for the project 
to proceed. The types of assistance covered here are: 
(a) federal guarantees of loans (principal and interest) 
required to finance the establishment, expansion 
or modernization of the undertaking concerned; 
(b) federal grants or loans towards the capital costs so 
incurred; or 
(c) "settling-in" grants, i. e., towards those costs of bringing 
into production and operating, for the first three years, 
the new, expanded or modernized undertaking, that are 
attributable to factors associated with the location of 
the undertaking in the "special area". 
The availability of financial assistance to "commercial 
undertakings" under Section 28 of the Government Organization Act 
is severely restricted, however, by Section 14 of the Regional 
Development Incentives Act. If the commercial undertaking is eligible 
to receive a development incentive under the latter legislation, that 
is, if the undertaking is a manufacturing or processing operation of 
the eligible type and the "special area" is located within, or 
synonymous with, a "designated region", then a federal loan guarantee 
may be negotiated only if the approved capital costs of the undertaking 
would exceed: 
(a) $75,000 for each job directly created, or 
(b) $30,000,000. 
Moreover, in such circumstances, neither federal capital loans or 
grants, nor "settling-in" grants, may be paid to commercial undertakings 
in special areas under the Government Organization Act. The effect 
of this restriction is to eliminate the possibility of "settling-in" 
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grants for manufacturing and processing facilities in "special areas", 
and to subject this type of undertaking to the maximum amounts 
available under the Regional Development Incentives Act. 
5 
In March 1970 the Department of Regional Economic Expansion 
announced the designation of 22 "special areas" across Canada. All 
provinces were affected except Prince Edward Island and British 
Columbia. Twelve of the "special areas" were located in the Atlantic 
Region - two in New Brunswick, two in Nova Scotia, and eight in 
Newfoundland. 
Six of the Newfoundland "special areas" were selected in 
order to develop their potential as population resettlement centres 
for persons moving from the province's outports. Their designation 
would permit federal financial assistance, in particular, for the 
community development facilities required to accommodate the influx 
of new population. 
The other six "special areas" apparently have been chosen 
for development as industrial growth centres. They are all medium- 
sized or large urban centres with the exception of the Strait of 
Canso area in Nova Scotia. The others are Halifax-Dartmouth in Nova 
Scotia, Saint John and Moncton in New Brunswick, and St. John's and 
Corner Brook in Newfoundland. In these locations the initial 
emphasis has been placed on the construction of infrastructure 
facilities expected to be required by incoming industrial enterprises. 
Federal-provincial agreements have been negotiated which provide for 
federal assistance with such expenditures. In New Brunswick, for 
example, a special Canada-New Brunswick growth centre committee has 
been established to coordinate the development planning for Saint John 
and Moncton; and it is comprised of senior officials of both the 
federal and provincial governments, and employs a full-time Executive 
Secretary and supporting staff. 
SThere 
are no maximum amounts specified in the legislation for grants 
under the Government Organization Act. 
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The omission of Prince Edward Island from the "special 
areas" program was doubtless influenced by the fact that a 
comprehensive development plan, negotiated under the Fund for 
Rural Economic Development Act, had been signed in March 1969. 
Thus P. E. I. was already a special kind of "special area". 
The Atlantic Development Council 
One of the former agencies absorbed in the new Department 
of Regional Economic Expansion was the Atlantic Development Board, 
whose activities were examined in Chapter 13. The Government 
Organization Act, 1969, provided at the same time, however, for the 
establishment of an Atlantic Development Council. 
The Council consists of a membership of no more than eleven, 
appointed to reflect the economic structure of the Atlantic Provinces 
after consultation with the provincial governments and other 
organizations in the region. Unlike the former A. D. B., the Council 
is entirely an advisory body. Its function is "to advise the Minister, 
in respect of the Atlantic region, on matters to which the duties, 
powers and functions of the Minister extend ... 
". 
More specifically, the Council is charged by the Act "to give 
consideration to, and make reports and recommendations to the Minister 
on: 
"a) plans, programs and proposals for fostering the economic 
expansion and social adjustment of the Atlantic region; 
"b) the feasibility of particular programs and projects and 
the contribution those programs and projects will make 
to the economic expansion and social adjustment of the 
Atlantic region; and 
"c) such other matters ... as the Minister may refer to 
the Council for its consideration. " 
The Council has a full-time Secretary and employs a small 
staff. Its operations are financed from funds appropriated by 
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Parliament to the Department of Regional Economic Expansion. Most 
of the staff formerly employed by the A. D. B. have been absorbed in 
the new Department, which includes a Planning Division. 
In January 1971 the Atlantic Development Council submitted 
"A Strategy for the Economic Development of the Atlantic Region, 1971- 
1981", to the Minister of Regional Economic Expansion. This document 
was published soon afterwards, and contains a comprehensive analysis 
of the development opportunities and problems confronting the Region. 
Concluding observations 
It is perhaps too soon to attempt a critical appraisal of the 
new program of regional development in Canada as it affects the 
Atlantic Provinces. For one thing, the program itself is still 
emerging through the time-consuming process of federal-provincial 
negotiation. Also, experience with the new incentives program, 
recent and limited, is insufficient basis for analyzing its 'impact 
on the region. Moreover, some of the capital expenditure programs - 
for infrastructure in "special areas", for example - can only be 
expected to exert their effects over a period of several years. 
Nevertheless it is possible to offer a few general observations 
regarding the implications of the new federal approach for the 
Atlantic Provinces, and to comment on whether the revised program 
may be considered consistent with the conclusions put forth in 
previous chapters. 
The absorption of the Atlantic Development Board into the 
Department of Regional Economic Expansion means that there is no 
longer a separate federal program directed specifically at the 
economic problems of the Atlantic Provinces. Any regrets at this 
outcome must be tempered, however, by a recognition that the problem 
of regional disparities in Canada generally has been given nation-wide 
prominence and a much greater priority among the objectives of federal 
economic policy. Also, the region has retained some degree of special 
treatment with the establishment and efforts of the Atlantic Development 
Council. 
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The departure of the A. D. B. does seem to imply, however, some 
diminution of the federal acceptance of responsibility for preparing 
an overall plan for the development of the Atlantic region. The 
Atlantic Development Council has set itself the important, but less 
ambitious, task of devising a development strategy for the regional 
economy. on the other hand, the geographic framework for planning 
by the Department proper, in consultation with the provinces, 
apparently has shifted from the multi-province region to subprovincial 
regions of the "special area" type. 
In the absence of overall planning, and notwithstanding the 
strategy recommendations advanced in 1971 by the Atlantic Development 
Council, the focus for assessing the likely impact of the new federal 
policy must shift to the programs actually being carried out by the 
Department of Regional Economic Expansion. The latter have included, 
in their emerging form, the elements of industrial incentives and 
growth centres recommended above, along with other elements as well. 
By and large, the main objective appears to be to make the Atlantic 
Provinces more self-supporting in an economic sense, since the 
emphasis is clearly on promoting development of the regional economy 
and not on re-distributing income. Obviously, also, the program is 
aimed particularly at expanding the size of the region's manufacturing 
sector. In general terms, then, the new program is quite consistent 
with the proposals advanced in previous chapters. 
It is not clear, however, whether the more fundamental 
objective of increasing interregional trade in commodities through 
increasing interregional complementarity of factor equipment, as 
discussed in Part I above, has been recognized. It is true that the 
provision of capital grants to industry can be regarded as consistent 
with this principle, but other objectives besides increased inter- 
regional complementarity could also be used as a basis of justification 
for offering this type of inducement. The point here is that this 
important objective can only be pursued in the course of administering 
the incentives program. The new policy framework certainly permits the 
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application of this criterion. Indeed, because the federal government 
operates the program on a nation-wide basis, and because the scale 
of incentives offered seems generous enough to have an effect on most 
industrial investment decisions being contemplated within Canada, the 
program offers a significant opportunity to institute a policy of 
actively promoting increased interregional complementarity. 
As regards the financial incentives to industry, the whole 
Atlantic region (except Newfoundland Labrador) has been designated as 
eligible. This represents a considerable improvement over the 
situation that existed under the previous A. D. A. program, when the 
region's major population centres were not covered. With the new 
program the framework has thus been created within which a growth 
centres approach to industrial development can be pursued. 
The industrial incentives take the form mainly of capital 
grants, as proposed, and the discretion afforded the Minister in 
their administration should enable a considerable degree of flexibility. 
But the grants have not been made eligible for subsequent depreciation 
against income tax liabilities, contrary to the suggestion made by 
Professor Wilson in 1964. There are no tax concessions included in the 
federal program, nor is there any specific provision for industrial 
estates and advance factories. Presumably, however, the opportunity 
exists to include the latter in the infrastructure programs for the 
"special areas" to be developed as growth centres. 
Whether or not a growth centres approach is to be effectively 
or adequately implemented, however, remains to be seen. The use to 
date of the "special areas" device would seem to point in this 
direction. But much will depend on the nature of the infrastructure 
and other expenditures under the federal-provincial agreements for the 
"special areas" and, more generally, on whether the proper approach 
is taken to planning the development of the growth centres themselves. 
Much will depend too, as already noted, on whether the administrators 
of the industrial incentives take adequate account of the desirability 
of increasing the extent of interregional complementarity between the 
Atlantic and other regions of the Canadian economy. 
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Finally, it should perhaps be repeated that the success of 
the new Canadian regional development effort will depend, to a 
considerable extent, on whether there is growth and expansion in 
the Canadian economy at large. The emphasis of the regional effort 
is on industrial investment to create employment, and on diverting a 
portion of this investment to less prosperous regions, including 
the Atlantic Provinces. Without a high level of investment nationally 
to give rise to an adequate flow of investment decisions by the private 
sector, such an approach to regional development stands little chance 
of achieving the desired effects. This, of course, is what makes 
regional development policy a long-term activity for the federal 
government, the Provinces, and - indeed - the private sector. 
CHAPTER 16 
A Recommended Approach to the Economic Development 
of Canada's Atlantic Region 
Introduction 
My main original purpose in undertaking this study was to 
consider what lessons could be drawn from the Scottish experience 
with regional policy and applied to the Canadian scene, particularly 
to development policy for the Atlantic Provinces. The inquiry thus 
started with a very broad field of analysis and it was necessary, 
at an early stage in my research, to choose somewhat more limited 
aspects as a basis for making comparisons. The task of selection 
was considerably facilitated by the simple fact that Scotland's 
situation as a lagging region within the British economy is 
fundamentally different in character from that of the Atlantic region 
within the Canadian economy. Essentially, Scotland's development 
problems are the result of declining tendencies affecting her 
manufacturing industries due to technological change, and the challenge 
for policy is to replace these industries with new ones, whereas 
the Atlantic Provinces depend more on primary, resource-based 
activities but have not industrialized to any appreciable extent. 
There the policy task is to get the industrialization process underway. 
Thus the two regional economies have rather different structures, and 
although both display the same sort of symptoms of regional retardation 
such as higher unemployment and lower average income, there seemed 
little purpose to be served in making detailed comparisons of them. 
What they do have in common, nevertheless, is a need to encourage 
the growth of new industrial activity. Since this policy objective 
has been recognized and pursued in Scotland since the 19301x, whereas 
Canadian efforts with regional policy are much more recent, it 
appeared to be only sensible to examine the Scottish experience with 
such policy. In other words, the purpose of the study became that of 
examining Scottish regional policy to see whether, and to what extent, 
it would be applicable in the somewhat different circumstances of the 
Atlantic Provinces' economy. 
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At the same time, it seemed necessary to conduct the analysis 
within some sort of theoretical framework. Unfortunately, however, 
regional development theory is not far advanced, a reflection perhaps 
of the relative youth of this branch of economic theory: the effort 
to devise regional policy has preceded, and stimulated, the evolution 
of theoretical constructs. A number of concepts have been borrowed, 
however, from other branches of economic theory and sometimes applied 
without much regard for whether they are suitable for effective 
transplantation. Against this general background it seemed sensible 
to undertake a review of certain theoretical contributions to the 
regional economics literature, and to develop a number of working 
assumptions from this review as a basis for the comparative study of 
policy in Scotland and the Atlantic Provinces. The theoretical review 
is contained in Part I above. 
Another decision was to concentrate on regional development 
policy at a broad, comprehensive level or, in other words, to deal 
with these regional economies at macroeconomic level. This was 
because the examination of policy affecting the Atlantic Provinces' 
economy had not yet been treated from such an overall viewpoint. 
Recent studies have been concerned with explaining, in a statistical 
sense, the disparity which exists between this region and Canada 
generally, with measuring the forces of change in the regional economy, 
or with particular aspects or sectors of the regional economy. 
Such studies contribute, of course, to a better understanding of the 
regional problem. But my special interest was in shedding some light 
on the question of whether policy towards this regional economy has 
been appropriate. It is just possible that the policy framework has 
been basically unsuitable for accelerated development of the regional 
economy. 
Similarly, it was necessary to choose some focus for the 
analysis of Scottish experience. Tice policy framework was found to 
consist primarily of physical planning carried out by the Scottish 
Development Department, and the location of industry policy of the 
United Kingdom Government as executed in Scotland by the Board of 
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Trade. This framework is a more explicit basis for development policy 
in Scotland's case than in the case of other British regions in view 
of the existence of special Scottish departments of government at 
Edinburgh under the Secretary of State of Scotland. In a sense, 
this arrangement makes Scotland more comparable to the Atlantic 
region, whose four provinces comprise units in the Canadian federal 
system of government. 
My research was greatly stimulated by the opportunity afforded 
me in 1966-67 by the Scottish Development Department to assess the 
process of selecting "growth areas" for Central Scotland in 1963. 
This exercise marked an important turning point in Scottish regional 
policy, and represented, among other things, an attempt to integrate 
physical planning programs and industrial development policy. The 
adoption of a "growth areas" policy by the Government of the day also 
involved a decision to pursue a more comprehensive approach to regional 
development. My analysis of the selection process of 1963 provides the 
basis for Part II above. 
Thus the pattern of this study evolved. Part I, as already 
noted, reviews certain theoretical aspects of regional economic 
development. In Part III, an attempt is made to specify the real 
nature of the development problem confronting Canada's Atlantic Region, 
and to examine the type of policy response to which it has given rise 
in the past. This examination includes, in Chapter 13, an original 
analysis of the activities of the Atlantic Development Board, a federal 
agency established in 1962 specifically to stimulate the economic 
growth of the Atlantic Provinces. Part II contains the analysis of 
regional development policy in Scotland, particularly of the significance 
of the "growth areas" approach adopted in 1963. 
It remains to integrate these three Parts into a coherent whole; 
this is the purpose of the present chapter. The approach used is to 
develop a set of recommendations regarding the future development of 
the Atlantic Provinces' economy in the light of both the theoretical 
findings of Part I and an interpretation of the Scottish experience as 
covered in Part II. 
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The Case for Regional Development Policy 
The Atlantic Provinces have been characterized as a lagging 
region, exhibiting the usual symptoms of regional retardation such 
as higher unemployment and underemployment, lower labour force 
participation rates, lower per capita income and output, a high rate 
of emigration, and a generally lower average standard of living. 
There is a disposition prevalent in Canada which favours the pursuit 
of policies to reduce "interregional disparities" of this kind. In 
general, however, the policies which have been adopted involve an 
attempt to raise standards of living in the lagging region through the 
redistribution of income on an interregional basis by such means as 
transfer payments to persons, tax equalization payments, unconditional 
and conditional grants to provincial governments in the region by 
the federal government, and the provision of various public services 
on more or less the same standard of quality as is available elsewhere 
in Canada. In other words, policy towards the Atlantic Provinces has 
leaned heavily towards the redistribution of national income and has 
not emphasized the development of the region's own economy. The 
attitude implicit in this approach to policy is that the Atlantic 
Provinces will continue to be a lagging region within the Canadian 
economy requiring continuing support from the rest of the country. 
Related to this approach to policy is a fairly widespread 
attitude that there is little real chance of making the regional 
economy viable by encouraging and promoting its further development and 
growth. This attitude is clearly exemplified in the writings of Anthony 
Scott which were discussed above in Chapter 2. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the-federal government did not become active in 
regional development policy until the 1960's. By then the attitude 
towards encouraging the internal economic development of Canada's main 
lagging region, the Atlantic Provinces, had become more receptive and 
more positive. 
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Since the purpose of this chapter is to consider a suitable 
approach to the future development of the Atlantic Region economy, it 
will be well to begin by reviewing the case for regional development 
policy generally. 
I have argued, in Chapter 4 above, that regional economic 
development should become a long term objective for the nation as a 
whole. This contention is based not on "economic" arguments, but on 
due consideration for the whole social framework within which 
individuals live and pursue activities of various kinds. In a 
democratic society where government assumes some responsibility for 
influencing the conditions in which that society operates, such 
responsibility extends to the various major regions which comprise a 
nation. This means that the national government has a responsibility 
to help create the conditions in which residents of every major 
region can make positive contributions to the economic, social and 
political life of the nation. Regional economic development is an 
important means to achieving this objective, because it involves 
attempting to create, at the regional level, the kind of conditions 
in which regional residents can contribute to national and regional 
life. The economic, social and political goals of a region, after all, 
differ very little from those of the nation of which it forms a part. 
Thus a region's aspirations differ very little from a nation's. 
The attainment and maintenance of regions that are viable 
economically and in other ways, therefore, are matters deserving 
attention from the national government. 
This does not relieve the region of all responsibility for 
its own condition. It must continue to tackle its own problems, and 
to work out proper solutions by its own efforts whenever possible. 
Also, it must accept some share of the responsibility for achieving 
national objectives. In fact, in pursuing its own objectives the 
region should be constrained by the national interest. Its objectives 
must be made consistent with national economic and social objectives, 
as much as possible. 
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This is not to argue that the main concern of regional and 
national governments should be with the region as such, and not with 
the individuals who reside in the region. Quite the contrary; the 
focus of policy-making for a lagging region should be the people who 
live there. This principle applies especially in a development 
context. The purpose of regional economic development is to create 
outlets for the creative energies of the region's people, not merely 
to make the best use of the natural resources which happen to be located 
there. Thus the object of policy for regional development is twofold: 
namely, to provide employment for the region's population who seek 
it and, in this way, to make it possible for them to enjoy a standard 
of welfare comparable with other parts of the same country. In other 
words, regional economic development is concerned with generating 
economic opportunity so that the region can itself support a national 
standard of income and welfare for its individual residents. 
In these terms, regional economic development can be viewed 
as a means of supporting a rising standard of living for the region's 
residents. It is not the only means available for achieving this 
purpose, of course. The logical, extreme alternative would be to 
encourage the further growth and development of richer, more developed 
regions in the national economy, and then to transfer part of the 
income earned in the richer regions to the less prosperous regions. 
As long as growth is sufficiently rapid in the rich regions not only 
to support a rising standard of living there, but also to provide an 
extra "dividend" which can then be redistributed to the poor regions, 
it may even be the case that this alternative offers a more efficient 
way of raising living standards and average welfare in the poor regions. 
That is, a policy of promoting growth in the rich regions, with 
suitable provision for redistributing a portion of the income thereby 
obtained to the poor regions, might even prove a more efficient method, 
from a national viewpoint, of bringing about increases in the living 
standards enjoyed by the residents of the poor region. 
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But the greater efficiency of this approach cannot be assumed 
on a priori grounds. Indeed, the very fact that there is a gap 
between the rich and the poor regions may well mean that there exists 
a greater potential for development in the poor region in the form of 
those investments required to catch up. That is, the poor region 
might be in a position to reap the advantages of being a latecomer. 
Moreover, relying entirely on redistributing the benefits of 
growth in the rich regions would have the effect of relegating 
residents of the poor regions to the status of "poor cousins", dependent 
for their welfare upon the efforts of residents in other regions. In 
the long run such a course of action might prove extremely risky 
for the nation as a whole, since the effort to find economic 
opportunities in the poor regions would be neglected, perhaps even 
abandoned. A failure of growth in the rich regions would, under such 
circumstances, expose the whole nation to stagnation or decline. 
Regional economic development is thus a superior alternative 
for several reasons. First, it may prove to be more efficient than 
redistributing the benefits of growth in other regions. Secondly, it 
reduces the risk associated with relying too heavily on the economic 
performance of a single rich region, or a few such regions. But perhaps 
more important than these considerations is'the implication it holds 
for individual residents of the poor region and their future prospects. 
Regional economic development has a certain dignity not possessed by a 
policy of redistribution, in that it attempts to encourage, and 
capitalize on, the creative energies and efforts of the region's own 
residents instead of merely offering them a certain minimum standard of 
living as a right associated with common citizenship of the same country 
with residents of the rich and growing regions. This is the essence 
of development: to seek out, to encourage, to stimulate people to 
exploit economic opportunities, and then to reward them when they are 
successful in doing so. The premium is on individual effort, talents 
and abilities, and on making the most of them. A policy of regional 
economic development involves a recognition that such individuals, and 
such opportunities, are to be found in any economic region regardless 
of what its present economic status happens to be. 
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A word is in order here about the strength of the national 
government's commitment to the goal of regional economic development. 
In the past regional policy has too often been treated as a minor, 
peripheral policy purpose. Instead, this goal must become a primary 
objective of public policy which receives continuing attention from 
both national and regional governments; only in this way can real 
progress with its attainment be made. 
This basis of justification for regional economic development 
suggests a number of general guidelines for the sort of regional 
policy to be pursued: 
(1) The objective should be to make each major region as 
economically self-supporting as possible. That is, 
each region should produce in total as much as it consumes 
in total. Since regions have differing resource endowments, 
however, they cannot be expected to produce all commodities 
and services with the highest possible efficiency. So 
they resort to trade with one another, exchanging those 
they produce more efficiently for those which other regions 
produce more efficiently. A region will be economically 
self-supporting when it is able to support its consumption 
of all types of goods and services by producing an excess 
of its requirements for those it produces more 
efficiently, sufficient to pay for them. This is not 
the same thing as making each region economically self- 
sufficient in the sense that it produces all its own 
consumption requirements without resort to trade with 
other regions. Specialization in certain lines of 
production, and trade with other regions, are to be expected. 
(2) Programs and projects for regional economic development 
should be assessed on the basis of their likely impact in 
terms of this objective. 
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(3) A policy commitment to eliminate interregional disparities 
entirely should be avoided, for two reasons. First, such 
a commitment runs the risk of dulling the incentives for 
individual enterprise in search of reward, which is one 
of the important elements for any development effort. 
Secondly, it might interfere with interregional and intra- 
regional factor mobility which is a useful adjustment 
mechanism. 
(4) Permanent subsidy of economic activities should be avoided. 
The effort should be concentrated on encouraging and assisting 
activities which show good, long term prospects of 
becoming efficient and self-supporting. 
Technical Aspects of Regional Development 
In terms of "economic" considerations, the justification for 
regional economic development is that the effective use of unused, 
relatively immobile labour resources in the lagging regions contributes 
to increases in national output, and thus to a higher rate of national 
economic growth. It may also be pointed out that failure to pursue 
a regional development policy is not without its costs since this 
alternative, as noted above, involves the national government in 
unemployment insurance payments, a greater degree of social assistance 
programs, transfer payments, and the like. These are telling 
arguments for regional policy. Nevertheless they are probably less 
important, on the whole, than the justification noted above that a 
national government has some responsibility for ensuring that residents 
of each major region have the opportunity to pursue useful lives and 
to contribute to, as well as to enjoy the benefits of, national 
economic progress without necessarily moving to other regions in order 
to do so. 
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It is only when a commitment to regional economic development 
as a policy objective has been accepted by the national government, 
and thus by the nation generally, that the economist can make some 
contribution to understanding the problems confronting a lagging 
region, and to working out policies, programs and projects for their 
solution. My purpose has been to analyze the difficulties facing 
one particular region, the Atlantic Provinces, as a basis for outlining 
the approach to be followed in stimulating this region's economic 
development. Before becoming specific, however, let us consider the 
general implications of the regional economic theory reviewed in 
Part I. 
The technical purpose of regional economic development is to 
foster increased interregional trade in commodities, to enable the 
lagging region to increase its output and thereby earn a higher standard 
of living. If the region is already enjoying a higher standard of 
living than it earns through its own production, as a result of receiving 
transfer payments and other "unearned" income from other regions, it 
should be recognized that even with faster growth, there can be no 
closing of the gap in personal income per capita until such time as 
regional earnings are brought into line with regional income. Thus the 
focus of regional development policy is on output, not income, since 
no overall increase in regional income can be expected until the need 
for interregional income transfers has been eliminated by the 
substitution of productive capacity within the region itself. This 
lack of early direct benefits from a regional development program 
may help explain the difficulty sometimes experienced in gaining 
general support from within the region for such development efforts; 
some people will prefer to seek increases in average welfare instead, 
through larger flows of transfer payments and other "unearned" income 
to the region from outside. This conflict of purpose is evident in 
approaches by provincial governments in the Atlantic region to Ottawa 
for increased assistance both with accelerated regional development and 
in the form of more interregional transfer payments of one kind or 
another. As a long term solution to "regional disparities", federal 
support for accelerated regional development is to be preferred to 
higher transfers, for two main reasons: 
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(1) it will encourage greater self-reliance on the part of 
the affected region and its residents; 
(2) it will be in the national interest to help develop 
regions capable of themselves supporting the average 
standard of welfare enjoyed in the country at large. 
I am assuming that there are development opportunities 
capable of being exploited in the lagging region. Indeed, there is 
no basis for making the opposite assumption in a major economic 
region such as Canada's Atlantic Provinces. If this sort of assumption 
had. been made by the Fathers of Confederation a hundred years ago, 
there would be no Canadian economy today. Economies are man-made 
entities, not results of some "natural" evolutionary process. Basic 
decisions are often involved, and such a basic decision - whether to 
pursue economic development consciously and with vigour - is required 
in the case of the Atlantic Provinces. Once such a decision has been, 
made, the problem resolves itself into seeking out and exploiting such 
development opportunities as do exist. 
In abstract terms, interregional trade in commodities is an 
alternative to interregional factor mobility, of course. This does 
not mean that one must choose one or the other. In fact, some of 
both will continue to be required in the interregional economic 
system, since each is a useful adjustment mechanism for achieving 
greater interregional equality and balance. What is suggested here is 
that the main emphasis should be put on fostering interregional trade 
in commodities as a basis for overcoming the problems of the Atlantic 
Provinces, without placing any restrictions on the migration of labour 
from the Atlantic Provinces to other regions. At the same time, it 
should be expected that there will be some migration of the labour 
factor into the Atlantic Provinces, especially in the case of skilled 
labour. 
To foster increased commodity trade between regions, it will 
be necessary to expand the productive capacity of the lagging region. 
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At present such trade which takes place between the Atlantic Provinces 
and other Canadian regions is largely in one direction only, namely, 
from central Canada to the peripheral Atlantic Provinces. The problem, 
therefore, is to increase the exports of the Atlantic Provinces to 
other Canadian regions and abroad. As a complement to this approach, 
it may be desirable to stimulate some "import substitution" in 
certain lines, i. e., those which can be produced within the peripheral 
region as efficiently and as cheaply as they can be produced in other 
regions and imported into the lagging region. 
Of crucial importance to increased interregional trade in 
commodities is the existence of interregional complementarity of 
factor supplies. That is, as noted in Chapter 3, policy should seek 
to make factor equipment in the lagging region more unequal; in other 
words, the lagging region must be enabled to specialize in certain 
lines of production for the total market comprised of both the 
peripheral and the central regions. This condition has not existed 
in the case of Canada's Atlantic Provinces. For example, the region's 
natural resources are competitive with those of Ontario and Quebec: 
indeed, except in the case of fish and a few selected agricultural 
products, the resource endowment of the Atlantic region is of inferior 
quality compared to that in Ontario and Quebec. The peripheral region 
has managed to develop its natural resources on the basis of export to 
foreign markets, but it is significant that it does not sell them in 
central Canada since these provinces have their own sources of supply. 
The Atlantic region must find, and develop, alternative products which 
it can sell to other Canadian regions. 
The other side of this coin was also noted in Chapter 3. There 
must be a demand in the other regions for the goods to be selected for 
production in the lagging region. In the Canadian case, this may 
require an implicit decision by the richer regions to refrain from 
producing certain commodities so that the lagging region may establish 
a specialization in these lines. This, of course, is a further specific 
reason why the participation of the national government in a regional 
development program is required, since it is rather unlikely that the 
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provincial government(s) of the rich region would accede to this 
suggestion readily. 
Pursuit of a policy which encourages new specializations in 
the lagging region to serve the total market comprised of all regions 
would be consistent with another suggestion made in Chapter 3, namely, 
that policy should seek to reduce any tendencies for further increases 
in total production to be concentrated in the rich regions. In 
Britain, this aspect of regional policy has been made explicit in 
the system of industrial development certificates (I. D. C. 's). 
A further aspect of regional policy is that the economic 
activities to be sited in the lagging region should include some which 
are capable of exploiting economies of scale in producing commodities 
to be traded with richer regions. 
The proper focus for regional policy-making, then, is to 
increase interregional trade on the basis of increasing the inter- 
regional complementarity of factor supplies. This will require a 
selective approach to the commodities in which trade is to be 
fostered. Success with this effort will strengthen Hirschman's 
"trickling-down" effects and thus enable growth to be transmitted 
from the rich regions to the poor regions. Such interregional trade, 
based on complementarity of factor supplies, will-lead eventually to 
a relative increase in the poor region's total supply of productive 
factors. In the Atlantic Provinces case, this increase in productive 
factors seems likely to take three main forms: 
(1) an increase in the capital factor; 
(2) increased entrepreneurial capacity; 
(3) improving quality of the labour factor. 
Long term programmes designed ultimately to influence either 
internal or external sources of supply of these productive factors are 
thus the gist of regional economic policy. 
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It should be noted that the regional development effort need 
not be based upon exploiting whatever natural resources the region may 
possess. If the region's natural resources are complementary to those 
available in other regions, so much the better. If, however, they are 
competitive with those in other regions and of inferior quality, it 
would only constrain the regional development effort still further to 
make them a necessary basis for the region's economic development. 
It would be better in such circumstances to place greater emphasis on 
other types of productive factors in developing increased exports from 
the peripheral region to other regions. 
The Real Nature of the Atlantic Provinces Problem 
According to economic base theory, a region's exports determines 
the size of its internal market and thus the extent of its "residentiary" 
industries which produce the goods and services required by regional 
residents. Those economic activities which sell all or part of their 
output in markets outside the region are termed the region's "economic 
base". Expansion of the regional economy thus depends on increasing the 
size of this economic base, either by increasing the output of present 
exporting activities or by adding new lines of economic activity 
producing for markets outside the region. 
The economic base of the Atlantic Provinces during the 
nineteenth century consisted of wooden shipbuilding and the associated 
carrying trade. When these activities declined, the region lost its 
economic base. In time, another developed to take its place but the 
process of adjustment has been slow and painful. 
The analysis in Chapter 10 revealed that, in 1961, the 
economic base of the Atlantic Provinces economy consisted of Forestry, 
Fishing, Mining, and Public Administration and Defence. The earnings of 
these sectors probably contributed positively to the regions balance 
of payments. A further credit to the balance of payments came in the 
form of the various interregional transfers paid by the federal government 
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to residents of the region and to the four provincial governments, 
as discussed in Chapter 12. These additional export earnings enabled 
the region to import a total volume of goods and services produced 
in other regions that was thus larger than what the region could 
have purchased with the income earned from its exports of goods and 
services. 
In these terms, the problem confronting the Atlantic Provinces 
economy is to expand its economic base. Associated with this need 
is the corresponding desirability of altering the region's present 
status of being a "kept region", dependent for a good part of its 
present standard of living on the generosity of Canadians in other 
regions of the country, exercised through the present system of 
interregional transfer payments. Successful expansion of the region's 
economic base would also serve to integrate the Atlantic Provinces 
more fully within the Canadian economy. 
In Chapter 10 it was shown that of the four basic sectors 
mentioned above, only Public Administration and Defence demonstrated 
any capacity for employment growth during the 1950's. Moreover, the 
growth of this sector was the result of public policy decisions, and 
not indicative of any growth trend in the sector. Such employment 
expansion as did occur in the region was in service-producing 
activities: in two such industries, education and health, the new 
jobs resulted indirectly from an increasing flow of intergovernmental 
transfer payments; the others concerned were of the non-basic, or 
residentiary, type of activity. If one purpose of regional economic 
development is the interregional transmission of growth, then an 
important agent in this regard for the Atlantic Provinces has been 
the federal government through its decisions with regard to the location 
of defence activities and in respect of various payments to the 
provincial governments. But continued reliance on a helpful federal 
government will not suffice as a solution to expanding the economic 
base of the Atlantic Provinces economy. 
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It is contended that the proper means of expanding the region's 
economic base is through stimulating the growth of the region's under- 
developed manufacturing sector. 
Thus the objectives of policy for the economic development of 
the Atlantic Provinces should be: 
(a) to foster the interregional transmission of growth; 
(b) to develop increased interregional trade in commodities, 
based upon greater interregional complementarity of 
factor supplies; 
(c) to expand the region's economic base; 
(d) to stimulate the growth of the region's manufacturing 
sector in lines that can become regional specialities 
and export all or part of their output to other regions 
and abroad; and 
(e) thus to contribute to the achievement both of faster 
national growth and to the more effective deployment 
of-unused labour resources in the Atlantic Provinces. 
Techniques for Industrial Development in the Atlantic Provinces 
It has been argued above that the main particular purpose of 
an Atlantic Provinces development program should be the selective 
expansion of the region's manufacturing sector. This is not intended 
to rule out efforts to increase output and efficiency in resource-based 
activities and other, non-manufacturing sectors; indeed, such efforts 
should be continued and intensified. Also, an important aspect of 
expanding the manufacturing sector may prove to consist of successful 
development and expansion of processing industries which use regional 
raw materials as inputs. In this connection, too, the region should 
support a policy of freer trade that would permit the export of further 
processed resource products, especially to markets in the United States. 
Programs and policies to increase output and the degree of processing 
in the natural resource sectors, however, should not be at the expense 
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of the drive to expand the region's manufacturing sector. The 
addition of new secondary industries to the region's economic base 
should become the prime focus of regional development policy. All 
development efforts should be concerted as much as possible to this 
important major objective. 
In pursuing this objective a necessary assumption will be that 
further growth and development of manufacturing in Canada can be 
expected in future. If this condition is not met, there will be 
little chance of locating new secondary industries in the Atlantic 
region. The problem facing the region may be seen as one of diverting 
a fraction of national manufacturing growth to the Atlantic Provinces. 
Whether or not there is likely to be manufacturing expansion at the 
national level raises a number of important issues', but their 
consideration lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It is recommended that the effort to increase employment and 
expand the region's economic base by stimulating the growth of the 
manufacturing sector should be pursued in two main ways: 
(1) through the development of a number of "growth centres" 
or "growth areas" within the region as locations for 
manufacturing enterprises; and 
(2) through the provision of suitable incentives to stimulate 
the attraction of auch manufacturing enterprises to the 
region. 
Each of these techniques will now be considered in greater detail. 
"Growth Areas" or "Growth Centres" 
As the analysis in Part III revealed, the Scottish "growth 
areas" had four main aspects. First, they offered the intending 
industrialist a range of various possible sites in Central Scotland 
from which to choose a location suited to his particular needs. Taken 
396. 
together, the Scottish "growth areas" thus were designed to permit 
the attraction of various types of manufacturing industry. Secondly, 
they provided a geographic focus for the effort to stimulate the 
development of the whole region. An important characteristic of 
growth centres is that their development is designed to encourage 
the economic expansion of the broader region within which the centres 
are located. The objective is greater than the expansion of the growth 
centre itself. At the same time, this approach requires the public 
authorities to concentrate the provision of infrastructure and other 
expenditures on the selected growth centres rather than diffusing 
them across a wider area, with the hope of achieving some economies in 
the process. Thirdly, they were designed to serve as centres of 
attraction for migrants from rural areas and other centres within the 
region, some of whom might otherwise emigrate to other regions or 
abroad. In this way they provide a useful means of complementing 
urban and industrial expansion with the adjustment and rationalization 
of economic activity in the rural areas of the region. Fostering such 
a relationship has special significance for the Atlantic Provinces 
where, as Howland has noted, the regional problem is manifested in a 
considerable excess of workers tied to marginal, subsistence operations 
in rural resource sectors. Fourthly, the adoption of a "growth areas" 
approach represented the integration of various strands of social and 
economic policy, as Cameron and Reid have pointed out. In other words, 
the programs and policies pursued by various departments of Scottish 
government were oriented and directed toward the major development 
objective of attracting more industry to Central Scotland. 
It is recommended that a relatively small number of growth 
centres should be selected and designated in the Atlantic Provinces. 
They should then be developed as suitable locations for new 
manufacturing industries to be attracted to the region. Their 
development as growth centres should be on a basis similar to that 
projected in Central Scotland in 1963. I shall elaborate this point 
presently; first, however, it is necessary to consider the characteristics 
which are desirable for Atlantic Provinces' growth centres. 
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The single most important characteristic for such growth 
centres is that they be included in whatever area is declared eligible 
for the industrial incentives to be discussed below. The fact that 
the Halifax, Nova Scotia and Saint John, New Brunswick labour market 
areas were excluded from the federal ADA grants program begun in 1965, 
made it almost impossible for federal and provincial authorities to 
pursue a growth centres' policy in the Atlantic Provinces, for these 
two areas are perhaps the most obvious candidates for selection as 
growth centres in the region. Much the preferred solution to this 
sensitive issue would be to make the entire Atlantic region eligible 
for any federal incentives program, and leave the differentiation of 
certain cities and towns as growth centres to be accomplished in other 
ways. This would also permit the incoming industrialist to make his 
own choice of location within the development region -a desirable 
state of affairs since presumably he knows his requirements best, and 
these are likely to differ somewhat from one firm to another. 
Secondly, the designated growth centres should contain a 
reasonably ample supply of serviced industrial sites. Although the 
industrialist should be left free to choose his own site, a growth 
centres policy does involve an attempt to concentrate new manufacturing 
activity in the selected centres. In this way "economies of agglomeration" 
may be achieved, and local governments will economize on the provision 
of serviced industrial land. As an extension of this need for 
industrial land in growth centres, it may be appropriate to develop a 
number of industrial estates, perhaps equipped with one or two advance 
factories, in the growth centres. 
Another desirable feature of a growth centre is that it should 
have access to a large potential labour supply. This will include 
not only its own residents, but also the population within feasible 
commuting distance of the centre. This criterion implies that cities 
and towns located at central locations on the regions highway system 
have special claims for designation as growth centres. 
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Fourthly, each growth centre should be capable of expanding 
its supply of housing accommodation. This will be particularly important 
if the growth centre's expansion is to offer an effective alternative 
destination for migrants from rural areas in the region who might 
otherwise move to urban centres in other regions. Also, many workers 
may move to an Atlantic Provinces' growth centre who would not 
consider migration to other regions, but would instead remain tied to 
a marginal, subsistence livelihood in farming, fishing, or logging. 
Fifthly, the selected growth centres should possess good road 
and rail access to other regions, as well as easy connections with one 
or more of the region's seaports and airports. This will be an 
especially important consideration for incoming industrial firms which 
export their output to markets outside the region, and those which 
import raw materials and component parts from other regions or abroad. 
Thus the growth centres to be designated should be eligible 
for industrial incentives offered by government, should contain an 
adequate supply of industrial land, should have access to a large 
potential labour supply, should be in a position to increase their 
supply of housing accommodation, and should enjoy advantageous location 
in the region's internal transportation system with good access to 
external markets and supply sources. 
On what basis should growth centres be planned and developed? 
One fairly obvious implication is that each centre should be 
the subject of careful, effective physical planning. A comprehensive 
development plan should be prepared for each city or town selected 
as a growth centre; but such plans must be more than the customary 
result of a "town planning" exercise as understood in Canada. For 
their purpose is not merely to enable the growth and development that 
is expected or forecast, to be'accommodated with the space they need. 
What is required is something that extends far beyond the "zoning" of 
land for housing, industry, commercial and other uses. 
399. 
The purpose of growth centres is to "trigger" economic 
development and growth not only within the boundaries of the designated 
city or town, but also throughout its hinterland. Taken as a group, 
the purpose of the growth centres to be selected for the Atlantic 
Provinces is to spark and encourage the growth of the whole region. 
In this, their most important particular purpose is to serve as 
attraction centres for the new manufacturing industry the regional 
economy requires. Essentially, this means they should be designed 
and developed as a system of centres to promote (and accommodate) 
the necessary expansion of manufacturing activity within the region. 
To make the selected growth centres attractive locations for 
new manufacturing industries will involve a careful review, reappraisal, 
and reorientation of various government programs and policies to serve 
this objective. In this sense the implementation of a growth centres 
policy will involve an integration and coordination of various government 
programs to serve the major objective of developing growth centres 
as locations for new manufacturing activity. This does not rule out 
other objectives for such programs, such as the encouragement of 
resource-based activities in rural areas. Rather it means adding an 
additional dimension to the set of criteria by which each such program 
is aesessed; does it contribute as effectively as possible to the 
development and growth of the regional growth centres? 
In the provision of various types of infrastructure, governments 
should also concentrate their expenditures as much as possible on the 
selected growth centres instead of diffusing them around the region. 
Hospitals, schools and training facilities should be built mainly in 
the growth centres, expenditures of this kind being designed to service 
the population distribution which is projected as a result of pursuing- 
the growth centres approach, rather than the existing population 
distribution. The highway network should be planned and developed 
with the selected growth centres as its most important nuclei, and 
should be designed to facilitate the migration of labour from rural 
areas to the growth centres, the movement of raw materials and other 
components needed by the anticipated new industry, and the outward 
shipment by such industries to their markets. In this connection an 
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important particular requirement is to permit the greatest possible 
access to markets outside the region. Major airports should be sited 
at or near the selected growth centres. The centres should have good 
access to seaports as well, so that their industries can ship their 
finished products to external markets with relative ease. 
Of special importance in a growth centres policy is housing. 
New housing accommodation of various types should be concentrated in 
the growth centres. Moreover, it should be built on a large enough 
scale to accommodate the influx of workers, and trainees, which will 
be required by the new industry to be developed in them. In many 
cases this will mean building houses somewhat in advance of need, 
so that prospective industrialists can be assured of an adequate labour 
supply. This is especially the case in the Atlantic Provinces where 
the existing labour reserves are located in large part in the more 
remote, rural parts of the region. An imaginative housing program 
can help a great deal in fostering the necessary population migration 
within the Atlantic region. 
Concentration of expenditures on infrastructure and other 
social overhead capital, and co-ordination of various government 
programs and policies in support of the development of the selected 
growth centres, is especially necessary in the Atlantic Provinces in 
order to overcome the region's severe locational disadvantages in 
supplying markets in central Canada. The essential problem is to 
select those centres in the region which possess the least 
disadvantages, relative to rival central Canadian locations, to 
overcome or reduce such disadvantages as much as possible, and thus to 
make the selected growth centres as attractive as possible as locations 
for new manufacturing enterprises. What is required is a serious 
commitment to concentrate the industrialization effort on the selected 
growth centres, and the systematic, continuing pursuit of various 
programs and policies co-ordinated to this purpose. The development 
of the growth centres must be seen to be the central, critical aim of 
regional development policy - not just an incidental objective. 
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Even if it is pursued on this basis, a growth centres 
policy by itself is not likely to be sufficient. It will serve to 
create the "external economies" which can be extremely important to new 
manufacturing firms. But more direct assistance to such firms will 
be necessary to attract new industry on the scale required; in this 
regard financial incentives to newly establishing and expanding 
enterprises are relevant. 
Incentives for Industry 
The pursuit of a growth centres policy along the lines 
indicated above is intended, as it were, to prepare the way for 
incoming industry and also to enable existing industry to expand. 
It is an equally important part of the industrialization effort to 
generate a flow of new industry to the Atlantic region, and to stimulate 
by positive means the growth of existing industry. Since the growth 
centres policy is essentially permissive, it must be complemented by 
more direct methods of bringing about industrial expansion of the 
type and scale required. A number of such direct methods may be 
considered: new industries might be established and operated by the 
public authorities themselves; there might be an attempt to identify 
desirable feasible lines of manufacturing activity which could be 
promoted with prospective industrialists as worthy of their attention; 
or, a range of fiscal, and/or financial, inducements could be offered 
by government to interest private entrepreneurs in an Atlantic Provinces 
location. Of these available approaches, perhaps the most acceptable 
in Canadian circumstances is to offer a suitable program of fiscal, 
and/or financial, inducements. 
As noted in Chapter 14, the purpose of such incentives is 
to transfer manufacturing entrepreneurship and manufacturing capital 
from richer regions to the Atlantic Provinces' economy, and in the 
process, increase total output in the interregional economy. A 
related objective is to increase investment in Atlantic Provinces' 
manufacturing by influencing the locational decisions of manufacturers 
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in the rich region, to secure some displacement of their total 
investment towards the Atlantic Provinces. Here the incentives 
program would be directed at manufacturing firms in central Canada. 
Such firms are most likely to be interested in an Atlantic Provinces' 
location for those products for which the Atlantic region market is 
large enough to support a plant of economic size. In some cases 
they might choose an Atlantic Provinces' location as a base from which 
to supply certain foreign markets, e. g., western Europe, more 
economically as a result of closer proximity to ocean shipping services. 
Thus the incentives must be effectively brought to the attention of, 
and made available to, manufacturing firms in central Canada. This 
is an important reason for having such incentives made available by 
the federal government. Those offered by provincial governments 
within the Atlantic region are not likely to be nearly as well known 
to, or have much impact with, manufacturers in Ontario and Quebec. 
A federally-operated scheme of regional industrial development 
incentives also stands a better chance of compensating for the absence 
in Canada of anything like the policy of industrial development. certificates 
administered in the U. K. by the Board of Trade. 
Incentives should be aimed at manufacturers in central Canada 
to encourage them to establish, in the Atlantic Provinces: 
(a) branch plants to supply the Atlantic Provinces' market; and 
(b) plants to supply overseas and other foreign markets. 
There is an even more important need, however, which is related to the 
major policy objective of fostering the interregional transmission of 
growth from central Canada to the Atlantic Provinces. This need is for 
new manufacturing plants which can sell their output in central Canada. 
In this regard two main comments may be made. First, it would be 
desirable to apply a careful selection process to the products 
concerned. The idea would be to identify those items for which demand 
in the rich region is enough to support an economic-size plant in 
the Atlantic region, or likely to reach that level in the near future 
on present growth trends. Another, even more important characteristic, 
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would be a reasonable prospect that production of the product 
concerned would not be undertaken also, or later, within the rich 
region. In other words, the Atlantic Provinces would somehow be 
granted the opportunity to become the supplier of certain selected 
product lines for the whole national market. Certain products at 
present imported into Canada from abroad might satisfy these criteria. 
Secondly, the capital, technology and entrepreneurship needed in such 
cases is more likely to come to the Atlantic Provinces from abroad than 
from the rich region of central Canada. Hence, the industrial 
incentives program should be directed also at manufacturing 
enterprises in foreign countries. British and other western 
European sources might prove especially relevant to such an effort, 
since a number of firms in these countries might well be interested 
in gaining a realtively accessible location as a "beachhead" for 
supplying the Canadian, and possibly the North American, market. 
Therefore, the incentives program should also be made known to 
manufacturing firms in foreign countries,, especially in Europe. This 
is a further reason for having the incentives program operated by 
the federal government. 
Thus, incentives for industrial development in the Atlantic 
Provinces should be made available by the federal government and aimed 
at influencing the locational decisions of manufacturers at present 
located in central Canada and in foreign countries, especially in 
western Europe. It, perhaps, should also be pointed out, in view 
of the shortcomings of the A. D. A. program discussed in Chapter 14, that 
the industrial development incentives should be available for new plants 
and expansions located within the designated growth centres of the 
Atlantic Provinces. In this connection the sensible procedure would 
be to make the incentives available on an equal basis throughout the 
Atlantic region, and to let the industrialist choose his own location. 
The attempt to encourage the concentration of manufacturing industry 
in the selected growth centres could then be pursued by other means 
open to government authorities, along the lines discussed above. But 
the private industrialist's prerogative of deciding where beat he can 
carry on his operations within the region, would be respected. 
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There remains the important consideration of the type of 
incentives to be offered, and the justification for them. 
As to justification, we may begin with the familiar "infant 
industry" argument. According to this line of reasoning, new 
industries are likely to encounter abnormally high costs during the 
first few years after their establishment in anew location. But 
these same industries should be able to operate as efficiently as 
their competitors elsewhere if they can survive the initial settling- 
in period. The policy problem is, therefore, to reduce the firm's 
settling-in costs so that it can successfully survive the initial 
difficult period and attain a state of profitable, efficient operations. 
Thus, the "infant industry" argument supports a policy of temporary, 
initial assistance to a new industry but does not justify permanent, 
continuing subsidy from the public purse. 
The "infant industry" argument would seem to apply in the case 
of new manufacturing plants being established in the Atlantic Provinces. 
The region does not have a manufacturing tradition; consequently, 
many of the "external economies" enjoyed by firms in central Canada, 
are simply not available. For example, the labour supply will be 
neither as concentrated geographically, nor as suited to the needs of 
modern industry. There will, thus, have to be a conscious effort to 
attract large numbers of the rural population at present tied to the 
resource sectors, into those urban locations where new manufacturing 
is to be concentrated. Also, programs of industrial training for these 
workers will be necessary on a more intensive basis than in central 
Canada so that they can be equipped with the skills, aptitudes and 
attitudes required by the newly establishing industries. Some of 
these costs are already borne by the public sector in Canada, e. g., 
manpower training programs. But some others will become part of the 
new plants' operating costs, especially where the technique of "on-the- 
job" training is used. It is important to recognize that costs such 
as these will not have to be borne indefinitely, that after a reasonable 
initial period the new manufacturer will have developed an adequate, 
well-trained labour force. During the training period, however, these 
extra costs would make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for the new 
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plant to compete successfully with other firms located elsewhere. 
The burden which they impose should not have to be borne entirely 
by the newly establishing industry, since the training program involved 
is an essential part of the whole process of long-term regional 
development. 
Other similar types of settling-in costs for the new plant are 
associated with establishing suitable sources of supply for raw 
materials and components, with "running in" its capital equipment 
and machinery and its production process, and with establishing 
the necessary markets for its final products. Of these, marketing 
costs are of special significance, since a key objective in the whole 
regional development effort is to locate plants in the Atlantic 
Provinces which can export their output to central Canada and abroad, 
and thereby contribute to strengthening the region's balance of 
payments. Such marketing costs involve more than just added transport 
costs, and include maintaining adequate product inventories in distant 
market areas so as to assure customers of continuous supplies, 
developing regular contact with important customers there, advertising 
in the distant market, etc. All these items are added costs for the 
firm in a peripheral region, but each is likely to be higher during 
the plant's initial years of operation. Where the plant produces a 
product not available in the rich region from local suppliers, there 
is a reasonable prospect that such costs can be absorbed in the 
selling price. But to the extent that these costs are higher during 
the settling-in period, the new plant will require outside assistance. 
Much attention has been paid in Canada to reducing interregional 
transport costs on a general basis through the public provision of 
transport facilities and such programs as the subsidies paid the 
railways under the Maritime Freight Rates Act, but a better approach 
might well be to reduce the incidence of all types of marketing costs 
by applying direct assistance to those Atlantic Provinces'manufacturing 
firms which sell a significant portion of their output in markets 
outside the region. This principle especially applies to financial 
assistance offered new manufacturing firms in the regions during their 
settling-in period. 
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Thus the "infant industry" argument provides a basis for 
temporarily subsidizing new manufacturing industry in the Atlantic 
Provinces - for reducing the burden of the firm's initial settling-in 
costs. It is one of the reasons for giving financial and/or fiscal 
incentives to assist the establishment and development of new industry. 
This argument by itself, however, would not justify permanent 
subsidization of regional manufacturing industry. 
Yet continuing public assistance may be necessary for some 
time in certain cases, for example, in developing those industries 
which sell their output in extraregional markets. Such assistance 
can be justified on two grounds: 
(a) the growth and development of these "leading", export- 
oriented manufacturing industries will generate 
expansion of output, income and employment throughout 
the regional economy; and 
(b) the cost of such subsidies to production in the long 
run, may well prove less than present expenditures on 
unemployment insurance and other interregional transfer 
payments. 
On an overall regional basis, such subsidization of key manufacturing 
industries should also prove effective over time in enabling the 
Atlantic region to achieve a national standard of consumption and 
welfare on the basis of its own productive efforts. Here again, any 
subsidy paid such "leading" manufacturers should be assessed in 
terms of their overall impact on the entire regional economy, and 
not interpreted simply as specially favoured treatment for the 
particular firms concerned. 
The above comments provide a basis for suggesting the type 
of incentives for industry to be offered in a development program for 
the Atlantic Provinces' economy. 
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It is recommended that, in addition to industrial training 
programs mounted by the public authorities, three main forms of 
assistance should be made available to manufacturing firms 
establishing new plants, or expanding their existing factories, in 
the Atlantic Provinces, as follows: 
(a) To help such firms in overcoming their initial, settling-in 
costs, direct grants towards the cost of new capital 
facilities should be provided. Assistance with capital 
should be the main form of inducement used in the 
development program, and its availability should be 
widely advertised throughout Canada and in western 
Europe and the United States. While the program should 
be based upon some formula, so that its effectiveness 
can be gauged beforehand by prospective industrialists, it 
should also contain a degree of flexibility. In particular, 
it should permit especially generous treatment to be 
afforded those new plants which propose selling a 
significant proportion of their output in markets outside 
the Atlantic region. As Wilson has pointed out, direct 
capital grants possess several advantages over other types 
of financial inducements: their value can be assessed 
beforehand by the prospective industrialist; they help 
during the difficult, settling-in period; and they can be 
used on a selective basis. 
The assistance provided to a firm by capital grants may 
outlast the settling-in period, but will not continue 
indefinitely. For capital facilities eventually wear out; 
if the firm does not prove viable, it will be unable to 
finance the necessary replacements when they are required 
in future. One concession that can usefully be made, 
however, is that recommended by Professor Wilson and 
adopted in the A. D. A. grants program in 1965, namely, the 
grant-assisted firms can be permitted to claim capital 
cost allowances under the Income Tax Act equal to the full 
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original cost of their capital facilities, and not be 
required to deduct the capital grants from the amounts 
they claim as depreciation for income tax purposes. It 
is recommended that this feature of the A. D. A. grants 
program be retained in the capital grants available to new 
manufacturing plants in the Atlantic Provinces. 
(b) As a further inducement to attract new manufacturing 
industry to the region, factory buildings should be 
constructed by the public authorities, sometimes in 
advance of need, and leased or sold to incoming enter- 
prises. There are three main reasons for offering this 
type of assistance to manufacturing investment. First, 
by locating such industrial estates and advance factories 
in the selected growth centres, governments can encourage 
the desired concentrations of industrial activity within 
the region that represent an explicit purpose of the whole 
growth centres policy. Secondly, in this way the 
governments concerned can give a clear, public indication 
of the degree to which they are committed to stimulating 
the accelerated economic development of the Atlantic 
Provinces and its integration within the Canadian economy. 
Thirdly, the availability of factory premises ready for 
early occupancy has been found, in Britain and elsewhere, 
to be one of the most powerful factors affecting location 
decisions by the individual firm. 
(c) Special income tax concessions should also be offered, 
on a selective basis, to take care of two types of 
special case which are not covered by direct grants and 
factory premises constructed with public funds. Some 
newly establishing factories in the Atlantic Provinces 
may be branch plants of profitable concerns already 
located elsewhere in Canada. Such firms may prefer for 
one reason or another to recover the costs of their new 
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branches by retaining a larger share of the profits earned 
elsewhere rather than accept outright grants from the public 
purse. This is a reasonable preference; to accommodate it, 
such firms should be permitted to claim income tax 
concessions "equivalent" to the amount of capital grants 
for which they would otherwise be eligible. Secondly, an 
additional, special tax incentive should be devised for 
those firms which manage to sell a certain proportion of 
their output in markets outside the Atlantic Provinces. 
This inducement should be offered on a continuing basis, 
a sort of permanent subsidy for those firms which constitute 
a part of the region's economic base. But the utilization 
of this form of assistance should be conditional upon 
the firm's success in extraregional markets, and not 
applied generally to all manufacturing firms. Such 
unconditional assistance as the Regional Employment 
Premium recently introduced in the United Kingdom and the 
subsidies paid under the Maritime Freight Rates Act, are 
less desirable than the special tax inducement proposed 
here, because they are simply an indiscriminate, permanent 
subsidy of all regional industry, quite unrelated to the 
underlying objectives of regional development policy. 
Non-Manufacturing Activities 
I have argued above that a regional development program for 
the Atlantic Provinces should concentrate on increasing the size of 
the region's manufacturing sector. It should be emphasized, however, 
that the essential purpose of the regional policy is to expand the 
region's economic base and thus establish a stronger connection with 
richer, faster-growing regions. In this sense the manufacturing 
sector seems to offer the best prospects for achieving such expansion 
of the economic base, mainly because it contains a sizable number of 
industries with strong growth prospects in the North American economy. 
Yet such opportunities for rapid future growth may also exist in other 
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sectors than manufacturing: for example, with increasing affluence 
the greatest increases in demand recently have affected the service- 
producing industries in both Canada and the United States. The 
resulting tendency for services employment to grow faster than 
employment in commodity production, moreover, seems likely to 
continue. Consequently, there may well be significant opportunities 
for a peripheral region like the Atlantic Provinces not only to 
participate in the growth of services output and employment, but 
even to "export" some types of services to other regions. We have 
already noted, in Chapter 10, the importance of Public Administration 
and Defence, Education, and Health Services, in this regard for the 
Atlantic Provinces. It may be that other, service-producing 
activities can be stimulated to occupy similarly basic roles in 
future. 
In this regard two particular types of such service activities 
come to mind. The first consists in the possibility of decentralizing 
some federal government operations to the Atlantic Provinces, in much 
the same way as the Post Office Savings Bank was transferred a few 
years ago from London to Glasgow. The possibility of similarly 
moving existing federal administrative activities from Ottawa to the 
Atlantic Provinces, or of locating new activities in the peripheral 
region, should be kept continuously in mind. Expansion of the 
region's economic base in this way would make a useful contribution 
to Atlantic regional development. 
Secondly, present efforts to promote tourism in the Atlantic 
Provinces should be continued and made as effective as possible. In 
this case a serious limitation, however, is the short duration of the 
summer tourist season. This implies that tourist development and 
promotion, while important, should not be substituted for a more 
frontal assault on the problem of extending the region's economic 
base. In this manufacturing development appears to offer the 
greatest prospects. 
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The Division of Effort in Regional Policy 
(a) The Federal Role 
There is no denying the federal government an important role 
in the effort to accelerate the economic development of Canada's 
Atlantic Region. For one thing, there has been an increasing 
acceptance of direct federal involvement in regional development 
programs in Canada in recent years. Critics of Ottawa's effort 
have pointed to the lack of coordination in various federal programs, 
and sometimes questioned the apparently inadequate formulation of 
objectives for regional policy, but nobody has suggested that Ottawa 
should leave the responsibility for regional development entirely 
to the Provinces. This probably reflects a clear recognition that 
the provincial governments in the low-income regions lack the 
financial resources at present, to undertake regional development 
on the scale required. 
But there is more to it than mere money. The provincial 
governments also lack the ability to influence a number of the 
important variables which influence regional growth. If, as I have 
suggested, the essential problem is to endow the Atlantic Provinces 
with a growth connection with central Canada by transferring some 
manufacturing entrepreneurship, capital and technology from central 
Canada to the Atlantic region, then the development effort must be 
undertaken in such a way that it can influence manufacturing enter- 
prises in central Canada and, indeed, abroad. This means, in 
particular, that the industrial development incentives recommended 
above must be made available by the federal government. Even if 
they could afford them, such incentives offered by the Provinces, are 
not likely to have much impact in industrial board rooms in Ontario 
and Quebec; moreover, they can readily be counteracted by similar 
incentives which might then be offered by the provincial governments 
of the industrialized regions. The only alternative is for the 
federal government, as the representative of a "national interest" 
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which is interpreted to include Atlantic regional development, itself 
to make available capital grants, advance factories, and income tax 
inducements of which Canadian industrial entrepreneurs are certain 
to become aware, and which cannot be cancelled by the actions of 
provincial governments in other regions. Such federally-financed 
and federally-administered industrial inducements would also be 
consistent with the notion that Atlantic regional development had been 
accepted as an explicit objective of national economic policy. 
The central importance of regional industrial expansion to 
the overall development program also implies a need for active 
federal participation in the process of selecting the growth centres 
to be developed in the region. While many of the facilities to be 
constructed in such centres are within the purview of provincial 
governments, nevertheless it must be recognized that the purpose of 
developing the growth centres is thus to stimulate the expansion of 
the regional economy. Therefore, the task of choosing the growth 
centres must be undertaken in a regional context. Federal involvement 
in such a task is made even more necessary by the fact that there are 
four provincial governments in the Atlantic region, each of which is 
likely to display a natural inclination to choose centres for their 
potential impact on provincial, rather than regional, development. 
Left to themselves, it is naturally to be expected that the total 
number of growth centres selected by the provincial governments, would 
probably be greater than would be the case if the selection is made 
in terms of the region as a whole. 
A further, related field of direct federal participation in 
the development program would be in helping finance the buildup of 
infrastructure facilities in the selected growth centres. In general, 
such facilities are the responsibility of the provincial governments 
and every effort should be made by them to concentrate provincial 
expenditures of this kind on the selected growth centres. But a point 
may well be reached where the financing of such expenditures cannot be 
handled, or carried, by the Provinces themselves. If so, because the 
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development of growth centres, is such a critical part of the 
regional development program, the federal government should stand 
prepared to assist the Provinces with financing infrastructure expansion 
in the selected growth centres. 
A number of other federal programs have an important bearing 
on economic development in the Atlantic Provinces. Of these, manpower 
and transportation come most readily to mind. In the course of 
reviewing these and other such federal programs, a continuing effort 
should be made to relate them as much as possible to the regional 
development program. The relevant question to be asked in such cases 
is whether they contribute as effectively as they might to achieving 
the objectives of Atlantic regional development. 
Since an alternative to manufacturing expansion as a means 
of expanding the economic base of the Atlantic regional economy is 
to locate a greater proportion of nation-serving government operations 
in the region, the federal authorities should watch continually for 
opportunities to establish new administrative, scientific or research 
activities in the Atlantic Provinces, or to decentralize existing ones. 
Ottawa's recent record in this respect, it should be noted, is 
reasonably good, as evidenced by the establishment of Camp Gagetown 
and the expansion of Naval activities in Halifax during the 1950's. 
The oceanographic research facilities at Halifax offer another case 
in point. The federal authorities could make a significant direct 
contribution to expanding the region's economic base by further decisions 
of this type. 
Ottawa is perhaps also in the best position to make another, 
more indirect contribution to long term development. The Atlantic 
Provinces are generally considered a major economic region and yet, 
probably because there is no regional government, the framework for 
analyzing the regional problem in aggregate economic terms, for 
deciding upon the major objectives of policy and their relationship 
to other key aggregate variables, and for working out suitable policy 
measures to deal with the problems, is lacking. Each provincial 
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government determines its fiscal and economic policy within the 
framework of the provincial economy to which it is related; the 
result is four sets of provincial policy which are unlikely to add 
up to a proper policy for the region as a whole. The federal government 
similarly lacks a proper analytical framework for devising and 
assessing the programs it undertakes in the Atlantic Provinces. In 
this situation the federal government should take the initiative in 
preparing and developing a macroeconomic model of the regional economy 
which could become a framework for decision-making in the field of 
development policy by both the federal and provincial governments. 
Much of the statistical data and analysis required as a basis for this 
exercise is already available, and the task is by no means insuperable. 
That it has not been accomplished before now is perhaps the most 
serious criticism that can be made of the Atlantic Development Board. 
This important gap in knowledge of the regional economy should not 
go unfilled any longer. 
With such a macroeconomic policy model made available, the 
process of agreeing development objectives and the strategy of policy 
between Ottawa and the four provincial governments could take place 
within a common framework. At least one part of the basis for 
federal-provincial disagreement would have been thereby removed. 
The above suggestions regarding the federal role in Atlantic 
regional development may now be summarized: 
(1) If regional development is considered a legitimate 
objective of national economic policy, it will be up 
to the federal government to represent the national 
interest by actively participating in the regional 
development effort. 
(2) In more practical terms, Ottawa's direct involvement 
is necessary because the provincial governments of this 
low income region lack the financial resources to spark 
415. 
the development effort by themselves. More 
specifically, the federal government should assist 
the Provinces in building infrastructure in the 
"growth centres". 
(3) Moreover, if the effort is to be successful it should 
be recognized that there are certain factors which 
influence the regional economy and may be affected by 
federal policies and programs, but which are quite 
outside the ambit of Provincial policy. A particular 
example here consists of industrial development 
incentives. 
(4) The federal government should participate in the 
process of selecting "growth centres" in the Atlantic 
region. 
(5) As much as possible, other federal programs, including 
transportation and manpower, should be coordinated with 
the regional development effort, and made an integral 
part of it. 
(6) Ottawa should maintain a continuing watch for 
opportunities to locate new federal activities in 
administrative, scientific and research fields, in the 
Atlantic region as a means of directly expanding the 
region's economic base. 
(7) Finally, the federal authorities should take the 
initiative in preparing a macroeconomic model of the 
Atlantic Provinces' economy to be used as a framework 
for analysis and policy-making by both Ottawa and the 
Provinces. 
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(b) Provincial Governments' Responsibilities 
Although it seems necessary that the leadership, 
organizational framework, much of the money, and a number of key 
instruments of development policy must, for various reasons, be 
provided by the national government, it is also true that without 
the active and vigorous support and participation of the four 
provincial governments, the whole regional development effort for 
the Atlantic Provinces is unlikely to succeed. 
The approach recommended above involves the use of (federal) 
financial incentives to attract new industry to certain selected 
"growth centres" in the Atlantic Provinces as a means of expanding 
the region's economic base. The direct financial assistance is to 
be complemented and reinforced by measures to improve the facilities 
which these "growth centres" have to offer incoming industry. Such 
facilities extend to, and include, not only basic capital works such 
as roads, water and sewer services, but also housing accommodation to 
ensure an adequate supply of labour, educational and health services 
including industrial training, and cultural and other amenities. 
Expenditures on these types of capital works and services 
are primarily the responsibility of provincial governments. If the 
facilities are to be expanded on the necessary scale in the selected 
growth centres, it will probably be necessary for the Provinces to 
forego other programs in other localities. Thus one important 
requirement for pursuing this policy is that the Provinces concentrate 
their expenditures of this kind in the selected growth centres. 
Perhaps the most critical need which arises from this situation 
is for the right kind of political leadership. For the deliberate 
discrimination in favour of the "growth centres" will have to be 
explained to the electorate at large. It will thus be up to the 
provincial government members to persuade the people throughout each 
province: 
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(a) that the concentration of infrastructure expenditures 
on the "growth centres" is necessary to attract the 
new industry; 
(b) that such new industry is needed in order to expand 
the region's economic base and thus permit future growth 
and development; and 
(c) that, in time, the expansion of the "growth centres" 
will permit, and contribute to, increases in income 
and economic welfare throughout the region. 
Assuming, however, that the Provinces are willing to adopt a 
"growth centres" approach, its pursuit imposes additional requirements 
on the Provinces. 
For one thing, it is also their responsibility to undertake the 
physical planning of the selected growth centres. This task will be 
more complicated by virtue of the variety of objectives which "growth 
centres" are intended to serve. As already noted, the provision of 
facilities and services on an expanded scale is intended to attract new 
industrial enterprises: that is essential, if the policy is to work 
at all. At the same time, however, the "growth centres" are intended 
to serve as alternative destinations for persons who might otherwise 
migrate out of the region. So some attention must be paid to providing 
the kind of housing and other services which will attract these people. 
Then too an effort should be made to ensure, as far as possible, that 
the industrial expansion in the growth centres does have a stimulating 
effect on other areas and centres within the region. All these tasks, 
in the final analysis, fall to the provincial governments. 
To accomplish them properly, the provincial government should 
coordinate their entire expenditure budget to the "growth centres". 
Each program should be related to the development effort and modified 
sa as to give the maximum possible support to the "growth centres" 
418. 
industrialization policy. Indeed, as the Scottish experience has 
shown, the very essence of the "growth centres" approach is the 
integration and coordination of public expenditures programs to the 
objective of regional growth and development. 
To recapitulate, then, the role of the provincial governments 
in Atlantic regional development is: 
(1) to concentrate their expenditures on economic overhead 
capital required by new industry, and social overhead 
capital as well, on the selected growth centres; 
(2) to persuade their electorates that such a discriminatory 
policy is both necessary, and likely to generate a 
greater degree of regional growth and development; 
(3) to plan the development of the "growth centres" so 
as to provide not only suitable locations for new 
industry, but also attractive destinations for migrants 
from other areas in the region, and to ensure, as much 
as possible, that the expansion of the "growth centres" 
generates expansion in the other areas of the region; and 
(4) to coordinate their entire expenditure program to the 
"growth centres", so as to provide maximum support to 
the regional development effort. 
If such an effort is made, and properly coordinated with the 
type of federal approach recommended above, the Atlantic Provinces 
may yet become integral, "functioning and proud components of the 
Canadian Confederation. 
All of which is respectfully submitted. 
Fredericton, Canada 
January 14,1974. F. T. Walton 
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